THE PLO OFFICES IN TUNIS AND AMMAN: POSSIBLE ROLES, LINKS AND CONDUCT IN FATAH OPERATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000507040004-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 27, 2010
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: October 30, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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SUBJECT: The PLO Offices in Tunis and Amman: Possible Roles,
Links and Conduct in Fatah Operations
Jock Covey (Pentagon)
George S. Harris (State)
David Long (State, M/CTP)
Philip Wilcox (State)
April Glaspie (State)
David Zweifel (State)
Howard Teicher (NSC)
1 - DDI
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - NIO/CT
1 - C/PES
1 - CPAS/ILS
1 - C/DDO/NE
1 - DDO/NE
1 - DDO/NE
1 - DDO/NE
OGI/CTG
PDB Staff
CPAS/IMD/CB t / X O,(t,O
D/NESA
DD/NESA
C/NESA/PPS
NESA/PPS
NESA/AI
NESA/SO
NESA/SO/I
NESA/AI/I
DDI/NESA/AI/I
(30Oct85)
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I I
Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
30 October 1985
The PLO Offices in Tunis and Amman:
Possible Roles, Links and Conduct in Fatah Operations
Key Judgments
Fatah's involvement in recent Palestinian
attacks against Israel and the possibility that
Fatah may attack US targets raises questions
regarding the functions and activities of the
PLO/Fatah offices in Tunis and Amman. Israeli
political leaders claim
that PLO facilities in Tunis and Amman have been
used for the planning and directing of Fatah
terrorist operations.
We have little hard information on which to
make conclusive judgments regarding any link the
PLO offices in Tunis and Amman may have with
recent FatahLdirected or inspired terrorist
operations. Our best estimates are based upon
October Israeli airstrike on the PLO headquarters
in Tunis and the Achille Lauro terrorist
operation.
This memorandum was prepared by
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis.
Information as of 30 October 1985 was used in its preparation.
Questions and comments should be directed to Chief, Arab-Israeli
Division,
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We believe that the governments of Tunisia
and Jordan, while supportive of the Palestinian
cause, are fully aware of the political and
military implications if either host serves as a
staging ground for PLO/Fatah-mounted terrorist
operations, particularly against Israel. We do
not believe, however, that either has adequate
manpower or technical resources to fully monitor
and control all PLO activity within their
borders.
PLO Headquarters, Tunis
PLO/Fatah offices in Tunis have served essentially as the
PLO's "capital" since its departure from Lebanon, primarily
handling routine administrative matters. There apparently have
been two main complexes in Tunis; one adminstrative office
located downtown and the beach hotel in the suburb of Hamman, hit
in the Israeli raid, where PLO officers were resident and
presumably held meetings. Palestinian fighters are located about
there are only about 100-150 fighters at the
camp and many of them are preparing for transfer to Iraq.
camp morale has been low
because the fighters have little to do--there is no military
training--and they are not allowed to travel into town because of
problems with the local population.
We believe Palestinians in Tunis have abided by the
restrictions laid down by local authorities against initiating
any terrorist activities from Tunisia.
we assess that Tunis has not been a center
for the planning and directing of PLO/Fatah terrorist operations,
even though the PLO's chief security official and head of the
United Security Organization, Salah Khalaf, is based in Tunis.
Fatah's Force 17 also had an office in Tunis, although its
headquarters4is in Amman. Muhammad Abbas's faction of the
Palestine Liberation Front, which has been associated with
Arafat, apparently planned the recent Achille Lauro operation
from Tunis. We cannot confirm, however, that Arafat had any
foreknowledge of the specifics of this operation.
The PLO's need to reestablish its headquarters and recover
from its physical losses following the departure from Lebanon in
1982 initially preoccupied senior PLO officials in Tunis. Even
after the PLO settled in during 1983, the isolation of the PLO
headquarters and Fatah offices in Tunis seems to have severely
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complicated and slowed all Fatah decisionmakin , including
planning operations against Israel.* 25X1
Nevertheless, we believe senior PLO officials in Tunis have
probably known in general terms of activities planned by Fatah
operatives against Israeli or anti-Arafat Palestinians. We
believe that Fatah security officials have been careful to use 25X1
bases in other countries to mount operations.
we believe that Khalaf uses his security 25X1
organizat on's office in East Germany for most operational
activities. The Force 17 facility in Tunis may have planned a
Fatah operation in West Berlin last January against pro-Syrian
Palestinians or Syrian officials there, but the operation was
headed off when the West Germans arrested the Palestinian suspect
and extradited him to Tunis. 25X1
Force 17 members appear to be most active in Lebanon,
Greece, and Cyprus. L
Force 17 was responsible for the murder of three Israeli
yachtsmen in Larnaca in late September.
PLO Offices, Amman
The number of PLO offices in Jordan has increased
considerably since November 1984, primarily because Arafat wanted
to move offices out of Damascus after alienating the Syrians and
radical Palestinians with his decision to convene the Palestine
National Council in Amman. The two largest offices to be
transferred from Damascus to Amman were the headquarters of the
PNC and the Palestine National Fund.
Palestinian military personnel in Jordan are divided into
four distinct groups. The first three groups have maintaineda
presence in Jordan for many years:
-- The Palestine National Liberation Army forces usually
called the Badr Brigade
-- Fatah Force 17, the organization's security service
-- Khalil Wazir's Western Sector Department
The fourth group includes almost 1000 fighters stationed at
a new PLO training camp in Khaw near the PNLA camp. Among these
fighters are pro-Arafat forces who were forced out of Lebanon
during the fighting with Palestinian rebels two years ago and
* During this period, Fatah fighters reportedly undertook
military training in Algeria and transited Tunis on their way to
Lebanon via Cyprus.
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approximately 200 Palestinians who came to Jordan from Libya
following the May Israeli/Palestinian prisoner exchange.
We believe King Hussein permitted the PLO to transfer some
facilities to Amman despite his distrust of the PLO because he
wanted to encourage Arafat to cooperate in an effort to move
toward peace negotiations with Israel. Hussein also wants to
preserve good relations with Jordan's Palestinian majority by
showing support for Arafat.
At the same time, the PLO's increased presence in Amman has
complicated Hussein's position with Israel.
The Israelis believe the Western Sector is the PLO's main
operational apparatus in Amman for directing terrorist activities
on the West Bank.
We believe that the Jordanians closely monitor PLO and Fatah
activities in Jordan, probably through the use of surveillance,
telephone taps, and informers. Jordan recently expelled Fatah's
Force 17 Commander, Mahmud al-Natur (Abu Tayyib) and possibly as
many as 36 Western Sector officials as a precautionary measure to
minimize the prospect of Israeli reprisals against Palestinian
targets in Jordan.
Despite what we believe to be stringent Jordanian efforts to
restrict activities, it is probable that Western Sector
operatives may have been behind some recent attacks against
Israelis. They apparently have used their increased contacts
with West Bank Palestinians visiting Jordan to encourage
operations in the territories.
Israeli officials also have told US Embassy officers
that they believe the bulk of West Rank violence is the result of
Palestinians acting on their own.
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Israel's Views
Israel has been consistent in public
in reporting what it perceives as evidence of
direct links between the PLO offices in Amman and Tunis and
Fatah-directed acts of Palestinian terrorism against Israel.
Although most of Israel's verbal attacks have been aimed at the
PLO presence in Jordan, it alleges that the squad the Israelis
arrested last August from the vessel Casselardit, traveling from
Cyprus to Lebanon, was directed from Tunis and had a fina
mission of attacking a bus in northern Israel.
Minister Peres and Defense Minister Rabin have stated that their
approval for the raid against PLO headquarters in Tunis was based
on evidence they believed showed that Fatah Force 17 directed the
Larnaca terrorist attack from Tunis.
Outlook
Despite the risks, Fatah is likely to try to retaliate
against Israel--and possibly the US--in the wake of the Israeli
raid on PLO headquarters in Tunis and the US interception of the
Achille Lauro hijackers. Arafat's security chiefs will press for
more frequent and spectacular operations. We believe Arafat, who
is aware of the political implications for his hosts, may urge
restraint until Fatah can carry out an attack that cannot be
traced to operatives in either Tunis or Amman.
Israeli Prime
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