SOVIET MILITARY PRESSURE ON PAKISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000406610001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 27, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 12, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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?. r "~ Centra Intel igenc
Washington, D. C.20S05
DIRECTORATE (~ INTELLI(~ NCE
12 July 1985
Soviet Military Pressure on Pakistan
The ntmber of Soviet and Afghan airstrikes in Pakistan have increased
significantly since Moscow's warning to I sl amabad 1 ast summer to end its
support for the Afghan resistance:
-- The airstrikes have been confined to Pakistan's border regions.
-- Nearly all of the attacks have been directly rel ated to Soviet and
Afghan Army attempts to relieve insurgent pressure on Afghan border
outposts or t~ interdict guerrilla supply lines from Pakistan to
Afghanistan.
Airspace viol ati ons over Paki Stan's frontier regi ons continue at a hi gh
rate, but there have been fewer cross-border ban bin attacks since the Soviets
completed major operations adjacent to the Pakistan border in mid-June.
Soviet Options for Increasing Pressure
We believe any intensification of Sovi et mi 1 i tary pressure on Pakistan
would be gradual and probing. Soviet perceptions of weakening Pakistani
resolve or uncertain US commitment to Pakistan's security might cause them to
further increase pressure on Pakistan.
The Soviets are more likely to increase military pressure by intensifying
cross-border airstrikes, rather than with heliborne or ground incursions:
This paper was prepared by (Office of Near Eastern and South
Asian Anal ys i s. Comments a gun eri es are wel come and may be directed to the
Chief, South Asia Division, NESA, on
85-10147
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SECRETI I "'~~'
could involve the United States.
camps or Palo stani mi 1 i tary targets because of the 1 i kel y international
outrage and greater risk of a major mi.litarv confrontation with Pakistan that
~trikps without strengtheni ng their air force i n Afghanistan. ~~ 25X1
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I n addi ti on to attacking i n~urgent supply 1 i nes, the Soviets might choose
to target resistance arms depots and training camps inside Pakistan. The
Soviets and Afghans would be less likely to systematically bomb Afghan refugee
-- The Soviets have the capability to further escalate cross-border
Likely Effect on the Resistance
Intensified cross-border airstrikes might force the insurgents to use
alternative, less-desirable supply routes into Afghanistan and to relocate
training camps and depots, but would have 1 i ttl e overal 1 impact on the tvar in
Afghanistan:
-- Insurgent arms depots close to the border are used by i ndi vi dual groups
for the transit of arms into Afghanistan and do not contain large
amounts of weapons .
-- Centralized storage depots for the Afghan resistance--where the bulk of
insurgent arms and ammunition are stockpiled--are much farther from the
Effect on Pakistan
Cross-border airstrikes have rei nforced Islamabad's resol ve to sustai n
its present policy on Afghanistan:
-- Zia warned i n 1 ate May that he would reconsider Pakistan's mi 1 i tart'
restraint if the banbings continue.
-- Contrary to expectati ons, the demand for direct tal ks with Kabul to
settle the Afghanistan conflict ,vas not widely voiced in the National
A ssembl y, where most del egates support Z i a' s policy.
-- Pakistani border troops have been given tactical anti aircraft missiles
to defend against air incursions.
-- The Pakistan Air Force and Army units opposite Afghanistan must still .
obtain high-level a r re they can respond to air incursions in
the border region.
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? SECRETI
SUBJECT: Soviet Military Pressure on Pakistan
DDI /NESA /S O/ (15 July 1985)
External Distribution:
Mr. Robert Peck, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA Bureau, Department of
State, Room 6244, Washington, DC 20520
Mr. Ron Lorton, Deputy Director, Office of Analysis for Near East and
South Asia, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Room 4636, Department of
State, Washington, DC 20520
1 - DDI
1 - DDI Registry
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - C/PES
1 - CPAS/ISS
1 - C/DDO/NE
1 - PD3 Staff
4 - CPAS /I MC/CB
1 - D/NESA
1 - DD/NESA '
1 - C/NESA/PPS
1 - NESA/PPS
1 - C/NESA/SO
2 - NESA/SO/P
2 - NESA/SO/S
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Cross-Border Air Attacks, August 1984-June 1985
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..Pakistan: Soviet A-ir ~~?lations
1982- - 85
Oi I II III IV I Ii III IV I~ III IV I
1.98.2 83 84
t~, 8 5
~' Air violations refer to overflights of Pakistani territory and/or attacks that
did not result in casualties.
b Serious violations refer specifically to attacks that produce casualties.
Secret
3()5994 6-85
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