AMAL AND HIZBALLAH: THE LINE BETWEEN POLITICS AND TERRORISM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000506780001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 7, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 16, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
16 August 1985
Amal and Hizballah: The Line Between Politics and Terrorism
Summary
Amal and Hizballah are committed to improving the political
status of Lebanese Shias, but see the fulfillment of their
objectives in settings that are fundamentally incompatible.
Amal is a secularist movement seeking redress of Shia
grievances within the Lebanese political context. Hizballah
rejects solutions based on compromise and advocates the
establishment of an Islamic republic.
Amal and Hizballah are separate and distinct movements in
terms of structure, policies, tactics, and ultimate goals.
Amal, nonetheless, is riddled with Hizballah sympathizers
seeking to undermine Amal's moderate policies. Despite their
organizational separation, Amal and Hizballah are inextricably
linked through.informal networks based on family
ideological belief, and personal rivalries.
There is no evidence linking the Amal organization to acts of
anti-US terrorism in Lebanon. The extensive and close contacts
between Hizballah and individual Amal members, however, makes
unofficial, clandestine cooperation a certainty. At the
grassroots level there is little distinction between Amal and
Hizballah and ,personal loyalties usually outweigh institutional
affiliations.
Hizballah sympathizers have been identified at every level
within Amal and include principal deputies of Amal chief Nabih
Barri. Several senior Amal officials have close ties with Iran
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This memorandum was prepared byl Ithe Levant Branch, 25X1
Arab-Israeli Division, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis at the
request of Ambassador Robert Oakley and Mr. Morton Abramowitz at the Department
of State. Information as of 15 August 1985 was used in its preparation.
Questions and comments should be directed to Chief, Arab-Israeli Division, at
copy f 8
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and Islamic Amal, the terrorist organization we believe is
responsible for the car bomb attacks against the US Embassy and
Multinational Force contingent in Beirut during 1983 and 1984.
Some Amal officials may have been involved in the kidnaping of
US citizens in West Beirut:
Rivalry between Amal and Hizballah may impel both towards
greater participation in terrorist acts--especially against
Israel but also against the United States--in response to
escalating demands for proof of commitment to the Shia cause.
Amal and Hizballah have dramatically different visions of Lebanon's future.
Both are committed to the improvement in the political status of the Shia
community, but see the fulfillment of their efforts in settings that are
fundamentally incompatible.
Amal has a secular political orientation. It is committed to the survival
of a unified Lebanese state, and its adherents seek their political destiny
within the context of the Lebanese political system. Amal seeks, ultimately, an
end to sectarian politics in Lebanon and redress of longstanding Shia grievances
through constitutional means.
Hizballah is committed to the establishment of an Islamic republic in
Lebanon and sees the eradication of Western, particularly US, influence as the
first step in that process. Hizballah has had some success in its attempts to
outbid Amal in the competition for the hearts and minds of Lebanese Shia through
its extensive social welfare programs funded largely by Iran. Its most powerful
drawing card, however, has been the spectacular suicide operations against the
United States and Israel and its surrogates.
Amal and Hizballah are separate and distinct movements in terms of
structure, policies, tactics, and ultimate goals. Amal, nonetheless, is riddled
with Hizballah sympathizers seeking to undermine Nabih Barri's leadership and
the movement's moderate policies. The example of the Iranian revolution and the
experience of Israeli occupation have transformed a growing number of Lebanon's
once politically despondent Shias into zealots determined to establish Shia
supremacy by any means. Hizballah's attraction stems primarily from its
brazenness in carrying out daring operations that Shia rank and file perceive as
single-handedly reversing US and Israeli policies in Lebanon.
Hizballah sympathizers and covert adherents within Amal have been identified
at every level of the organization from relatively minor military officials to
principal deputies of Amal chief Nabih Barri. Despite the subversive
relationship of many Amal officials with Hizballah, we believe that very few
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extend h ment to the establishment of a theocratic state in Lebanon.
Among senior and more politically astute Amal figures, Hizballah appears to
be an effective mechanism for asserting Shia influence on the Lebanese domestic 25X1
political process, and possibly, in seizing power. Hizballah also serves as a
foil for those who accuse Barri of perverting Amal's goals and of selling out
the aspirations of the movement's founder, the venerated Imam Musa Sadr.
The largely unsophisticated Shia masses probably cannot discern the
antithetical nature of Amal and Hizballah aspirations. They are, however,
impressed by the apparent success of Hizballah's tactics as opposed to the
relatively ineffectual political program of Amal. Their affinity for Hizballah
is reinforced by the preachings of Iranian-trained clerics who wield
extraordinary authority over their followers.
Aural and Hizballah: Organizational Structures
Amal is a highly structured and hierarchical organization. The Presidency
is the highest executive body and currently consists of six members and an
exofficio representative of the Higher Shia Council. Nabih Barri is president.
The other seats are held by Aqif Haydar, head of the political bureau, and Hasan
Hashim, head of the Executive Committee. Rabab Sadr, the sister of Amal's
founder, the missing Imam Musa Sadr, serves as her brother's representative, and
the two remaining seats are held open for the Aural members who disappeared along
with Musa Sadr during ja trip to Libya in 1978.
Members of the Presidency are elected by the General Conference, Amal's
supreme legislative forum which is supposed to meet every April to review Aural
policies and leadership. Some 300-1400 delegates attend, representing all of the
regional commands of the organization and its executive bodies, as well as
senior Shia religious leaders. Barri has refused to convene the General
Conference for the past two years, reflecting his fears that his support within
Amal has dwindled to the point that he could be ousted from office.
Directly under the presidency is a political bureau of some sixty members
headed by Aqif Haydar. Although charged with directing Amal's political policy,
the political bureau has only limited influence on Aural operations. Below the
Political Bureau is the Executive committee headed by Hasan Hashim, which is
composed of about twelve officers responsible for various tasks such as
education, propaganda, and military activities. Within the Executive'Committee,
Zakariya Hamzah, a Hizballah loyalist, is in charge of military affairs.
Regionally Amal is divided into three commands: Beirut, the Bekaa Valley,
and the southern command. The Beirut command is composed of eight zones, the
Bekaa of about three and the divided into nine zones.
the number of commands would appear
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to coincide with the strength of Amal in each region. Thus Amal draws its
strength primarily from the South and is weakest in the Bekaa.
Separate from all of the above organizational apparatus is the security and
intelligence apparatus headed by another Hizballah loyalist, Mustafa Dirani.
Dirani's organization is independent of the military command of Hamzah. It
consists of at least two major branches, one is concerned with internal security
and a second is responsible of "special tasks."
Since Islamic fundamentalism first emerged as a recognizable movement in 25X1
1982, Hizballah has evolved rapidly into a highly structured organization in the
Bekaa Valley, but remains amorphous in Beirut and South Lebanon. Headquartered 25X1
in the Bekaa, it has been nurtured through the presence of the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard contingent there and hap been able fn onerate unfetbe
c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t y or opposition from Amal.
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the Hizballah organization
in Beirut,
over the past two years it has made
dramatic gains at Amal's expense. Hi
zballah has benefited from the existence in
the southern suburbs of a highly politicized and alienated Shia population ripe
for Hizballah's radical solutions. Amal, nonetheless, remains the stronger
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movement among Beirut's Shias, and much of Hizballah's operation there remains 25X1
clandestine.
Hizballah's increasing confidence and capabilities are evidenced by the
establishment of an office in Sidon which became active this spring following
the Israeli withdrawal. The degree to which Hizballah is able to challenge Amal
in its southern stronghold will be a test of Amal's staying power and the appeal
of radical fundamentalism.
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Despite fairly well-defined structures, command and control mechanisms are
virtually non-existent in both organizations. Capabilities to implement or
thwart actions is more a question of personal loyalties than hierarchical
responsibility. The myriad of fellow travelers and ad hoc formations that
identify with Amal and Hizballah further detracts from their formal
organizational structures. At the grassroots level, both Amal and Hizballah
devolve into amorphous movements.
These circumstances, plus the ready availability of weapons and know-how in
the anarchy of contemporary Lebanon enables free-lance groups to operate at
will. We believe that within the ranks of Hizballah any action that serves the
cause is applauded, whether authorized or not, and further adds to the sense of
solidarity among Shia activists who see these undertakings as an indication of
the growing influence of their radical ideology. The lack of discipline within
Amal enables Hizballah sympathizers to pursue nefarious activities with their
radical colleagues with little fear of reprimand or punishment.
Loyalty and Leadership: Ties That Bind
Hizballah followers are bound together by their fanatical devotion to
Ayatollah Khomeini and the cause of sparking an Islamic revolution in Lebanon
some assumptions can be made based on the nature of the
movement itself. e elieve that Hizballah cadre share the camaraderie typical
of conspiratorial underground movements. The cell structure of its rank and
file elements may serve to channel hierarchical loyalties and inhibit personal
rivalries. Moreover, entire extended families appear to be drawn into
Hizballah, further strengthening interpersonal links among members.
The doctrine of clerical authority is central in shaping patterns of loyalty
among Shias. The Shia believe that their clerics are endowed with
divinely-inspired powers, an article of faith that obligates all believers to
follow the rulings of the living ulema. Historically, political and social
protest movements in the Middle East have been led by Shia clerics who have
attempted to challenge the legitimacy of Sunni orthodoxy and its monopoly over
the mechanisms of state authority. As a result, the prestige of the ulema has
been enhanced because it has become an established tradition that ulema who are
subservient to temporal authority are spiritually inferior. These factors have
resulted in a religious,hierarchy that can take independent positions and lead
independent movements.
The Shia religious hierarchy in Lebanon is tied to that of Iran historically
in both a religious and kinship sense. Lebanese clerics receive their training
in Iran or in Shia holy cities in Iraq where they become the disciples of
prominent Iranian theologians. Moreover, extensive intermarriage between
Iranian and Lebanese clerical families has produced powerful theological
dynasties that have served--and will continue to serve--as channels of
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solidarity between Iranian and Lebanese Shias, as well as purveyors of political
influence. 25X1
Amal, on the other hand, is a broad-based overt organization that has been
part of the Lebanese political process for more than a decade. As such, it
reflects the same personal animosities and internal factionalism of other
Lebanese parties. Dissatisfaction with moderate Amal leaders is being
exacerbated as increased awarenesss of their Shia identity has led to growing
impatience among younger Amal activists fed up with Amal's gradualist policies.
The moderate center may not survive under the assault of fundamentalist
rhetoric couched in the familiar terms of religion and the traditional Shia
vision of the faithful triumphing over oppression. The increasingly militant
rhetoric of Barri suggests that the moderate center itself is moving toward more
uncompromising positions than in the past.
Within Amal personal rivalries are high. We believe that at the senior
leadership level it is these rivalries--rather than strictly ideological
considerations--that have spawned the close ties between senior Amal officials
and the Hizballah movement. Nonetheless, power plays that depend for their
success upon Hizballah or Iranian support will produce a leadership within Amal
that is compromised by, and indebted to, these radical elements.
The "faithful" cadre within Amal--those sympathetic to Hizballah and to the
Islamic government in Iran--are attempting to purge Amal of its deviationist
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leaders and restore the movement to what they perceive as the principles laid
down by Musa Sadr. The first objective is to remove Nabih Barri from office.
This endeavor will be aided by Hizballah's close ties with key Amal officials.
The challenge to Barri is crystallizing on two levels. Pro-Iranian radicals
seeking to transform Lebanon into an Islamic republic view Barri as a major
obstacle to their ambitions. He is also confronted by personally ambitious
challengers who, while not committed to Islamic rule or Iranian hegemony in
Lebanon, are prepared to cut deals with Iran and Lebanese fanatics in order to
strengthen their own claims to leadership.
Executive Committee head Hasan Hashim appears to be Barri's principal rival
for leadership of Amal. The struggle between the two is personal rather than a
serious disagreement over policy or ideology. Although both men were born in
the south, Hashim seems to draw most of his support from the Bekaa, Hizballah's
stronghold, giving the struggle serious regional and ideological implications.
Barri has a number of lieutenants who are susceptible to Iranian and
Hizballah blandishments. The most powerful Hizballah loyalists within Amal are
Mustafa Dirani and Zakariyah Hamzah. Both maintain close and continuing ties
with Hizballah and with the Iranian Ambassador in Damascus, who is responsible
for implementing Iranian policy in Lebanon and for overseeing Hizballah
activities there. Hamzah and Dirani are principal supporters of Barri's rival,
Aqil Hamiyah, Amal's military chief for Beirut, is another key radical
figure within Amal. He maintains some degree of loyalty to Barri. but is also
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Hamzah, Dirani, and Hamiyah all hail from the Bekaa--where Iranian and
fundamentalist influence is strongest. All three have maintained the
primitiveness associated with the Bekaa's tribalistic social order, however, and
epitomize the cadre of thugs and gangland bosses within Amal whose rapaciousness
outweighs their commitments to the Shia community, let alone to the
establishment of Islamic rule in Lebanon.
Barri's relationship with Syria and his access to other players in the
Lebanese milieu have proven invaluable in maintaining the sinecures of Amal
officials like these. Nonetheless, under the right circumstances and for the
right price, any of them could be encouraged to supplant their chief and lead
Amal into an alignment with Hizballah.
Hizballah and Amal: Terrorist Links?
extensive and close contacts between Hizballah and
individual Amal members make unofficial, clandestine cooperation a certainty.
This has been confirmed concerning resistance operations against Israeli forces
and their surrogates in South Lebanon, is highly probable in the kidnapings of
at least some US citizens, and possible in the bombing of the US Marine Barracks
in October 1983. We believe it is unlikely that Barri or other senior Amal
officials--except those direptlv involved with H allah--would be witting to
Hizballah plans in advance.
Although Amal does not espouse the virulent anti-American rhetoric that has
become a hallmark of Hizballah, many Amal adherents are hostile to the United
States. US support for Lebanon's Christian-dominated government, US support for
the state of Israel, and US hostility to the Islamic regime in Iran, are
powerful motivators for young Shia. Most probably would require little coaxing
to oarticioate. or at least cooperate, with Hizballah in anti-US actions.
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The TWA hijacking last June was planned by the Hizballah
Amal's subsequent involvement in the hostage crisis is not indicative of
prior knowledge, cooperation, or approval of Hizballah actions. We believe that 25X1
once Barri was involved in the negotiations, he attempted to use the situation
to his advantage. Barri wanted to grab headlines from his detractors and 25X1
demonstrate his ability to deal effectively with the United States and win
concessions,
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Hizballah elements responsible for the planning and execution of the TWA
hijacking undoubtedly resent being upstaged by Barri and Amal. The carefully
orchestrated press extravaganza surrounding Barri's mediation effort and Amal's
public relations coup with the American hostages burnished Barri's and Amal's
credentials within the Shia community and portrayed Amal to the world as the
legitimate champion of Shia rights. Hizballah certainly is 1 to
discredit Barri and regain the momentum from Amal.
We believe that Imad Mughniyah is also the principal figure responsible for
the kidnaping of seven US citizens in West Beirut.
imp ca e in e assassination o two French soldiers with the peacekeeping
force in Beirut, and has been linked with other murders that have taken place in
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the more parochial context of Lebanon's violent domestic conflict. By virtue of
his position, we believe Mughniyah is in frequent contact with Amal officials,
especially those who are opposed to Barri and, like Mughniyah himself, are close
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n our view, however, it is highly improbable that
Hizballah could spirit kidnap victims between Beirut and the Bekaa without th
knowledge and probable participation of some Amal officials.
Zakariyah Hamzah and Mustafa Dirani, by virtue of their key positions and
close ties with Hizballah, are likely candidates for cooperation with Hizballah
in this type of operation. We believe it would be difficult for the hostages to
be maintained in Beirut for any length of time without the cognizance of at
It is impossible to sever the links between Amal and Hizballah. Despite the
organizational separation of the movements and their competitive and frequently
hostile relations, they are inextricably linked through a myriad of informal
networks based on family ties, ideological belief, and personal rivalries.
Barri is aware of the threat, but his attempts to counter radical influence
within^Amal have servesi instead to alienate further his opponents and enrage
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Barri is fighting for his political life in an organization that is falling
under the influence of Shia extremists who are implacable enemies of the United
States. If Barri losses power and his moderate policies are repudiated by his
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successors, the United States will lose its only avenue into Lebanon's important
Shia community. Unless Amal is able to deliver tangible political successes to
the Shia community that would diminish Hizballah's attraction, Amal has few
prospects of surviving as a moderate secular organization.
Shia political demands cannot be fulfilled within the Lebanese context as
long as a political modus vivendi eludes factional leaders. Despite Hizballah's
inroads with Amal, we believe that Amal continues to represent the aspirations
of the majority of Lebanese Shias. The longer Shia frustrations fester,
however, the more irrelevant those distinctions will become. Rivalry between
Amal and Hizballah may impel both toward greater participation in terrorist
acts--especially against Israel but also against the United States--in response
to escalating demands for proof of commitment to the Shia cause.
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SUBJECT: Amal and Hizballah: The Line Between Politics and Terrorism
Distribution:
External
Copy 1 - Ambassador Oakley
Copy 2 - Mr. Abramowitz
Internal
Copy 3 - DDI
Copy 4 - NIO/NESA
Copy 5 - C/PES
Copy 6,7,8,9 - CPAS/IMD/CB
Copy 10 - CPAS/ISS
Copy 11 - D/NESA
Copy 12,13 - NESA/PPS
Copy 14 - NESA/AI
Copy 15,16 - NESA/AI/L
DDI/NESA/AI/L/I K16 Aug 85)
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