NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY FRIDAY 18 FEBRUARY 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000100010066-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 17, 2010
• Sequence Number: 66
• Publication Date: February 18, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
National intenlgence Lamy
Friday
18 February 1983
CPAS NID 88-W21X
e ruary
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Top Secret
South Africa - Angola: Continuing Dialogue . . . . . . . . 2
China-USSR-Vietnam: Beijing's Hard Line . . . . . . . . . 3
Zimbabwe: Government Confronts the Opposition
Philippines-US: Defense Minister's Visit . . . . . . . . . 6
USSR-US: Interest in New Grain Agreement . . . . . . . . . 7
Persian Gulf: Foreign Ministers Meet . . . . . . . . . . . 8
18 February 1983
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SOUTH AFRICA - ANGOLA: Continuing Dialogue
Press reports stating that South Africa and Angola have
reached agreement on the outline of a limited disengagement in
southern Angola are overdrawn, although senior officials of the
two countries may meet again during the next few weeks to try to
work out such an agreement.
The two sides reportedly will continue talks begun
at their meeting in Cape Verde last December on a cease-
fire and mutual pullback of forces. The proposal under
discussion calls for a withdrawal of South African troops
from Angola and a shift of Angolan, Cuban, and SWAPO forces
north from the Angola-Namibia border region.
Comment: The Angolans, who face an intensifying
UNITA insurgency and remain fearful of new South African
incursions, would be likely to welcome an agre
provided some pause in South African attacks.
A limited accord probably would be acceptable to
both the hardline and moderate factions in Luanda. The
Soviets and the Cubans also might go along with it, pro-
vided that South Africa did not demand prior agreement
on a Cuban troop withdrawal.
The South Africans almost certainly distrust the
Angolans and might back away from concluding an agreement.
Nevertheless, a disengagement agreement requiring Angola
to abandon militarily some of its territory could be por-
trayed domestically by Pretoria as a major accomplishment.
(S NF)
Such an agreement, however, could easily break
down. The Angolans could prove unable to keep SWAPO forces
from moving back into the border region and provoking a
South African military response.
The South Africans, moreover, probably will continue
to provide aid to UNITA. This could lead Luanda to re-
nounce a disengagement pact, particularly if the insurgents
moved into the area vacated by the South Africans.
18 February 1983
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CHINA-USSR-VIETNAM: Beijing's Hard Line
The Chinese are maintaining their tough stand on Soviet
involvement in Indochina and Afghanistan as they prepare to resaums
talks in Moscov next month.
A commentary last week in People's DaiZpf criticized
Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kapitsa for defending
Vietnam's presence in Kampuchea and for endorsing Viet-
namese proposals for regional talks previously rejected
by ASEAN. The article also rebuked the Soviets for
increasing their military presence in Indochina, par-
ticularly at Cam Ranh Bay, Da Nang, and Kampong Sam.
In addition, the Chinese media continue to criticize
the Soviet presence in Afghanistan and to highlight the
activities of resistance forces there.
China also is rebuffing Hanoi's overtures to improve
relations. Beijing has rejected another Vietnamese pro-
posal for a cease-fire on the border during the lunar
new year and has accused the Vietnamese--for the first
time in months--of firing into Chinese territory. More-
over, during a visit to Bangkok last month, the Chief of
Staff of China's armed forces renewed his country's sup-
port for Thailand's security and hinted at retaliation
if the Vietnamese increase their military activity along
the Thai-Kampuchean border.
Comment: The Chinese are emphasizing that the USSR's
support for Vietnam remains the main obstacle to major
improvements in Sino-Soviet relations. When Secretary
of State Shultz visited Beijing, the Chinese cited the
similarity of views on Kampuchea and Afghanistan as one
of the positive elements in Sino-US relations.
18 February 1983
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Mozambique
Zambia
HARARE *
,VQ!
b
&,9 ~a
Botswana
Zimbabwe
Matabeleland South
Mozambique
South Africa ?s 100
E Kilometers
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ZIMBABWE: Government Confronts the Opposition
The government has embarked on a high-risk campaign aga
opposition Zeader Joshua Nkomo and his foZZowers in the Army.
The regime has been actively considering a purge
from Army enlisted ranks of former Zimbabwe African
People's Union guerrillas for alleged disloyalty. The
purge is still a matter of some debate in the government,
but many former ZAPU soldiers returning from leave re-
portedly have been advised that they have already been
discharged.
Comment: If the government follows through with
the purge, many of the remaining former ZAPU officers
and soldiers probably will decide to quit the Army.
Rather than return to their homes in Matabeleland, many
would be likely to join dissident bands in rural areas
or flee to Botswana and Zambia.
The overall decision to get tough with ZAPU prob-
ably was made by the ZANU Central Committee, which Mugabe
heads but has never fully controlled. Mugabe has long
acted as a brake on hotheads in the party, but he usually
acts in accordance with the Central Committee's decisions,
which are reached by consensus. The Prime Minister will
remain a moderating influence, but it is uncertain how
successful he will be.
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Defense Minister since 1972... confidant
of Marcos, believed architect of martial law
(1972-81)
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Defense Minister EnriZe will use meetings with US officials
in Washington next week to set the stage for the review of the
MiZitarzg Bases Agreement that is scheduled to begin in Manila in
Apri Z.
Enrile's most important objective is to pave the
way for eventual acceptance of a Philippine proposal to
store US war reserve materiel at the bases for Philippine
use. Manila links this issue to compensation for US use
of the bases and to progress in modernizing the Philippine
armed forces--the key items on the base review agenda
Comment: Enrile, who is close to President Marcos,
will play a major role in the bases review. He believes
that the talks this year give Manila an excellent chance
to "correct" a security relationship he views as heavily
weighted in Washington's favor. The Defense Minister's
visit also offers a chance to settle the war reserve
materiel proposal and other issues before the review
actually begins.
18 February 1983
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USSR-US: Interest in New Grain Agreement
The director of the Soviet grain purchasing agency
said publicly last week that Moscow is ready to negotiate
a new long-term grain trade agreement with the US. He
stated, however, that the USSR is unwilling to increase
the minimum amount it has to buy above the current require-
ment of 6 million tons.
The Soviets want to maintain an agreement because the US
is the world's most stable producer and largest exporter
of grain. Nevertheless, Moscow continues to view the US
as an unreliable supplier. Since the US embargo in 1980,
the Soviets have diversified their sources of grain
imports by entering into long-term agreements with other
countries.
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PERSIAN GULF: Foreign Ministers Meet
The Foreign Ministers of the Gulf Cooperation
Council--composed of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain,
Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman--will discuss
the war between Iran and Iraq as well as other regional
issues at their quarterly meeting tomorrow in Riyadh.
Specific topics reportedly will include Saudi Arabia's
efforts--unsuccessful thus far--to mediate between Syria
and Iraq and the declaration of support by Syria and
Libya last month for Iran.
Comment: The ministers probably will criticize
Tehran obliquely in their communique for not agreeing to
peace negotiations. Syria's reaffirmation of support for
Iran may prompt the ministers to consider--as they did
last year--the possibility of cutting off financial aid
to Damascus, but they are not likely to follow through.
The Council members, particularly Saudi Arabia, fear
retaliation by Syrian-sponsored terrorists. The Saudis
also worry that cutting off aid would make the Syrians
even less cooperative in Middle East peace efforts.
18 February 1-983
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