AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000506960001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 27, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Afghanistan Situation Report
19-811
IMC/CB
NESA M 85-10199JX
SOYA M 85-10178JX
1 October 1985
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FIGHTING IN PARTIA, MAZAR-E SHARIF DIES DOWN
Fighting has decreased in Paktia Province L_
but the Soviets are conducting
major air assaults in areas north of Kabul.
The Kabul regime called a meeting of border tribes
in September partly to arm them against the
insurgents and stir up tribal unrest in Pakistan
aimed at undermining Islamabad's support for the
guerrillas.
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The Afghan Air Force is plagued by sabotage, poor
morale, and defections that restrict its role in
the war and force the Soviet Air Force to bear the
lion's share of the fighting.
This document is prepared weekly by the Office of
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis and the
Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions or comments
on the issues raised in the publication should be
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FIGHTING IN PAKTIA, MAZAR-E SHARIF DIES DOWN
Fighting in Paktia Province, which resulted in numerous
casualties, appears to have trailed off during the
final week of September. Insurgent forces attacked
outlying Afghan guard posts established during the
height of the Soviet campaign, and drove the
government's forces back into the main encampment at
With ground operations drawing to a close, the Soviets
are relying more heavily on airstrikes against
suspected insurgent positions and infiltration
routes. On 24 September, the Soviets launched hundreds
of air sorties during a major assault on the Shomali
and Paghman areas just north of Kabul, according to
sources of the US Embassy in Kabul.
In the capital, insurgents are maintaining pressure on
the Afghan government. They rocketed Kabul airport--
inflicting limited damage--on the nights of 17 and
24 September, and attacked vehicle convoys along the
Salang Highway on 23 September.
The Afghan regime used the September meeting of border
tribes (jirga) to arm them and incite unrest along the
Babrak Karmal also appealed to Pushtun
nationalism during the tribal assembly--an apparent
attempt to revive Pushtun interest in a separate
homeland. F_ I
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Comment: The jirga undoubtedly was called in part to
step up pressure on Pakistan to alter its policies and
to curb insurgent infiltration. Afghan Government
efforts to buy off tribal groups with arms and money
have been underway for at least three years with scant
effect. In fact, some groups have turned their weapons
against Afghan Army posts.
Although the tribal region of Pakistan has long been
well supplied with arms, tribal disputes have remained
local and do not threaten Islamabad. Pushtun tribes,
moreover, have never agreed on the issue of creating a
separate homeland and most consider it less important
than the insurgency.
-- Satellite photography suggests that two Afghan Air
Force MI-8 troop transport helicopters were
sabotaged at Mazar-e Sharif airfield on
16 September. If true, this would be at least the
third sabotage incident involving the Afghan Air
Force that resulted in destroyed aircraft this
year.
an ammunition
storage facility at Qonduz suffered extensive
damage between 11 and 27 September, possibly as a
result of negligence.
-- The treasurer of the Afghan National Bank has
vanished, taking with him all the bank's foreign
currency,
His departure follows the recent disappearance of
KHAD's treasurer, who also embezzled KHAD's foreign
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The Afghan Air Force remains an unreliable Soviet ally
that suffers from both a lack of combat will and
internal unrest. These problems are largely caused by
improved insurgent military performance, Soviet
domination, Muslim sympathy for the insurgents, and
feuding between the two factions of the Afghan ruling
party. Although the Air Force's unreliability has
limited its participation in the war, the Soviets
believe the Air Force can play an important role over
the longer term. Because prospects for improved
performance are poor, however, we expect the Soviets
will continue to assume the lion's share of the air
war.
Reliability Problems
The Afghan Air Force suffers from a lack of combat
will, sabotage, and defections. Air Force defectors
say Soviet advisers often fly with Afghan fighter
pilots to prevent them from jettisoning their bombs
before they reach insurgent targets. One defector
asserts that pilots try to avoid approaching heavily
armed insurgent bands closely even when Soviet advisers
are present.
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Air Force saboteurs destroyed two 25X1
MIG-17s at an airfield in Mazar-e Sharif in
September. Air 25X1
Force officers blew up 21 Afghan planes at Shindand
Airbase in June 1985; nearly succeeded in carrying out
a similar action at Bagram Airbase; and tried twice to
sabotage the aircraft of General Abdul Fatah, the
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Defections also plague the Air Force. Air Force pilots
and crews defected to Pakistan with two MI-25
helicopters in 1985, and pilots defected with an AN-26
transport plane in 1984, an SU-22 fighter in 1983 and
an MI-8 helicopter in 1981.
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Reasons for Poor Performance
We believe that improved insurgent military
performance, Soviet domination, sympathy for the
insurgents, and rivalry between the Afghan ruling
party's two factions largely explain the Air Force's
unreliability. Afghan Air Force defectors say that
Afghan pilots are reluctant to close in on insurgent
bases because insurgents have more heavy machineguns
and SA-7 antiaircraft missiles than they have had in
the past. One pilot defector says that the insurgents
also have learned to fire at the upper surfaces of
helicopters, which are less heavily armored than the
lower surfaces.
Soviet domination of
the Afghan Air Force has also caused widespread
resentment among Afghan airmen. One defector estimates
that only a third of the pilots are pro-Soviet. Soviet
advisers must approve all Air Force operations, and the
Soviets control operations unilaterally in the northern
provinces, The advisers
choose all bombing targets and brief Afghan pilots only
an hour before bombing missions, giving only the
takeoff time, target coordinates, and a sketchy
description of the target. They never allow Afghan
pilots to attack targets of opportunity.
We believe that sympathy for the insurgents contributes
to the Air Force's unreliability. Many support
personnel who do not face insurgents in combat probably
sympathize with the guerrillas, and even Air Force
pilots are generally apolitical, in our view.
Soviet mechanics
closely monitor Afghan mechanics and never allow them
to work on Soviet aircraft.
Political infighting between the Khalqi and Parchami
factions of the ruling party also promotes poor
morale. I each
faction blamed the other for the Shindand incident.
Soviet advisers have also criticized the two factions
for their lack of cooperation and periodic clashes. We
believe these tensions are exacerbated by the imbalance
between the Parchami-dominated Air Force high command
and the rank-and-file, where Khalqis outnumber
Parchamis by two to one.
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Implications
The Afghan Air Force's unreliability impedes the Soviet
war effort, in our view. The lack of reliable pilots
largely explains, for example, why the number of Afghan
aircraft has only increased by about 10 percent since
1979. Air Force defectors, moreover, say the Air Force
never participates in combat operations involving
Soviet troops or combined Soviet-Afghan Army operations
because Soviet officials consider Afghan pilots
unreliable and are afraid they might bomb Soviet
troops. the
Afghan secret police must devote more agents to
monitoring Air Force personnel because of increased
sabotage and defections.
Despite these problems, Moscow apparently still hopes
the Air Force can play an important role in the war
over the longer term.
the Soviets are replacing Afghan air losses relatively
quickly; the aircraft destroyed at Shindand Airbase in
June were replaced shortly after the incident. Because
substantial improvements in Afghan Air Force
performance are unlikely any time soon, however, we
believe the Soviets will continue to bear the brunt of
the air war.
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Afghan Air Force Order of Battle
Our a he Afghan Air
Force7 study of the main
Afghan airbases: Kabul, Bagram, Qandahar, Shindand,
Mazar-e Sharif, and Herat. Most helicopters are based
at Kabul, but most fighter-bombers are based at
Bagram--reflecting the relatively greater strategic
importance of eastern Afghanistan. The Air Force is
commanded by Major General Abdul Qadr, an engineer who
has been a member of the People's Democratic Party of
Afghanistan since its inception 20 years ago.
Helicopters
MI-8 76
MI-25 20
Fighter-bombers
MIG-21 62
MIG-15/17 58
SU-7 20
SU-22 10
IL-28 14
Transports
AN-26
Trainers
L-39
Total 313
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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