INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SITUATION REPORT #47

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000608410001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 31, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 19, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

-Nk 25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000608410001-7
,C,O
10
Next 4 Page(s) In Document Denied
'CIO
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000608410001-7
400;
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000608410001-7 25X1
Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
International Financial Situation Report #47
19 December 1985
Summary
After deliberating on 16-17 December, the Cartagena Group issued a declaration calling
for increased lending from commercial banks and multilateral sources and, over the long term,
for a reduction in world interest rates. The three most influential members of the group-
Mexico, Brazil and Argentina-allied themselves and injected the group with newfound political
clout. In other developments:
o OPEC decided to defend its share of the oil market. As a result, we believe oil
prices will begin to fall by early 1986. For every $1 per barrel drop in the price of
oil, Mexico stands to lose $550 million in revenue.
o Support for Secretary Baker's debt initiative continues with endorsements from the
IMF, World Bank and commercial banks in the US, the UK and Japan.
o Mexico's meeting with its bank advisory committee produced few concrete results
and was at times acrimonious. Some bankers admit that the uncertainty over
Mexico's participation in the Baker plan has kept them from dealing with the
Mexican funding issue.
o Brazil's unwillingness to guarantee full repayment of foreign obligations owed by
three failed banks has emerged as more of a stumbling block to its debt rescheduling
than Brazil's rejection of the IMF. Brazil
stands to lose a significant portion of its $16 billion in short-term trade credits if the
government does not deal with these obligations to the creditors' satisfaction. 25X1
o South Africa extended its moratorium on most debt principal repayments from
31 December to 31 March. Creditors have dismissed Pretoria's initial rescheduling
plan as unrealistic and ten key creditors responded with their own proposal.
o Lower oil imports have allowed Brazil to maintain a large trade surplus despite lower
exports. Mexico's trade surplus declined b 42 percent in the first ten months of this
year. (See Appendix) 25X1
NOTE: REPORT #48 WILL BE PUBLISHED ON 16 JANUARY 1985.
This situation report was prepared by analysts of the Intelligence Directorate.
welcome and may be addressed to the Situation Report Coordinator,
Copy Z of 74
--r----25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000608410001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000608410001-7
KEY ISSUES
The Montevideo Theme: An Emergency Situation
Foreign and finance ministers from most of the 11 Latin American countries that
make up the Cartagena Group met for the fourth time to discuss ways to alleviate their
debt servicing burdens. Uruguayan President Sanguinetti, echoing other Latin officials,
opened the Cartagena Group ministerial meeting calling for some emergency measures to
help Latin America fulfill their foreign debt commitments. After deliberating on 16-17
December, the Cartagena group issued a declaration calling for:
o A reduction of real interest rates and a reduction of bank profit margins.
o An increase in new bank loans at a level at least equal to the world inflation
rate.
o A ceiling on capital outflows linked either to economic growth or export
earnings.
o An increase in multilateral development lending of 20 percent a year for the
next three years.
A five-nation committee-Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela-has been
organized to follow up on the progress of their "emergency" proposals. The Cartagena
Group also announced that Uruguay will retain the secretariat and that another meeting
will be held in Uruguay on a date to be established.
In our judgment, the substance of the Montevideo declaration goes beyond
previous Cartagena documents by asking for specific relief measures, which run counter
to US government policies. One demand, for example, would double the amount of bank
lending outlined in the Baker plan to $40 billion. Another demand calls for interest
capitalization. The Cartagena Group's response to the Baker initiative highlights the
Latin belief that the initiative provides insufficient debt relief, and by demanding further
assistance, they attempt to put the onus back on creditors. Moreover, given the fact
that Mexico, Brazil and Argentina have allied themselves, the so far ineffective group
has now been injected with enhanced political clout.
Mexico and an Oil Price Decline
We believe oil prices will begin to fall by early 1986 if OPEC follows through on
its recent decision to defend its "fair" share of the oil market. The fall would primarily
reflect a seasonal decline in consumption. If OPEC attempts to maintain crude
production at its current level of ig million b/d, and if non-OPEC producers do not
reduce theirs, oil prices will fall to balance supply and demand, perhaps to as low as $15
per barrel. At this time, however, we believe that prices are more likely to fall to the
$20 to $25 range during the first half of 1986.
According to Embassy reporting, Mexico will lose about $550 million in revenues
for every $1.00 per barrel drop in the price of oil assuming it can maintain its current
export volume. Thus, a $5.00 per barrel drop would cause Mexico to lose over $2.5 billion
in revenue. Believing that reduction in the price of crude will force a concurrent drop in
interest rates of t percent, the country will require $1.7-2.0
billion in new money beyond what is now being requested from commercial banks in 1986
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000608410001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000608410001-7
if oil prices drop to the $20 to $21 per barrel range. At some point, probably around
$?0 a barrel, revenues will fall below minimum levels needed to service its interest
payments.
The Baker Plan Receives Support
The IMF and World Bank publicly voiced in early December their strong support
for the Baker Plan and stated their willingness to cooperate fully with all parties. More
recently, the IMF and World Bank announced that international banks-"accounting for an
overwhelming majority of claims on troubled debtors"-have indicated their support for
the US Treasury proposal to increase their lending to these countries by $20 billion over
three years. The bankers' support, however, is contingent upon the participation of all
parties-governments, institutions, and banks. Although the Baker initiative cites three
principals-debtor countries, multilateral institutions, and commercial banks-
international banks want industrial country governments to increase their financial
commitments to debt-troubled countries and to modify existing regulatory policies.
REGIONAL SITUATIONS
Latin America
Mexico's meeting with its bank advisory committee yielded few concrete results,
Brazil's unwillingness to guarantee the debts of three failed banks poses a stumbling
block with creditors, and Argentina denies that they have agreed to be a pilot country for
the Baker debt initiative.
Mexico
The Bank Advisory Committee meeting on 2-3 December with the Director of
Public Credit Gurria yielded few concrete results and some portions of the meeting were
described as acrimonious. discussion of most
substantive issues was postponed until the next round of talks scheduled for early next
month. Gurria outlined Mexico's funding needs including $2.5 billion in 1986 and
$10 billion over the next three years
hankers were put off by Mexican insistance that negotiations on a new money package
begin before a letter of intent is approved by the Fund. International bankers also felt
that Gurria was less than forthright about Mexico's foreign reserve position-raising end
of year estimates to over $5.5 billion after having stated they would be less than
$4.0 billion only hours earlier. Negotiations between Mexico and its international
creditors probably will continue well into 1986. Because of Mexico's deteriorating
financial position and political pressures against further austerity, negotiations with the
IMF are tough, but are progressing. Moreover, some bankers admit that the uncertainty
over Mexico's participation in the Baker Plan has been keeping them from dealing with
the Mexican funding issue.
Brazil
The Sarney Administration's efforts to continue negotiations for a multiyear debt
restructuring and to obtain another rollover of short-term money facilities met with stiff
resistance from Brazil's bank advisory committee last week. The government's
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000608410001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000608410001-7
unwillingness to guarantee full repayment of foreign obligations owed by three failed
private Brazilian banks has emerged as a more important stumbling block for most 25X1
committee members than has the potential Brazilian rejection of the IMF.
Central Bank President Bracher insisted that Brazilian 25X1
taxpayers should not have to pay off all the losses of failed private banks, but did offer
to repay between 25 and 75 percent of the value of the obligations once the banks' assets
were sold. Committee members, however, expressed particular concern that Brasilia had
not developed a long-term policy to handle what they foresaw as a recurring problem.
unless the government deals satisfactorily 25X1
with the obligations of the failed banks, Brazil will lose a significant portion of its
$15 billion of short-term trade credits and interbank deposits. Both Brazil and the bank
advisory committee apparently believe if they can reach a settlement on the failed banks
issue, when they resume talks this week, they may be able to agree on a continued
rollover of short-term facilities and a reschedulin of 1985-1986 medium-term maturities
at lower interest rates without IMF monitoring. 25X1
Argentina
Finance Minister Juan Sourrouille last Friday criticized the Baker proposal for not
solving the basic problems of debtor countries and asserted that under the initiative new
loans would be targeted toward increasing imports from creditor countries instead of
repaying the debt. Sourrouille also denied that Argentina had agreed to become a pilot
country for the initiative, according to press reports. He did indicate, however, that the
government would soon decide whether to join the Baker Plan.
In the meantime, Argentina's recession deepened with real manufacturing output
down 18 percent and GDP declining by 5 percent in the third quarter.
real wages dropped between 12 and 21 percent
during the May-October period. According to press reports, Buenos Aires hopes to lift
the 6-month-old wage freeze on wages before the end of the month. We doubt, however,
that an agreement acceptable to all parties can be reached. The labor unions are
demanding collective bargaining for wages but the government has indicated it will
approve salary increases only when they are justified by productivity gains.
Eastern Europe
Among the Eastern European countries, Poland made a $280 million principal
repayment to commercial banks-the first such repayment since reschedulings began in
1981, and Yugoslavia is scheduled to sign their bank rescheduling agreement this week.
Poland
Warsaw signed an agreement with the Paris Club on November 19 to reschedule
debt due in 1985 and presented creditors with revised projections of its financial
targets. The terms of the 1985 agreement were similar to the 1982-84 accord: a 10 year
rescheduling with a five-year grace period. The Poles lowered their target for a hard
currency surplus to $1.3 billion-a reduction of $200 million from the past plan, probably
because of a failure to sufficiently increase exports and control imports.
Poland paid about $280 million to commercial bank creditors last week, the first
principal repayment since reschedulings began in 1981. Warsaw announced it would
restrict hard currency imports in late November, probably to assure itself of sufficient
funds to cover payments. Poland also made a $220 million November interest payment to
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000608410001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000608410001-7
its Paris Club creditors. Polish negotiators, however, told government creditors that
they were unable to meet the payments due in the next several months. The Poles
requested a postponement of interest due on the 1982-84 debt worth $550 million and,
according to State Department reporting, the Poles speculated on how government
creditors could influence banks to provide Poland debt relief. The Paris Club agreed to
meet on December 17-18 to examine alternatives to handling moratorium interest under
the 1982-84 rescheduling and outlines for rescheduling 1986 payments.
Meanwhile, Poland continued to sign bilateral rescheduling agreements with
Western governments while lobbying for credits. Britain recently finalized a
rescheduling accord for the 1982-84 debt, while West Germany concluded a rescheduling
of payments due in 1985. France granted Warsaw $12 million in short-term loans and
held out the possibility of future medium term project credits.
Yugoslavia
The chairman of Yugoslavia's International Coordinating Committee informed
members that the recently negotiated bank rescheduling agreement will be signed on
17 December in Belgrade, The agreement 25X1
reschedules some $3.5 billion in commercial debt originally due in 1985-88. Belgrade will.
now seek a similar multiyear rescheduling agreement from official creditors when talks
begin next spring on $1.4 billion in debts falling due in 1986-88. However, Yugoslavia
does not intend to seek an IMF-supported program which is typically required for any
official rescheduling. 25X1
Yugoslavia will face difficulty sustaining last year's improvement in hard-currency
trade and payments. The US Embassy in Belgrade projects a $600 million hard currency
surplus-down from $865 million in 1984-that would leave Yugoslavia $50-$100 million
short of its IMF target for a $200 million increase in official reserves. Nonetheless, in a
recent review of Yugoslavia's performance under its standby program which expires in
May 1986, the Fund praised Belgrade's progress in correcting external imbalances this
year, despite weaker-than-projected economic performance. According to State
Department reporting, IMF Managing Director de Larosiere informed Paris Club
Chairman Trichet that the Fund believes official creditors should agree to a MYRA for
Yugoslavia when the current rescheduling expires. However, the Paris Club took the
position that any MYRA for Yugoslavia would have to be based on "full IMF
conditionality." 25X1
In Asia, the IMF Executive Board meets on 20 December to review the Philippines'
performance under its standby arrangement, and in Singapore the collapse of Pan-
Electric Industries forced the closure of the stock exchanges in Singapore and Kuala
Lumpur.
Philippines
The IMF Executive Board is scheduled to meet on 20 December and is expected to
formally approve the satisfactory completion of the Philipppines second standby review-
waiving the government's failure to meet end-September budget targets. In response to
revenue short-falls the Fund has nearly doubled the target for the government's yearend 25X1
budget deficit.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000608410001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000608410001-7
25X1
IMF approval would also pave the way for the second disbursement of
$175 million in new money from commercial banks. The IMF staff report indicates that
Manila's reform efforts improve the medium-term prospects for the economy, but further
reforms are needed in taxes, agricultural marketing monopolies, and financial
institutions. The Staff is also concerned that an economic recovery will not materialize
if exports fail to grow or business confidence remains low.
In addition to making progress with the Fund,
the largest public corporate borrowers will sign their rescheduling
agreements with commercial banks in January. The borrowers which account for about
$2.7 billion of the $3.7 billion in public sector debt due to be rescheduled include: the
Central Bank, National Power Corporation, Development Bank of the Philippines,
Philippine National Bank, Philippine Airlines, Philippine National Oil Company and the
National Investment and Development Corporation.
25X1
25X1
25X1
Singapore
Pan Electric Industries (Pan-El) headed by Malaysian politician-businessman Tan
Koon Swan slid into receivership on 30 November after salvage negotiations with 30
creditors collapsed. Reverberations from the collapse forced the Singapore and Kuala
Lumpur Stock Exchanges to close on 1 December; when trading in Singapore reopened on
F December share prices fell by 61 points. According to Embassy reporting, the
Monetary Authority of Singapore asked Singapore's four largest banks to develop a $85
million rescue package for several brokerage houses weakened by their Pan-El
involvement in order to prevent their collapse which authorities believed could trigger a
general financial crisis. The Pan-El problems underscore the fragility of the Singapore
financial market where vast amounts of transactions are done by brokerage houses on a
forward basis. When Pan-El's $600 million in forward commitments could not be met, it
threatened the brokerage houses themselves, thus jeopardizing the entire system. 25X1
Meanwhile, bankers are bracing themselves for new bankruptcies. According to
Embassy reporting, at least two large firms in real estate and general investments, in
addition to the aforementioned brokerage houses, are rumoured to be close to the edge.
The US Embassy concurs with local press reports which characterize the Pan-El affair as
the gravest in Singapore's financial history. 25X1
Africa/Middle East
In Africa, initial reaction among government leaders to the Baker Trust Fund
proposal is positive, Nigeria suspended negotiatons with the IMF, Sudan is in danger of
triggering a Brooke Amendment cutoff, and South Africa extended its moratorium on
most principal repayments until 31 March.
Reaction to Trust Fund Proposal
Initial African reaction to Treasury Secretary Baker's proposal to relend $2.7
billion of IMF Trust Fund reflows to the poorest developing nations has been generally
positive according to US Embassy reports from the region. Many of the eligible countries
concur with the proposal's goal of harmonizing IMF, World Bank, and bilateral assistance
programs, although some are wary of conditionality attached to the new funds. Several
countries' reactions revealed unfamiliarity with the details of the proposed program.
Kenyan and Zambian officials, for example, were concerned that assistance under the
Trust Fund program would be conditional on performance under other IMF and World
Bank aid agreements as well. Niger and Burkina Faso are concerned that increased dono25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000608410001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000608410001-7
coordination might further slow aid disbursements. Most African officials seem aware of
the Trust Fund proposal in a general way, but seek additional information and explanation
from the US and indicate they need to study it further before making recommendations
to their Fund and Bank executive directors.
South Africa
Pretoria last week extended its moratorium on most debt principal repayments
from 31 December until 31 March. At the same time, the country's initial debt
rescheduling plan-which proposed delaying until 1990 any repayment of the $14 billion in
debt currentl under the moratorium-was dismissed by bank creditors as unrealisitic,
according to US Embassy reporting. Ten key bank creditors 25X1
responded with their own proposal, however, calling for South Africa to remove medium-
term debts from the moratorium, and to repay 10 percent of short-term debts by yearend
1986. Creditors would then review the country's financial position to determine a
repayment plan for 1987. The banks' plan also suggests Pretoria consider a Paris Club
rescheduling of its $3.5 billion in foreign government-guaranteed debt. Pretoria has been
careful to avoid entangling foreign governments in the debt moratorium, however, and in
our view would accede only under extreme financial pressure. 25X1
The next formal meeting between South African officials and bank creditors
probably will occur after President Botha opens parliament on 31 January. If Botha's
opening speech lacks expected political reform announcements, debt negotiations would
be set back, but probably not scuttled. Meanwhile, South Africa is keeping current on
interest payments to bank creditors, and on all payments on debts excluded from the
moratorium, 25X1
Nigeria
President Babangida announced last week that Nigeria was suspending negotiations
with the IMF. Babangida stated that the public debate he initiated after seizing power in
August convinced him that Nigerians overwhelmingly favor a go-it-alone strategy. As a
result of the decision, Western bankers already are cutting trade credits, and France and
the UK have rejected proposals to bilaterally reschedule official debts,
Some bankers fear Lagos may declare a debt moratorium but
Babangida probably will press initially for a rescheduling agreement with commercial
banks. Lagos has serviced medium- and long-term debt on schedule, but has accumulated
as much as $9 billion in short-term debt arrears since 1983. Debt service policy probably
will be announced during this month's presentation of the 1986 budget.
Even a commercial debt rescheduling probably will not solve Nigeria's economic
problems. The boost in oil production will temporarily ease Nigeria's financial problems,
but the decline in world oil prices projected as a result of OPEC's recent decisions may
slice export revenues by over 25 percent next year. Thus, although Babangida has
avoided the short term costs of implementing a politically unpopular IMF program, he
.still will face domestic discontent as incomes continue to decline and unemployment
rises.
Unless the Sudanese government acts promptly, its inability or unwillingness to
pay about $2.5 million in debt obligations will trigger a December 31 Brooke Amendment
cutoff of all US assistance. Khartoum had, according to US Embassy reporting, hoped to
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000608410001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000608410001-7
postpone repayment until a Paris Club rescheduling substantially reduced the amount
due. No rescheduling agreement is possible, however, before the December 31 cutoff
date, and is highly unlikely by February 11 when another $5.5 million in US debt becomes
one year overdue. Khartoum may be testing the United States' resolve to actually
enforce a Brooke Amendment cutoff. Meanwhile, disarray within the civilian Cabinet
has thus far precluded approval of a much watered-down economic reform program that
had received tentative acceptance from the IMF. Unless Khartoum makes an eleventh-
hour commitment to the economic program, or makes some repayment against its $220
million arrears to the IMF, on 3 January the Fund may well declare Sudan ineligible to
use Fund credit.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000608410001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000608410001-7 25X1
o Panama, Peru pushing strongly for Latin American presidential summit...
agenda to feature debt issue. ..'Brazil Mexico tentatively to attend, but
Argentine response cool so far. 25X1
o SELA ministerial meeting focused on debt ...canmunique criticized 1W
conditionality, developed country "protectionism"...urged more financial
assistance to developing countries. 25X1
o Banking experts from Latin American, European countries and multilateral
institutions conferred on debt issue in Guatemala recently... Costa Rica
also hosted ministerial-level meeting of smaller Latin debtors last
week... President Monge urged pressure for new international econanic
order. F I 25X1
o Bolivia has submitted a letter of intent to the 1W.. .expects to sign a
$50 million standby agreement early next year...LaPaz has agreed to
supplement its anti-inflation program with fiscal reforms, including its
first official budget in four years. 25X1
o Chile received $520 million of its $785 million new money facility...two
government-owned Italian banks that had delayed the loan signed early this
month... the remaining $265 million will be disbursed during 1986 and tied
to IMF documents. 25X1
o Colanbia has obtained a $1 billion loan fran cammercial creditors... helps
cover impending $300 million foreign exchange gap.. .will also enable Bogota
to meet its December IMF targets. 25X1
Europe
o Hungary signed a $400 million loan package... priced at LIBOR plus 0.375
percentage point for the first 3 years, LIBOR plus 0.50 percentage point
for remaining 4 years... includes first note issuance facility (NIF) for a
CIRVIA member... slowness of syndication reflects bankers' concerns over
riskiness of NIF and level of Hungarian borrowing.
o Article IV for Hungary... IMF endorsed Budapest's intent to give priority to
achieving external balance...also urged reduced subsidies, tighter credit
policy, exchange-rate adjustment... advocated introduction of personal
incame and value-added taxes. ~I 25X1
o Romania arranging a $150-million five-year loan fran a group of Arab
banks... follows closely on $150 million s ndicated loan signed last
week.. .will be used to increase imports.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000608410001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000608410001-7 25X1
o The Bank of 'Thailand will intervene in currency markets...will hold the
baht to approximately 27 baht to $1...designed to protect gains made in
November 84 devaluation which were being eroded by the weakening US
dollar.
Africa/Middle East
o QAU Chairman and Senegalese President Diouf to contact African leaders on
possible African debt conference... might approach leaders at April INF 25X1
Development Ccnmittee meeting ...press reports say French President
Mitterrand supports African debt meeting.
2bX1
o Nbrocco missed its first payment due on 6 December under its October 22
London Club rescheduling...unable to make the $83 million payment because
of foreign exchange shorta es... Morocco's reserves stand
at less than $50 million. 25X1
o Senegal's imperiled IWVF program was probably saved by recent adjustment of
performance targets and French emergency aid...allowed six months to
paydown $27 million in external arrears...INF mission canpleting final
program review in Dakar this week. FI 25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000608410001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP85T01058R000608410001-7
APPENDIX
Selected LDC Debtors: Trade Performances, 1984-85
Billion US Dollars
Exports (fob)
Change
1984
1985 (est.)
(percent)
Argentina)
5.5
5.2
-6
Brazil.
22.3
20.8
-7
Chile
2.6
2.6
0
Colombia2
2.0
2.2
10
Indonesit
20.8
19.0
-9
Malays~ia
7.9
7.6
-4
Mexico
20.0
17.9
-10
Nigeria
11.2
11.3
1
Peru
3.3
3.0
-9
Philippines4
2.6
2.3
-12
South Korea
29.3
29.5
1
Thailand
7.3
7.1
-3
Venezuela
15.9
13.7
-14
Imports (fob)
Change
1984
1985 (est.)
(percent)
Argentina)
2.2
2.0
-9
Brazi
11.4
10.5
-8
Chile
1.8
1.5
-17
Colombia2
2.7
1.9
-42
Indonesil
15.3
14.0
-8
Malaysia
6.2
5.9
-5
Mexico
9.6
11.6
21
Nigeria
9.5
8.5
-11
Peru
2.6
1.9
-27
Philippines4
2.9
2.6
-10
South Korea
28.4
27.3
-4
Thailand
9.3
9.5
2
Venezuela
7.8
7.5
-4
------------
'Data for January to July only.
2Data for January to October only.
3Data for January to August only.
4Data for January to June only.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP85T01058R000608410001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP85T01058R000608410001-7
Trade Balances
1984
1985 (est.)
Change
Argent nal
3.3
3.2
-0.1
Brazi
10.9
10.3
-0.6
Chile
0.8
1.1
0.3
Colombia2
-0.7
0.3
1.0
Indonesil
5.5
5.0
-0.5
Malaysia
1.7
1.7
0
Mexico
10.4
6.3
-4.1
Nigeria
1.7
2.8
1.1
Peru
0.7
1.1
0.4
Philippines4
-0.3
-0.3
0
South Korea
0.9
2.2
1.3
Thailand
-2.0
-2.4
-0.4
Venezuela
8.1
6.2
-1.9
------------
lData for January to July only.
2Data for January to October only.
3Data for January to August only.
4Data for January to June only.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP85T01058R000608410001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000608410001-7
25X1
SUBJECT: International Financial Situation Report #47I I19 Decanter 1985
Copy No. t Sec. James Baker Treasury
2 R. G. Darman
2 James W. Conrow
4 Robert Cornell
5 James E. Amierman
6 Charles Schotta
James A. Griffin
8 Doug Mulholland
9 Manuel Johnson
10 Robert M. Kinmi t
1.1. David Mulford
13 John C. Whitehead
14 Murton I. Abramowitz
12 Sec. George Shultz State
15 Michael Armacost
16 Ralph Lindstran
29 David Wigg
27
28
22 Paul Wolfowitz
23 Richard Murphy
24 Harry Gilmore
25 Byron Jackson
26 S. Bruce Smart
17 W. Allen Wallis
1.8 Elliot Abrams
19 Rozanne Ridgway
20 Douglas McMinn
21 Chester Crocker
30 Stephen Danzansky
31 Randall Fort
32 Leo Cherne
33 David Tarbell
34 DCI
3S ExDir
36 SA/DDCI
37 DDI
38 ADDI
39 Ch/PES/DDI
40 NIO Econanics
41 DDO
42 Ch/DDO/EPDS
43 Ch/BDO/NCD
44 (a /DDO/AF
45 C'h /DDO/EA
46 Ch/DDO/EUR
47 Ch/DDO/LA
1 - Steve Farrar, CNB
1 - William Isaac, Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation
1 - Beryl Sprinkel, CEA
1 - Ch/ECD
1- Ch/BCD/Fl
1 - Ch /ECD/T
1 - Ch /ECD/DI
1 - C h /EC D/QVI
25X1
48 Ch/DDO/NE
49 Ch /I.7DO/SE
50 D/ALA
51 Cn /ALA/SAD
52 D/OEA
53 D/EURA
54 Ch/EURA/EE/EW
55 D/SOVA
56 D/NESA
57 tD/OGI, D/OGI
58 Ch/OGI/SRD
59 Ch/OGI/FSIC
60 Ch/OGI/ECD
61-62 Ch/OGI/ECD/FI
63
64 CPAS ISS SA DA
65 Ch /OGI /Pub
66-68 GGI/Pub
69-74 CPAS/I U/CB 6W70
25X1
crttl a&
C.anne rce
11
1 - Edwin Truman, Federal Reserve Board
1 - Henry Wallich, Federal Reserve Board
1 - David Roberts, Federal Reserve,
New York
1 - Leo Cherne, PFIAB, New York
It
1 - E. Gerald Corrigan, President,
Federal Reserve Bank, New York
PFIAB
1 - Alan Greenspan,
PFIAB
Townsend, Greenspan and Co.
06D (ISA)
2 - Doug :Mulholland, Treasury
1 - Roland Kuchel, State
1 - Lauralee Peters, State
1 - Peter W. Rodman, State
5 - Byron Jackson, Caimerce
1 - Warren E. Farb, Cammerce
1 - DIA 25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000608410001-7