AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000507080001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 27, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 19, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Afghanistan Situation Report
79-81 I!!C/CB
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After nearly a month of heavy fighting in Herat,
Soviet and regime troops have withdrawn from the
city, leaving the insurgents free to resume
activities.
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The Soviet soldier who entered the US Embassy in
Kabul described his experience in Afghanistan as
dismal and boring. His comments illustrate
typical morale problems among Soviet troops.
The Afghan insurgents are making concentrated
efforts to cut off Soviet supplies sent by convoy
or fuel pipeline. Soviet countermeasures have
been taken in an attempt to increase road security
and guard the pipelines, but the resistance will
probably continue to make resupply a costly matter
for the Soviets.
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This document is prepared weekly by the Office of
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis and the
Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions or comments
on the issues raised in the publication should be
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FIGHTING ENDS IN HERAT,
Combined Soviet-Afghan operations in Herat Province--
underway since mid-October--came to an end on 11
November. According to the US Embassy in Kabul, the
Soviets successfully imposed a two-day curfew on Herat
City on 9-10 November after which they withdrew to
their garrison, probably leaving the city open to
insurgent reinfiltration.
The US Embassy in Kabul reports
the virtual absence of military activity in the capital
region and a significant decrease in regime security
personnel in the streets. F_ I
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Afghanistan
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The Soviet soldier who scaled the wall of the US
Embassy in Kabul on 31 October--Aleksander Valeriyevich
Sukhanov, a 19-year old from the Moscow area--provided
some insights into his life in Afghanistan. During his
three-month assignment as a guard at Radio Afghanistan,
Sukhanov did not leave the grounds of Radio Afghanistan
except for occasional political indoctrination classes
or administrative matters. He described life in
Afghanistan as bleak and dismal--without recreational
facilities, clubs or access to alcoholic drinks. He
had no opportunity to return to the USSR on leave
before the end of his two-year tour of duty.
Comment: The soldier's statements are further
confirmation that Soviet conscripts normally serve two-
year tours in Afghanistan. His comments also
underscore the continuing low morale among Soviet
soldiers in Afghanistan. Major complaints include poor
living conditions, bullying by contemporaries and
superiors, homesickness, and boredom.
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oviet helicopters attacked an insurgent
headquarters using a larger caliber rocket than the
standard 57-mm rocket. The rocket was
probably an 80-mm rocket which as been used more
frequently by the Soviets since late summer, when a
Soviet Air Force commission recommended them.
-- According to the US Consulate in Peshawar, an
American journalist, who returned from an eight-day
trip into Afghanistan with a Hizbi Islami (Khalis)
group, believes that insurgent training is
improving and their intelligence is good. The
journalist said the resistance used scale drawings
of a Soviet Divisional Headquarters in northern
Paktia Province to direct fire from mortars,
ground-to-ground missiles, and recoilless rifles.
At a 14 November press conference in Rome,
officials of the Italian Independent Human Rights
Commission accused the Soviets of using a UNESCO-
funded literacy program to reshape Afghan society
in the Russian mold. The Commission, which
recently completed a nine-day tour of Afghan
refugee camps for Prime Minister Craxi, will
recommend that Italy stop contributing to the
literacy fund. According to the press, it will
also urge Craxi to provide economic and medical aid
to refugees and insurgents, support UN observer
status for the resistance, and establish an
independent Afghan university, possibly in
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-- According to a US Embassy officer in Moscow who
recently traveled in the Eastern Ukraine, the war
in Afghanistan is unpopular but accepted as
necessary to secure the southern frontier. The
Ukranians interviewed indicated that young men
would not shirk their "patriotic duty," despite
widespread concern about the dangers, purpose, and
high cost of the war.
the Soviets are offering large pay incentives to
induce Soviet officers to serve a two-year tour in
Afghanistan.
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INSURGENT CONVOY ATTACKS PROVE COSTLY
The Soviets and the Afghan regime are heavily dependent
on fuel supplies and other materials shipped from the
Soviet Union by convoy and, to a much lesser extent,
the fuel sent through pipelines that run from Termez to
Bagram Airfield in the northeast, and from Kushka (just
north of Towraghondi) to Shindand Airfield in the
west. The resistance is making major efforts to
interdict these supplies, largely by ambushing the
convoys that ship between 70 and 90 percent of all
Soviet petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL) products to
Afghanistan. Although most supplies get through,
frequent insurgent ambushes raise the cost of the war
to Soviet and regime forces and are prompting new
Frequent Successes Against Soviet Convoys
Because the Soviets ship the bulk of fuel by convoy,
insurgents frequently target these convoys. Convoy
ambushes are also designed to inflict heavy vehicular
losses and to obtain other materiel and supplies. The
insurgents have scored a number of recent successes
against Soviet convoys:
-- On 28 June, approximately 170 vehicles were
destroyed during insurgent ambushes north of the
Salang Tunnel, according to US Embassy sources.
a probable Soviet-Afghan POL
truck was destroyed by an insurgent mine en route
to the Panjsher Valley in July (see photo).
On 30 July, insurgents destroyed a 45-vehicle
convoy in the Salang Pass,
-- Ambushes in Lowgar and Vardak Provinces resulted in
the destruction of 18 and 14 vehicles on 1 and 2
August, respectively,
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insurgents attacked a large Soviet convoy west of
Qandahar. They reportedly destroyed 18 trucks, 6
tanks, and 3 other vehicles in a two-day battle on
26 and 27 August.
-- More recently, according to sources of the US
Embassy in Kabul, the resistance mounted at least
three convoy attacks along the Salang road in early
November and reportedly captured 11 trucks carrying
jet fuel.
Insurgents typically lay their ambush along a part of a
road and attack any target of opportunity, including
isolated sections of large convoys. They generally
plant mines or fire rocket-propelled grenades at
passing vehicles. The road ambush is followed by an
assault or sweep during which food, weapons,
ammunition, and equipment are taken, and everything
else is destroyed, if possible.
Insurgents also disrupt Afghan civilian traffic by
establishing roadblocks and "taxing" vehicles which
pass through their territory. They typically siphon
gas, confiscate government supplies and sell safe-
conduct passes.
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Impact on Kabul
Although in general Kabul appears adequately supplied
with fuel, insurgent attacks and Soviet logistic
problems periodically cause fuel shortages. In the
spring of 1984, for example, successful insurgent
attacks against convoys caused severe fuel shortages,
leading to sharp price increases and long lines for
gasoline, kerosene, and diesel fuel in the capital.
Electric power was also disrupted because diesel fuel
is necessary to run electric power aenerators-
As with fuel, there are periodic shortages of food and
other goods as a result of convoy attacks. These do
not appear to last long, however, and many of the goods
captured by the rebels show up in the black market.
Soviet Countermeasures
Soviet forces are trying to cope with insurgent
ambushes by sending minesweeping vehicles to lead
convoys; using tanks, armored personnel carriers, and
quick reaction troops as escorts; and providing attack
helicopters for added convoy security. In addition,
Soviet and Afghan outposts are spaced along the
highways to enhance road security, and convoy drivers
reportedly are required to continue moving--even if
hit--in order to minimize the rest of the convoy's
vulnerability to attack. Convoy size was also
increased recently; as a precautionary measure most
convoys now include over 100 trucks. The Soviets and
Afghans periodically launch retaliatory attacks against
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nearby villages, forcing the insurgents to choose their
ambush sites more carefully to avoid retaliation
against their supporters.
The Tradeoffs
Soviet countermeasures will probably prevent the
resistance from gaining as much materiel during convoy
ambushes as they have in the past and will make them
more cautious. The insurgents will probably adopt hit-
and-run tactics on isolated sections of large convoys,
rather than fight long, pitched battles--that increase
the risk of retaliation--designed to obtain supplies.
At the same time, large convoys preceded by
minesweepers move slowly and make inviting targets.
The resistance undoubtedly will continue to view the
convoys as a high priority.
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