NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY WEDNESDAY 12 JANUARY 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000100010192-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 12, 2010
• Sequence Number: 192
• Publication Date: January 12, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
Wednesday,
12 January 1983
CPAS NI X
anuary
281
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Top Secret
El Salvador: Status of Military Dispute . . . . . . . . . . 3
12 January 1983
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EL SALVADOR: Status of Military Dispute
A peaceful resolution of the power struggle between Defense
Minister Garcia and rightist Army Field Commander Ochoa seems
likely--the two may meet today--but militar unitu has been dam-
aged and Garcia's future is in doubt.
Comment: Although many officers sympathize with
Ochoa, even his closest supporters cannot ignore his
serious breach of military discipline. Ochoa thus ap-
pears increasingly likely to relinquish his post and
accept a foreign assignment after some compromise with
Such an arrangement could entail Garcia's retiring
on schedule next month and stepping down as head of the
armed forces. This would save face for both officers and
allow the military to reach consensus on a new leader.
The political battle ultimately is a test between
moderates led by Garcia and hardliners led by Assembly
leader D'Aubuisson. Garcia's departure would be a per-
sonal victory for D'Aubuisson, but it would not enable
his followers to consolidate their power.
Ochoa's rebellion--and subsequent exile--will serve
to weaken the small extremist clique in the military.
The officer corps is likely to choose another pragmatist
as defense minister in an effort to strengthen the unity
DIA does not agree that the present crisis is a
"test between moderates . . . and hardliners." Rather,
it is the result of a number of factors, including mili-
tary politics associated with officer-class affiliation;
a growing feeling within the officer corps that Garcia
has served his time; and a conviction that changes are
necessary both in the military personnel organization and
in the prosecution of the war. The probable outcome will
reinforce the military's tradition of deliberative ne-
gotiated consensus, avoiding extreme positions, and pre-
serving a centrist conservative organization.
12 January 1983
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The Indian Embassy in Moscow reports the Indian
Government may be leaning toward accepting a Soviet offer
to build nuclear power plants in India. The Soviets re-
portedly have agreed to accept payment in rupees, which
makes the offer much more attractive. During Prime
Minister Gandhi's trip to Moscow in September, the Soviets
were asked to consider providing three or four small
power reactors rather than the 1,000 megawatt reactor
they have been trying to sell India for several years.
Most of the scientific community in India, however, is
still opposed to importing reactor technology.
Comment: New Delhi's counteroffer and possible
interest in Soviet technology probably reflect in part
its embarrassment over the failures of the domestic
power program, which is largely based on Indian copies
of Canadian-designed heavy water reactors. India is
likely to postpone a decision on the Soviet offer because
the government has tried to keep foreign involvement, in-
cluding safeguards, in its nuclear program to a minimum.
In addition, the money and prestige put into the program
and the confidence of Indian scientists that they can
solve the problems plaguing heavy water production facil-
ities make any foreign reactor deal unlikely in the near
future.
12 January 1983
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