RELIGIOUS DISSENT AND THE CHRONICLE OF THE UKRAINIAN CATHOLIC CHURCH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000508010001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 25, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 17, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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 DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
17 October 1985
Religious Dissent and The Chronicle
of the Ukrainian Catholic ur-h
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Summary
The appearance in early 1984 of a Soviet
underground journal, The Chronicle of the Ukrainian
Catholic Church--which began to reach the West on y
s anuary-- as provided a valuable new source of
Information on the activities of Ukrainian Catholics
and on the regime's tactics in attempting to
discredit the church and its leaders. Although
questions have been raised about the sponsorship of
the Chronicle, it appears to be an authentic
The increased activism on the part of Ukrainian
Catholics revealed by the Chronicle is part of a
larger burgeoning of religion taki-ng place in the
USSR today. Ukrainian Catholic activism, however,
poses special problems for the regime, because of
the Ukrainian church's ties to Rome and historical
association with Ukrainian national feeling. Over
the past several years, the onset of unrest in
Poland and the election of a Slavic Pope have
increased regime concern that external influences
could spur greater dissent among Ukrainian
dissident pub ication.
Catholics.
or to the Chief, Domestic Policy Division,
Soviet Analysis. Comments and questions may be directed to the author
This paper was prepared byl Ithe Office of
SOVA M- 85-10185
25X1
25X1
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The regime has reacted to the Chronicle's
appearance by harshly repressing most of ose known
to be involved in its publication. Ukrainian
Catholicism has such a large popular base in Western
Ukraine, however, that continued agitation among the
church's adherents is likely. This activism will
continue to be a thorn in the regime's side,
impeding efforts to Sovietize and Russify Western
Ukraine.
Background
Since early 1985, nine issues of a new Soviet underground
(samizdat) journal, The Chronicle of the Ukrainian Catholic
Church, have reached the United tates. tenth issue was
reportedly confiscated by Soviet authorities, but a three-page
version of it arrived in the United States this October. The
issues do not bear publication dates but from their contents can
be dated between early 1984 and January 1985. The Chronicle is a
valuable source of information both on recently revived ac ivism
among Ukrainian Catholics--probably the largest religious group
without legal sanction in the USSR--and on the regime's modus
operandi in dealing with the church. It is also important as a
tribune from which Ukrainian religious dissenters appeal to
foreign and domestic audiences for support.
The Soviet Regime and the Ukrainian Catholic Church
Regime repression of Ukrainian Catholicism has reflected the
close connection between Soviet ecclesiastical and nationality
policies. The regime's perception of an invidious tie between
religion and nationalism in the USSR--linking Islam with
nationalism in Central Asia and the Roman Catholic Church with
Lithuanian nationalism, for example--is strengthened in the case
of Ukrainian Catholicism by the long history of open church,
support for Ukrainian separatist movements. Over the last
several years, the regime has intensified efforts to liquidate
the Ukrainian Catholic Church, probably reflecting increased
official concern about Ukrainian susceptibility to Papal and
Polish influences.
The Ukrainian Catholic Church (also known as the Uniate
Church), which recognizes Papal authority but observes Eastern
rites, has traditionally been the main symbol of Ukrainian
national identity--particularly in the Western regions of
Ukraine. The church played an important role in popular efforts
to resist polonization of the Western Ukrainian community before
World War II, when Western Ukraine was under Polish rule.
Following Soviet annexation of the region in 1939, Ukrainian
Catholics were active in the armed resistance to Soviet power
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during the 1940's and 1950's. This resistance was spurred in
part by the regime's postwar decision to outlaw the Ukrainian
Catholic Church, forcing its adherents to choose between
incorporation into the Russian Orthodox Church or forming
large Ukrainian minority and a vigorous legal Catholic Church.
The Uniate Church probably continues to this day to command
the allegiance of the bulk of the population in Western
Ukraine. There are no available statistics on the size of the
underground church, but Western estimates of the number of Uniate
believers range from four to five million. Published Soviet
sources indicate that Ukraine has a higher percentage of
believers than any other Soviet republic and that this percentage
doubles in the western oblasts bordering Poland, which has a
underground congregations.
Because of the religious, ethnic, and cultural affinity
between Western Ukraine and Poland, the Soviet regime has always
been sensitive to the problem of a spillover of political and
religious influences. Soviet fears of contagion intensified with
the onset of unrest in Poland in 1979. Reporting from Western
Ukraine in 1980-81 indicated a high level of interest--especially
among young people--in developments in Poland, which Ukrainians
were able to follow by watching Polish television. Scattered
strikes reportedly occurred in several Western Ukrainian cities
during this period.
The election of a Polish Pope in 1979 contributed to the
concern of Soviet authorities, who have been apprehensive that
Pope John Paul II's vocal support of the Uniate Church would open
the door to increased external influences on Ukraine. The Pope
increased Radio Vatican's broadcasting time in Slavic languages,
appointed East Europeans to several important positions in the
Vatican hierarchy, and in 1979 sent a letter of support to the
head of the Uniate Church. In his most recent statement on the
subject, in early October, Pope John Paul II told a synod of the
Ukrainian Catholic Church in exile that the Ukrainian Church
"was, and is, unjustly treated and persecuted" and that as a
The Ukrainian Catholic Church's affiliation with Rome
enables it to maintain direct contact with the international
church and, through it, to communicate with Western political and
social organizations and with the numerous congregations of
Ukrainian Catholics in the emigre community. The Ukrainian
Church throughout the world is led in Rome by its own cardinal.
Until September 1984 this position was occupied by Josyf Slipyj,
whose uncompromising stand on the integrity of the Ukrainian
Church and support for Ukrainian national aspirations made him
fellow Slav he shared its leaders' grief.
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anathema to the Soviet regime, which exiled him to Rome in 1963
after imprisoning him in the USSR for eighteen years. In May
1985, following Slipyj's death, 70-year-old Myroslav Ivan
Cardinal Lubachivsky--a naturalized United States citizen who was
born in the Ukraine and left the Soviet Union in 1938--was named
to replace him. 25X1
Soviet authorities are attempting to take advantage of
Slipyj's death to press harder for a severing of Uniate ties to
Rome and the absorption of Ukrainian Catholics into the more
malleable Russian Orthodox Church. In the fall of 1984,
Ukrainian party chief Shcherbitskiy announced that the party
planned to strengthen significantly its efforts to suppress
"religious fanaticism," and propagandists have stepped up attacks
on the Uniates.
These intensified attempts to bring the Uniates to heel are
consistent with growing regime concern not only about Ukrainian
Catholicism but also about the recent growth of religion
generally in the USSR, particularly among the young. In the
1980s there has been an upsurge in reports of harrassment and
arrests of Soviet religious dissidents of all faiths, suggesting
that the leadership has mandated a more aggressive policy in
dealing with activists of all sects.
Regime repression, however, is not indiscriminate. Official
policy makes distinctions among sects, favoring relatively
subservient denominations. The Russian Orthodox Church, in
particular, is given a preferred status. Closely supervised by
the regime and penetrated by the KGB, it serves both as an
instrument of Russian imperialism and as a symbol of the Russian
national heritage. Thus, the regime has evidently decided to use
the Russian Orthodox Church in an effort to subsume the upcoming
commemoration of an important milestone both in Christian and in
Ukrainian history into a Russian national observance. The event
is the 1988 celebration of the millenium of the adoption of
Christianity as the state religion by the medieval principality
of Kievan Rus, which was centered in present-day Ukraine. Soviet
authorities are playing up the Russian Orthodox Church as the
successor of the early church to ensure that it dominates the
celebration and to downgrade any Ukrainian Catholic role or
visibility.
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The History of the Chronicle
These increased regime efforts to coopt or control Ukrainian
Catholicism are in part a reflection and in part a cause of he
heightened Uniate activism that the Chronicle represents. 25X1
The Chronicle, which is published by the Action Group for
the Defense of the Rights of Believers and the Church, first
appeared in Ukraine at the beginning of 1984. The Central
Committee of Ukrainian Catholics probably was formed in early
1982 and the Action Group set up in September of that year by
five Ukrainian Catholics. The Action Group in turn was very
likely modeled on the Lithuanian Catholic Committee for the
Defense of Religious Rights, formed in 1978. The Action Group's
stated goal is legalization of the Uniate Church and an end to
anti-Catholic propaganda campaigns. The Group described the
Chronicle, in a letter to the Central Committee of the Ukrainian
Communist Party announcing formation of the new organization, as
a response to increasing repression against the Ukrainian
Catholic Church. 25X1
The regime was not long in acting. Within a few months of
the Chronicle's appearance, the regime moved against the three
most visible of its five organizers.
-- In November 1984, the secretary of the Action Group, 85-
year-old Father Hryhorii Budzins'kyi was arrested and
was later reported to have been confined briefly in a
mental hospital.
-- At about the same time, Vasyl' Kobryn, chairman of -the
Action Group since the end of 1983, was arrested and
charged with "dissemination of knowingly false
fabrications discrediting the Soviet political and
social system." In March 1985 Kobryn was sentenced to
three years in a labor camp for "anti-Soviet slander."
Yosyp Terelia, first chairman of the Action Group and
the person probably most responsible for the compilation
of the issues of the Chronicle that have reached the
West, went into hiding in November of 1984 after
authorities searched his home in the Lvov region
Western Ukraine. Earlier Terelia had ignored a
to report for questioning. In February 1985 he
of
summons
was 25X1
arrested for "anti-Soviet activity"
25X1
25X1
letters apparently written to his ami y from pr
ison not
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long after his arrest, Terelia reported that his KGB
interrogators had questioned him in particular about the
manner in which copies of the Chronicle left the Soviet
Union.
The Chronicle ceased appearing for several months after
January 1485, an the ninth issue--which reached the West in
May--was widely feared to be the last. However, the recent
appearance of Number 10 containing January 1985 information
indicates that the Action Group may still be active despite the
imprisonment of the original leaders. Since there has been a
considerable time lag between the printing of issues and their
appearance in the West, it is possible that the Chronicle is
still being produced and that other issues will make their way to
the West.
Contents of the Chronicle
The Chronicle publishes on a broad array of secular and
ecclesiastics topics, intermingling informational items about
social, political and church-related events in Ukraine with
programmatic statements and appeals to foreign governments and
groups. This mixing of genres and issues probably intensifies
regime anxiety because it demonstrates graphically the close
linkage of Ukrainian nationalist activism with the Catholic
Church in the republic, as well as the spiritual bond Ukrainian
The primary focus of the publication and its main function
is to publicize activities of believers and punitive official
actions against Ukrainian Catholic activists in Western
Ukraine. These informational accounts of specific events are
Catholics feel for foreign supporters.
often presented in great detail with respect to date and
location, names and job titles of those involved, and the precise
treatment of dissenters. In addition, material is published on
numbers of believers by denomination and the conditions under
which they are held, and often tortured, in prisons, labor camps
and psychiatric hospitals. Some items glorify religious
martyrdom and report incidents in the lives of those who have
chosen to suffer persecution for the sake of their beliefs. The
Chronicle provides, as well, evidence of the continued vitality
of religious practice, reporting--for example--a fully
operational three-year monastery school for children in
Transcarpathian Ukraine, and ordination of 81 priests in that
F__ I
The Chronicle thus acts as an information bulletin or
newspaper for interested audiences abroad and presumably for
local believers and sympathizers. Several issues have been
almost entirely devoted to copies of letters, autobiographical
region during the past three years.
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and biographical sketches, recorded court proceedings, and other
documents. The letters in, particular--most of which are first-
hand accounts of incidents of repression or conditions of
confinement--are probably the most prompt and efficient method of
relaying information to a broad audience, given the difficult
conditions under which Soviet samizdat is published and
circulated. Other informational items include instructions on
what to do during a search or arrest, and acknowledgments of
prisoners' birthdays and major religious and national
anniversaries.
The Chronicle evidently tries to build a substantial and
systematic body o evidence to document the extent and nature of
regime repression, publicizing the identities of the perpetrators
as well as of the victims, as a basis for continuing activism. A
handwritten statement by Yosyp Terelia at the end of the eighth
issue informed readers that the journal's printing machines had
been confiscated but that every effort must be made to continue
to publish some kind of reports--with particular attention to
such details as full names (unless publication of the last names
of believers would endanger them). In an apparent attempt to
enlist support from other denominations, the Chronicle also
includes detailed incident reports of persecution o aptists,
Jehovah's Witnesses, Russian Orthodox, Lithuanian Catholics, and
Pentecostals.
The Chronicle records the regime's resort to extreme
propaganda charges against the Vatican and local Uniates--who are
portrayed as neo-fascists, bourgeois nationalists and traitors to
the Soviet fatherland. For example, the Chronicle has claimed
that the regime has conducted propaganda campaigns designed to
"unmask" Action Group members as KGB agents, and to discredit all
Ukrainian Catholics by claiming that a radical sub-group of the
sect--the Uniate Repentants--was really made up of KGB agents.
In fact, the Soviet media have paid considerable attention to
this group, describing it as a fanatical sect tightly bound up
with Ukrainian nationalism.
The Chronicle also has reported regime attempts to push an
institutional so ution to the Uniate problem. According to one
issue of the Chronicle, Father Budzins'kyi was approached by
officials from the republic Council for Religious Affairs
responsible for the Lvov Oblast, who told him that the time had
come for Ukrainian Catholics to "begin a dialogue with the
authorities" and asked him to tell them exactly what the Action
Group wants. Another Chronicle issue reported at length a
meeting between Terelia and four republic officials, who floated
the idea of severing the Ukrainian Catholic Church from Rome.
They reportedly assured Terelia that if the Church did this, came
"out from underground" and registered with the Council for
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Religious Affairs, it would be allowed to function legally in the
Soviet Union. The Chronicle declared that such a "clear
provocation" could not be considered. 25X1
Another major type of material published in the Chronicle is
the open appeal for support. These letters and petitions--intended
as part of a campaign to enlist the aid of foreign governments
and influential groups--have been addressed to such diverse
recipients as Lech Walesa, the President and Knesset of Israel,
the Austrian Catholic Central Committee,
President Reagan
,
Ukrainian Emigration," and "Christians of the World." 25X1
These appeals attest to the deep spiritual and political
affinity which Ukrainian Catholics feel for such groups. For
example, one issue of the Chronicle included a letter, from
Terelia to Walesa, which praised t Fe leaders of the Polish
workers' movement and Catholic Church and charged that what the
"present rulers in Moscow fear so much" is the "solidarity of all
Christians." The same issue published an open letter from
Terelia to the Government of Israel in which he asked for Israeli-
citizenship. Terelia enclosed a copy of this appeal in a letter
to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in which he
renounced his Soviet citizenship. 25X1
The Chronicle also reports on secular developments relating
to the Ukrainian human rights movement and popular opposition to
the war in Afghanistan. Several reports reflect a popular
perception and resentment in Ukraine of a disproportionately
large number of local recuits being forced to serve in the
Afghanistan war. One issue of the Chronicle printed a June 1984
protest of the exploitation of Ukrainians in military action
beyond Soviet borders, signed by the three leading members of the
Action Group and addressed to then Minister of Defense Dmitni
Ustinov. Also included was an item providing statistics and
details of casualties suffered by Soviet troops in the war. 25X1
The journal documents considerable civil resistance,
reporting that at the end of 1983 as many as 520 Ukrainian
Catholics burned their internal passports and refused any
contacts with officials--whom they consider representatives of a
regime hostile to Christianity. According to the Chronicle,
since January 1984, 920 additional passports have been given up
in Western Ukraine. 25X1
The Question of Authenticity
It is impossible to determine for certain whether the
Chronicle is an authentic samizdat journal or a KGB
provocation. The central issues pertaining to the question of
authenticity revolve around Terelia's role, the openness with
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which the Chronicle documents its cases, and the perennial rumors
of KGB infiltration.
A major question regarding the Chronicle's legitimacy
centers on the personal credibility o Yosyp Terelia, who has
spent eighteen of his forty-two years in labor camps and
psychiatric hospitals. Terelia's emergence as the primary voice
of the Chronicle was sudden. He is not known to have been a
vocal member of-any religious or human rights movement prior to
1982, and some Western observers are consequently skeptical that
he is a bona fide dissident. However, there are some persuasive
reasons to believe that Terelia is a sincere spokesman for his
cause. There is evidence of an association between Terelia and
Mykola Rudenko, leader of the dissident Ukrainian Helsinki Watch
Group that was founded in 1976. In the June 1977 court
proceedings on the Rudenko case, Terelia was said to have
provided Rudenko with "anti-Soviet" documents, and Helsinki Group
samlzdat mentioned that Terelia was repressed for having contacts
with the group.
Terelia's conversation with representatives of the Soviet
regime, and his rejection of their proposal for registration and
legalization of an autocephalous Ukrainian Uniate Church,
reported in the Chronicle, raise questions about his motivation--
since legalization of the church has been a goal of the Action
Group. However, he may well have judged the severing of ties
with Rome and the consequent loss of a protective voice in the
West to be too high a price to pay, as have most Ukrainian
Catholics in the past. In any event, the Action Group would have
scant reason to trust the state's willingness to honor its part
of such a bargain once the link to Rome had been broken.
It has been argued that a bona fide samizdat publication
would not reveal names of dissidents and specifics of their
activities on the grounds that such disclosures unnecessarily
increase their vulnerability, setting them up for arrest.
Nevertheless, publications of other dissident groups have also
revealed identities of activists, despite the danger of playing
into the hands of the authorities. During the Brezhnev period
many dissident groups felt protected by their very visibility,
which drew attention from the West. Today, the decision to
publicize activities may also reflect desperation and an
acceptance of martyrdom--which is characteristic of religious
dissidents among Pentecostal and Baptist groups as well as among
Ukrainian Catholics.
The absence of any hard evidence that the Chronicle
circulates in Ukraine is not a telling argument against its
authenticity. A number of other dissident groups also refrain
from circulating their samizdat publications internally due to
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repression and instead send them directly to the West. In fact,
there has been a pronounced trend over the past two or three
years for dissidents to send their writings directly to the West,
counting on Western radios to broadcast the contents back into
the USSR.
Some emigres and members of other dissident groups are
suspicious that the Action Group is controlled or infiltrated by
the KGB. It is certainly conceivable that the regime wants to
publicize activities of religious believers to lay the groundwork
for legal action against them, or to put out bogus documents
purporting to demonstrate the treasonous character of Catholic
dissent, its collaboration with foreign elements attempting to
subvert the USSR internally, and its support for Ukrainian
separatism.
On the other hand, the necessity of operating clandestinely
makes most Soviet dissident groups vulnerable to charges of KGB
collaboration. Such charges are hardly unique to the
Chronicle. The Chronicle itself has reported that the KGB has
attempted to di scre t t Fe Action Group by spreading rumors of a
"KGB connection." Moreover, the KGB would be playing a risky
game to engage in such an elaborate provocation, which could have
the effect of stimulating heightened religious activism among the
heavily Catholic population of Western Ukraine.
Conclusions
Assuming the Chronicle's authenticity, its appearance in the
face of repression testifies to the vitality of Catholic dissent
in Ukraine. The Chronicle reveals more fully than any other
current source the tren toward defiance of state authority among
some Ukrainian Catholic believers today. The regime's sharp
reaction to the Chronicle, in turn, testifies to the seriousness
with which Soviet leaders regard this dissent.
As long as Ukrainian Catholics refuse to accept the
strictures on religious activity (breaking the tie to Rome,
prohibition on proselytizing or giving religious instruction to
children) that legalization would require, the regime will
continue its differentiated policy of harshly repressing the most
active Uniate leaders, while offering blandishments of legality
on its own terms. Soviet success in curtailing Ukrainian
Catholic dissent will depend to a considerable extent on factors
beyond the regime's direct control--whether or not the situation
in Poland remains stabilized and the Polish Church placated,
whether or not the Pope is willing to sever Vatican ties to the
Uniates for the sake of improved relations with Moscow and
permission to visit other Catholic congregations in the USSR,
whether or not Western political and social groups strongly
support the Uniates.
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If further issues of the Chronicle appear, it will continue
to provide a useful monitor of regime behavior and a unique
source of information on trends in Catholic activism. Whatever
immediate success the regime may have in suppressing the
Chronicle, however, Ukrainian Catholicism retains such a large
popular base in Western Ukraine that agitation among the Church's
adherents will probably continue. This activism will remain a
thorn in the regime's side, impeding efforts to Russify and
Sovietize the Ukraine.
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