AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000506900001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 27, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 17, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence "1~
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Afghanistan Situation Report
17 Septesb~r 1985
Top Secret
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eptem r 1983
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AFGHANISTAN SITQATION REPORT
COMBAT OPERATIONS IN PAKTIA AND QANDAHAR
Major Soviet operations continue in Paktia
Province and Qandahar.
MASOOD'S INACTIVITY
Some diplomats in Kabul have criticized the recent
inactivity of Masood's fighters, who probably are
recovering from the Panjsher offensive, which
ended in late July.
DNITED NATIONS TO CONSIDER HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT
The United Nations General Assembly is focusing
more intently on the situation in Afghanis
especially in the area of human rights.
NEW AFGHAN DIPLOMATS NAMED
Kabul has assigned several officials to new
diplomatic posts as part of attempts to
Afghanistan's international relations.
improve
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NEW LIFE ITT HELMAND PROVINCE INSQRGENCY ( 25X1
Insurgent groups in the Helmand Valley have ended
longstanding differences and have become more
effective, thereby increasing both resistance and
Soviet activity in the region.
This document is prepared weekly by the Office of
Near Lastern and South Asian Analysis and the
Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions or comments
on the issues raised in the publication should be
17 September 1985
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TOP SECRET
COMBAT OPERATIONS IN PARTIA AND QANDAHAR
Recent military activity focused on Paktia Province and
Oandahar, and Soviet operations north of Kabul ended.
indicates Afghan forces continued to operate near
Khowst and along the Pakistani border in Paktia
Province. Press reports indicate insurgent machinegun
fire downed an MI-24 helicopter carrying two Afghan
generals and a high ranking Soviet officer in Paktia
Province on 17 September.
the 70th Independent
Motorized Rifle Brigade continuing a combat sweep in
the Qandahar area, probably in reaction to several
successful insurgent attacks in the area.
Western, Chinese, and Pakistani diplomats in Kabul have
recently criticized Panjsher Valley commander Masood
for his failure to open a second front while Soviet
troops were occupied in the Konar and Paktia Province
offensives this summer, according to the US Embassy in
Kabul. The recent lack of combat in the Panjsher,
coupled with reports of a Soviet truce offer to Masood,
have fueled speculation among Kabul diplomats that
Masood may not be initiating attacks while he considers
the pact. The Embassy also reports that Masood's
inactivity highlights the lack of insurgent
coordination and undermines the efforts of resistance
as a whole.
Comment: 4e believe that Masood's inactivity results
largely from his need to rest and resupply his units
following intense combat in the Panjsher last July.
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supply levels are now good among the 5,000 insurgents
under Masood's leadership. Panjsher insurgents did
attack convoys along the Salang highway and attacked
the garrison at Peshghowr during the Konar campaign in
late May and early June.
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'TOP SECRET
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Soviet forces from Afghanistan. Although diplomatic
reporting indicates that Pakistan is interested in
having a member of the insurgent alliance address the
committee, Islamabad is reluctant to support formal
resistance representation at the General Assembly
sessions because it fears a strong Soviet reaction.
Kabul recently appointed new ambassadors to East
Germany and Syria and a new charge d'affaires to
Italy. The appointees to Rome and Damascus are low-
level party figures but the new ambassador to East
Germany, General Baba Jan, is a candidate member of the
PDPA Central Committee and a former Chief of the Armed
Forces General Staff (1980-84). A career military
officer, Baba Jan, about 60, was "retired" for failing
to prosecute the war aggressively. The Syrian
appointment upgrades relations from the charge 1
the Syrians do not maintain a post in Kabul.
Comment: We believe that the Syrian appointment--only
the second Afghan ambassador currently assigned to an
Islamic country (Iraq is the other)--is part of
Afghanistan's ongoing effort to improve its
international image. Kabul would like full diplomatic
relations with as many nations as possible and probably
sees states friendly to Moscow as the best place to
start. Baba Jan's posting, however, is clearly a
diplomatic exile--a frequent fate for out-of-favor
party figures. Other fallen stars now stationed
overseas include Khalqi leader Assadollah Sarwari (Ulan
Bator) and former Finance Minister Abdul Wakil
(Hanoi).
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IINITED NATIONS TO CONSIDER HIIMAN RIGHTS REPORT
The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) will give an
unprecedented amount of attention to the Afghanistan
question this year, considering for the first time the
human rights situation in the country. In the spring
of 1985, the UN Human Rights Commission issued a report
that accused "foreign forces" in Afghanistan of using
chemical weapons and massacring civilians. The UNGA
Social and Humanitarian Committee will consider this
report in November and probably issue a resolution
based on it.
In mid-November, the General Assembly plenary will also
vote for the seventh time on a resolution calling for
the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. In
1984 a record 119 countries supported the resolution
with only 20 countries opposed. The Afghanistan issue
may also arise in the UNGA Decolonization Committee.
Comment: The US Mission to the UN predicts that the
human rights resolution would pass by at least a 5 to 1
margin; no significant change is expected in the vote
totals on the resolution calling for the withdrawal of
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NEW LIFE IN HELMAND PROVINCE INSORGENCY
Major improvements in insurgent cooperation in the
upper Helmand Valley area in 1985 resulted in a high
level of activity, threatening Soviet and Afghan regime
control of the Kajaki Dam and security on the highway
from Qandahar to Herat. For the first five years of
the war, insurgents in Helmand Province, beset by
internal squabbling, posed little challenge to the
Soviets and the Kabul regime.
Strategic Importance
The importance of Helmand Province derives from its
agriculture and the segment of the highway from
Qandahar to Herat. The most productive agricultural
area is the Helmand River Valley. In the upper valley,
the US-built Kajaki dam and a 36-mile long lake feed a
network of irrigation canals; a hydroelectric station
at the dam serves Gereshk--an important transfer and
supply point for Soviet and Afghan Government convoys,
Gereshk is situated on
road from Qandahar to
The war has increased the economic importance of the
since 1980 the area has rep aced Qandahar as the
regional economic center because of frequent Soviet and
Afghan bombing of Qandahar. One Helmand village,
Tambah, has grown into a major black market for items
obtained from Soviet soldiers,
Soviet and regime forces maintain battalion-sized
garrisons at Gereshk and other forces at Lashkar Gah.
The Soviets reinforced their contingent in the province
this spring. Larger units are brought in from Qandahar
and Shindand for major operations in the province. The
rest of Helmand Province has little strategic
importance. Apart from the sparsely populated Helmand
River Valley and the mountainous north, the province is
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Insurgent Discord
There were deep differences between the various
insurgent roups active in Helmand until the last year
or so. much of the
tension grew out of efforts by the Hizbi-Islami
Gulbuddin faction to expand its influence at the
expense of the more moderate Harakat-i-Ingilab-i-
Islami. Beginning in about 1980 and lasting until late
1984, Hizbi and Harakat forces fought each other. The
struggle intensified when Iranian-backed Shia groups
from the Hazarehjat region, eager to take revenge on
the Harakat for earlier attacks on Shia groups in the
eastern Hazarehjat region, entered the fighting on the
side of the Hizbi,
In late 1984 or early 1985, mediation by a local
religious leader brought an end to fighting between the
Harakat and Hizbi, and
we believe that political shifts outside the region
also contributed to development of accord among the
caroups in the upper Helmand.
in late 1984 relations between Iran ana Huai
worsened; as a result, the Iranian-backed Shia groups
from the Hazarehjat probably loosened their ties with
Hizbi, makin Hizbi accord with the Harakat possible.
Moreover, at about the
same time Pakistan began pressuring Gulbuddin's
organization to show more tolerance toward other Sunni
groups, to facilitate the formation of the new
resistance alliance.
Renewed Insurgency
The end to internecine fighting had dramatic effects on
the insurgency in the area. Morale rose and attacks on
Soviet and regime targets increased sharply in February
and March 1985, producing the heaviest fighting of the
war in the Helmand Valley,
Harakat attacks on Gereshk resulted in eavy
cas~ s on Soviet and regime forces,
and prompted the Soviets to send
reinforcements and counterattack. The insurgent attack
on Gereshk, further raised
morale among Qandahar guerrillas, who believed the
Soviets would have to spread their resources and thus
relieve pressure on the Qandahar groups.
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Heavy fighting continued into the s rin and summer.
In March, insurgents
attacked Soviet and re ime ositions near the Ka'aki
Dam.
insurgents participated in the attack, and
the attacks continued,
high. In mid-June,
with varying intensity, for more than two months. In
early June, the insurgents were expecting to retreat
into the northern mountains and, although the
insurgents suffered heavy casualties, morale was
insurgents detroyed the Afghan Army's 20th
civilians. In mid-July,
retaliatory strikes aimed at breaking the alliance
succeeded mainly in killing large numbers of
Brigade and killed its commander; government
Soviet and Afghan forces broke off the
The insurgency in the province remains strong. 0
although the guerrillas
resistance during the fighting.
admit to heavy casualties and large arms and ammunition
losses, they claim to have inflicted much heavier
losses on the Soviet and Afghan forces. They were
especially proud of having successfully resisted Soviet
and Afghan regime efforts to take the village of Musa
Qaleh. At heavy cost, insurgents aggressively attacked
advancing armored vehicles, destroying many and
breaking the siege. Insurgents claim, moreover, that
more than 300 regime soldiers deserted to the
Outlook
Prospects are good for a continuing strong insurgency
in Helmand Province. Soviet and Afghan regime military
pressure has often caused insurgent groups to set aside
internecine quarreling and concentrate on fighting.
Such pressure is likely to continue. Once begun,
military cooperation among insurgent groups has tended
motion internal bickering.
Insurgent cooperation in Helmand, however, probably
will remain somewhat vulnerable to political shifts
outside the region. For example, a strong effort by
Iranian-backed Shiite groups to extend their influence
into the Helmand Valley--though unlikely in the near
term--could disrupt the current cooperation and set in
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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