AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000507040001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 27, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 29, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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 Directorate of
Intelligence
101
Too Secret
Afghanistan Situation Report
79-81 INC/CB
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AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT
COMBAT OPERATION IN BAGLAN AND PARVAN
PROVINCES ENDS
Soviet and Afghan forces completed sweep
operations along the strategic Salang Highway, but
attempts to clear the area of insurgents will
probably only reduce resistance activity
temporarily.
IN BRIEF
UPCOMING EVENTS
PERSPECTIVE
THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE AND AFGHANISTAN
It is doubtful that the organization of the
Islamic Conference will provide significant
support for the Afghan insurgency since many of
its members are more interested in Middle East
issues and do not want to antagonize the Soviet
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This document is prepared weekly by the Office of
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis and the
Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions or comments
on the issu raised in the publication should be
directed to
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COMBAT OPERATION IN BAGHLAN AND PARVAN PROVINCES ENDS
A combined Soviet and Afghan combat operation underway
along the Salang Pass between Jabal os Sarai and Pol-e
Khomri ended last week,
chose not to confront Soviet forces.
the insurgents apparently sustained few losses and
The approximately 5,000
Soviet and Afghan troops involved in the operation
returned to their garrisons in Kabul, Bagram, Pol-e
Khomri, Ghazni, and Jalalabad. These operations, aimed
at clearing insurgent bands along the strategic Salang
Pass and the north-south highway linking the Soviet
Union to Kabul, probably will not have any lasting
impact on insurgent capabilities in the area because
US Embassy
KHAD agents occurred last week.
reporting indicates that the guerrillas are still
active, albeit at a reduced level, in the Kabul area
and the Embassy reports that regime security in the
capital has generally lessened since the summer.
Several insurgent rocket attacks and two kidnappings of
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According to press reports, the Gulbuddin-led
Afghan resistance delegation sent a letter to the
UN secretary general last week contesting the
credentials of the Kabul regime and asserting the
resistance's right to Afghanistan's UN seat.
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Special Representative Cordovez.
will also convey its concerns during a briefing by
-- Reporting from the US UN mission indicates that the
British will protest informally to UN Secretary
General Perez de Cuellar about the recent UN report
blaming Pakistan for the "procedural impasse" in the
Geneva proximity talks. The European Community group
Afghanistan.
Afghan resistance delegation
goes home.
11-13 November UN General Assembly debateon
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Afghanistan
International boundary
Province boundary
~t National capital
0 Province capital
Railroad
Road
0 50 100 150 200 Kilometers
0 50 100 150 200 Miles
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The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) is
unlikely to furnish much more than impotent resolutions
in support of the Afghan resistance. Pakistan and
Saudi Arabia, the two OIC members most concerned with
Afghanistan, do not view the OIC as a significant or
useful forum on the Afghan issue. Pakistan wants to
keep the pressure on the Soviets, but does not want to
antagonize Moscow unnecessarily. Saudi Arabia, the
main financial backer of the OIC, prefers to keep the
OIC focused on Arab-Israeli problems. The Saudis want
to maintain a low profile in their support for the
insurgents. Other Arab states are reluctant to offend
Moscow on the Afghan situation for fear of losing
Soviet support on Arab-Israeli issues.
US ability to influence the OIC is slight because the
organization associates Washington with Tel Aviv.
Washington would have to work through Islamabad,
Riyadh, and perhaps Cairo to influence the OIC on
Afghanistan.
A Shaky Alliance
The OIC since its inception has been a weak
organization most concerned with forging consensus
among its 44 members. Despite the OIC's charter that
calls for "safeguarding the independence and national
rights of all Muslim peoples," many controversial
political topics, such as the role of the Soviets in
Afghanistan or the Iran-Iraq war have tended to reveal
conflicting interests and have resulted in relatively
tame resolutions. In contrast, militant resolutions on
the status of Jerusalem and the Palestinians find near
universal support.
The OIC bureaucracy is small and not well equipped to
provide material aid to Muslim guerrilla groups such as
the Afghan insurgents. Secretary General Sharifuddin
Pirzada, who was in President Zia's government, is not
an independent-minded official likely to advocate an
Afghan policy counter to Islamabad's wishes. We do not
believe the OIC's Islamic Development Bank--created to
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fund projects such as irrigation or municipal
services--will stretch its charter to aid the
Mujahedin. The organization's Islamic News Agency
might consider publishing more articles on the
insurgents, provided that the Mujahedin establish an
information arm.
An unwieldy group such as the OIC compares unfavorably
with other international organizations such as ASEAN.
ASEAN is a more geographically compact and politically
cohesive group than the OIC and is better positioned to
take action in the face of external aggression directed
at one of its member states.
Disinterest in Afghanistan
The OIC has displayed only limited concern for
Afghanistan. In January 1980 the OIC suspended
Afghanistan's membership and "strongly condemned Soviet
military aggression against the Afghan people,"
according to the published resolutions. But by May
1980, the OIC Foreign Ministers Conference had softened
its criticism to express only "deep concern over the
perpetuation of Soviet military intervention in
Afghanistan, and strongly reiterated the demand for the
immediate, total, and unconditional withdrawal of all
foreign troops from Afghanistan." This same softened
language has been repeated in OIC Afghan resolutions
since 1980.
In 1984, despite US demarches for a tougher
condemnatory resolution and an impassioned speech
attacking the USSR by a prominent Afghan Mujahedin
figure, Islamabad offered no new language for the
Afghan resolution, with the exception of a phrase
critical of the bombing of Pakistani territory. The
widely-publicized final communique of last December's
Foreign Ministers Conference called only for "further
efforts to safeguard the independence of Afghansitan as
a nonaligned Islamic state." The document did not
mention the Soviet occupation. The final resolutions
do mention the Soviets, but these were published months
after the meeting and received scant attention.
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Islamabad, in our view, probably believes that Arab
delegations friendly to the USSR would successfully
thwart any anti-Soviet effort. President Zia, faced
with both political divisions within Pakistan over the
effectiveness of a hard line policy on Afghanistan and
tougher language,
The Key Players
Pakistan, which plays the major role in OIC
consideration of Afghanistan, has not pushed for
increasing Soviet pressure, does not want to get too
far out front on an anti-Soviet resolution.
the OIC was lifted only last year--does not want to
expend its limited political capital on Afghanistan.
Saudi Arabia and Egypt--the most influential Islamic
nations in the OIC--also seem reluctant to support a
stronger Afghan resolution. The Saudis prefer a low
profile on Afghanistan. Egypt--whose suspension from
remained silent during the debates.
US influence in the OIC is minimal. In last year's
final communique, the US was condemned by name for its
"hostile attitude towards the Palestinians," its
continued support of the "Zionist enemy," its anti-Arab
voting in the UN, and its military presence along Arab
coasts. US friends and allies among the OIC membership
set a precedent.
Outlook
The OIC is likely to continue to pay little more than
lip service to Afghan affairs unless a key OIC member
such as Pakistan or Saudi Arabia takes a more active
leadership role. Until then, the best we expect the
OIC to do is to continue to allow Afghan insurgent
leaders to address the annual foreign ministers
meetings. Even with Pakistan and Saudi leadership,
other Arab and African members would probably drag
their heels because of their own priorities.
Similarly, if the Mujahedin were to arrive on the OIC's
doorstep with a unified delegation, we believe pro-
Soviet Arab states would resist granting it formal
observer or government-in-exile status. Other moderate
OIC states such as Morocco or Sudan would have qualms
about seating an anti-regime group for fear it would
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