AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000506810001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 27, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 27, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Top Secret
Intelligence
79-81 11CIC
Afghanistan Situation Report
27 August 1985
Top Secret
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SOYA
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AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT
FIGHTING PICKS UP IN PARTIA PROVINCE
Soviet and Afghan troops launched multibattalion
operations in Paktia Province at Ali Khel, just
opposite Parachinar, Pakistan.
INDIA-AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN:
THE DOST VISIT
The Indian Government expressed its willingness to
convey messages between Afghanistan and Pakistan
on the Geneva peace negotiations and reportedly
also relayed the official Pakistani position on
direct negotiations with the Afghan regime.
SOVIETS PREVENT CRITICISM OF AFGHANISTAN AT
WORLD FESTIVAL OF YOUTH
Moscow prevented Western delegates to the World
Festival of Youth from openly protesting the
Soviet presence in Afghanistan.
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THE ORDEAL OF A FRENCH JOURNALIST IN AFGHANISTAN
During his imprisonment in Afghanistan, French
television journalist Jacques Abouchard was
generally well-treated by his Afghan and Soviet
captors, probably because Moscow was afraid of
damaging its relations with France.
This document is prepared weekly by the Office of
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis and the
Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions or comments
on the issues raised in the Dublicatinn chn?l r7 he
directed to
PUBLICATION NOTE
Unless major developments warrant otherwise, we
will not publish the AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT
next week. The next report will appear on
10 September 1985.
7
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FIGHTING PICKS UP IN PARTIA PROVINCE
a multibattalion
Soviet and Afghan force is operating in northern Paktia
Province at Ali Khel--opposite Parachinar, Pakistan.
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Afghanistan
International boundary
Province boundary
* National capital
Province capital
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During the seventh meeting of the Indo-Afghan Joint
Commission, held early this month in New Delhi, the
Indians transmitted Pakistani views on the Geneva peace
process to Afghan Foreign Minister Dost, according to a
senior Indian official. The official told US diplomats
that New Delhi would not mediate between Afghanistan
and Pakistan, but would be willing to continue to act
as a conduit for messages between the two sides. He
also said that Dost believed that direct Pakistani-
Afghan talks on Afghanistan would be possible because
Islamabad no longer viewed them as equivalent to
recognition of the Kabul regime.
The meeting between the two foreign ministers broke
little new ground in bilateral relations between India
and Afghanistan. New Delhi agreed to provide technical
aid to Afghanistan's public health program, small-scale
industry, and power generation; and to continue to help
finance a children's hospital and an industrial park in
Kabul. The two countries also signed a cultural
agreement.
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For its part, New Delhi's willingness to serve as a
communications link between Afghanistan and Pakistan
could reflect India's new activism on Afghanistan. In
June, Rajiv Gandhi had foreign Secretary Bhandari
personally relay to Gorbachev India's impression that
the United States was willing to hold serious talks on
Afghanistan.
New Delhi downplayed the significance of the Dost visit
for bilateral relations and merely announced that the
two sides had resolved some transportation problems
that have impeded trade since the last Commission
meeting in Kabul in October 1983. The grant aid
continues the small Indian assistance program begun by
Indira Gandhi in 1969.
YOUTH
Several western European delegates attending the World
Festival of Youth in Moscow earlier this month intended
to publicly object to Soviet policy on Afghanistan, but
were stopped by Soviet countermeasures. A Swedish
delegate, for example, tried to read a speech critical
of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, but was
prevented from doing so when the auditorium's address
system coincidentally "broke down". On another
occasion, several Norwegian delegates showed up for a
parade in Red Square wearing identical shirts saying,
"Soviets out of Afghanistan;" they were summarily
rounded up and returned to their hotel. The Norwegian
delegation was subsequently told that if such
"provocative" actions recurred, the Soviets would no
longer be able to guarantee their security.
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Comment: The Soviets were unwilling to tolerate even a
minimal give-and-take on the Afghanistan issue. Their
tight control of the discussions alienated the more
sophisticated representatives from western Europe and
-- Afghan Foreign Minister Shah Mohammed Dost and
Pakistani Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan met with
Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy
Korniyenko on 26 August en route to the Geneva
peace talks, according to press reports. It is not
clear if the two foreign ministers had private
Afghan Prime Minister Sultan Ali Keshtmand left for
Moscow on 13 August, according to the US Embassy in
Kabul. His unannounced departure may be related to
persistent rumors that Moscow would promote
Keshtmand to the largely ceremonial head-of-state
position now held by Babrak Karmal, leaving Babrak
with the sole title of Secretary General of the
Peoples' Democratic Party of Afghanistan. Although
Keshtmand's promotion would bolster his position
vis-a-vis Babrak, Keshtmand has reportedly argued
to stay in his post, believing he will be more
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PERSPECTIVE
THE ORDEAL OF A FRENCH JOURNALIST IN AFGHANISTAN
by NESA
information on the insurgents.*
25X1 Jacques Abouchard's account of his six-week long
imprisonment in Afghanistan, In the Cage of the Bear,
gives a unique picture of Soviet and Afghan handling of
suspected foreign intelligence agents. The Soviets and
Afghans tried to force Abouchard to say he worked for
US or French intelligence by using threats, frequent
and prolonged interrogation, and isolation, but they
did not physically abuse him. Abouchard denied any
ties to the CIA or French intelligence, but provided
his captors with some potentially useful intelligence
Capture by Soviets
Jacques Abouchard, a noted French television
journalist, and two French camera technicians entered
Afghanistan from Pakistan with an insurgent band allied
with resistance leader Sayyid Ahmand Gailani on 17
September 1984. Abouchard intended to film for French
television the group's planned attack on Soviet and
Afghan regime forces. Although Abouchard's network is
controlled by the French government, he claims that the
French Foreign Ministry and the French Embassy in
Islamabad were unaware of his project.
Soviet airborne troops apparently had advance
intelligence about Abouchard's plans. They captured
him in Qandahar Province after his group had been in
Afghanistan only a day; the French technicians escaped
to Pakistan. The Soviet commander indicated that he
had known when the party was going to enter
Afghanistan. Abouchard believes that Afghan Government
agents found out about the party's plans at Chaman, the
Pakistani border town where the part stayed for
several days. F
* Abouchard's book, Dans La Cage de L'Ours, was published in
France in 1985. He is currently working in Washington for the
French television station Antenne 2.
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The Soviet airborne troops treated Abouchard
correctly. They did not interrogate him extensively
during the 24-hour period they held him. Abouchard
refused to say whether he was accompanied by other
journalists and his captors did not pursue the
question. They also untied his arms after an hour and
shared their food and water with him. They seemed much
more interested in France--repeating frequently "Paris"
and "champagne"--than in Afghanistan.
The Soviet forces, however, stole Abouchard's
traveler's checks, toothpaste, and toilet paper. Only
their commander prevented them from taking his watch.
Abouchard noted that the troops' clothes were filthy,
their boots had no laces, and they used string to hold
up their pants.
Soviet Interrogation in Qandahar
After his capture, Abouchard was taken to Qandahar
where he was interrogated for three days by Soviet and
Afghan officers. The senior Soviet officer asked
Abouchard about CIA operations in France and CIA
relations with French intelligence, but the officer did
not pursue the subject when Abouchard said he knew
nothing. The officer at Qandahar was fairly relaxed
and ended the interrogation by recalling the fine
relations between France and the Soviet Union during
World War II.
Lower-ranking Soviet officers were more hostile towards
Abouchard. One officer accused him of belonging to a
neo-Nazi organization and of planning sabotage.
Afghan Interrogation Techniques
Abouchard was then taken to Sidorat prison in Kabul.
During his first week there, Afghan intelligence (Khad)
officers tried to force Abouchard to admit that he was
either an employee of the CIA or French intelligence.
During the second and third weeks, the Afghans tried to
persuade him to admit that he had been forced into
carrying out his project by his superiors at French
television. Two Khad officials interrogated him most
of the time.
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Abouchard says that Khad director Dr. Najibullah, who
joined the interrogation before Abouchard's press
conference and trial, tried to convince him to be
cooperative. Najibullah was correct but cold. None of
the interrogators tried to recruit Abouchard to work
for Afghan or Soviet intelligence.
Afghan intelligence used threats, frequent and
prolonged interrogation, and isolation to try to
extract a confession:
-- They threatened Abouchard with a long prison
term unless he cooperated.
-- Although they never threatened physical
violence, Abouchard shared a cell with Afghans
who were beaten and he occasionally heard
screams of people being tortured.
-- Afghan intelligence questioned him nearly every
day for periods lasting up to 12 hours. Most
interrogations started at dawn, although some
began around midnight.
-- They gave him a monotonous diet of thin soup,
corn-beef, and bread; he had to sleep in a cold,
small cell with three other people, wash with
cold water despite the cold weather, and was
allowed to use the toilet only at certain
times. He was allowed walks only rarely. He
was permitted to see a doctor.
-- They isolated Abouchard from nearly all contact
with the outside world, rejecting his repeated
requests to see the French ambassador in Kabul
or receive letters from his family and
colleagues. They also forbade contact with all
prisoners except those in his cell. Abouchard
heard no news because prison guards
intentionally lowered their transistor radios
during news broadcasts.
Abouchard's Response
Abouchard made few compromises with his
interrogators. He admitted only to having entered
Afghanistan illegally and to having claimed falsely on
his passport to be a businessman. Abouchard denied
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categorically that he had links to the CIA and French
intelligence and claimed he revealed little important
intelligence information. He did, however, provide the
Khad with a description of the physical appearance of
the insurgents he accompanied, and described where they
procured their arms and how the Pakistani Army allowed
them to pass unhindered through numerous roadblocks in
Baluchistan. He claimed this information was too vague
to be of much use.
His Show Trial and Release
After his interrogation at Sidorat, Afghan and Soviet
authorities displayed Abouchard at a press conference
and trial. There they accused him of being a member of
foreign intelligence services and presented his
captured camera equipment and introductory letter to an
insurgent group in Qandahar as state's evidence.
After a brief show trial, Abouchard was found guilty
and sentenced to 18 years in prison. Abouchard's
treatment improved during his short incarceration at
Puli-Charki prison in Kabul. He could awaken when he
wanted, ate better food, and circulated freely among
most of the prisoners. He was released on 29 October
after only five days.
We believe that Abouchard was released quickly after
his trial because Moscow wanted to limit damage to its
relations with France. Abouchard's capture received
widespread publicity in France and sparked protests and
demonstrations, including several outside the Soviet
embassy in Paris. Even the French Communist Party
sought his release. The French government told Soviet
officials that bilateral relations would suffer
seriously if Abouchard were imprisoned for a long
period.
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We believe Abouchard was better treated than many
suspected foreign agents would have been because he is
a well-known French journalist. Soviet and Afghan
authorities treated a French doctor whom they captured
in 1983, Philippe Augoyard, far worse. Augoyard spent
five months in prison even though he praised the Afghan
government and criticized the insurgents at a public
trial. Afghan authorities also periodically threatened
Augoyard with hanging.*
* Augoyard's book 'La Prison Pour Delit D'Espoir" was also
published in France in 1985. Au o and is still ctive in France
in support of the insurgency. 25X1
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Top Secret
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