AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000506970001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 8, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 8, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Afghanistan Situation deport
79-81 IMF/CB
Top See, et
Se cret
NESA M 85-10202JX
SOYA M 85-10180JX
8 October 1985
Copy 0 8 1
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The Soviets are adding infrared jammers to their
helicopters in Afghanistan to counter the
insurgents' use of heat-seeking missiles.
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INSURGENT SUCCESS OR SOVIET CARELESSNESS? I 1 25X1
Soviet negligence probably was responsible for at
least one of two recent explosions at Soviet
ammunition dumps in Afghanistan, but we cannot
rule out the possibility that the insurgents are
getting better at penetrating and sabotaging
Soviet garrisons.
IN BRIEF
UPCOMING EVENTS
PERSPECTIVE
Western travelers will probably find it more
dangerous to travel in Afghanistan because of
better Soviet intelligence and increased military
sweep operations.
Afghanistan will probably produce an above-averge
grain crop this year, despite the war's
destruction and the persistence of last year's
drought through early spring.
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8 October 1985
NESA M 85-10202JX
SOVA M 85-10180JX
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This document is prepared weekly by the Office of
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis and the
Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions or comments
on the issues raised in the publication should be
Unless major developments warrant otherwise, we
will not publish the AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT
next week. The next report will appear on
22 October 1985.
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8 October 1985
NESA M 85-10202JX
SOYA M 85-10180JX
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NEW INFRARED JAMMER ON SOVIET HELICOPTERS
that
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Soviet helicopters in Afghanistan are being supplied
with an infrared jammer system. The infrared jammer,
located on the top rear of the fuselage just forward of
the tail boom, is designed to increase survivability
against heat-seeking infrared missiles such as the
Soviet-made SA-7 used by some insurgents. The jammer
works with an infrared suppressor to vent exhaust gases
aft of the aircraft, thereby reducing heat emissions.
Cogent: The jammers represent the latest in a series
of Soviet attempts to reduce helicopter losses caused
by insurgents using heat-seeking missiles. Initial
Soviet efforts to counter this threat included using
flare dispensers, changing flight patterns, and
employing better evasive techniques. Infrared
suppressors were subsequently added to all Soviet
helicopters operating in Afghanistan; Afghan
helicopters have not been modified. The modifications
demonstrate continuing Soviet concern over aircraft
losses and increasing insurgent effectiveness in
countering the Soviet air threat.
SOVIET CARLESSNESS?
According to imagery, two Soviet ammunition dumps--one
at Konduz and one at Khair Khana in Kabul--suffered
extensive damage from explosions during mid-
September. The Konduz explosion took place between
11 and 27 September; the US Embassy heard a large
explosion in Kabul on the 19th.
Afghans who
witnessed the Kabul explosions gave conflicting
accounts of the incident,
some claimed the dump was hit
by a rocket, while others said an insurgent disguised
as an Afghan soldier blew up the warehouse with
explosives.
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8 October 1985 25X1
MESA N 85-10202JX
SOYA N 85-10180JX
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Poor storage practices may have contributed
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to extensive damage at both facilities. Similar cases
of accidental explosions, some with spectacular
results, have occurred at ammunition storage areas
inside the Soviet Union.
Soviet ammunition dumps--one accidental and one at the
hands of a disgruntled Soviet--have been observed
since 1979. Insurgent sabotage, if true, would
suggest an improved ability to penetrate Soviet
garrisons.
We cannot rule out the possibility that insurgents
sabotaged one or both of the ammunition dumps,
however. The proximity in time of the recent
explosions is unusual. Only two other explosions at
-- Resistance alliance spokesman Gulbuddin Hekmatyar
announced that the group will send a delegation to
the UN General Assembly to lobby for unseating the
Kabul government; the alliance is also planning to
seek recognition from the Organization of Islamic
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8 October 1985
NESA N 85-10202JX
SOYA N 85-1O18OJX
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-- On 21 September, two Saudis working with the Kuwait
Red Crescent Society were attacked and robbed of
$62,500 while en route to Afghanistan,
Two Afghans from
Gulbuddin's Hizbi Islami group were accompanying
the Saudis when they were attacked, suggesting that
the Muslim Brotherhood may be making direct cash
payments to Gulbuddin's group.
-- Babrak Karmal told the Revolutionary Council on 25
September that insurgents have caused more than 35
billion afghanis in damage--$700 million at the
official exchange rate or $270 million at the black
market rate--since April 1978.
-- Radio Free Afghanistan began broadcasting into
Afghanistan from Munich on 2 October. Soviet and
Afghan media have roundly criticized the broadcasts
as CIA-sponsored.
UPCOMING EVENTS
11-13 November The UN General Assembly debate on
Afghanistan.
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8 October 1985
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WG ~1NANGAR~
Afghanistan
International boundary
Province boundary
* National capital
Province capital
Railroad
Road
_
--
F J
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MESA M 85-10202JX
SOYA M 85-10180JX
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GROWING RISKS FOR WESTERN TRAVELERS IN AFGHANISTAN
Although Western journalists and medical personnel have
been able to operate inside Afghanistan relatively
easily in the past, better Soviet intelligence and more
frequent military operations are increasing the
risks. The recent death of an American journalist
during an apparent Soviet attack underscores these
dangers.
Soviet Attitudes Towards Westerners
We believe the Soviets place a high priority on
preventing Westerners from visiting or working inside
Afghanistan without the Afghan Government's
permission. Soviet commanders sent an airborne unit to
capture French journalist Jacques Abouchard in 1984 and
apparently assigned a unit to capture French doctor
Philippe Augoyard during a major military operation in
Paktia Province in 1983,
Both men were subsequently released after a
relatively short incarceration and regime-staged show
The Soviets oppose the presence of Westerners,
including doctors and journalists, because credible
eyewitness reports often contradict Soviet and Afghan
claims that the war is being won, and the insurgency
has no local support. By capturing Western
infiltrators, moreover, the Soviets probably hope to
reinforce their charges in the international media of
massive outside support for the insurgents.
Despite a hostile Soviet attitude, Westerners were able
to operate inside Afghanistan relatively easily in the
past. Since 1980, the Soviets had captured only one of
the approximately 300 European doctors who have worked
clandestinely in Afghanistan and only one of the many
Western journalists and scholars who have travelled
there. Soviet and Afghan attacks caused the death of
only one journalist--in October 1985; another was
killed--probably inadvertently--during a Soviet or
Afghan bombing attack in 1982.
8 October 1985
NESA M 85-10202JX
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Increasing Dangers
Afghanistan.
Nevertheless, many observers believe--and we agree--
that the dangers are increasing for Westerners inside
Soviet intelligence
although its red cross was clearly visible by air.)
in 1981, Soviet aircraft destroyed a French clinic,
began to improve in 1984 and that the Soviets--using
local informers and reconnaissance aircraft--can now
often quickly locate French clinics. (In one incident
Western physicians must move their clinics more
frequently because of better Soviet intelligence,
movement inside Afghanistan has
American journalist was killed near Qandahar City.
from Pakistan face particular danger because of the
area's flat terrain. The Soviets captured Abouchard
during his first day in southern Afghanistan, and the
We believe Westerners entering southern Afghanistan
Pakistan--190 so far this year--reflects more
aggressive military operations near the border.
become more dangerous because the Soviets are bombing
the main infiltration routes more frequently. The
large number of Soviet and Afghan air violations of
By
contrast, Augoyard was captured in Paktia Province--in
southeastern Afghanistan--only after spending several
In the most recent incident, as many as four
helicopters attacked a truck carrying four Americans
and about 12 insurgents on the night of 19 September
seven miles north of Qandahar City, killing newsman
Charles Thornton and probably wounding another
American. The helicopters-left soon after the attack,
allowing the survivors to escape and bury Thornton's
body. Two of the Americans decided to continue their
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8 October 1985 25X1
NBSA M 85-10202JX
SOYA M 85-10180JX
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travels in Afghanistan and one returned to Pakistan.
Arrangements were being made for the removal of
Thornton's body,
Outlook
We believe that the Soviets will continue to improve
their intelligence capabilities against Western
travelers. Stepped up Soviet sweeps along insurgent
infiltration routes from Pakistan, moreover, suggest
that Western travelers will inevitably bear some of the
fallout. We believe that the Soviets probably view
Westerners traveling with insurgent bands as fair game,
and make a special effort to attack or capture them if
they become aware of their presence.
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NESA N 85-10202JX
SOYA N 85-10180JX
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AFGHANISTAN: THE 1985 LATE-SEASON AGRICULTURAL OUTLOOK
crops to food production.
The abandonment of agricultural fields is extensive in
some combat areas, but these fields represent only a
very small portion of Afghanistan's agricultural land
and their loss should not significantly reduce total
grain production. Furthermore, the loss of much of
this grainland has been offset by the expansion of
cultivated land elsewhere in Afghanistan, and the
diversion of some land previously used for industrial
yields.
A preliminary crop survey of key grain-growing areas in
Afghanistan indicates that the 1985 wheat crop will be
larger than last year's estimated 2.7 million tons.
Other grain crops are also expected to do better than
average. Irrigation water, dangerously low early in
the year, was replenished in time for the winter grains
to produce above-average yields. The dryland crops and
the summer crops should also produce above-average
reduced flow.
1985 Weather Summary
Afghanistan suffered a serious water shortage until the
last week as a rP_-,111t- of unusual weather
patterns. ~"~ secondary
rivers and most feeder streams were dry or nearly dry
during March--much lower than in March 1984.
Irrigation canals were running, but with greatly
snow fields expanded.
first week in April. Rivers, irrigation canals and
reservoirs were replenished and the depleted mountain
equal to its average annual rainfall. A second low
pressure system moved across the country during the
The outlook began to improve on 31 March when a deep
low pressure area with an associated frontal system
moved across the country from west to east, dropping
unusually large amounts of rain. For example, in Farah
Province, a weather station recorded 106 mm, an amount
numerous pools of standing water throughout the
country.
8 October 1985
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Unseasonable rain in varying amounts also fell over
wide areas during the remainder of April, May, and
June. Still more rain fell in the northeast provinces
during t nnrmallu dry of July. When last
observed rivers and streams in 25X1
most areas of the country were still flowing well above
normal and at si nificantl higher levels than last
year. F 'y 25X1
1985 Production Outlook
Despite last winter's precipitation shortfall, we
believe that this year's grain harvest will be better
than last year's estimated 2.7 million tons.* This
preliminary analysis suggests that:
-- The irrigated winter grain crop, mainly wheat,
should produce above-average yields--slightly
better than last year.
-- The dryland grain crop, mainly wheat, should
produce above-average yields--considerably
better than last year's crop, which fell an
estimated 25 percent from 1983 levels due to
drought.
-- The irrigated summer crops, consisting mostly of
corn and rice, should produce above-average
yields--slightly better than last year.
Because most food shortages in Afghanistan have
resulted from crop failure in the dryland region, the
above average estimate for dryland grain production and
the average to above-average estimates for the other
large producing regions indicate that Afghan food
supplies will be adequate this year.
Favorable reporting on harvest and procurement
activities in neighboring countries, which are
generally affected by the same weather patterns as in
Afghanistan, also support our assessment of above-
average Afghan crop prospects. The size of the grain
harvest in south Uzbek, SSR--which adjoins the Afghan
* Estimated wheat production in 1984 was identical to the 1980-84
wheat production average, which is based on both Foreign
Agriculture Organization and CIA estimates.
8 October 1985
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dryland area on the north--was above plan in late June,
according to Moscow radio. Reporting from Pakistan
indicates that grain procurements for the May-July
period ran about 10 percent higher this year than
Impact of the War on Food Production
Our preliminary analysis of the principal agricultural
areas reveals no large-scale deliberate destruction of
crops or irrigation systems by Soviet or Afghan
military forces. Military action--such as bombing and
armored vehicle traffic--is estimated to have damaged
less than one percent of the total agricultural area.
The abandonment of agricultural fields is extensive in
some combat areas, but these fields represent only a
small portion of Afghanistan's agricultural land and
should not significantly reduce total grain production.
-- Agricultural activity in the Panjsher Valley in
1985 was nearly nonexistent, but grain production
there normally accounts for less than 2 percent of
total national output. The continued presence of
Soviet and Afghan military forces apparently
discouraged farmers from,returning to the valley;
most of the villages in the central part of the
valley remain abandoned and the fields unattended.
site of recent heavy military actions, shows a
steady decline in population and cultivated land
since the Soviet invasion. Approximately 50
percent of the population has left since 1979. The
majority of the abandoned land is on the eastern
side of the Konar River. The agricultural area
abandoned in and near the entrance to the Konar
Valley equates to less than 2 percent of
Afghanistan's grain producing area, however.
-- Military operations this summer in and around Herat
had no significant impact on grain production since
most of the activities occurred after the main
grain harvest was completed.
8 October 1985
PSSA M 85-10202JX
SOYA K 85-10180JX
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Arriving at an Estimate
This preliminary assessment of the agricultural outlook
in Afghanistan is based on analysis of weather data[
of the most important agricultural
areas in the country. These areas include the
irrigated cropland in the vicinity of Kabul, and in
Jalalabad, Qandahar, and Herat Provinces; and the
principal dryland farming area in the northern
provinces (Badghis, Faryab, Jowzjan, Balkh, Samangan,
Konduz, Takhar, Badakhshan, and Baghlan).
was used to check the availability of water
in the irrigation systems; to determine crop health
during critical growth stages; and to make a rough
estimate of the size of the harvest based on the number
and density of post-harvest straw shocks. Because of
the direct relationship between the amount of grain
harvested and the amount of straw shocks observed in
the fields, this methodology provides a reliable
indication of relative differences in grain yields from
one year to the next.
Less than half of Afghanistan's approximately 8 million
hectares of arable land is cultivated due to limited
supplies of water. Some 3.3 million hectares of the
arable land are irrigated but, because of fallowing
practices, only about three-fourths of this area is
cropped each year. Irrigated land produces
approximately 85 percent of the country's food and
industrial crops. Dryland crops occupy about 900,000
hectares and are concentrated mainly in the foothills
of the northern plains region.
Afghanistan's agricultural production is highly
weather-sensitive because 85 percent of Afghanistan's
food and industrial crops are produced on irrigated
land. The dryland crops are totally dependent on
spring precipitation and the summer crop is heavily
dependent on irrigation water. Water for irrigation
comes primarily from snow-fed rivers flowing out of the
central mountain region and is augmented by ground
water and spring rains. Since little rain normally
falls after May, the principal rivers depend on snow
melt and mountain springs to maintain their flow during
the late spring and summer, when demand is high.
8 October 1985
MESA N 85-10202JX
SOYA N 85-10180JX
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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