POSSIBLE KGB INVOLVEMENT IN MURDER OF POLISH PRIEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000507230002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 17, 2009
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 10, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
10 January 1985
SUBJECT: Possible KGB Involvement in Murder of Polish Priest
Whatever the outcome of the trial currently in progress in
Warsaw, definitive evidence clearly implicating or absolving
the Soviets in the mid-October murder of human rights activist
priest Father Jerzy Popieluszko by officials of the Polish
Internal Affairs Ministry may never surface. This speculative
memorandum examines possible disadvantages and advantages the
Soviets could have seen in arranging or allowing the murder.
Whether or not the KGB was actively involved in the murder of
Father Popieluszko, the Soviets bear some indirect
responsibility. By encouraging hardline factions in the Polish
party and police to push for harsher measures against
Solidarity, they helped create the climate in which such an act
could occur.
Case Against Soviet Involvement
Several arguments can be advanced against the hypothesis
of Soviet complicity in the murder:
-- It is not at all clear that the Soviets see any viable
alternative to Jaruzelski. If they do not, they would
not wish to take any action aimed at weakening his
ability to rule.
This memorandum was prepared by I lof the Office of 25X1
Soviet Analysis. Comments or questions ma be addressed to the
Chief, Policy Analysis Division, on 25X1
Copy of
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Even if the Soviets wanted to remove Jaruzelski or to
increase pressure on him to hew more closely to Moscow's
wishes, they could not be confident that they could
control developments in Poland following the murder.
They might have feared that the murder would backfire,
leading to an undesirable level of popular turmoil or to
a strengthening of Jaruzelski's position. For example,
the Soviets might have anticipated Jaruzelski would use
the murder as a pretext for a lower-level housecleaning
of the pro-Soviet faction of the interior Ministry. He
now appears to be trying to single out Soviet-backed
Politburo member Miroslaw Milewski for negligence,
setting the stage for his removal.
-- The timing of the murder argues against KGB
participation. At a time when the Italian Government is
trying a Bulgarian for the attempt on the life of the
Pope amid suspicions of KGB complicity, the Soviets
might well hesitate to undertake an operation that could
draw attention tooaa possible KGB role in a political
assassination.
-- It is not necessary to posit KGB involvement to account
for the priest's murder. Sentiment for harsher measures
against Solidarity exists within some circles of the
Polish party and security forces. A Polish faction
could have acted independently to kill the priest in
order to scare Solidarity, to cause unrest that would
force the government to crack down harder, or to create
a complete impasse between the regime and Solidarity
elements and thereby undermine Jaruzelski's position and
strengthen the hand of hardliners.
Case for Soviet Involvement
On the other hand, several reasons can be adduced that
could have impelled the Soviets to seek the priest's death:
-- The Soviets have faulted Jaruzelski for not moving
effectively to rebuild the Polish party and for being
too accommodating to opposition elements (e.g.,
Solidarity, the church). They could have believed the
murder would be instrumental in reminding Jaruzelski of
their ability to create problems for him, in creating an
environment that would make his objective of
establishing a modus vivendi with the church impossible
to achieve, or even in weakening the Polish elite's
confidence in his ability to control events and thereby
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setting the stage for a move against him.
way.
Before his murder Popieluszko had teportedly just opened
a photographic exhibit of Polish history in Torun that
included photographs of the Katyn Forest massacre--a
World War II incident in which the Soviets are believed
to have killed large numbers of Polish military
officers. This action could have given the Soviets a
particular incentive to want Popieluszko out of the
"political clericalism."
The Soviets had publicly raised concerns about the
activities of Polish church figures. In September 1984,
for example, before his abduction and murder, Izvestiya
had attacked Popieluszko by name as a
counterrevolutionary. Since his murder, Soviet media
have reiterated the need for the Poles to get tough with
KGB Capability
There is no doubt that the KGB had the capability, through
its assets in Poland, to arrange for the murder to be committed
by the Polish security service or to gain knowledge of such an
operation if it were initiated by high-level Polish security
officials:
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KGB on Its Own?
If the KGB was involved in the assassination, approval for
it probably came from the Politburo.
Nevertheless, the possibility cannot be dismissed
categorically that the KGB acted on its own without seeking
appropriate authorization, or that lower-level KGB officers
broke discipline and acted without clearance from Moscow to
conspire with hardliners in the Polish Interior Ministry to
kill Father Popieluszko. The influence and status of the KGB
within the political hierarchy have grown considerably in
recent years.
Iit is possible
that the KGB's inclination to act autonomously has increased.
If the KGB or individuals within it did overstep recognized
authority boundaries in a case with such maior implications,
those responsible would lose their jobs.
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Internal Distribution
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2 - DDCI
3 - SA/DCI
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