NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY WEDNESDAY 9 FEBRUARY 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000100010097-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 19, 2012
• Sequence Number: 97
• Publication Date: February 9, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
Wednesday
9 February 1983
~e ruary 1 83
~y ~ B t
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Israel: Cabinet Debates Commission Report 1
Iran-Iraq: MiZitar~ and Diplomatic Moves 2
El Salvador: Maneuvering in the MiZitarg 3
USSR - East Germany: Support for MiZitar~ Traffic .
Sudan: Official Debt Rescheduled
5
Warsaw Pact: Soviet Inspections of Polish Units
6
India: Opposition in Disarray
7
Special Analyses
USSR - The Koreas: Changing Soviet ReZatio~zs
Saudi Arabia - Lebanon: Riyadh's Concerns 11
9 February 1983
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ISRAEL: Cabinet Debates Commission Report
Fri-me Minister Begin 's cabinet is having difficu?tz~ a;;rcr~~;n,r
cra its reaction to the in~uirz~ commission's recommendat~i.on that
D~~'ense Minister Sharon resign or be fired.
The cabinet's failure to reach a decision yesterday
reportedly resulted from a struggle between pro- and
anti-Sharon factions in the governing coalition. Accord-
ing to press accounts, the coalition's ultraorthodox
Agudat Israel and the far-right Tehiyya party support
Sharon, while the National Religious Party and the
Likud's Liberal Party faction have demanded his ouster.
The cabinet will meet again today to discuss the
issue. The opposition Labor Party, meanwhile, is demand-
ing that the government adopt the commission's recom-
mendations in full.
Comment: Begin probably would like to see Sharon
step down but is reluctant to take the lead in removing
him. The Prime Minister appears to be coordinating
cabinet pressure to convince Sharon that he has no choice
but to leave. Begin has made no effort to support Sharon
publicly, and the public call yesterday by a high-level
official of the National Religious Party for Sharon's
resignation will add to the pressure on the Defense
Without support from Begin, Sharon's position is
weak. Even so, he clearly is reluctant to leave and
apparently is trying to rally rightwing support for
his position.
If Begin cannot persuade Sharon to resign, he may
try to get the coalition to agree to hold new elections
to end the controversy. He would have difficulty, how-
ever, convincing some of the smaller member parties to
go along. Recent polls have indicated that these z~arties
would do poorly if a new vote were held now.
Labor party leaders probably hope that disputes
within the coalition become so bitter that some members
decide to desert Begin and join Labor in forming a new
government without elections.
Top Secret
9 February 1983
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IRAN-IRAQ: Military and Diplomatic Moves
Iran's new o ~'fensive and tougher conditions for ~~e~u~e h~rv~:
r-Iraq to intensifz~ its search for diplomatic suppor'.
Tehran has reverted to its sternest conditions for
ending the war. Assembly Speaker Rafsanjani--Ayatollah
Khomeini's representative on the Supreme Defense Council--
has renewed the demand for the overthrow of Iraqi President
Saddam Hussein, and Iranian radiobroadcasts have repeatedly
called on Iraqi soldiers to revolt. The regime has warned
its domestic audience to expect a major battle.
Baghdad, meanwhile, has launched a diplomatic campaign.
The Iraqi Foreign Ministry has called in ambassadors from
countries on the UN Security Council and representatives
from the Nonaligned Movement, the Islamic Conference, and
the Arab League to urge sanctions against Iran similar
to those applied during the hostage crisis.
Iraq's diplomatic moves are unlikely to gain it
greater support.
9 February 1983
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El SALVADOR: Maneuvering in the Military
DefeYZSe Minister Garcia has moved loyalists zn the miZitar~~
to ke~~ posts to shore up his faltering support, but his actions
ire likely to precipitate renewed efforts to unseat him.
Comment: Garcia probably will resign if a majority
of officers and President Magana ask him to do so, but
he apparently wants to retain his post at least for the
Nevertheless, Garcia's opponents--including Air
Force Commander Bustillo and lst Brigade leader Colonel
Blandon--could see Garcia's tactics as a signal that he
plans to renege on his promise to step down soon.
9 February 1983
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Norway
me unites states cn~ernmern nae not renn9ni~ed
the incorporation of Estonia, Letvie. and Lithuania
into the Soviet Union. Other boundary representation
is not necessarily eu thoritative.
$iOVI@t
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USSR - EAST GERMANY: Support For Military Traffic
1Jy~~ ~ ~?~l;'' ~ ?12 '.~, ~ Q ~,CXY'c~e, ''F'1'Y'7J, Q12ii Y'ti2 ~ ~,Y'C~J?.
~ ..~ ~1:, ~ t.'~. ;12Y'I?lCX1'i'/ Qi~Y'OcS ~;Yle' [7
The ferry system will connect Klaipeda in the USSR
aria Sassnitz in East Germany. It is scheduled for com-
pletion in 1986 and will have six 11,700-ton ships to
carry loaded rail cars. The ferries reportedly will
handle up to ono-third of the commercial traffic between
East Germany and the USSR and will allow the East. Germans
t.~ avoid dela~~s and transit fees encountered when their
a~:~~ds move through Poland.
Corrunent: The ferries also will give the Soviets
another way to move reinforcements from the USSR to
Central Europe before hostilities. Most Soviet units
designated for reinforcement--more than 25 divisions
with accompanying support units and supplies--are pres-
entl or aniz to move by rail through Poland.
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The Sassnitz ferries will be able to supplement but
not replace the overland routes. For example, the num-
ber of troops they could transport to East Germany in a
day would comprise less than half of one division
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.
A similar ferry at Ilichevsk, on the Black Sea, was
used by the Soviets last fall during Shield 82 to carry
military equipment to Bulgaria. The route enabled them
to avoid longstanding Romanian restrictions on overland
transit of military units. Construction of the Baltic
ferry system parallels other improvements in the USSR's
regional military sealift capabilities usina m~dPrn roll-
on and roll-off ship technology.
Despite Soviet concerns about the reliability of the
routes through Poland, Moscow continues to urge the Poles
to improve transportation facilities which would be used
by Soviet reinforcements. Meanwhile, the USSR is con-
tinuing to work on a broad gauge rail line through Poland
that could be used for military traffic but which would
still require facilities to transfer shi men ~ rope's
riarr_ow gauge lines.
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Western governments to which Sudan will owe some
$500 million in payments and overdue debts this year have
agreed to a generous rescheduling program. The terms
established at a meeting in Paris last week call for a
16-year repayment schedule, with a six-year grace period
during which only 50 percent of the interest due is to
be paid. The remainder of the interest due is to be
added to the rescheduled debt. Sudanese payments to the
Western governments this year are to total only $20 million,
which the IMF believes is all that President Nimeiri's
financially strapped regime can handle.
Comment: Khartoum, with the IMF's help, will now
try to reschedule $1 billion in payments and overdue
debts for this year that it owes to Arab oil-producing
states, as well as $1.2 billion owed to commercial
creditors.
9 February 1983
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WARSAW PACT: Soviet Inspections of Polish Units
Several Soviet generals recently inspected the status
of training, including political and ideological work, in
unidentified Polish units, according to the US military
attache in Warsaw and a Polish militar news aper. The
attache reported that the Soviets
were paying special attention to political training to
judge how effectively young soldiers' attitudes tower
Solidarity had been counteracted in recent months.
Comment: The inspections could be used to evaluate
the ability of units to fulfill their general combat
obligations to the Pact and to gauge the political atti-
tudes of new soldiers. During the past several years,
the Soviets have administered extensive general readiness
inspections to non-Soviet units committed to the Combined
Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact. General readiness
evaluations also focus on combat skills and unit admin-
istrative procedures.
9 February 1983
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INDIA: Opposition in Disarray
Prime Minister Gandhi's clear victory in _~unicipal
elections in the Delhi area last weekend is r-.c~re a measure
of the disarray among opposition parties than the popu-
larity of her Congress Party. According to the US Embassy,
Congress candidates won a large number of seats by slim
margins and profited in many constituencies from the
inability of the opposition parties to submit unified
slates. The leader of the major opposition party has
taken personal responsibility for his party's complacency
and organizational weakness and has resigned.
Comment: The victory in the Delhi area will improve
the morale of Gandhi's party after its recent election
losses in southern India. The results, however, do not
necessarily point to successes for Gandhi in elections to
be held in two northeastern states later this month.
Government corruption and maladministration were not the
key issues in the Delhi area, as they are in the larger
states. Moreover, Gandhi has cultivated voters in the
capital wi lavish overnment s ending on public works
projects.
9 February 1983
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Special Analysis
USSR - THE KOREAS: Changing Soviet Relations
The USSR is respond2ng to political and economic changes on
the Korean peninsula by opening a dialogue raith South Korea z~hiZe
aZZozving relations z~ith North Korea to remain cool. South Korea's
economic success--which makes it a potentially valuable trading
partner--and its gro~a2ng international stature have attracted Soviet
interest. The Soviets, hotaever, do not z~ant the many tensions in
their relationship z~ith Pyongyang to Zead to an open break. Unless
North Korea adopts markedly different oZicies these trends in
Soviet policy are ZikeZy to continue.
Moscow, after ignoring persistent efforts by Seoul
to interest it in economic and political ties, recently
initiated an indirect dialogue through South Korean pro-
fessors, scientists, athletes, and middle-level officials.
The first Soviet officials to visit Seoul were three TASS
representatives and a middle-level cultural official who
attended international conferences there last October.
The Soviets are sounding out the South Koreans on
regular direct trade and development cooperation.
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9 February 1983
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Relations between Moscow and Pyongyang have cooled
during the past two years. Late last year North Korean
President Kim Il-song, in answering questions from the
Japanese press, reprimanded Moscow for the Soviet visits
to Seoul, and he also indicated that his country's rela-
tions with China were better than those with the USSR.
Moscow, meanwhile, has shown displeasure with Kim's moves
to make his son his successor and with P'yongyang's fail-
ure to meet its trade and payment agreements with the
USSR.
The Soviets probably are also irritated over im-
provements last ear in ties between North Korea and
China.
Kim's visit to China in
ep e er are, i ~~been particularly disturbing
to the USSR.
The USSR continues to provide Pyongyang with es-
sential economic aid, however, even though North Korea
has not always fulfilled its trade plans. Moscow prob-
ably calculates that the imposition of major trade
restrictions might only drive Kim closer to the Chinese.
The Soviets are likely to welcome North Korea's
sale of arms to Iran, because this earns Pyongyang
badly needed foreign exchange or oil supplies and
makes Tehran more dependent on Soviet-designed weapons.
The USSR is unwilling to supply North Korea with advanced
armaments, however, because ~ r h mi ht be used
to start a new Korean war.
Prospects
The change of Soviet leadership does not seem for
now to have affected relations with the two Koreas. The
positive tone of recent messages between Kim and General
Secretary Andropov, however, suggests that both hope for
better relations.
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9 Fe ruary 19 3
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The Soviets are unlikely to provoke a break with
Pyongyang. They will continue to provide economic
assistance and technological aid to North Korea's mili-
tary industry and probably will reluctantly accept Kim's
son. These policies are aimed at maintaining Soviet
influence there.
Unless Pyongyang adopts more pro-Soviet policies,
the USSR probably will seek greater economic and polit-
ical access to South Korea. Indirect and unofficial
contacts are likely to increase, and Moscow will prob-
ably look for a formula that permits direct official
contacts in the absence of diplomatic recognition.
In addition, the Soviets are likely to offer limited
opportunities for South Korea's recession-troubled export
industries. At the same time, Moscow probably recognizes
that it has little chance of loosening Seoul's military
dependence on the US.
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Special Analysis
SAUDI ARABIA - LEBANON: Riyadh's Concerns
Saudi leaders are worried that Lebanese President JumayyiZ raiZZ
accommodate Israel's demands for normalized relations as the price
for its ~ithdrawaZ from Lebanon. If he does so, the Saudis probably
r~iZZ agree to any Arab consensus to isolate JumayyiZ and ~aithhoZd
economic aid from his country.
The Saudis believe that Jumayyil cannot establish
his authority until all foreign forces withdraw from
Lebanon. They also fear that a protracted impasse over
troop withdrawal would undermine the US peace initiative.
As a result, King Fahd has worked hard to secure what
he considers to be firm commitments from both Syrian
President Assad and PLO leader Arafat to withdraw Syrian
and Palestinian forces.
In return, Fahd expects the US to press Israel to
soften its conditions for withdrawal. He has made clear
that Israeli demands for normal relations with Lebanon
are unacceptable--particularly the concept of "open bor-
Fahd worries that any major Lebanese concessions
would weaken Jumayyil's position and increase the chances
of renewed civil war. Furthermore, the King believes
that such concessions would scuttle Saudi efforts to
obtain the withdrawal of Syrian and Palestinian forces
and lead to a radical Arab backlash that would shatter
the moderate Arab consensus he has tried to build.
9 February 1983
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In addition, Fahd fears a potential domestic back-
lash. Israel's invasion of Lebanon last summer and the
massacres in Beirut spawned severe public criticism of
the royal family, and of the. King in particular, over
Saudi ties to the US. He would again become the target
of criticism--even within the royal family--if the US
were viewed as allowing Israel to impose on Lebanon a
one-sided settlement.
He is un i e y, owever, o expen a i iona
political capital with the Syrians and the PLO if he
believes that the US is unable to temper Israeli condi-
tions for withdrawal.
If an Arab consensus to isolate Lebanon developed, the
Saudis would go along to avoid Arab criticism. At a
minimum, they probably would withhold economic aid and
might go so far as to impose trade sanctions.
Israeli gains in Lebanon also would diminish Saudi
confidence in the ability of the US to obtain concessions
from Tel Aviv on the West Bank and Gaza. As a result,
Fahd probably would be less willing to push the PLO
to give Jordan's King Hussein its proxy in negotiations
with Israel.
9 February 1983
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