AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000506690001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 5, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 30, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Top Secret
79-83
30 Jdy 1985
Ii1C/C}3
Top Secret
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AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT
SOVIET OPERATIONS IN PANJSHER, OTHER AREAS
Recent Soviet activity has been concentrated on
the Panjsher Valley; insurgent activity,
meanwhile has picked up in Kabul and other
areas.
The regime's inability to improve its position in
Herat has prompted another Soviet sweep of the
area.
NURISTAN: GATEWAY TO NORTHEASTERN AFGHANISTAN
Nuristan, a rugged area bordering Pakistan, is
typical in many ways of remote regions of
Afghanistan that are not strategic but that
provide insurgents with a source of supplies and
transit.
30 July 1985
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This document is prepared weekly by the Office of
Near Eastern and South Asian Anal s i and thp
Office of Soviet Anal s i s .
30 July 1985
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SOVIET OPERATIONS IN PANJSHER, OTHER AREAS
After intensified operations in the Panjsher Valley,
Soviet forces aooarentl v are withdrawing.
some Soviet motorized rifle
and artillery units have left both Bazarak and Rokha
and are moving toward the mouth of the valley. Some
Soviet forces remain at Bazarak, the northernmost
Soviet deployment in the valley. The Soviet withdrawal
follows intensified activity that included operations
in the Hazara Valley and the deployment of Soviet
try into the upper reaches of the Panjsher Valley.
In other regions, areas of Kabul and the Soviet
military complex at Darulaman were rocketed on 16 and
18 J u l y , respectively, according to the US Embassy. I n
Feyzabad, Badakhshan, guerrilla attacks nearly
succeeded in closing the airport,
The crew of two Soviet MI-25 Hind helicopters defected
to Pakistan on 13 July, bringing their aircraft with
them. Guerr'i ll a spokesmen in Peshawar reported that
131 captured Afghan officers about to be exchanged were
killed when Afghan Government helicopters bombed a
muj ahedi n stronghold in the Panjsher Valley.
successful in operations in the first part of this
month against Soviet and regime units in Herat. By
10 July, the insurgents controlled two-thirds of the
city, and by 17 July, after intense fighting, regime
forces withdrew.
major elements of two Soviet motorized rifle regiments
had left their garrisons in the Herat area.
Comment: The regime's inability to improve its
position in Herat probably has prompted another Soviet
sweep of the area,
The Sovi ets may temporarily suppress the
insurgents in the city--probably at the cost of high
casualties--but they have insufficient forces to effect
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SOVIET UNION
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0 50 100 150 200 Kilometers
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Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative
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dramatic improvements in security there. The wel 1-
organized insurgent forces in the area also are l i kel y
to concentrate on attacking targets--border posts,
convoys, and the fuel, pipeline--left undefended while
the Soviets conduct urban operations in Herat.
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two Flogger
G-equipped Soviet fighter squadrons--one at Bagram
and another at S hi ndand airfields--have rotated.
They were replaced with two Flogger G vari ant-
equi pped squadrons, which will marginally increase
Soviet air combat capabilities.
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CIA Internal Use Only
NURISTAN: GATEWAY TO NORTHEASTERN AFGHANISTAN
Nuristan, a rugged area bordering Pakistan, is typi cal
in many ways of the sparsely populated, remote regions
of Afghanistan that are not strategic but that provi de
the insurgents with a safe source of supplies and
t r a n s i t . The N uri s t a n i s are p o l i t i c a l l y independent
and generally have remained outside the conflict
between the Kabul regime and the insurgents.
The Liberation of Nuristan
Nuristan comprises the northern half of Konarha and
Laghman Provinces in eastern Afghanistan. The area is
inhabited by about 100,000 Nuri stani s, one of
Afghanistan's smaller ethnic groups. Most of the
region is extremely mountainous and wel 1-forested,
making it difficult for Soviet and regime forces to
penetrate, although armored vehicles can enter the
area's three main river valleys on primitive dirt
roads.
The Nuristanis were the first ethnic group to take up
arms against the Communist regime in Kabul after the
April 1978 coup. They revolted after Kabul authorities
had executed the Afghan Interior Minister--the highest
ranking Nuristani official in the Daoud government--and.
arrested a number of l oc al N uri stani government
off i ci al s, according to a Western observer. During the
summer and autumn of 1978, they pushed the Afghan Army
and police out of the area's three main river
valleys. F__1
A government effort to reconquer the region in late
1978 failed. The government organized a mi l iti a
composed of about 20, 000 nei ghbori ng G uj ars (an I ndi an
people originally from the Gujarat area of the Punjab)
and 15,000 Pushtuns--the N uri stani s' traditional ethnic
rival s--and promised them that they could pill age
Nuri stani vi 11 ages, according to a Western observer.
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Reinforced by three regular Army battalions, the
militia pushed its way back into three main river
valleys in October 1978 but was forced to retreat in
the spring. Several ineffective bombing attacks by the
Afghan Air Force against several N uri stani vi es
failed to intimidate the area's inhabitants.
Independence from Conflict
Since the expulsion of the Afghan Army, Nuristan has
been important as an insurgent supply route.
N u r i s t a n ' s m a i n t r a i l s have been used by Taj i ks as one
of several routes to the Panjsher Valley and to
northeastern Afghanistan,
Taji ks from Badakhshan have also used the
Nuristan route more often since the Panjsher Valley
offensive in 1 ate 1982 to export gems, whi ch they sell
in Pakistan to buy arms.
The Nuristanis have sometimes harassed the Tajik
insurgents but have not actively sided with Kabul
Nuristani groups, who cl aimed they represented an
independent Nuristan, were demanding transit fees from
insurgents.
Few Nuristanis have joined Kabul's militia. The
government funded Sanwar Nuri stani , the former
commander of the Kabul Central Garrison under Prime
Minister Daoud, and sent him to northern Afghanistan in
1980 to raise a militia to interdict insurgent convoys,
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Little Activity Against Soviet and Afghan Forces
Nuristani insurgents have been active only in the upper
Konar Valley, against the Afghan Army outpost at
Bari kowt.
the most active commander was J ali at ul l ah J al al , who
began harassing the Afghan Army outpost in 1981 with
about 500 armed men and subsequently gained control of
a number of vi 11 ages south of the outpost.
Jalal's insurgents included about
120 Gujars, but that a change in leadership among
either ethnic faction could cause this alliance to
col 1 apse.
Other Nuristani insurgents have been inactive because
they are far from Soviet and Afghan forces. With the
exception of the upper Konar River Valley in Nuristan,
Afghan and Soviet troops are located only in the
southern part of Konarha and Laghman Provinces in
Pushtun areas.
tribal and ethnic divisions continue to handicap
the Nuristanis. The two main insurgent leaders of the
Nuristani interior, Mol l ah Af zal , the leader of the
Kati tribal group of upper Nuristan, and Amin Anwuar
Khan, the leader of the Kam tribal group of lower
Nuristan, have never cooperated extensively with each
other or with Jal al in exchanging intelligence
information or in attacking Soviet or Afghan forces.
The Pushtun Hizbi I sl ami leader in southern Nuristan,
Mol l ah R ustam, has extended his influence because of
this lack of unit
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Outlook
Nuristan probably will continue to have only a minor
role in the insurgency. The Soviets and Afghan
Government are unlikely to seek military domination of
the area in the near term because of its remoteness,
rough terrain, and independent populace. Meanwhile,
the region will remain important as one of several
transit routes for the insurgents, especially the
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Portrait of the Nuristanis
According to Western academics, the Nuristanis--once
considered to be descendants of the ancient Greeks--are
now thought to be related to an earlier people from
central Asia. They tend to have lighter features and
to be less repressive towards women than other Afghan
ethni c groups.
The Nuristanis were the last people to be conquered by
the Kabul authorities. They were converted forcibly to
Islam in 1895 by the King of Afghanistan, who changed
the name of their region from Kafiristan (land of
infidels) to Nuristan (land of light). The Nuristanis
were treated well by the King and proved loyal subjects
to him and his successors. Ma nv rose to prominence in
the government and military.
The Nuristanis traditionally have been on poor terms
with their southern neighbors, the Pushtuns and
Gujars. According to Nuristani tradition, the Pushtuns
siezed most of the best land in the Konar-Kabul basin
areas over the last several centuries and forced the
Nuristanis into the back valleys and mountains. The
Gujars, though less numerous than the Pushtuns, also
have been competitors for land. Warfare between the
Nuristanis and the Pushtuns was frequent until the
Nuristanis' conversion to Islam in 1895.
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