AFGHANISTAN: A GOOD 1985 GRAIN HARVEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000608550001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 1, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 8, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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( 855-,
0 8 JAN 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR: (See Distribution List)
Chief, Strategic Resources Division
Office of Global Issues
SUBJECT: Afghanistan: A Good 1985 Grain Harvest
1. The attached study provides a comprehensive look at
regional crop conditions in Afghanistan and gives our best
estimate of 1985 wheat output, a useful indicator of total food
production. The study is based primarily on the analysis of
meteorological data acquired during the
1985 crop season.
2. Land abandonment, as the result of military combat,
continues to slowly increase in Afghanistan. In our estimation,
it is not a major problem for the Afghan government. However, as
we earlier agreed, we have begun a study to more precisely
quantify the amount of this abandonment. We expect to complete
it in the spring of 1986.
3. This assessment was produced by
Agricultural Assessments Branch, Strategic Resources Division,
Office of Global Issues. Comments and questions may be addressed
to the Chief, Agricultural Assessments Branch
Attachment:
Afghanistan: A Good 1985 Grain Harvest
GI M 85-10328, January 1986
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SUBJECT: Afghanistan: A Good 1985 Grain Harvest
OGI/SRD/AAB (8 January 1986)
Distribution:
1 - Ambassador Morton Abramowitz, State
1 - Mr. Frank McNeil, State
1 - Mr. Manny Rubio, Director/White House Situation Room
1 - White House Situation Room
1 - Mr. Jock Covey, NSC
1 - Mr. Elmer Klumpp, Agriculture
1 - Mr. Douglas P. Mulholland, Treasury
1 - Mr. Byron Jackson, Commerce
1 - Mr. Charles W. Greenleaf, Jr., AID
1 - Mr. Dennis Murphy, State
1 - Mr. George S. Harris, State
1 - Ms. Lillian Harris, State
1 - Ms. Phyllis Oakley, State
1 - Mr. Peter Modley, State
1 - Mr. Michael Egbert, State
1 - Mr. Jonathan Olsson, State
1 - Captain Robert Anderson, JCS/J-5, Pentagon
1 - Colonel Alfred Prados, DIA/DIO, Pentagon
1 - SA/DDCI
1 - Executive Director
1 - DDI
1 - DDI/PES
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - NIO/W
1 - NIC/AG
1 - OCR/ISG
1 - C/DDO/NE~
1 - C/DDO/NE
1 - DDI/ASG/AMB
1 - C/CPAS/CSG
1 - CPAS/ISS
5 - CPAS/IMC/CB
1 - D/OIA
1 - C/IEG
1 - D/NESA
1 - C/NESA/SO
1 - C/NESA/SO/P
1 - D/OGI, ADD/OGI
1 - C/OGI/GD
1 - C/OGI/GD/NE
1 - C/OGI/GD/ERA
1 - C/OGI/ECD/CM
1 - C/OGI/TNAD/NAR/E&W
1 - C/OGI/SRD
8 - C/OGI/SRD/AAB
1 - OGI/EXS/RG
3 - OGI/EXS/PG
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Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
0 8 JAN 156:;
Afghanistan: A Good 1985 Grain Harvest
Summary
Afghan farmers have harvested a good 1985 grain crop. Based
on an analysis of imagery and meteorological data, we estimate
that 2.9 million tons of wheat, the staple of the Athgan diet and
historically about 60 percent of annual grain output, were
produced. Grain imports--typically over half coming from the
USSR--will still be required to assure food availability in the
rapidly growing urban centers. Assuming that our projection of
1985 wheat imports--400,000 tons--is correct, food supplies
should be better than last year. However, localized shortages
are likely to continue as the result of military action and
transportation problems.
Wheat production rebounded in 1985 despite continuing combat
operations. We identified very few incidents of intentional crop
destruction this year and our analysis 25X1
continues to indicate that the amount of destruction, whether
intentional or caused accidentally by military action, is
insignificant compared to total production. Abandonment.of
agricultural land continues in combat areas, but we estimate that
at a maximum it does not exceed 5 percent of total cropland, and
it could be considerably less. Furthermore, there is some
limited evidence to suggest that the loss of production due to
abandonment is being offset by shifting agricultural production
from cash to food crops and by bringing new land under
cultivation. 25X1
This memorandum was prepared by
Agricultural Assessments Branch, Strategic Resources Division,
Office of Global Issues. Comments and questions may be addressed
to Chief, Strategic Resources Division, OGI
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Afghanistan: A Good 1985 Grain Harvest
Background
Agricultural Constraints. Afghanistan is mostly unsuitable
for agriculture with mountains, desert, and forest extending
across the country. The poorly structured soils, limited water
availability, severe climate, and primitive farming practices all
limit Afghanistan's agricultural production. The soils are
alkaline, high in calcium, and low in organic matter.
Precipitation can fluctuate considerably from year to year with
most of the country unable to support dryland farming. The
agriculture depends heavily on irrigation from the rivers and
streams formed from the snow melt in the mountains. The arid
continental climate is comprised of hot, dry summers, and wet,
usually harsh winters. Agriculture is largely of a subsistence
nature. Farming operations are mostly powered by men and draft
animals with limited use of chemical fertilizers, pesticides, or
new seed varieties. However, the Soviets and the Afghan central
government are continuing measures begun prior to the Soviet
occupation to bolster agricultural output. These include
increasing the availability of fertilizers and improved varieties
of seed, importing agricultural machinery, and using agricultural
Cropping Patterns. The arable land in Afghanistan is
estimated at 8 million hectares. However, less than half is
cultivated because of the limited availability of water.
Irrigated land is estimated at 3.3 million hectares but due to
fallowing practices only three-fourths is planted each year.
Approximately 85 percent of Afghanistan's agricultural production
is from irrigated crops. Dryland crops, mostly located in the
` foothills of the northern plains are estimated at 900,000
hectares.
Approximately 90 percent of Afghanistan's crops are grain
crops comprised of wheat, corn, rice, barley, and millet. Fruits
and vegetables account for approximately 6 percent of the
agriculture. Industrial crops, to include cotton, sugar beets,
oilseeds, and poppies, account for the rest. Wheat, the staple
crop in the Afghan diet, comprises 60 percent of the grain
production. Wheat yields in Afghanistan are low by world
standards with the irrigated crops averaging 16-17 quintals per
hectare and the dryland 5-6 quintals per hectare. Irrigated
winter wheat in the area of the Soviet Union adjacent to
Afghanistan, averaged 24 quintals per hectare and 10 quintals per
hectare on dryland from 1976-80. Despite low yields,
Afghanistan's traditional wheat varieties tend to produce stable
yields. Grain production does not show wide fluctuations from 25X1
year to year as does the Soviet grain crops. 25X1
GI M 85-10328
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Population Trends. Approximately 3.5 million people, out of
a pre-war population estimated at 15.3 million, have fled the
country to Pakistan and Iran. Rapid growth since the 1979
invasion, however, brought the population back to roughly
15 million. The exodus occurred primarily from the eastern
provinces with estimates of approximately 2.5 million refugees
located in refugee camps in Pakistan. Fewer refugees have left
the western provinces and fled into Iran. Most of the refugees
have been from the agrarian and pastoral sectors, which made up
85 percent of the population prior to the Soviet occupation. In
addition, many people have migrated to the cities in order to
escape the military conflict in the countryside and to take
advantage of better food supplies. For example, according to the
State Department, the population of Kabul increased from 800,000
in 1979 to 2.5 million in 1985.
Weather Summary
Although a serious water shortage existed in Afghanistan
until the end of March 1985, meteorological and imagery data
indicated that the situation improved steadily during the
remainder of the year. Total rainfall was sufficient to support
crop production nearly everywhere and equally important, the
precipitation apparently fell at optimum times for plant
development.
o Winter: as a result of 25X1
insufficient snowfall, secondary rivers and most feeder
streams were dry or nearly dry during March, much lower
than in March 1984. Irrigation canals were running, but
with greatly reduced flow.
o Spring: The outlook began to change on 31 March when a
deep low pressure area with an associated frontal system
moved across the country from west to east dropping
unually large amounts of rain. A second system moved
across the country during the first week in April
contributing more precipitation and encouraging the
growth of grain crops. Unseasonable rain in varying
amounts also fell over wide areas during the remainder of
April, May, and June.
o Summer: Still more rain fell in the northeast provinces
during the normally dry month of July. Rivers and
streams that normally dry up as the growing season
progresses, continued to flow. Although most grain crops
were harvested by mid-summer, additional water provided
plenty of moisture for the non-grain crops.
o Fall: When last observed) rivers and 25X1
streams in most areas of the country were still flowing
at levels above normal. 25X1
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The Wheat Estimate
The 1981 Afghanistan wheat crop is estimated at 2.9 million
metric tons. This brings production back to the level attained
prior to the 1984 drought.2 Agricultural output was good in most
areas of the country, except where lengthy and intense combat had
occurred and forced farmers to abandoned the land. Our analysis
indicates that in a few regions such as in Charikar and Kabol,
yields were excellent.
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METHODOLOGY
This assessment is based primarily
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analysis of Landsat
imagery. supplemented with meteorological
At least one half-of
the entire agricultural area of the country
was also imaged with the unclassified multi-
1 The Afghan government has reported that over 2.85 million tons
of wheat were produced in 1985.
2 harvest and procurement activities in
neighboring countries, which are generally affected by the same
weather patterns as Afghanistan, also support our assessment of
above average Afghan crop prospects. The size of the grain
harvest in south Uzbek, SSR--which adjoins the Afghan dryland
area on the north--was above plan in late June according to
Moscow Domestic Radio. Unclassified reporting from Pakistan--to
the east of Afghanistan--indicates that grain procurements for
the May-July period ran about 10 percent higher this year than
last.
3 Because of the direct relationship between the amount of grain
harvested and the amount of straw shocks observed in the fields,
a comparative estimate of the difference in grain yields can be
made from one year to the next.
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spectral Landsat system. 25X1
Intentional Crop Destruction. Refugee reports alleging the
intentional destruction of crops and irrigation canals by the
military, continued to be received during 1985. However 25X1
direct actions against Afghanistan ,s 25X1
agriculture have occurred in only a few locations. Most often
when damage to crops and irrigation systems was observed, it
appeared to be inadvertent and not the result of deliberate
action to disrupt agriculture. in Herat, 25X1
for example, except for some isolated cases, military vehicles
almost always cross over irrigation canals at vehicle crossings
and avoid driving through active agricultural fields.
Furthermore, the occurrence of crop destruction in Afghanistan
both intentional and non-intentional is so limited that we
believe it has no significant impact on total agricultural
production. 25X1
Agricultural Abandonment. Abandonment of agricultural land
is a more important problem in Afghanistan than crop
destruction. We are uncertain of its long-term impact cn
production levels because thus far we have not measured the
amount of land abandoned, the amount of new land being brought
under cultivation and the extent to which land formerly devoted
to cash crops has been shifted into food production. We have
seen large scale abandonment caused by military operations, but
only in limited areas such as the Panjsher and Konar Valleys and
near Jalalabad Airfield. In the worse case, however, we believe
that less than five percent of the land that was in production
prior to the Soviet invasion has been abandoned.
o Abandonment occurs primarily in those areas where there
is heavy combat, generally within 40 miles of the
Pakistan border. There is little if any abandonment, for
example, in the northern provinces which account for
about 50% of the agricultural land.
o As much as 25% of agricultural land is left fallow each
year, thus not all abandoned land would have been
productive in the current year.
4 An effort to measure the amount of abandonment and new land
being brought into production is underway.
5 Total area sown to wheat in Afghanistan is still held at
2.6 million hectares. This is based on historical Foreign
Agriculture Service estimates of 1982 and 1983 and current year
visual estimates made from imagery.
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If 5% of the land has been abandoned, the total sown area
would be reduced from 2.6 to 2.5 million hectares. However,
there is one area near Herat 25X1
where previously untilled land has been placed in production. It
is possible other new fields exist outside the area we nave
sampled Furthermore, UN/FAO 25X1
statistics indicate that during the 1980s; the production of
industrial crops has decreased in Afghanistan while the
production of food crops has remained stable. While we do not
put great trust in FAO statistics on Afghanistan, it is possible
that land is being taken out of cotton and sugar beet production,
food
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Food Distribution and Imports
Afghanistan must import foreign grain each year to
supplement the rapidly growing urban centers. Based on past
import figures, we estimate grain imports, mostly wheat, will
amount to about 400,000 tons this year. Approximately
225,000 tons arrives from the Soviet Union, of which 100,000 tons
is purchased and approximately 125,000 tons is provided as grant
aid. The remainder arrives through unofficial channels from
Pakistan. Since the Soviet occupation, the Afghan government has
nearly doubled its imports of foreign grain to alleviate food
shortages, especially in urban areas.
As we have indicated in the past, the entire Afghan food
supply chain--from the farm to the marketplace--remains
fragile. Any escalation in the fighting or a Soviet effort to
disrupt the food distribution network could easily upset the
tenuous balance, thereby leading to shortages, particularly in
the cities. According to open source reporting,
recent Soviet and insurgent operations have caused some
disruptions in food availability. Localized shortages are
occurring, particularly in areas of concentrated fighting, from
attempts by the Soviets to deny food to insurgents.
A Regional View of Yields
Eastern Valleys and Provinces (Kapisa, Laghman, Konarha, Parvan,
Vardak, Ghazni, Paktia, Paktika, Lowgar, Nangarhar, and Kabol).
These 11 provinces surrounding Kabul contain approximately
30 percent of the country's agricultural land. Some of the most
fertile and high yielding valleys in Afghanistan are located in
these valleys. It is, however, also the area most affected by
the Soviet occupation. The major valleys and basins include the
Panjsher, Charikar, Nangarhar, Konar, Ghazni, Lowgar, and Khowst.
At least three of these valleys (Panjsher, Konar and Nangarhar) have
been the sites of heavy military operations.
The Panjsher Valley, located approximately 60 miles
northeast of Kabul in Kapisa Province, is of interest since it
has been the scene of almost continuous fighting since early
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1984. The valley is one of the few locations where deliberate
burning of grain fields was identified in 1984. Because of the
continued military presence this year, farmers have almost
totally abandoned the valley and crops are not being
cultivated. However, since this long narrow valley is only a
minor grain producer this abandonment does not have a significant
impact on Afghanistan's total grain production.
The Charikar Basin is a fertile valley located approximately
40 miles north of Kabul at the base of the Panjsher Valley. This
area shows little fluctuation in grain production from year to
year and these high yielding irrigated fields traditionally
produce surplus grain for the Kabul region. Harvest occurred on
schedule in June this year and yields across the basin were
excellent. The irrigation canals were in good repair with
adequate water and unlike most years the river level increased
through the growing season. With the exception of some fields
that had been burned near the entrance to the Panjsher Valley,
the only destruction observed in the area was caused by armored
vehicles crossing some fields. The minor destruction observed
would have no significant effect on total grain production for
this valley.
In the Nangarhar Valley surrounding Jalalabad, 40 miles east
of Kabul, and the adjacent Konar Valley, harvest occurred on
schedule in May. Yields were in the good to excellent range in
the Nanagarhar area and fair to good in the Konar Valley.
However, this region is showing the effects of continued military
activity. Some destruction, due to vehicles driving through the
fields and burning of crops, was observed in both the Nangarhar
and Konar Valleys. Some of the burned fields in the Konar Valley
appeared to have been intentionally destroyed. But the factor
most affecting agricultural production in these valleys is the
steady decline in population and abandonment of land since the
Soviet invasion in 1979. It appears that in the Konar Valley the
abandonment was mostly caused from continued military operations.
In the Nangarhar area much of the abandonment, in addition to the
military operations, is apparently an attempt to secure large
defensive zones around military installations. For example, a
large agricultural area adjacent to Jalalabad Airfield is almost
totally uncultivated this year
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Crop yields in Ghazni province thig year looked good with
lodging observed in many of the fields. Unlike last year, water
was still flowing in the canals in late July. 125X1
The crops looked good 25X1
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The Kabol (Shomali) region, located around Kabul city, had
good to excellent yields this year with heavy lodging in many of
the fields. The irrigation canals were flowing with a few
indications of minor damage near military installations from
excessive military vehicle traffic. There is very little
abandonment in this region.
Crop yields in Lowgar Province historically are lower than
in the provinces to the north. However, yields were good this
year for this area and better than yields in 1984 since water
availability was not a problem.
Grain yields are good in both Paktia and Paktika Provinces.
Yields in these two provinces have not fluctuated in the last two
years since water availability has not been a problem. Military
activity continues in this area adjacent to the Afghan-Pakistan
border. However, only minor damage from vehicle tracks through
agricultural fields was observed in Paktia Province. Although its
population was never large, abandonment in the Khowst Valley in
Paktia is the greatest we have seen in Afghanistan. Total
production in Paktia as a whole is probably slowly decreasing as
abandonment of cropland continues.
Northern Provinces (Badghis, Faryab, Jowzjan, Balkh, Samangan,
Konduz, Takhar, Badakhshan, and Baghlan).
These nine northern provinces, bordering the Soviet Union,
include all of Afghanistan's Northern Plains. This region
contains irrigated crops in the river basins and almost all of
Afghanistan's dryland crops in the foothills. It is referred to
as the "bread basket" of Afghanistan, and accounts for approximately
fifty percent of the country's agricultural land. 25X1
Geographic features and agricultural practices are similar
across the region, but climatic conditions and soils vary. These
variations produce differences in both irrigated and dryland crop
yields. The western provinces of Badghis, Faryab, and Jowzjan,
6 Lodging is a condition that occurs when grain stalks bend or
break and the crop forms a flattened or tangled mass. Generally,
lodging results when the weight of the mature head cannot be
supported by the stalk, and in these circumstances it can
indicate good yields. However, wind, rain or hail also can cause
the condition.
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adjacent to the Karakum Desert, are hot and arid and the soils
appear poor. The lowest yields in dryland and irrigated crops
are found in these three provinces. The river near Meymaneh in
Faryab Province was dry and remained dry throughout the season.
However, adequate moisture must have been available earlier in
the season since yields for the irrigated and dryland crops,
although not as good as 1983, were better than in 1984. The
other rivers observed in these provinces continued to flow,
harvest was on schedule, and yields were consistently better than
last year.
The provinces in the central area, Balkh, Samanyan, Konduz,
and Baghlan, have the highest yields in the region and they show 25X1
little change between years. Drought conditions in 1984 had little
effect on this area. This year, the harvest occurred on schedule in
mid-June and July and yields were as good as or slightly better than
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The summer crops in Baghlan Province, including rice, were
observed in October and yields were excellent I __1 Dryland 25X1
and irrigated crop yields in the two eastern provinces of Takhar
and Badakhshan were good. Unlike most years, the level of the
Kowkcheh River in western Badakhshan Province increased from mid-
May through late June of this year As observed 25X1
in most other areas, yields in Takhar and Badakhshan are better
than in 1984 and not quite as good as 1983. The yields in these
two provinces this year, as in most years, are better than the
yields in the three western provinces but not as good as the
higher-yielding four central provinces. 25X1
Central Mountain Provinces (Bamian, Ghowr, and Oruzgan).
This steep mountain area, known as the Hazarehjat Region,
contains less than 5% of Afghanistan's agriculture in some small
narrow valleys. The available imagery of this area is limited
except for the Bamian Valley. this
intensely cultivated valley indicated good yields for this
area. Harvest occurs late here since the crops are grown at
elevations greater than 2,500 meters and the cooler temperatures
cause them to mature slower.
Western Border Provinces (Herat, Farah, and Nimruz).
The three western provinces bordering Iran contain
approximately ten percent of Afghanistan's agriculture. The
Khash Desert, centered between the two southern provinces of
Farah and Nimruz, limits the amount of arable land in this
area. The most agriculturally productive area in this region is
along the Harirud River in Herat. Harvest was on schedule in
this area in late May and most of June with heavy lodging in many
fields and good yields evident. Irrigation canals were flowing
with adequate water and there was no evidence of military
operations to destroy or disrupt this fragile system
Intense military activity around Herat in 1985 had little impact
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on agricultural production. Bombing of some areas in Herat
destroyed a few fields, and other surrounding fields were burned,
but it is difficult to determine if any of the fields were burned
intentionally or caught fire as a result of the military activity
In either case, most of the fields had been harvested
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prior to the surge of military activity in late June and July.
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Around Shindand, in Farah Province, significant
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military activity was evident. However, the fragile kareses
(underground water tunnels) continue to flow providing much of the
irrigation water for this area. Harvest was on schedule in June
with good yields. Abandonment in this area, perhaps due to the
persistent military presence, appears to increase each year,
although its impact on total production is still minor. 25X1
Southern Provinces (Helmand, Qandahar, and Zabol Provinces).
Agriculture in the vast desert areas of these provinces
consists mostly of bands of irrigated crops along branches of the
Helmand and Arghandab rivers. It amounts to approximately
ten percent of Afghanistan's total cultivated land. The poor
sandy soils and severe desert environment here cause the yields
of crops to be consistently less than in most other irrigated
areas of Afghanistan. 25X1
Harvest occurred on schedule in this area in late May and
early June and yields were good for these provinces. Military
activity was extensive around Qandahar City and in the valleys
around Lashkar Gah in Helmand Province. Numerous villages
surrounding Qandahar City have been bombed in past years and
continued to be bombed this year. Although it appears that the
villages are the major targets, some irrigation ditches had been
inadvertently hit. However, despite the bomb damage, the main
irrigation canals continue to flow. Individual fields have been
burned around Qandahar near s and in numerous
locations near Lashkar Gah Some of the burned 25X1
fields may have been the indirect result of the high military
activity, but armored vehicle tracks leading into a few fields
suggest that some of the burning may have been intentional.
There is some noticeable increase in the amount of abandonment
around the bombed villages near Qandahar. However, despite all
this heavy military activity, a large majority of the
agricultural activity continues. 25X1
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oviet Union
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Photos A and B
Afghanistan: Increased Abandonment in Jalalabad and
Konar Valley From 1979 to 1985
Comparative Landsat imagerv q/Jalalahad and the Konar Valhi on the 22nd q/ March 1979 prior to the
Soviet imva.sion and the 7th of March /985 indicates how abandonment has impacted this region. The
winter grain Jields have come out of dornntnev by these imaging dates and the bright red areas
indicates areas that have been sown in winter wheat.
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