IRANIAN INVOLVEMENT WITH TERRORISM IN LEBANON

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000406550001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 6, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 26, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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26 June 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
FROM: DDI Working Group on TWA Hijacking
The Iranian Government is now trying to exploit the hostage
situation, even though it does not appear to have been involved in
planning or carrying out the hijacking. An overwhelming body of
evidence, however, has implicated Iran in the Hizballah campaign
of violence against Americans and other Westerners in Lebanon
during the past two years. Iran provides substantial material and
political support to the Lebanese radical Shias, but it does not
control or have advance knowledge of all of their operations.
Senior Iranian clerics and Foreign Ministry officials are involved
in supporting terrorism in Lebanon.
Iran and the TWA Hijacking
Iranian officials are now clearly encouraging the Hizballah to
prolong the hostage situation, but we do not believe that Iran was
involved in planning or carrying out the TWA hijacking
Available evidence still suggests that the original hijackers
were part of a small group of disgruntled Shias from southern
Lebanon acting more or less inde endentl of an lar er
organization or government.
Iranian officials became involved, however, after Hizballah
elements seized a small number of the Americans during their
second stop at Beirut airport.
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Iran and the Hizballah
The Iranian Government maintains an intimate relationship with
the Lebanese Shia fundamentalist groups that comprise the
Hizballah network. Iran has greatly strengthened the Hizballah
during the past two years by providing money, weapons, logistical
support, training, and political and religious indoctrination.
Hizballah leaders have also worked in collusion with Iran on
some terrorist operations. The Revolutionary Guards based in the
Bekaa Valley are often colocated with Hizballah elements
Despite Iranian efforts, however, the Hizballah remains
largely a domestic Lebanese political movement with its own
political agenda. While Iranian assistance may have been critical
in 1982 and 1983, the Hizballah movement does not depend on Iran
for its existence. Shia fundamentalism, whetted by decades of of
Shia deprivation and Israeli occupation, has firmly taken
root in Lebanon and has achieved a momentum of its own. Hizballah
elements can and often do conduct many of their activities without
Iranian foreknowledge.
Hizballah terrorism is driven by the movement's internal
goals. Lebanese Shia fundamentalists do not target Western
officials primarily because Iran has ordered them to do so.
Hizballah and Iranian cooperation on anti-Western terrorism arises
from the shared belief that the first step in an Islamic
revolution is the elimination of Western influence from Lebanon.
Hizballah leaders share with Iran the ultimate objective of
establishing an Islamic state in Lebanon and are therefore often
receptive to Iranian encouragement and recommendations. Certain
Hizballah elements, however, are also motivated by other concerns,
such as a desire to free their Lebanese coreligionists in prison
for terrorism in Kuwait and elsewhere.
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The Lebanese Hizballah movement has grown increasingly
independent as it has expanded in terms of membership and
resources. Hizballah leaders are now serious competitors for the
leadership of Lebanon's large Shia population and command the
loyalty of perhaps as many as several thousand armed fighters.
There is mounting evidence that the Lebanese Shias---although
respectful of Khomeini and the Iranian revolution---will no longer
tolerate Iranian attempts to dictate their policies. Heavyhanded
Iranian behavior and the competition between rival elements within
the Iranian Government have also annoyed leaders of the Lebanese
Hizballah.
In summary, the Hizballah network has become an autonomous
terrorist problem in its own right. Iran supports and advises the
Hizballah but cannot control it. It is no longer safe to assume
that Iranian officials know in advance about all Hizballah
operations.
Iranian Involvement in Past Terrorism
While Iran does not appear to be responsible for the current
hijacking, there is considerable evidence of Iranian support for
past terrorism in Lebanon. Circumstantial evidence indicates that
the bombing of the US Embassy in Beirut in April 1983 was the work
of pro-Iranian Lebanese Shias, but there is no hard evidence
directly linking the act to Tehran.
The "Islamic Jihad Organization," which claimed responsibility
for the bombing of the Embassy was probably an Iranian-supported
Lebanese Shia group.
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-- The Jihad Organization had claimed responsibility for the
attack in March on the US Marines assigned to the
multinational peacekeeping force. It also said it carried
out at least one other attack against the French contingent
of the multinational force.
Evidence also pointed to Iranian-backed Lebanese Shias as
perpetrators of the bombing of the US and French Multinational
Force contingents in Lebanon during October 1983.
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We also suspect Iran was involved in the bombing of the US
Embassy Annex in East Beirut in September 1984, but we have less
specific evidence in this case.
Iranian Policy Regarding Terrorism
Tehran's support for terrorism stems primarily from the
perception of the Khomeini regime that it has a religious duty to
export its Islamic revolution and to wage, by whatever means
necessary, a constant struggle against the non-Islamic world,
particularly the US. Tehran's aim is to eliminate Western
influence, overthrow pro-Western regimes, and establish Islamic
republics. Iranian leaders--both clerics and laymen--are
convinced of the righteousness of Khomeini's brand of Islamic
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fundamentalism and believe that other Muslim societies would
benefit from it. This religious motivation provides Iranian
leaders with a moral justification for the use of terrorism.
Iranian leaders are divided between Islamic radicals and
pragmatists who both support the use of terrorism--although for
different reasons--and conservatives and moderates who generally
oppose it. Islamic radicals,
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terrorism as a legitimate tool of state policy. In their view,
the fusion of politics and religion justifies any means to export
the revolution. Moreover, radical clerics in Qom who may hold no
official position within the regime have independent sources of
income and are able to finance and support terrorist operations
without government approval.
Pragmatists--such as President Khamenei, Assembly Speaker
Rafsanjani, and Ayatollah Montazeri--are willing to support
whatever policies, including terrorism, that are likel to further 25X1
Iranian interests.
They support
terrorism because it can be a highly effective instrument of
policy, but they also recognize the need for improved
state-to-state economic relations and have sought to curb radical
excesses. The pragmatists prefer to use terrorism selectively,
choosing targets important to Iranian national interests rather
than purely revolutionary goals.
Iranian policy on terrorism is now caught up in the internal
power struggle among radicals, pragmatists, and conservatives as
Iran moves toward the post-Khomeini era. So long as Iranian
pragmatists perceive little cost in supporting terrorist
operations, the Khomeini regime will continue its deep involvement
in terrorism. Moreover, the US will remain a high-priority target
for Iranian terrorism barring the unlikely accession of a
conservative coalition.
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