GANDHI'S DIPLOMATIC DEBUT: AN IMPRESSIVE START

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000506720001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 27, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington.D.C.20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
1 August 1985
GANDHI'S DIPLOMATIC DEBUT: AN IMPRESSIVE START
Summary
Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's visits
to the USSR, the Middle East, France, and the
United States during May and June showed that he
is able to move Indian foreign policy in new
directions and to do so in a more pragmatic, less
emotionally charged style than his predecessors.
He signaled that India was ready to enhance
significantly its economic, particularly
technological, ties to the United States and
Western Europe. He also showed a willingness to
give Western, particularly American, foreign
policy positions an honest hearing. In return,
Gandhi will be watching for signs that Washington
is following up on issues raised during recent
high-level visits by officials of both
countries. Gandhi's travels played well at home
and served to complete symbolically his full
takeover of his mother's leadership role.
This memorandum was prepared by
the Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. It was
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations. Information as
of 31 July 1985 was used in its preparation. Comments and
queries are welcome and may be addressed to the Chief, South Asia
Division, NESA,
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Gandhi's trip to the Soviet Union and his short stopovers in
Egypt and Algeria should be viewed largely as efforts to
demonstrate continuity with two basic tenets of Indian foreign
policy--close Indo-Soviet ties and commitment to the Non-Aligned
Movement. In Moscow, he sought to reassure the new Soviet
leadership that India's foreign policy remained anchored by New
Delhi's extensive economic and military ties to the USSR, and he
publicly stated that efforts to establish closer relations with
the West would not come at Moscow's expense. By signing new
economic, trade, and scientific cooperation agreements, accepting
the Lenin Peace Prize for his mother, and dedicating a square in
Moscow to his grandfather, Gandhi engaged in the kind of symbolic
acts that have long characterized Indo-Soviet relations.
In Egypt and Algeria he discussed, among other NAM issues,
efforts to end the Iran-Iraq war and the selection of next year's
NAM chairman. Although both stops were short--less than 24
hours--they also served to balance what would have otherwise been
an exclusively Western trip.
Improving Ties in the West
Gandhi came to the United States with the intent of gaining
careful consideration for his agenda in exchange for giving
careful consideration to that of the United States.
he believes he accomplished this mission.
-- Rajiv clearly feels the United States has a more detailed
appreciation of the Sikh terrorist threat.
-- Soon after he returned to India, he declared to the press
that he was satisfied Washington would do more to. prevent
development of a Pakistani nuclear weapon.
-- New Delhi apparently believes the Gandhi mission softened
the US position on multilateral loans to India.
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With respect to US concerns, Rajiv has clearly taken aboard
the briefing he received on SDI.
-- He has not made direct comments to the press on the
subject since his visit and his Scientific Advisor at the
Defense ministry has asked for a more detailed SDI
briefing when he arrives in Washington this month.
On Afghanistan--an issue on which New Delhi has long been
suspicious of US motives--Gandhi accepted declarations of good
faith about the need for a negotiated settlement at face value.
He then took what was an important step in Indian policy by
sending Foreign Secretary Bhandari to Moscow to signal his
conviction that Washington was, indeed, serious about
negotiations.
-- Gandhi's move even gained him some political favor in
Islamabad, judging by Pakistani Foreign Minister Yaqub's
public statements crediting Gandhi's initiative with
creating a more hopeful atmosphere at the recent round of
United Nations-sponsored talks on Afghanistan in
Geneva.
. The Indians are also showing some movement on the issue of
terrorism. Airline terrorism--the TWA hijacking, the Air India
crash, and the luggage explosions in Tokyo's airport--has had a
special effect on Gandhi who is formerly an airline pilot. These
events combined with a growing realization in New Delhi of the
threats to Gandhi.'s life, have led to a raising of India's
official consciousness about terrorism. Gandhi has also spoken
out in recent weeks on the need for an international response to
terrorism, implying that India, as one of the world's leading
democracies, must break with its ambiguous, low-key stance on the
issue, acknowledge publicly the moral case against terrorism, and
play a more active, cooperative role in combatting it.
Rajiv's stop in France was designed to find alternatives for
sophisticated commercial and military technology if the United
States refuses to sell to India. It may also have demonstrated
Rajiv's view of India's place between the United States and the
USSR. Gandhi said publicly that he admired the French, both for
their close relations with Washington and Moscow and their
ability to speak out independently on foreign policy issues. The
comment may contain a hint that Gandhi envisions a similar role
for New Delhi among the developing countries.
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Gandhi and "High Tech"
The Western visit offered evidence that both
confirmed and clarified Gandhi's widely advertised
penchant for western "high technology." The fact that
he visited high-tech facilities in the United States
and France, but declined an invitation to tour Soviet
installations in Siberia will not be lost in :ioscow,
which is watching the issue as one of the signposts of
Rajiv's India. The agreements Gandhi signed in Paris
and Washington to develop jointly new technologies in
agriculture, medicine, and energy also will not go
unnoticed by Moscow.
Gandhi's reaction to the high-tech presentations
in Washington was also instructive. He focused on new
technologies most applicable to India, such as biotech
developments, and showed less interest in a robotics
demonstration, suggesting that the national prestige
aspects rank below practical applications in his scale
of values. His well-publicized personal affinity for
computers has not clouded his sense of what is
realistic for India.
Gandhi's Style
Three signals emerge from Gandhi's trips on his evolving
personal and diplomatic style. First, his apparent willingness
to give a fair hearing to other points of view strongly suggests
that he is motivated to try to cut through emotionally charged
issues to get to problem-solving. This has, in our view, been
played out in his "step-by-step" approach to improving relations
with the United States and Pakistan and to resolving the Tamil-
Sinhalese conflict in Sri Lanka.
His two meetings and
occasional telephone calls to Pakistani President Zia, his
discussions with President Jayewardene, and his spur-of-the-
moment, "barefoot summit" with Bangladeshi President Ershad to
show concern over recent flood damage all illustrate Gandhi's
penchant for personal diplomacy. These relationships also give
Gandhi a more strongly held personal stake in making progress in
improving relations in South Asia.
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The third glimpse into Rajiv's personal style comes from his
dealings with the international press--a force with which he has
become much more familiar as a result of his trips. In a Moscow
press conference following his talks with Soviet officials, Rajiv
answered leading questions on the US role in Nicaragua and on SDI
in a way that allowed reporters to play up Indo-US differences.
His performance at a similar event in Washington, however,
suggested Gandhi had made some progress in learning to deflect
questions designed to trap him and his subsequent press
interviews have generally ?hown a more careful couching of
language, particularly in response to questions on United States
policy.
Gandhi's apparent efforts to improve his performance points
up his sensitivity to the importance of projecting a positive
image. His decision to hold India's first live televised press
conference in late June suggests that he feels more confident
dealing with the international press since his trip. He used
that occasion to lecture Indian reporters on their frecruent
failure to cover stories honestly and objectively.
Playing to the Domestic Audience
Coming after his election successes, Gandhi's foreign trips
served to complete his full accession to power at home.
According to most evidence, the tour played well with all
domestic constituencies--the public, the Congress Party, and the
government bureaucracy.
The Indian press emphasized Gandhi's success in establishing
personal rapport with his hosts. Photos and headlines noted
Gandhi "hitting it off" with President Reagan, meeting five times
with President Mitterrand, and accepting General Secretary
Gorbachev's proffered lilac sprig in Moscow. The media also
predictably focused on instances where Gandhi stood up resolutely
for India's positions, such as criticizing the US stance toward
the Pakistani nuclear program, and vet earned a warm reception in
Gandhi received good marks for the Soviet trip, his first
foreign venture. The Indian press cast the Moscow stop as a get-
acquainted meeting of two new leaders but anticipated no change
in Indo-Soviet ties. Gandhi's public reassurances of the
importance of the Indo-Soviet relationship and the announcement
of additional joint economic ventures fortified tho
The visit to Washington clearly generated the most
excitement and anticipation among Indian observers and press.
This was in part due to Gandhi's decision to make the trip in
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spite of the Sikh assassination plot uncovered by the FBI. It
also reflected a sense in India--primed by the many preceding
visits of high-ranking US officials--that Washington had high
expectations for the Gandhi trip and was preparing to "woo" the
new Prime Minister.
Indian media recaps of Gandhi's Washington visit generally
welcomed the change in atmosphere in Indo-US relations although
the press cautioned readers that real gains may be slow to
materialize. It reported Gandhi's remarks that US policymakers
had assured him that they were doing all they could to halt
Pakistan's nuclear program, as well as his characterization that
Pakistan's conventional weapons programs constituted less a
security threat than an economic drain for India.
Outlook
Rajiv clearly is more favorably inclined toward the West and
the United States than his mother. Unlike his mother and many
other Third World leaders, he appears willing to consider
alternative policy views--including those of the United States--
on or close to their own merit. In this sense, he may he more
open than most Third World leaders to an approach that expects
him to examine all aspects of complex issues, that nurtures and
plays to his sense for realistic problem-solving, and emphasizes
the shared responsibilities of democracies in the international
arena.
Rajiv's reasoned approach to issues suggests that his
opening to the West will not be easily derailed. He will
probably see bureaucratic gliches and honest differences of
opinion as obstacles that can be overcome, as long as he receives
sufficient evidence that Western countries--particularly the
United States--are making an honest effort to treat India
fairly.
The next major foreign policy events on Gandhi's schedule
are the Commonwealth Summit in the Bahamas and possibly the'UN
General Assembly in October. Buoyed by his apparent success in
negotiating a settlement in the Punjab and in getting Sri Lankan
negotiations started, however, he may well turn his attention
over the next several months to New Delhi's relations with
Islamabad and Beijing.
I.
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Economic and Technical Agreements Reached During Gandhi's Trips
-- A $1.5 billion aid agreement with the Soviet Union that
will probably be used for energy projects. The loan is
probably at 2.5 percent interest, repayable over twenty
years.
-- An agreement on guidelines for Indo-Soviet trade and
scientific cooperation for the next 15 years. Details
are not yet available, but the accord probably contains
few innovations.
-- The finalization of an earlier agreement to establish an
Indo-French joint research center, with some French
funding. French officials report that neither government
considers this agreement significant.
-- A broad framework agreement to use French technology to
reduce pollution in the Ganges river and obtain fuel and
fertilizer from sewage. The grant element of this deal
was probably small. Apparently, no business contracts
were signed in France despite press reports of a $530
million deal.
-- The purchase of up to 500,000 tons of Algerian petroleum,
apparently linked to Indian projects in Algeria.
-- An extension of the Indo-US science and technology
cooperation agreement for three years, which will
facilitate meetings between scientists and an exchange of
research. The new agreement includes Indo-US vaccine
research and development.
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Military Discussions
Indian Defense Minister Rao accompanied Gandhi to Moscow,
France, and the United States to continue discussions about
future purchases of arms and technology under India's military
modernization program, but no military agreements were signed.
-- Discussions in Moscow presumably focused on delivery
timetables and terms for weapons systems already in the
pipeline.
-- Paris, according to US Embassy reports, made a special
effort to ease New Delhi's suspicions about France's role
in a major Indian spy scandal in January. They also gave
Gandhi tours of defense and scientific establishments.
Gandhi's last-minute addition of Rao to his Washington-bound
delegation and the return visit by the Scientific Adviser at the
Defense Ministry suggests he is genuinely interested in
developing military ties to the United States. Gandhi has stated
in public that India would begin by negotiating on small
subsystems before purchasing major weapons systems from the
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SUBJECT: Gandhi's Diplomatic Debut: An Impressive Start
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SUBJECT: Gandhi's Diplomatic Debut: An Impressive Start F__1 25X1
Captain Edward Louis Christensen
USN, Chief, South Asian Regional Plans and Policy Branch,
Department of Defense, Room 2E973, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301
Mr. Stephen P. Cohen
Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, Room 7312,
Washington, DC 20520
Mr. James P. Covey
Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director,
Near East and South Asia Affairs, National Security Council,
Room 351, Old Executive Office Building, Washington, DC 20500
Mr. Donald R. Fortier
Special Assistant to the President for Political-Military Affairs
National Security Council, Room 374, Old Executive Office
Building, Washington, DC 20500
Mr.' Donald Gregg
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs,
Room 381, Executive Office Building, Washington, DC 20520
Mr. George S. Harris, Director
Office of Analysis for Near East and South Asia
Intelligence and Research Bureau, Department of State
Room 4643, Washington, DC 20520
Mr. Byron Jackson
Office of Intelligence Liaison, Department of Commerce,
Room 6854, Washington, DC 20520
Mr. Ron Lorton, Deputy Director
Office of Analysis for Near East and South Asia
Intelligence and Research Bureau, Department of State,
Room 4643, Washington, DC 20520
Colonel Kenneth E. McKim
Director, Office of the Secretary of Defense, International
Security Affairs, Near East and South Asia Region,
Department of Defense, Room 4D764, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301
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SUBJECT: Gandhi's Diplomatic Debut: An Impressive Start
External Distribution (continued)
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