NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY FRIDAY 21 JANUARY 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000100010161-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 12, 2010
• Sequence Number: 161
• Publication Date: January 21, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85T01094R000100010161-7 25X1
Director of 11)I.L_
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
Friday
21 January 1983
secret
CPAS NID 83-018JX
anuary
281
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85T01094R000100010161-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85T01094R000100010161-7
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85T01094R000100010161-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85T01094R000100010161-7
Japan-US: Reactions to Nakasone's Visit . . . . . . . . . 2
China-Taiwan: Dispute Over ADB Membership . . . . . . . . 4
South America: Debt Problems Spreading . . . . . . . . . . 5
USSR: Efforts To Improve Propaganda . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Poland: Solidarity Leaders Speak Out . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Pakistan-Afghanistan-Iran: UN Mediator's Trip .
USSR-Syria-Israel: The SA-5 Issue . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
21 January 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85T01094R000100010161-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85T01094R000100010161-7
Iq
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85T01094R000100010161-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85T01094R000100010161-7
Japanese reactions to Prime Minister Nakasone's Washington
visit have been generally positive, although the opposition parties
have criticized his pledge to increase defense cooperation with
the US.
IThe extensive Japanese press coverage
of the trip has focused on the two leaders' reaffirmation
of the US-Japanese alliance, their establishment of a
personal relationship, and their agreement on broad
issues. Liberal Democratic Party members and Japanese
business leaders have told reporters the talks were a
step toward strengthening bilateral realtions, although
party leaders realize more has to be done on trade and
defense.
According to the press, the Japanese were re-
lieved that the Prime Minister was able to hold his
ground on the beef and citrus issues. On defense, the
Japanese Communists and Socialists have warned that Japan
may become entangled in the US world military strategy.
Comment: Nakasone's pledge for further coooperation
with the US on defense will be the subject of intense
debate when the Diet convenes on Monday. If the opposi-
tion uses this issue to disrupt the Diet's activity over
an extended period, Nakasone may dissolve the lower house
and call for general elections. His popularity is rising,
and he may hope to use this and his successful foreign
policy initiatives over the past month to his party's
advantage at the polls.
In the coming weeks the Japanese will try to de-
termine the effect of the visit on bilateral ties and on
Japan's foreign relations in general.
The Japanese also will be watching
for indications of how much time they have to make
further progress on trade and defense and probably will
use Secretary of State Shultz's visit at the end of
the month as one gauge.
21 January 1983
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85T01094R000100010161-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85T01094R000100010161-7
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85T01094R000100010161-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85T01094R000100010161-7
CHINA-TAIWAN: Dispute Over ADB Membership
Chinese officials have told the US and other members of the
Asian Development Bank that Taiwan has to be expelled from the bank
before China will join, but Taipei for the first time appears to be
trying to remain a member o an international financial organiza tiori
even if China joins.
Chinese officials have privately lobbied other bank
members since last November and have indicated China
would withhold a formal request for admission until the
Taiwan question was resolved by all the members. Yester-
day, however, Chinese diplomats reiterated
that Taiwan has to be expelled.
Comment: Beijing's effort to join the bank could
irritate smaller, less developed members, especially if
China followed India's recent lead and requested large
loans. Thus far, Beijing seems unwilling to guarantee
that it will restrict its borrowing but has promised to
consider the interests of the other borrowers.
Japan and most other members have indicated they
will support China's request for admission when it is
submitted, but they appear to be awaiting a US decision
on the question of Taiwan's seat. Despite Taipei's
unprecedented effort to appear forthcoming on dual repre-
sentation in the bank, Beijing has consistently rejected
such a solution. It is unlikely to alter its view in
this case.
4 21 January 1983
25X1
^
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85T01094R000100010161-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85T01094R000100010161-7
South American Debtors, 1982
Amount
(billion US $)
Estimated
US Bank Share
(percent)
Brazil
25
Argentina
40
20
Venezuela
35
30
Chile
16
38
Peru
13
Colombia
9
33
Others a
12
30
South America
210
25
a Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85T01094R000100010161-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85T01094R000100010161-7
SOUTH AMERICA: Debt Problems Spreading
The foreign debt problems of South American countries are
becoming worse, with Brazil's cash crisis still acute, Chile fae nn
a cutoff in credit, and Venezuela encountering new difficulties in
refinancing its debts.
Comment: South American debtors will have diffi-
culty servicing their foreign debts, totaling some
$210 billion, because export earnings are falling short
of repayment requirements. The confidence of bankers
is fragile and often tends to waver. Each additional
debt problem increases the likelihood that credit to
the region will be cut back.
The recent intervention by the Chilean Government
in banking operations has intensified bankers' wariness
of doing business in Chile. More cutbacks in lending
are likely, increasing the chances a rescheduling will
be required. Venezuela, which also is encountering
difficulties in restructuring its maturing debts, could
soon face a foreign exchange crisis.
Argentina has nearly completed arrangements to
meet its basic financial needs this year, but it would
be in serious trouble if there is another international
shortage of credit. It may encounter delays in securing
the $1.5 billion unified credit being organized by a
large number of banks. Smaller US banks, increasingly
concerned about political developments, may be unwilling
Private banks may again be called on to provide a
quick infusion of cash to avert a financial crisis in
one or another of these nations. Even so, cutbacks in
imports and tighter exchange controls among South American
countries will slow the recovery of many others from the
global recession and hamper the repatriation of profits.
At worst, South American borrowers may suspend repayments
and resort to other extreme actions to alleviate financial
problems, but at the expense of regaining the confidence
21 January 193
25X1
I
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85T01094R000100010161-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85T01094R000100010161-7
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85T01094R000100010161-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85T01094R000100010161-7
USSR: Efforts To Improve Propaganda
The Leadership evidently is planning to reorganize the propa-
ganda apparatus as part of a broad effort to have more impact on
foreign and domestic audiences.
Since General Secretary Andropov took office, new
chiefs have been appointed to head the Central Committee's
Propaganda Department, the State Committee for Publishing,
and the Komsomol youth organization.
the First Deputy Chief of the International
Information Department has been moved to a job with
Izvestiya, that his superior also will be reassigned, and
that the department may be abolished. Changes also are
rumored that would affect several important newspapers,
the management of Soviet radio and television, the Central
Committee's Department of Science and Education, and the
social sciences sector of the Academy of Sciences.
An editorial in Pravda on Tuesday called on Soviet
newspapers to eliminate boring articles, to print more
pieces written by workers, and to provide more factual
information on the day-to-day activity of party and
other official organizations.
Comment: The campaign is intended primarily to make
propaganda directed at both foreign and domestic audiences
more effective. The overhaul of the propaganda machinery
also increases Andropov's control over this segment of
the party apparatus. At the same time, by subjecting the
work of lower level officials to closer public scrutiny,
the regime is, increasing pressure on them to improve their
performance.
21 January 1993
25X1
25X1
25X1
^
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85T01094R000100010161-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85T01094R000100010161-7
Iq
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85T01094R000100010161-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85T01094R000100010161-7
POLAND: Solidarity Leaders Speak Out
Solidarity leader Walesa and 13 of his colleagues
jointly appealed yesterday for the release of the seven
union leaders who were arrested in December for trying
to overthrow the government. The appeal urges public sup-
port for an amnesty of all political prisoners, an end to
reprisals against former internees, and stricter observance
of workers' rights. The statement was given to Wei
journalists to ensure widespread distribution.
Comment: The appeal is the first such joint action
by the former union leaders and indicates they have estab-
lished enough contact to allow some discussion of tactics.
Walesa's signature suggests he has decided to approach
the regime more boldly, perhaps disregarding the advice
of some of his cautious advisers. Although the authori-
ties may not take immediate steps to retaliate directly
against the union leaders, they could look for additional
ways to intimidate Western journalists who are conveying
their message.
PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN-IRAN: UN Mediator's Trip
UN Special Representative Cordovez today begins
another series of visits to Islamabad, Kabul, and Tehran
for discussions of the Afghanistan problem. The US Mission
at the UN reports Cordovez will seek Pakistani concessions
on aid to the insurgents and on direct negotiations with
the Afghans. An aide to Cordovez has told the US Embassy
in Islamabad that the representative may for the first
time establish contacts with "refugee" leaders in Pakistan.
In Kabul, Cordovez will sound out Soviet and Afghan offi-
cials on an eventual timetable for the withdrawal of Soviet
troops. He also will try to develop further dialogue with
Iran, which is becoming more interested in UN support for
its Afghan refugees.
Comment: Cordovez presumably does not expect to
secure major Pakistani and Soviet concessions on this
trip. He probably hopes nevertheless that the tour will
give new momentum to the UN mediation effort, particularly
if he does meet with Afghan insurgent leaders in Pakistan.
Cordovez had been reluctant to contact them there before
because of the USSR's opposition to including them in the
negotiations.
21 January 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85T01094R000100010161-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85T01094R000100010161-7
Lebanon's central bank has told President Jumayyil
it will not lend his government foreign exchange funds
for reconstruction until the cash-starved treasury can
assure steady collection of tax revenues, according to
press reports. Customs duties, Beirut's main source of
income, dropped last year to just $106 million--barely
half of the total in 1980. The Lebanese Forces, a
powerful Christian militia, has refused to turn over
control of several lucrative illegal ports to the
central government.
Comment: This rebuff to Jumayyil from the central
bank probably precludes a major government-financed
reconstruction program. Banking officials reportedly
are worried about maintaining the value of the Lebanese
pound and are reluctant to add the government's substan-
tial debt as long as Beirut's ability to collect taxes
is so limited. The Arab states of the Persian Gulf are
unlikely to aid Jumayyil while Israeli forces remain in
Lebanon or if he goes too far in normalizing relations
with Israel. The World Bank also has been reluctant to
provide reconstruction loans.
21 January 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85T01094R000100010161-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85T01094R000100010161-7
Special Analysis
lil: .` slots S!Y'ZCZY s~ and Israelis all have high t'OGLLL aL
os in trio oontrovers'j over tale introduction of Soviet SA-v
str~?il~~~rl~')l
~4Cr;zoc-to-air mossole units into Sgria. Moscow wants to
as a i orc(' to be reckoned with Zn t lee Mod l o Soo t
at r
a to L o US L'i acE initiatives. Tel Aviv voews to Zr,
lc comet tenant to Sgria as a threat to Israel's freedom of
and an incentive to Skrian President Assad--whose parr; a In i ~l,
Loll as boon strengthened--to pursue more laws esil po l c Zc's.
/; ; `Z, o itl al considerations and the impact on US r Lat LL'Yls~
%u :'cr, ?.YLGI tronglg influence an,j Israeli decision on ~l tlloY
oh a str
The USSR's move evidently is designed to reverse
the setbacks it suffered as a result of Israel's inva-
sion of Lebanon. It appears aimed at reestablishing a
Soviet position of influence in the region, countering
the US military presence there, thwarting Washington's
current dominance of the peace process, and restoring
the reputation of Soviet arms.
By introducing the SA-5s, the Soviets probably
intend to send a message to the countries of the region
and to the US. To the Syrians and other Arabs, it is
an affirmation that the USSR is a reliable counterweight
to Israel and the US and is determined to strengthen
Arab military capabilities. To the Israelis, it is a
warning that they can no longer attack a Soviet ally in
the Middle East with impunity, and to the US an admoni-
tion to rein in Israel.
The USSR probably sees its greater military involve-
ment in Syria as a counter to US peacekeeping contingents
in Lebanon and the Sinai Peninsula, which it views as
bridgeheads for US military intervention throughout the
Middle East. The Soviets are likely to hope their move
will contribute to tensions in the region, thereby hin-
dering US-sponsored Lebanese and Arab-Israeli peace
settlements. Moscow also may calculate its increased
backing for Syria will make Jordan's King Hussein and
PLO chief Arafat think twice about pursuing the US peace
formula.
21 January 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85T01094R000100010161-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85T01094R000100010161-7
The Soviets may believe
that the Israelis will not attack the sites.
They could not have embarked upon the project, however,
without taking into account a substantial risk of such
an attack. They probably are prepared to respond to a
successful strike by reestablishing the SA-5 complexes,
by strengthening surface-to-air missile defenses around
them, and perhaps by dispatching fighter aircraft units
to fly combat air patrols.
Even these augmented defenses would be unlikely to
prevent determined Israeli follow-on strikes. The Soviets
might calculate, however, that Israel would be unwilling
to continue indefinitely paying the increasingly high mil-
itary and political price of repeated attacks.
At the same time, there is at least an even chance
Moscow would go beyond these steps in response to a
successful Israeli strike. The Soviets might assume a
more direct role in running the entire Syrian defense
network, as they did in Egypt in 1970. This action
probably would involve the deployment of a much greater
21 January 19-83
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85T01094R000100010161-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85T01094R000100010161-7
Defense Minister
Sharon and the military at some point probably will urge
a strike if there is a sharp increase in the level of
tension between Israel and Syria. There would be some
advantages in attacking in the next few weeks, after
most of the equipment is in place but before the sites
are operational.
There almost certainly would be substantial opposi-
tion to such a move in the cabinet, however, with many
ministers seeing little popular support for the kind of
all-out conflict that could follow. They also are wary
of new strains with the US. A decision to launch an
attack, moreover, probably would be made only after
securing opposition support in the Knesset's Defense
and Foreign Affairs Committee.
On balance, these factors make an immediate strike
doubtful. Over the longer run, however, recurring crises
and the persistent threat to Israeli freedom of action
in periods of tension are likely to tip the scales in
favor of an attack.
Before approving a strike, Prime Minister Begin
would weigh carefully the political considerations, par-
ticularly the possibility of new strains with the US.
He would explore other alternatives, including some form
of tacit agreement with Syria on ground rules for employ-
ing the system.
The Israeli military, however, would almost certainly
insist on including suppression of the SA-5s in any con-
tingency plans for major hostilities with Syria--whether
in Lebanon or Syria itself. It would argue it cannot
rely on tacit understandings about the rules of engage-
ment because the Israelis believe the Soviets would use
the missiles over Lebanon if Syria insisted its security
was at stake.
Implications for US-Israeli Relations
The Israelis, in stressing to US officials that the
missile deployment has to be seen primarily as a Soviet
challenge to US interests in the region, probably are
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85T01094R000100010161-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85T01094R000100010161-7
motivated in part by their interest in getting the US
to shelve the peace process and focus instead on the
Soviet threat. Trhe_,~__may hope a closer military relation-
ship with the US
would undercut Washington'
relations with the moderate Arabs.
Israel also may adopt an even tougher negotiating
position on Lebanon. It may insist that the deployment
of the SA-5s makes it all the more imperative that it
receives ironclad security arrangements that include
early warning stations in southern Lebanon.
Syrian Attitudes
Syria's confidence in its air defense network was
shattered by the experience during the war in Lebanon
but will be restored by the SA-5s. At this point, Assad
will be likely to view his military position in Lebanon
as less precarious.
The SA-5 itself, however, is only one of many fac-
tors that Assad would consider in determining whether he
would order his troops out of Lebanon. Syria's current
overall military readiness to confront Israel would be a
more important factor for Assad to consider. Even with
the SA-5 system, Damascus still has a long way to go in
improving its overall force structure before it gains
the confidence to undertake a major military gamble to
achieve political ends.
The Syrians have long sought stronger Soviet backing
to help offset US support of Israel, and Syrian foreign
policy positions at least in the near term are likely to
reflect closer cooperation with the USSR. Assad and
many of his supporters in the Army have been wary, how-
ever, of an extensive Soviet military presence and have
been unwilling to give Moscow a veto over their military
or foreign policy. This is unlikely to change, but the
greater Soviet involvement in Syrian defenses could
become a point of friction--as it was with Egypt in the
early 1970s.
21 January 1983
25X6
25X6
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85T01094R000100010161-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85T01094R000100010161-7
Top secret
Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/08: CIA-RDP85T01094R000100010161-7