NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY WEDNESDAY 16 FEBRUARY 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000100010074-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 17, 2010
• Sequence Number: 74
• Publication Date: February 16, 1983
• Content Type: REGULATION

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TOP Seeret-
Director of
Central
Intelligence F
National Intelligence. Daily
Wednesday
16 February-1983
~bp-seereE-
281
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Lebanon: Military Movements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
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Pakistan: Urban Unrest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Bangladesh: Political Disturbances . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Persian Gulf - Egypt: Expanding Ties . . . . . . . . . 5
Chile: Economic Cabinet Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Special Analysis
El Salvador: The Military Balance . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
16 February 1983
Israel: No-Confidence Motions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
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Beirut
WEST
BEIRUT
EAST BEIRUT .
Lebanese Army Control
in East Beirut
Mediterranean
Sea
Sidon'
Lebanon
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LEBANON: Military Movements
The movement of Lebanese Army troops into East Beirut yesterda.i
uwiZZ strengthen the central government's hand in its dealings with
the Phalange-dominated Lebanese Forces.
The Israelis had warned earlier the deployment
could cause problems, but it reportedly proceeded with-
out incident. Although the Israelis protested that the
Lebanese Government had not consulted with them on the
deployment, President Jumayyil was careful to reach a
prior understanding with the Lebanese Forces.
The Israelis and the Lebanese Forces Christian
militia are still allowed to use routes along the eastern
edge of Beirut to supply their forces in the Shuf and
Alayh areas. Lebanese Army Commander Tannous, however,
is said to have ordered his troops to prevent Israeli
movement into the city.
Meanwhile, Major Haddad, the commander of the Israeli-
controlled Christian militia in the south, returned to
Sidon on Monday. He declared his "state," which stretches
from Israel in the south to the Al Awwali River in the
north, will exist as long as Lebanon is occupied by
foreign forces.
Comment: The Army's move into East Beirut will
reduce the presence of the Lebanese Forces there. It
also will expand the central government's authority into
Christian as well as Muslim areas.
Haddad's forces are widening their control throughout
southern Lebanon with Israeli support to reinforce Tel
Aviv's demand that security arrangements in the 45-kilo-
meter zone be restricted to Haddad's militia and Israeli
monitoring stations. Tel Aviv probably is trying to
head off deployment of a multinational force or the
Lebanese Army by creating a functioning security frame-
work before the negotiations can deal with that question.
16 February 1983
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Prime Minister Begin's success in winning the
Knesset's approval for keeping former Defense Minister
Sharon in the cabinet suggests he will have little
trouble defeating several no-confidence motions criti-
cizing his handling of the recommendations of the Beirut
massacre inquiry commission. At least one coalition
member, however, is threatening to vote against the
government.
Meanwhile, Begin is meeting with leaders of Likud's
Liberal faction to discuss Sharon's status and some new
cabinet appointments. The Liberals want more seats in
the cabinet in return for approving Ambassador Arens--a
member of Begin's more conservative Herut Party--as
Defense Minister. They also want Sharon's new duties
to be narrowly limited.
16 February 1983
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Iq
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
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Sarv Union
Lahore.
f~ymonstrations
attorneys
PakSis'a
lndisnclal
1ne+ese tine`
of control
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da
Karachi
Demonstrations
and strikes
Souticlary representation is
not necessanly authoritatie.
China
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Increasing unrest in major urban centers is testing
the ability of municipal authorities to maintain order
and could be exploited by President Zia's opponents. In
Karachi, Sunni Muslim leaders have given authorities
until Friday to meet their demands for action against
Shias, including banning their religious processions.
Bus and taxi drivers in the city--supported by student
activists--are threatening to go on strike again to
protest recent increases in fuel prices. In Lahore,
police on Saturday reportedly beat and used tear gas
against a group of prominent women attorneys protesting
proposals to limit women's testimony in court.
Comment: If communal discord becomes violent, it
could be difficult for municipal authorities to control
and could embolden other dissatisfied groups to take
to the streets. A sustained alliance of students and
labor over economic issues would be a danger signal for
Zia that his opposition is beginning to coalesce.
With political violence growing, the military regime
is cracking down on political and student opponents. The
daughter of Bangladesh's political founder was among 30
political leaders detained yesterday after she called for
a nationwide protest tomorrow against martial law. On
Monday police clashed with several thousand students at
Dhaka University protesting martial law and government
education policies. The government has closed the univer-
sity, tightened enforcement measures against prohibited
political activity, and imposed a curfew on the capital.
Comment: Despite the crackdown, student activists
are likely to stage new protests next Monday, the anniver-
sary of the martyrdom of student protesters in the 1950s.
Political parties probably will have to increase support
of the students to maintain their political credibility.
Ambitious military officers, critical of General Ershad's
leadership, may exploit these incidents as they try to
develop their own support.
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PERSIAN GULF - EGYPT: Expanding Ties
The Arab states on the Persian Gulf may be seeking
increased cooperation with Egypt.
Comment: The Persian Gulf states remain worried
about subversion and military threats from Iran, and they
have been working in the Gulf Cooperation Council to
strengthen their security. Led by the Saudis, however,
the Gulf Arabs will normalize relations with Egypt slowly
for fear of becoming the targets of Arab and Palestinian
terrorists.
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CHILE: Economic Cabinet Changes
President Pinochet's cabinet shuffle this week has
raised doubts about the government's ability to revive
the economy and to resume external debt payments.
According to the US Embassy, the new financial team of
Finance Minister Caceress and Economy Minister Martin
lacks the stature to resolve Chile's financial problems.
In announcing the shakeup, Pinochet attacked domestic
critics and said there would be no major changes in
economic policies.
Comment: The changes will do little to restore
confidence, and foreign bankers probably will be more
cautious in supporting Santiago's requests to restore
credits and renegotiate maturing debt. Caceress and
Martin will have to resolve the issue of government guar-
antees for private-sector foreign borrowings to get the
stalled debt renegotiations back on track. Until this
problem is resolved, bankers are likely to resist new
lending. This will hinder financing of necessary imports
and could lead to additional domestic bankruptcies.
16 February 1983
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SA
SALV *
1
Guate-mara
SAN SALVADOR*
El Salvador
u r a
. .11
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Special Analysis
EL SALVADOR: The Military Balance
urine f,he Zast several months, the insurgents have incr'as
;monstrated a capabiZitg to overrun small towns and isolat
garrisons, therebg inflicting heavier losses on gover~an,~erit,
orsonnel. The Armg has responded again with large-scale sweep opor
til'.ons against Guerrilla strongholds. These actions continue to kas
ittie Zastino impact, however, and the government. has Zitt/c pros-
~ect o'substantiaZZ8g weakening insurgent resistance before the
e'.~ctioes in March 1984. The government probab17' hopes that, v 1k
won inucd US assistance, it can at least regain tT in ?:tiati:E: o'ec
-pie no..rt, ?year.
Some 3,500 government troops were killed or wounded
in 1982, an increase of more than 20 percent from the
previous year. Losses have been particularly high since
mid-October, when the insurgents began a series of offen-
sives that are continuing sporadically.
The insurgents also have captured large
prisoners, including over 250 in late 1982.
quently released the prisoners in an attempt
the military's willingness to fight.
numbers of
They subse-
to weaken
In addition, government forces conceded insurgent
control, at least temporarily, over large areas of eastern
Chalatenango and northern Morazan Departments. This has
strengthened the morale of the guerrillas, who claim some
of these areas are "liberated." The insurgents also
have seized upon recent political infighting in the
Constituent Assembly and the officer corps to underscore
the disunity in San Salvador.
Persistent Problems
The government has failed to take full advantage of
the strengthening of the armed forces over the past year
to gain a military advantage. The Air Force now has
18 UH-1H helicopters and six A-37 counterinsurgency
aircraft, and the Army has two new US-trained and two
Venezuelan-trained battalions--bringing total military
and security personnel to more than 30,000. The new units,
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Top Secret
however, have been used primarily in major operations
that have failed to weaken the guerrillas significantly.
The military's ability to capitalize on the improve-
ments is hindered by poor leadership, inadequate training,
and the continuation of a garrison mentality. Many depart-
mental commanders still are appointed more or their polit-
ical loyalty than for their command ability. Competent
officers are sometimes removed because of their opposition
to the top leadership, as illustrated by the recent re-
bellion led by Lieutenant Colonel Ochoa.
New recruits still serve only 18 months and, because
there is no standard training, units are often committed
to combat prematurely. In areas of insurgent strength,
there also is a reluctance to conduct aggressive small-
unit patrolling because of fear of guerrilla ambushes.
The insurgents appear to have at least maintained
their personnel strength over the past year. They may
even have increased it somewhat to as many as 4,000 to
6,000 armed regulars.
The guerrillas also continued to receive arms via
Nicaragua, with air delivery receiving high priority
because of Honduran and Salvadoran land and sea interdic-
tion efforts. As a result of the adequate supplies of
arms, the insurgents apparently have been able to make
better use of their 5,000 to 10,000 local militia and
other support personnel for offensive operations.
In addition, the insurgents have improved cooperation
recently among their different factions, resulting in
more joint operations and better coordination of offen-
sive plans. Serious rivalries remain, however, particu-
larly between the two largest factions. One still favors
a prolonged war and prefers small-unit operations, while
the other believes large-scale attacks are needed to
touch off a spontaneous popular revolt.
Without the aid they have received from the US over
the past several years, the armed forces might already
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have lost the war. To prevent the guerrillas from making
major gains, continued aid at least at the current level
will be necessary to offset Cuban and Nicaraguan support
for the insurgents. Moreover, without an amnesty proposal
and a serious civic action program, the government appears
to have little chance permanently to reduce insurgent
control over specific regions.
To regain the military initiative and provide
adequate security for isolated towns, the Army would
have to adopt more aggressive patrolling and mount hit-
and-run raids. This would require effective small-unit
leadership, better use of intelligence, improved mobility,
and better coordination of forces--factors still lacking
in many operations.
Such changes, however, are likely to come slowly.
Even if the military leadership manages to stick together
over the next year, the Army will be hard pressed to
do more than hold its own until the elections.
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