NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY FRIDAY 11 FEBRUARY 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000100010089-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 17, 2010
• Sequence Number: 89
• Publication Date: February 11, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of oP
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence. Daily
Friday
11 February 1983
281
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CIA Late Item
ISRAEL: Defense Minister Resigns
e eYise 11 stet .;haron'S res anat2on--eJJe_'i-l Se ncSa --/as
nS ' t t :: ?r red ; to threat to the Begin government, the
tronerS'i ooer th Znc7 ir? (?onrm-'ssion report is iihe',~ `o
Comment: Sharon's decision will remove much of the
pressure on the government generated by the report, but
there will be a Knesset debate on it next week. More-
over, rightwing members of the governing coalition--
particularly the ultraconservative Tehiyya Party, which
has three seats in the Knesset--are likely to be unhappy
with Begin's,handling of the affair and could leave his
government.
Begin also must choose a successor to Sharon. Early
speculation has focused on Ambassador to the US Arens,
although Begin may keep the portfolio for himself. Some
members of Begin's party are urging that former Defense
Minister Weizman be named, but this seems unlikely,
given Begin's dislike of Weizman.
Sharon's departure should make the government's
negotiating position on Lebanon somewhat more flexible,
although Begin is unlikely to drop his demands for major
security and political concessions by the Lebanese. The
resignation will do little to change opposition in Tel
Aviv to the US peace plan. Indeed, Begin could seek to
get back in the good graces of the right wing by author-
izing major new settlement activity.
11 Fe hruary 1083
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Top Secret
Hungary: Political Trial Balloons . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
USSR: Increase in Industrial Growth . . . . . . . . . . . 7
North Yemen - Saudi Arabia: President's Visit . . . . . . 7
Canada-US: Weapons Testing Agreement Signed . . . . . . . 8
Special Analyses
USSR: Conflict in the Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Norway-US: Visit of Prime Minister WiZZoch . . . . . . . 13
11 February 1983
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Recent calls by officials for political reform and a more
flexible foreign policy probably are intended to test Soviet and
domestic reaction.
A member of the Central Committee, in an interview
last month in the government newspaper, urged that the
parliament be given some control over day-to-day opera-
tions of the state administration and that it participate
in policy formulation. He said a proposal for multiple
candidates for seats in parliament--already approved by
the Central Committee--will not make much difference
because the parliament is largely a rubberstamp. He
appealed for greater tolerance of divergent views in the
media and in government councils.
A senior official responsible for international
affairs recently suggested publicly that Hungary serve
as a bridge for the exchange of ideas between East and
West. He stressed Hungarian foreign policy is not
identical with Soviet policy, and he said Hungary wants
to continue to expand ties with the US. Other officials
have indicated Hungary would like to help develop common
European positions that could influence both the US and
the USSR.
Comment: The regime's consideration of these unor-
thodox views suggests a growing sense of self-confidence
and commitment to reform, even at a time of stringent
economic measures and tighter controls over dissidents.
The Hungarians may believe General Secretary Andropov
is more receptive to innovation and sympathetic to the
leadership.
11 February 19-83
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USSR: Increase in Industrial Growth
A speech by Economic Planning Chairman Baybakov to
the Council of Ministers on Wednesday indicates that
during January industrial output grew at an annual rate
of about 5 percent over January 1982.
Comment: The comparison with January 1982 is some-
what misleading because that was a particularly poor
month for industrial output. The improved output last
month may reflect the new regime's emphasis on labor
discipline, especially the crackdown on absenteeism.
Industrial production grew at a rate of roughly 2 percent
in 1982. The information has been released at an un-
usually early date, suggesting General Secretary Andropov
is anxious to give the impression his policies are
succeeding.
NORTH YEMEN - SAUDI ARABIA: President's Visit
North Yemeni President Salih probably urged the
Saudis to provide additional help for his country's
faltering economy when he visited King Fahd earlier this
week. Sanaa's foreign exchange holdings have dropped
from $1.6 billion in March 1980 to less than $600 million,
Comment: Financial constraints on the Saudis stem-
ming from reduced oil revenues make it unlikely they will
give North Yemen much additional aid. They may even try
to capitalize on Salih's problems to wring political
concessions from Sanaa for maintaining official aid at
the level of about $300 million it has averaged in recent
years. Riyadh has repeatedly urged Salih to cut back
Soviet military aid programs for North Yemen. If in-
creased Saudi aid is not forthcoming, Salih will have to
institute new austerity measures that could provoke un-
rest.
11 February 1983
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CANADA-US: Weapons Testing Agreement Signed
Ottawa is submitting the weapons testing agreement
it signed yesterday with the US to Parliament, where it
it likely to draw a good deal of criticism from the
socialist New Democratic Party. A major purpose of the
long-delayed agreement is to allow for the testing of
US air-launched cruise missiles in western Canada, and
it has become the focal point for widespread disarmament
and antinuclear sentiment. The government's efforts to
promote the agreement included sending External Affairs
Minister MacEachen to Geneva last week to obtain support-
ing data from US disarmament negotiators and to reaffirm
publicly Canada's commitment to the disarmament process.
Comment: The government is confident that it can
weather the parliamentary debate, and it seems unlikely
further obstacles will prevent implementation of the
agreement.
ll February 1983
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Special Analysis
USSR: Conflict in the Leadership
General Secretary Andropov appears to be firmly in command, but
friction among Soviet leaders reportedly is growing as he tries to
consolidate his position. Although some evidence suggests Part,
Secretary Chernenko may be losing ground politically, other evidence
suggests some Politburo members continue to view him as an alterna-
tive to Andropov. Conflicting reporting about Chernenko's status
probably indicates his political future and that of Andropov himseZf
has not been resolved.
A middle-level Soviet diplomat says Chernenko is be-
ing "withdrawn from political life." Chernenko was not
listed among those attending a Central Committee meeting
of propaganda workers on 29 January.
As the ideology secretary, Chernenko normally would
play the leading role at such a conference. Dissident
Marxist Roy Medvedev previously had said Chernenko was
organizing such a meeting.
These signs that Chernenko may be in political
trouble come at a time of apparently heightened conflict
in the leadership. Recent press articles have denounced
party factionalism and called for the removal of "undesir-
able elements" from party ranks. Their appearance sug-
gests that Andropov is laying the groundwork for a more
extensive housecleaning of the party organization but that
he is meeting resistance.
Several Soviet sources also have indicated support
for Andropov in the Politburo is not solid. Late last
month a Soviet journalist in Moscow claimed infighting
between Andropov and Chernenko had intensified, and
Medvedev described the opposition to Andropov as being
more formidable then he had previously thought. Accord-
ing to Medvedev, the influence of Chernenko and Premier
Tikhonov was increasing as officials fearful of losing
their jobs tried to back Chernenko as a counterweight to
Andropov.
Top Secret
11 February 1983
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A Climate of Insecurity
Since Andropov took over, he has made some signifi-
cant personnel changes in propaganda, foreign policy, and
security organizations, and also in the economic bureauc-
racy. Some officials, including the head of the Central
Committee's Propaganda Department and the first deputy
chief of the International Information Department, have
been removed for purely political reasons.
These officials were appointees of Brezhnev who
Andropov wanted to replace with clients of his own.
Others, ranging from the Minister of Railways to economic
managers and other lower level personnel, have been ousted
on grounds of incompetence.
A combination of political and personal shortcomings
has accounted for some firings. The former Minister of
Interior--one of Brezhnev's cronies--was vulnerable
because Andropov wanted to tighten his personal control
over the security apparatus and because the Ministry of
Interior was riddled with corruption.
11 February 1983
Top Secret
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The changes have created insecurity among party
officials. Brezhnev's indulgent policies in effect gave
party workers job tenure, and many officials are appre-
hensive about the consequences of a fundamental change
in personnel policy.
Signs of Resistance
Resistance to Andropov's consolidation of power also
is suggested by the fact that he has made only two changes
in the Politburo--the removal of Party Secretary Kirilenko
and the promotion of Geydar Aliyev from candidate to full
membership. Both changes probably were planned by the
leadership before Brezhnev's death. In the first months
after Brezhnev took over in 1964, changes at the top were
much more extensive.
Andropov has yet to make a large number of appoint-
ments in the regional party apparatus. Few of the per-
sonnel changes that have taken place since he took office
have affected regional officials. This suggests Chernenko
has retained influence over job appointments at this
level.
Chernenko's Prospects
Chernenko reportedly is popular among regional offi-
cials and, to a lesser degree, among economic managers and
other bureaucrats. Previous Soviet leaders have regarded
such support as important to maintaining their positions
and accomplishing their policy objectives. Politburo
members not firmly in Andropov's camp believe Chernenko's
presence on the Politburo serves to protect their in-
terests, and they could turn to him if Andropov stumbles.
If Andropov were to accelerate the campaign against
corruption or undertake other controversial initiatives,
Chernenko could serve as a rallying point for disgruntled
elements in the party. If Andropov attempts at this
point to remove Chernenko abruptly or otherwise over-
reaches his mandate, he might force a coalition whose
common purpose would be to keep Andropov from wielding
excessive power. This could even put his own position
at risk.
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Age 54 ... reputation for honesty and
political integrity ... effective in debate .. .
confines discussions to substantive issues . .
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Special Analysis
Prime Minister and Conservative Party chairman Wilioch, who
arrives in the US next week, probably hopes the visit will shore up
political support at home for his minority government. Although
domestic opposition to INF is increasing, Willoch's government
remains firm in its backing of NATO's dual-track decision. In addi-
tion to seeking US support on INF, WiZZoch's delegation is likely
to discuss bilateral security issues and energy matters.
Willoch has been an outspoken advocate of Norway's
participation in NATO. His minority government relies
on parliamentary support from the moderate right Center
and Christian People's Parties to govern, however, and
it faces increasing opposition on INF. Although Norway
is not a basing country, polls indicate a majority of
Norwegians oppose deployment.
Last November the government won by a single vote
parliamentary approval for Norway's contribution to INF
infrastructure funding. The opposition Labor Party
subsequently released a document advocating a freeze on
nuclear weapons, a halt to preparations for INF deploy-
ments, an interim agreement reducing Soviet missiles and
blocking US deployments, and negotiations for nuclear-
weapons-free zones in Europe. These moves mark a depar-
ture from the traditional consensus on foreign policy
among the major parties.
Bilateral Security Issues
When Willoch's goverment came to power in 1981, it
quickly carried out plans to stock supplies for a US
Marine brigade in central Norway. Now, however, the
Prime Minister may claim budget constraints and insuffi-
cient NATO infrastructure funding threaten to delay
plans for stocking similar material in northern Norway
for a Norwegian brigade. The defense budget for 1983
contains no funds for Norwegian stockpiling.
11 February 1983
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Equidistant line
Theoretical sector line
Disputed area
Greenland
(Denmark)
rRAN/ ir?::r?
LAN!'
\NNrwfm crair r
Svalbard
Norwegian Sea
Spitsbergen Treaty of 1920
/Barents Sea
r /
l
N.orWay
Sweden
Soviet Union
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Despite political opposition to having AWACS air-
craft operate from Norway, Willoch is prepared to support
their use. He probably will stress, however, that NATO
flights crewed by US personnel avoid entering the
ernmost territory adjacent to the USSR.
In discussing the US request to install radar on
Jan Mayen Island, Willoch is likely to reiterate that
the issue be handled in NATO. A Norwegian official has
noted this would allow Norway to request NATO funding.
The Norwegians also may want to discuss their
recent reevaluation of their air defense systems. This
includes the possible purchase or lease of US Improved
Hawks.
Other Foreign Policy Concerns
Norway is open to ideas for reducing tensions in
Europe, but the government criticized Sweden's recent
proposal for a nuclear-weapons-free zone in Central
Europe. Willoch believes that initiative detracts from
the more realistic START and INF negotiations, and he
was particularly annoyed that he first learned of it
through the press.
Although Norway remains a loyal member of NATO, its
proximity to the USSR leads it to maintain open lines
of communication with the Soviets. Moscow disputes the
demarcation line along the continental shelf in the
Barents Sea between the two countries and the sovereignty
of Norway's Svalbard Islands. On the other hand, the
Norwegians recently won significant concessions from the
Soviets on fishing quotas in the Barents Sea.
Increasing Norwegian oil production, which reached
about 1 million barrels per day in 1982, has contributed
to stable growth in recent years and allowed an expansion
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of social spending. Recently, however, the decline in
oil demand and prices has reduced revenues, causing
budgetary problems.
The recession has raised unemployment to a postwar
record of 3.6 percent and created greater strains on
the budget. The fight against inflation, currently at
11 percent, is being hampered by devaluation and sizable
wage gains.
Although Willoch had promised to reduce government
spending and cut taxes, his government has been unable
to cope with current budgetary problems. Some polls
have shown an increase in support for the Labor Party,
and this could spell danger for the government's con-
sensus on domestic policy if inflation remains high and
unemployment grows.
Willoch hopes to expand oil and gas production,
possibly to reach 1.2 million barrels per day annually
by the 1990s, as one means of strengthening the economy.
The Norwegians are concerned that oil could create an
imbalance in their economy, however, and are likely to
move cautiously to implement the increased exploration
and development required to maintain this level of
production.
The government hopes expanded production will make
increased natural gas exports to the continent more
feasible by the 1990s. Before that time, however, Willoch
does not believe Norwegian gas can replace Soviet deliv-
eries to Western Europe.
11 February 1983
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Top Secret
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