THE PLO THREAT TO US INTERESTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000507070001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 27, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 7, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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P &PD CY' ~ " ' ~ "
State Dept. review
completed
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SUBJECT: The PLO Threat to US Interests
1 - The Honorable Robert B. Oakley
1 - The Honorable Morton I Abramowitz
1 - Mr. Jock Covey, NSC
1 - Ms. April Glaspie, NE/ARN, State
1 - Lt. Col. Fred Hof, OSD/ISA/NE-SA, Pentagon
1 - DDI
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - NIO/CT
1 - C/PES
1 - CPAS/ISS
1 - PDB/Staff
4 - CPAS/IMD/CB
1 - D/NESA
1 - DD/NESA
1 - C/PPS
2 - NESA/PPS
1 - NESA/AI
1 - NESA/AI/I
DDI/NESA/AI/I
1~1
(7 Nov 85) 25X1
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Central intelligence Agency
Washmslon. D C 20SOS
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
7 November 1985
THE PLO THREAT TO US INTERESTS
Summary
United States interests--particularly in the
Middle East and Europe--are likely to become
primary targets for various PLO factions seeking
to avenge the US intercept of the Achille Lauro
hijackers and alleged US collusion in Israel's
raid on PLO headquarters in Tunis. Palestinian
leaders have long been frustrated with Washington
for what t'ney view as unquestioned support for
Israel, and we believe their attitude has now
moved to outright anger. PLO Chairman Arafat has
stated publicly that the PLO has a "right to
pursue" US personnel--a statement PLO hardliners
will interpret as Arafat's approval to attac'{ US
interests. Arafat may try to rein in some PLO
operations to blunt the damage to his
international image and to his already strained
relations with Jordan's King Hussein. But Arafat
will not be able to control the actions of all PLO
factions--nor will he want to do so in the
interest of preserving his role as PLO leader. In
his view, PLO operations against US officials or
facilities help ensure the United States perceives
the PLO as a viable national liberation movement
with which ;,lashington must reckon in its pursuit
of a negotiated settlement to the Palestinian
problem
PLO Chairman Arafat has long followed a two-track policy
that allows him simultaneously to pursue a diplomatic solution to
This memorandum was prepared by of the
Israel-Jordan-Palestinian '3ranch, Arab-Israeli Division, Office
of Near Eastern and South .Asian Analysis. Information as of
7 November 1985 was used in its preparation. Questions and
comments should be directed to Chief, Arab-Israeli Division, at
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the Palestinian problem while condoning military operations
against Israel. Many Palestinian leaders believe the PLO must
carry on the "armed struggle" with Israel until they get to the
negotiating table so they can negotiate from a position of
strength rather than weakness. Arafat undoubtedly is sympathetic
to t'nis view and probably believes he must support operations to
maintain his leadership credibility.
Nevertheless, since the mid-1970s Arafat had enforced a ban
on operations outside Israel and the occupied territories in
hopes of enhancing the PLO's international credibility. Until
recently all PLO factions abided by Arafat's restriction; only
the Abu Nidal and the 15 May organizations, two extremist groups
outside the PLO, conducted international terrorist operations.
Since the rebellion against Arafat within Fatah in 1983 and
the subsequent splintering of PLO ranks, however, several
Syrian-supported PLO factions have undertaken wideranging attacks
against Israeli interests. The Fatah dissidents, headed by Abu
Musa, for example, claimed responsibility for an attack on the
Israeli embassy in Cyprus in the fall of_ 1984. 25X1
Evidence is growing that members of Arafat's own Fatah
organization also are involved in carrying out terrorist
operations outside Israel and the occupied territories. tae
believe Fatah was responsible for several attacks on Syrian
interests inside Syria and in Europe during the last year. ~,
number of embassy reports indicate Arafat 25X1
approved several attacks on Syrian facilities in retaliation for
the assassination by Syrian-aided Palestinians of PLO Executive
Committee member, Fahd Qawasmah, last December. Moreover, Fatah
Force l7, an elite special commando unit that evolved from
Arafat's personal security guard, almost certainly was
responsible for the killin of three Israeli yachtsmen in Cyprus
in late September. ~ 25X1
Such action suggest that Arafat supporters, who have been
willing to wait and see if Arafat's dialogue with ~Cing Hussein
would reap real dividends--such as recognition by the United
States--have lost patience and have returned to the "armed
struggle."
US Interests Now Threatened
We believe that US citizens and facilities are particularly
vulnerable to PLO attacks in the wake of the US intercept of the
Achille Lauro hijackers and the alleged US support for Israel's
raid on PLO headquarters in Tunis. *Qany Palestinians are
convinced that the only way Israel could have staged the
longrange attack was with US assistance. They argue the raid
proves their claims that Israel and the US are working
hand-in-glove to destroy the PLO.
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toe believe PLO attitudes toward Washington have changed from
frustration to anger since the US interception of the Achille
Lauro hijackers. Arafat believes tVashington accused PLO
officials unjustly and ignored the help the PLO provided in
getting the hostages released. Since the US operation, we have
seen numerous reports and statements warning about potential
threats to US interests. Arafat and other senior Fatah leaders
have stated publicly that the PLO will attack US interests. In
an interview to the London Press, Arafat said "we have the right
to pursue US diplomats and pilots responsible for t'ne
hijacking." Hani al-Hassan, one of Arafat's most pragmatic Fatah
lieutenants, also sharply criticized the US action and warned
that the "PLO would strike at US and Israeli interests
We believe US citizens and facilities in Europe and the
Middle East are most vulnerable to attack because Palestinian
operatives are most active in these areas. US diplomatic and
military personnel are prime targets, but American businesses
also are vulnerable. At least ten US embassies throughout the
world have received bomb threats since the US intercept
operation. Threats against embassies in Amman and Tunis or t'ne
US Consulate in Jerusalem are not unusual, but bomb threats have
also been received by US embassies and consulates in the Hague;
D.. ... L.-. ... ,.. ..L _ r~_~~ ___ n ...
Palestinians are likely to employ other potentially
dangerous forms of protest against the United States.
Anti-American marches and rallies already have been conducted
outside US embassies and consulates in Cairo, 3aghdad, New Delhi
and Sydney. Such action could lead to riots and attempts to
overrun the embassy, as was the case in Iran and Islamabad in
PLO Operational Ca abilities
Despite the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and the
subsequent dispersal of Palestinian fighters throughout the
region, we believe the PLO has maintained an effective terrorist
25X1
network capable of mounting operations when desired.
Syrian-supported Palestinian radicals,
25X1
such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General
Command (PFLP-GC) and the Palestine Struggle Front (PSF),
continue to stage operations of their own and to train other
terrorist groups. The PFLP-GC, for example, has long provided
technical assistance in the use of explosive devices to various
terrorist groups, includin radical Lebanese Shia
organizations.
25X1
Three groups within AraEat's Fatah organization--the Western
Sector, Force 17, and the United Security Organization--also
continue to plan, direct and stage operations. Western Sector
and Force 17 personnel have focused their operations against
Israel, but we cannot rule out the possibility that they wilt
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extend their actions to attack US interests if targets of
opportunity are found.
Salah Khalaf, chief of the United Security Organization, is
the only Fatah leader to have directed attacks against the United
States in the past. Khalaf is the former head of the Black
September Organization, which was responsible for the kidnapping
and murder of the US Ambassador and Deputy Chief of Mission in
Sudan in 1973. The Black September group also staged the
massacre of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics. Khalaf
has long advocated a more militant approach to resolving the
Palestinian problem. He may now direct his anger not only at
Israel, but at Israel's main benefactor--the United States.
Khalaf's headquarters are in Tunis, but his main operational
base is in East Berlin. Khalaf also may have smaller offices in
Algeria and East European States such as Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and
Czechoslovakia. We believe Khalaf's extensive infrastructure in
Europe puts him in a particularly good position to strike at US
interests in the region.
Outlook
Notwithstanding Arafat's public statements calling for
attacks on US interests, we believe he will try to rein in some
Fatah and other PLO operations against the United States. In so
doing, Arafat will aisn to blunt further damage to the PLO's
international image and keep the diplomatic option alive. Arafat
has a vested interest in maintaining his dialogue with icing
Hussein because it gives the PLO greater access to Jordanian
territory and thus closer proximity to the occupied territories
for attacks against Israeli citizens and facilities there.
Nevertheless, Arafat probably will not be able to stem all
Fatah-associated terrorist activity against the United States nor
will he see it as in his interest as PLO Chairman to do so. His
prime motivation is to preserve his leadership position within
the PLO and to do that he must at least maintain the unity of
Fatah, by far the largest of the eight PLO factions. To this
end, we judge that Arafat will give into pressure from key Fatah
hardliners, including Salah Khalaf for operations against both
Israel and the United States in the wake of the recent events.
Moreover, Arafat has given his general approval for
operations against Israel, and is not alwa s informed of the
details. internal rivalries 25X1
among Arafat's senior Fatah officials have resulted in o eration
without his specific a royal.
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Arafat, in our view, will dramatically step up terrorist
operations against US targets--despite further damage to his
tarnished international respectability--if he becomes convinced
that the PLO has been maneuvered out of the peace process. We
believe he would then conclude that the only way to draw
attention to the PLO's grievances with Israel is to stage more
frequent terrorist "spectaculars", not only against Israel but
against Israel's prime benefactor--the US.
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