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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000608080001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 19, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Pl&.nncaosos
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
November 1985
Gorbachev's Foreign Policy Team: Implications for the US
Summary
By transferring Gromyko to the Presidency last
July, Gorbachev boldly demonstrated his intention to
take control of foreign policy. The General Secretary
has begun to surround himself with individuals willing
to re-examine past policies and project an innovative
and forward looking stance. -In contrast to Gromyko--
whose fixation on -Saylet elations and reputation
for inflexibility led to his removal--
Foreign Minister appears more willing to
support regional initiatives, not only for their own
sake but in order to gain the Soviet Union added
leverage vis-a-vis the US. While the Soviets have not
made any dramatic policy departures, we have already
seen a revitalized foreign policy effort, with new
overtures to the US, West Europe and Asia.
Despite Gorbachev's desire to pursue a more
"balanced" foreign policy, managing relations with the
US continues to be the leadership's first priority.
Gorbachev's initial foreign policy actions appear
designed to strengthen pressures for change in US
policy by creating the impression of a more flexible
Soviet diplomacy and forging closer relations with key
US allies in Europe and Asia.
This paper was prepared byl Ithe Domestic Policy Division,
Office of Soviet Analysis with a contribution from USSR/EE Division/OCR.
Comments and questions may be directed to the
Chief, Domestic Policy Division
SOVA M- 85-10198X
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Gorbachev has begun to assemble a foreign policy
team whose training, career experiences and knowledge
of the US political scene should enable them to react
more quickly to US moves and maneuver with more skill
to exploit perceived weaknesses. Several personnel
changes Gorbachev desires have yet to materialize, and
we could see a pick-up in the pace of turnover after
his meeting with President Reagan.
Taking Control of Foreign Policy
With the replacement of Andrey Gromyko as foreign minister,
Gorbachev signaled his intent to control the foreign as well as
the domestic policy process.
Gromyko's activities since assuming the Presidency confirm a
loss of political influence and a move to the policy sidelines.
Although he accompanied Gorbachev to the Warsaw Pact meetings in
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October, Gromyko's substantive responsibilities as President have
been limited and his public appearances confined to
routine ceremonial occasions.
Gromyko failed to head the Soviet
delegation to the UN's anniversary ceremonies in New York--a
tailormade opportunity to demonstrate continued visibility as a
foreign policy spokesman. He did not participate in substantive
discussions when the President of Finland visited the Soviet
Union in September, something Nikolay Podgornyy--the last
President who was not also General Secretary--had routinely
done.
Shevardnadze's Impact at the MFA
From the vantage point of establishing political control and
signaling a new era In Soviet diplomatic relations,
Shevardnadze's appointment as Foreign Minister may prove to be a
masterstroke.
Shevardnadze can be expected to con uct
foreign policy in accordance with Gorbachev's wishes. The two
men a arentl have close personal ties--shevaranaaze
has known the General Secretary
for a long time. he
holds Gorbachev in very high esteem an looks to m or policy
direction. Unlike Gromyko, who under a series of ailing General
Secretaries greatly expanded his foreign policy decision making
role, Shevardnadze will
adhere strictly to policy guidelines laid down by the General
Secretary.
Shevardnadze also appears better suited than Gromyko--both
by background and training--to support Gorbachev's regional
initiatives. In contrast to Gromyko, Shevardnadze's career
involvement has been primarily with the Third world. He has
served on the presidium of the Soviet Committee for solidarity
with Asian and African countries since 1958 and visited Algeria,
Brazil, India and Tunisia.
Shevardnadze's personal style is also in tune with the new
leadership. Gorbachev views
Shevardnadze as able to project Soviet policy with more flair and
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I I
polish than Gromyko. Shevardnadze's demonstrated sensitivity to
public opinion while serving as party chief in Georgia, and his
obvious skill in using the media, will contribute to the effort
to repackage Soviet foreign policy initiatives to gain them a
more receptive hearing in the West.
exchanges with the Soviets are more
free-flowing than under Gromyko and relatively lacking in
ideological harangues--though so far no less inflexible on
substance.
Institutional Rivalries
Gromyko's removal and the fluid policy situation under
Gorbachev have renewed institutional rivalries for influence
among the foreign ministry, the Central Committee departments and
the academic institutes. Some accounts suggest that the new
General Secretary is less concerned with the issue of
bureaucratic turf--picking and choosing among individuals
regardless of institutional affiliation in order to frame the
most effective policy response.
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Gorbachev's Americanists
Americanists are prominent among the handful of foreign
policy officials we can so far link to Gorbachev. While they do
not appear united in their assessment of the long-term prospects
for US-Soviet relations, as a group they appear to share a
relatively sophisticated understanding of the US political
scene.
-- The only additional personnel move in the foreign
ministry announced so far is the September appointment
of Sergey Tarasenko as a special advisor
Shevar na ze. n May 1984, Tarasenko
it clear he did not always agree with the foreign
minister on superpower relations.
-- After a period of political eclipse during Chernenko's
reign, Georgiy Arbatov has reemerged as one of
Gorbachev 's mos mportant advisers. His appearance
next to the General Secretary at the recent Time
interview is one indicator of his improved political
status. Arbatov's commentaries are appearing with
renewed freauencv in the Soviet media and
Aleksandr Yakovlev (a former ambassador to Canada, now
heading the Cen ra Committee Propaganda Department) is
reportedly close to Gorbachev and advises him on a range
of foreign policy issues. Yakovlev apparently made a
favorable impression on Gorbachev while serving as his
official host during a 1983 visit to Canada, returning
to head the World Economics and International Relations
Institute only 2 weeks later. Yakovlev's rising
influence was apparent when he subsequently accompanied
Gorbachev to England in December 1984. His recent
promotion to head the Central Committee Propaganda
Department and the fact that he will accompany Gorbachev
to Geneva underscore his close professional relationship
with the General Secretary. Gorbachev's tough public
rhetoric and continuing attacks on the Reagan
administration may in part reflect Yakovlev's counsel.
Yakovlev has been openly skeptical that US domestic
political trends will lead to any moderation of Reagan
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Administration policy toward the USSR in the near
future. Yakovlev's new post, moreover, places him in a
good position to wage a public relations effort against
the US.
In the only other major foreign policy appointment, Yevgeniy
Primakov, former director of the Oriental Institute, was named in
November to head the senior foreign affairs think tank, the World
Economics and International Relations Institute (IMEMO). He
reportedly has close professional and both' personal ties to Yakovlev and Arbatov.
While not an
Americanise --his area of expertise is the Mid-east--Primakov
aDDears share the 7up's extensive knowledge of the West.
he will follow Gorbachev's lead in
pursuing more creative approaches to dealing with the mid-East.
Anatoliy Gromyko, son of the former Foreign Minister, who
now heads the Africa Institute was also rumored to be in the
running for the IMEMO post. His failure to get the top spot is
yet another indication that the political power of his father has
declined.
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Implications for the United States
Gorbachev came into
office intending to end the MFA's alleged "fixation" on relations
with the US and introduce more balance into Soviet foreign
diplomacy. The removal of Gromyko--who was associated in Moscow
with a US-centric diplomacy--strengthened the impression that
Gorbachev intended to shift to a more "balanced" foreign
policy.
The regime's first steps suggest that Gorbachev in fact is
encouraging an era of renewed diplomatic activity toward Europe,
Asia and perhaps other parts of the Third World. But these steps
have been accompanied by an apparent re-examination of past
approaches towards the United States as well--a more effective
public relations toward the US, a renewed effort to engage the US
on a range of bilateral issues, and a series of arms control
proposals that contain provisions going beyond what his
predecessors were prepared to offer.
Even the regime's initiatives toward Europe and Asia may be
motivated in part by Gorbachev's desire to move the US-Soviet
relationship off dead center.
The foreign policy officials we can identify with Gorbachev,
moreover, also point to a continuing focus on the US
relationship. They appear uniquely suited by training and career
experience to provide the General Secretary with new options for
dealing with the US.
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