AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000506680001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 13, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 22, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/13: CIA-RDP85T01058R000506680001-1
Directorate of Top Secret
Intelligence
79-81
IMC/k.B
Afghanistae Situ~tioe Be rt
22 Ju 1985
Tap Secret
25X1
copy 0 81
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/13: CIA-RDP85T01058R000506680001-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/13: CIA-RDP85T01058R000506680001-1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/13: CIA-RDP85T01058R000506680001-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/13: CIA-RDP85T01058R000506680001-1
AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT
CONTENTS
INSURGENT DEFECTIONS ON THE INCREASE
The increasing number of defections from insurgent
groups to the Afghan regime reflects a variety of
problems within the insurgency.
SOVIET MORALE AND HEALTH PROBLEMS
Morale and health among Soviet troops in
Afghanistan remains poor, despite efforts by the
Soviet government to provid cuitahl rewards and
improve health conditions.
THE IMPACT OF THE AFGHAN REFUGEES ON PAKISTAN
More than 2 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan
could create increasing problems for Islamabad in
the future, but so far the government has
successfully managed the situation.
This document is prepared weekly by the Office of
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis and the
Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions or comments
on the issu
directed to
(secure) or
(secure).
1 25X1
23 July 1985
NESA M 85-10155CX
SOVA M 85-10135CX
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/13: CIA-RDP85T01058R000506680001-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/13: CIA-RDP85T01058R000506680001-1
TOP SECRET
tJ'"VIET P IONN~
-^t' , Fey bbd
11 T~togpn CEEshka ham
O Sbarlfe
Kkalm~ Ko duz~
Shebargh 1 E. :Kr?,
an;,;, r? l
.r }
8aghltn ~A?i
h oI-a f~komri 45
ayman
8 ~ (( 3 AN SIanB le,
Charl I MahmO A ,~av oaa
Bamlany an avn Bap a
9 rr~ a lrel
ghcharan ehtaHimm
D a a I,~11 ala bit,
Ashiow Y ~t
~
, AN Ghazni .G
ORUZ
1j~(NAZNI Khewat
arin - *0 all
Ko - )~
dab
Pi9- o Qalat -^tv -
6o ',,80L
bOandahar
UANI,Aa-AH
7 OM
A
BA D G) I
OQBrah-ye /
Now Cha
Herat O
Hf RAT
zud
w
Rpd i
sh i'
F~
~
f ARAN
t Farah
i i,F; MAND
NI!..1(t U::
Khash ppd Lashkar GOO
~a~a a
Da yale
2
CWIPIA
"Odu
araeeft
w
II IA
Afghanistan
International boundary
Province boundary
* National capital
Province capital
Railroad
Road
0 50 100 150 200 Kilometers
T 'I r~
0 5b 100 150 200 Miles
Boundary representation is
not necesNrdy authoritative
68
23 July 1985 25X1
NESA M 85-10155CX
SOYA M 85-10135CX
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/13: CIA-RDP85T01058R000506680001-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/13: CIA-RDP85T01058R000506680001-1
TOP SECRET
INSURGENT DEFECTIONS ON THE INCREASE
Insurgent groups have been defecting to the Afghan
regime at an increasing rate this year,
Comment: The increasing number of insurgent defections
reflects several problems confronting the insurgency.
Some groups defect to gain an opportunity for resupply
and respite from the fighting--but often rejoin the
resistance after a few months. Most of the defections
are smaller groups from Pashtun
23 July 1985
NESA M 85-10155CX
SOYA M 85-10135CX
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/13: CIA-RDP85T01058R000506680001-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/13: CIA-RDP85T01058R000506680001-1
TOP SECRET
areas, where local rivalries are strong. Moreover,
Soviet and Afghan intelligence services continue to
exploit local insurgent differences through bribery and
spreading rumors.
The high proportion of G ul buddi n' s commanders among the
defectors probably is a result of their recent losses
of territory in battles with other insurgent bands.
Outside support for Gulbuddin has been declining, and
his commanders--disadvantaged as a consequence--are
probably suffering from retaliation by neighboring
bands that Hizbi Islami earlier tried to dominate.
Paradoxically, defections may increase as insurgent
cooperation improves. As the more dominant
organizations gradually extend their influence, bands
that are unwilling to share local authority and
resources may decide to side with the regime for a
promise of local autonomy.
SOVIET MORALE AND HEALTH PROBLEMS
Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan remains poor.
the troops are demoralized by the Afghan Army's lack of
desire to fight. Ill health also is contributing to
the Soviet soldiers' demoralization, with a Soviet
regiment in the Kabul area suffering a 30 percent
mortality rate from illnesses brought on by poor health
and sanitation practices. Steps to improve morale
sometimes are backfiring; financial rewards or honors
given to soldiers for each wound or trauma are causing
a steady rise in the number of self-inflicted wounds.
Meanwhile, Soviet troops are
carrying out counterproductive, cruel acts against
Afghans.
Comment: (morale and
health care continue to be s i nifi cant problems for the
Soviets. common perception in
the Soviet Union that fighting and living conditions in
Afghanistan are poor. (C)
23 July 1985 25X1
NESA M 85-10155CX
SOYA M 85-10135CX
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/13: CIA-RDP85T01058R000506680001-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/13: CIA-RDP85T01058R000506680001-1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/13: CIA-RDP85T01058R000506680001-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/13: CIA-RDP85T01058R000506680001-1
TOP SECRET
PERSPECTIVE
THE IMPACT OF THE AFGHAN REFUGEES ON PAKISTAN
The influx of over two million Afghan refugees has
produced little conflict or disruption ' i n Pakistan so
far, but several issues could cause problems over the
long term. Pakistanis increasingly fear that most
refugees will never return to Afghanistan and are
concerned about them as a growing source of political
and economic competition. In addition, refugees are
straining municipal services.
Refugee Flight
Afghan refugees, currently the largest refugee group in
the world, fled to Pakistan in three stages, each
corresponding to political events in Afghanistan.
After Prime Minister Daoud overthrew King Zahir
Shah in 1973, a few hundred Afghans--mostly
Islamic fundamentalists persecuted by Daoud--
fled to Peshawar where they obtained limited
political support from the Bhutto government.
-- A half million Afghans--including many
intellectuals, university professors, and upper
level bureaucrats--fled after Taraki's coup in
April 1978.
-- More than 2 million Afghans fled after the
Soviet invasion in December 1979.
Most of the refugees are Pushtuns who moved into
Pushtun areas of Pakistan--the tribal areas and regions
close to the Afghan/Pakistani border. The 2500-
kilometer-long, largely undemarcated border has little
meaning for the Pushtun tribes on both sides. Before
the Soviet invasion, approximately 75,000 Afghans
belonging to nomadic Pushtun tribes traditionally
migrated from the mountains of Afghanistan in the
summer to the warm Indus plain in the winter.
25X1
25X1
23 July 1985 25X1
NESA M 85-10155CX
SOYA M 85-10135CX
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/13: CIA-RDP85T01058R000506680001-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/13: CIA-RDP85T01058R000506680001-1
TOP SECRET
The Refugee Population
Estimates of the number of Afghan refugees now in
Pakistan vary widely. The Pakistani Government claims
almost 2.9 million registered refugees plus as many as
200,000 unregistered the
number to be considerably ower; the World Food Program
estimates 1.7 million in the camps.
Pakistan finds its higher estimates helpful because
international aid is based on head count. A larger
niimhar al cn helps to dramatize the refugee probl em.
As refugees increase, so do problems. Land in
Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) is being
used up, and Pakistan is attempting to shift some
refugees away from the border, particularly to Punjab
Province. I n addition to decreasing refugee
concentrations, redistribution lessens potential local
hostility and limits proximity to the border, which
invites incursion by Afghan Government or Soviet forces
into Pakistan. Redistribution also eases distribution 25X1
of services.
The redistribution has gone slowly so far. By mid-1984
fewer than 100,000 registered refugees were in the
Punjab. The Afghans, many of them used to cool summers
in the mountains, do not want to move to the hot Indus
plain. They also want to be close to the border since
many return home periodically to farm or fight.
Refugees and Ethnic Politics
The Afghan refugees complicate ethnic problems that
have been a significant obstacle to Pakistan's
stability since the founding of the country, but
Punjabi concerns about resurgent Pushtun nationalism
appear exaggerated. Afghan and Pakistani Pushtuns have
significantly different views on Pushtun nationalism.
Afghan Pushtun nationalists want to free Pushtun
territory from Pakistan--the Pushtunistan issue;
Pakistani Pushtun nationalists are more concerned with
economic issues with Islamabad.
23 July 1985 25X1
NESA M 85-10155CX
SOVA M 85-10135CX
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/13: CIA-RDP85T01058R000506680001-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/13: CIA-RDP85T01058R000506680001-1
TOP SECRET
Numbers belie the ethnic threat as well. The refugees
increase the number of Pushtuns in Pakistan about 9
percent--less than a 1 percent increase in the overall
Pakistani population. Moreover, the Afghans have
laraely stayed out of Pakistani regional politics.
Ethnic tensions are more of a problem in Baluchistan,
where the Bal uch tri bes have made demands for greater
provi nci al autonomy. The Bal uch have long resented
Pushtun domination; Quetta, the capital of Baluchistan,
was heavily Pushtun even before the Sovi ets invaded
Afghanistan. Most refugees arriving since then have
been Pushtuns, and they may now be in the majority.
Socio-Economic Issues
Some Pakistani officials fear that Afghans in the
refugee camps are developing a "welfare" mentality.
Conditions in the camps, while not up to Western
standards, are good by local Pakistani standards, and
the refugees in the camps almost certainly have greater
access to medical and educational facilities than in
Afghanistan.
The Government of Pakistan and the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) have stressed
projects to empl oy the ref ugees, but these al so raise
Pakistani concerns. Some Pakistanis believe
economically active refugees are less likely to return
to Afghanistan and that every Afghan employed takes a
job away from a Pakistani . Islamabad and the UNHCR
have emphasized self-contained refugee projects that
provide work, divert energies, provide self-
sufficiency, and neither take jobs from local
Pakistanis nor encourage refugees to put down roots.
Such projects include truck farming, growing vegetables
for seed, and carpet weaving, which most of the
refugees lack ski l is or interest to perform.
Attempts to keep the refugees out of the local
Pakistani economy are probably too little and too
late. A UNHCR survey done in refugee camps in a
distri ct near Peshawar found 72 percent of the adult
mal es had some type of employment that brought in
wages, and 87 percent of the families had at least one
wage earning member.
23 July 1985 25X1
NESA M 85-10155CX
SOVA M 85-10135CX
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/13: CIA-RDP85T01058R000506680001-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/13: CIA-RDP85T01058R000506680001-1
Afghan refugees are integrating themselves into the
Pakistani economy, particularly in the service
sector. Upward of 60,000 Afghan refugee families are
supported by the motorized transport business in the
NWFP and elsewhere in Pakistan; many of the refugees
brought trucks with them. Pakistan, with a shortage of
trucks, registered these vehicles. The Afghans have
also established small retail shops and are gaining _-A
foothold in the bazaars of Peshawar and Islamabad.
Competition for jobs in Pakistan could become an acute
problem if the numbers of Pakistani men working abroad
declines significantly. Since 1983, job
opportunities--particularly in the Middle East where
most of the approximately 3.5 million Pakistanis
working abroad have gone--have been falling.
Pakistan's wage scale, inflated by migration, is likely
to be depressed, and cheap Afghan labor adds to the
potential for depressed wages.
Municipal services of cities affected most by the
refugees are stretched to the limit. The ref ugees--who
are disproportionately represented by the elderly,
young children, and women of childbearing age--have
increased pressure on medical services; availability of
water is a critical probl em; and buses are ful 1 .
Outlook
The Afghan refugees pose more potential problems--
economic, ethnic, and political--than actual problems
for Pakistan. There has been little violence, few
outbreaks of disease, and almost no starvation. We
believe that the Pakistanis, with continued support
from the international community, will continue to be
able to keen the situation from becoming a crisis.
23 July 1985
NESA M 85-10155CX
SOVA M 85-10135CX
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/13: CIA-RDP85T01058R000506680001-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/13: CIA-RDP85T01058R000506680001-1
Top Secret
Top Secret
- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/13: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000506680001-1