US-PAKISTAN: IMPLICATIONS OF AN AID CUTOFF

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000506640001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 30, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 15, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/10/30: CIA-RDP85T01058R000506640001-5
f t.
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
15 July 1985
US-Pakistan: Implications of an Aid Cutoff
SUMMARY
A suspension of US security assistance to Pakistan
would probably cause I sl anabad to intensify its nuclear
program and move towards a test. Pakistan's support for the
Afghan resistance almost certainly would decrease
dramatically, which eventually would lead to a Soviet
victory in Afghanistan.
Zia's policy is staked on the premise that US security assistance is
essential to enable Pakistan to withstand Soviet pressure for acconxnodation on
Afghanistan. By strengthening Pakistan's military capabilities and implying a
US commitment to Pakistan's security, US aid also reduces Islamabad's
incentive to test a nuclear device.
Effect on Nuclear Proliferation
In the event of a US aid cutoff, Pakistan almost certainly would try to
escalate its nuclear weapons development program. Without new deliveries of
advanced US weapons, a nuclear weapons capability would become an even greater
strategic imperative for Pakistan to compensate for India's conventional force
superiority. 25X1
This paper was prepared by ~ ~ Office of Near Eastern and South 25X1
Asian Analysis. - Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the
Chief, South Asia Division, NESA, 25X1
85-101JO
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An aid cutoff would remove the major political obstacle to a Pakistani
test of a nuclear device:
-- Islamabad would view a test as important to validate its nuclear
weapons capability and to achieving nuclear deterrence.
-- A Pakistani test would be a stark failure of US nuclear
nonproliferation policies and could serve as an example to other
Effect on the Afghan Resistance
Suspension of US aid pro rams to Pakistan probably would cause Islamabad
to decrease its support to the Afghan insurgents:
-- Without US backing, Pakistan would be exposed and vulnerable to
increased Soviet pressure.
-- Islamabad might feel it had no choice but to accept Soviet domination
of Afghanistan and gradually to phase out its support for the
-.-}
re
e
Pakistan might continue to provide some aid to the Afghan resistance with
the support of China and Saudi Arabia, but would be unwilling to risk a
confrontation with the Soviets.
The diminution of Pakistani support would not end the resistance in
Afghanistan.
-- Many insurgent groups would continue to fight the Soviets and to use
Pakistani territory to move arms and supplies into Afghanistan.
-- Islamabad could seri
the border but could
ously impair the Afgha
not seal the frontier
ns' ability to move across
, where Islamabad's
overni
authority is poor.
g
ng
25X1
Nonetheless, without major Pakistani (or Iranian) aid to th
e Af
han
guerrillas, the Soviets eventually would crush the resistance
g
.
25X1
Political Impact on Pakistan
2
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SUBJECT: US-Pakistan: Implications of an Aid Cutoff
DDI /NESA/SO
11/6981 (15 July 1985)
External Distribution:
Mr. Robert Peck, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA Bureau, Department of
State, Room 6244, Washington, DC 20520
Mr. Ron Lorton, Deputy Director, Office of Analysis for Near East and
South Asia, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Room 4636, Department of
State, Washington, DC 20520
Internal Distribution:
1 - DDI
1 - DDI Registry
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - C/PES
1 - CPAS/ISS
1 - C/DDO/NE=
1-PDBStaff
4 - CPAS /I MC/CB
1 - D/NESA
1 - DD/NESA
1 - C/NESA/PPS
1 - NESA/PPS
1 - C/NESA/SO
2 - NESA/SO/P
2 - NESA /S 0/S
3
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/10/30: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000506640001-5