AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000506730001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 27, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 6, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Afghanistan Situation Report
6 Amt 1985
79-8 1
Top Secret
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SOVIET OPERATIONS END IN HERAT AND THE PANJSHER
Soviet operations in Herat and the Panjsher Valley
have ended, and troops have returned to
garrison.
Recent polls indicate that Soviet public support
for the war in Afghanistan has declined, but this
trend probably is balanced by a general acceptance
of government policy that Soviet interests in
Afghanistan require continued involvement there.
This document is prepared weekly by the Office of
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis and the
Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions or comments
on the issues raised in the publication may be
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International boundary
Province boundary
National capital
Province capital
Railroad
Road
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that the Soviet offensive in the Panjsher Valley ended
by 1 August and that Soviet forces have returned to
garrison. One Soviet motorized rifle regiment remains
in the valley in Rokha and battalion-size Afghan units
are deployed at Bazarak, Barak, Tahana, and
Peshghowr.
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-- Insurgent sources claim to have shot down a Soviet-
made transport as it was landin at an airport near
Khowst on 27 July. the
presence of a damaged Soviet An-12 Cub aircraft.
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Officials of the International Medical Corps, the
US volunteer health organization that has been
operating inside Afghanistan since April 1984, have
decided the dangers from Soviet military operations
are too great to continue their activities in the
country. The International Medical Corps instead
will provide paramedical training to Afghans in
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Recent public opinion polls suggest that Soviet support
for the war in Afghanistan has declined sharply since
1980. Radio Liberty interviews with some 2,960 Soviets
who traveled to the West in 1984 indicate that about a
quarter of the group expressed support for Soviet
policy, a quarter were opposed, and half had no
opinion. This is a significant change from a similar
poll in 1980 when some two-thirds of the 564 Soviets
interviewed expressed support for their government's
policy. Other polls we have examined support Radio
Liberty's major finding--that public support for
Moscow's Afghanistan policy is falling.
Radio Liberty's Findings
The Radio Liberty poll suggests that support for Soviet
Afghanistan policies varies with geographic area,
nationality, party membership, age, and sex.*
-- Support for Soviet policy is strongest in the
Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic,
particularly in the Moscow area. Disapproval is
highest in the non-Russian areas of the Soviet
Union, particularly in the Baltic States,
Central Asia, and the Caucasus, and among non-
Russian nationalities.
* Radio Liberty interviews were conducted by a
contractor and the interviewees did not know their
views were being reported back to Radio Liberty. The
major flaw in the Radio Liberty poll is the sample
used: interviewees are members of the elite who do not
represent the Soviet population as a whole. Most are
educated, urban males aged 30-49 who are Communist
Party members and who reside in the European part of
the USSR. Nevertheless, using an MIT computer model
designed to correct for these biases, Radio Liberty has
been able to project the attitudes of this sample to
the Soviet urban population as a whole. These
projections are used in the tables and the analysis.
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-- Central Asians display both high approval and
disapproval of Soviet policy. This may reflect
differences between the nonassimilated
indigenous people of the region and the Slavic
emigres, and those indigenous people who have
been assimilated.
-- Communist Party members--not surprisingly--
voiced much greater approval of government
policy than non-party members; of those party
members who voiced disapproval of government
policy, two-thirds were non-Russian.
-- Soviet young people are less opposed to Moscow's
involvement than members of the older
generation--perhaps because the young have no
first-hand experience of war and/or are less
interested in political matters than their
elders.
-- The better educated are also more likely to
support Soviet policy.
-- There were no significant differences between
men and women, although women were slightly more
likely to approve official policy and slightly
less likely to be ambivalent.
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Table 1
SOVIET ATTITUDES TOWARD AFGHANISTAN
(Urban Adults)
Disapprove of No Clear Approve of
Official Policy Attitude Official Policy
(percent) (percent) (percent)
Total Population*
Communist Party
Membership
Members
8
37
55
Nonmembers
26
52
22
Age
18-29
13
62
25
30-49
31
46
23
50 or over
30
44
27
Education
Less than Secondary
24
58
18
Secondary or More
26
39
35
Male
25
53
22
Female
25
49
26
* Total percentages may not equal 100 because of rounding. All
percentages reflect MIT's extrapulation of poll data to the
Soviet urban population at large.
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The survey notes that few Soviets expect the Afghans to
emerge victorious from the conflict. Nearly three-
quarters of the respondents do not accept official
assurances that the Afghan problem can be resolved and
believe that the situation will remain stalemated
indefinitely. The same people who oppose Soviet
intervention in Afghanistan are also most pessimistic
about the prospects of Soviet success there. In
Central Asia even those who approve Soviet policy do
not believe strongly in Soviet success.
Table 2
PROGNOSES FOR SUCCESS OF SOVIET POLICY
(Soviet Urban Adults)
(Percent)
No Clear Soviet Success
24
Uncertain
53
Clear Soviet Success
23
Total
Other Recent Polls
The findings of the Radio Liberty poll are consistent
with the results of two other polls received in the
last six months. In February, USIA published the
results of its third surrogate poll on Soviet elite
attitudes and perceptions on a wide range of internal
and external questions.* The USIA interviews, which
were conducted between December 1983 and May 1984,
showed that dissatisfaction with Soviet involvement had
become widespread in elite circles. Although three-
* USIA interviewed about 166 US and West Europeans in
frequent contact with members of the Soviet elite and
asked them to respond as they believed their Soviet
contacts would on a number of issues. USIA then
weighted their responses according to the degree of the
interviewee's knowledge of the USSR, number of contacts
and degree of intimacy, accuracy of recall, and command
of the Russian language.
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fifths of senior officials still agreed with the
statement "In sending Soviet troops to Afghanistan, the
Soviet leaders did precisely what they had to do," only
one-third of mid-level officials did. In contrast to
the 1980 and 1981 surrogate polls, some admitted that
major mistakes had been made, and two-thirds expressed
misgivings about whether the intervention was worth the
price in lives, resources, and lost prestige.
Human rights activists in Moscow also queried some 287
individuals in the Moscow area in early 1984. It found
the highest degree of internal opposition to
involvement in Afghanistan--62% of those queried.
Their poll was the least scientific and its results the
most suspect, however, because of the bias of the
interview.
USIA SURROGATE POLL ON SOVIET ELITE ATTITUDES
SOVIET LEADERS WERE RIGHT TO SEND TROOPS
(Percent)
Senior Officials
Strongly Agree
Agree Somewhat
Strongly Disagree
Disagree Somewhat
Total
Mid-Level Officials
Strongly Agree
Agree Somewhat
Strongly Disagree
Disagree Somewhat
Total
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Table 4
DISSIDENT POLL ON SUPPORT FOR THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN
(Percent)
Support the War
Support with Reservations
Not Interested
No Opinion
Do Not Support
Total
Outlook
Even though the three polls have varying degrees of
credibility, they suggest that popular enthusiasm in
the USSR for the USSR's venture in Afghanistan--even
among the elite--is waning. Nonetheless, the polls do
not tell us how intense opposition to Afghanistan
policy is, and other reporting--including diplomatic
observers, journalists, and most expert travelers--
suggests that negative feelings about the war are
balanced by a broad acceptance that Soviet interests in
Afghanistan require continued involvement.
Disenchantment with Soviet policy in Afghanistan,
moreover, is surpassed by popular concern about other
issues, such as the economy.
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