SYRIA: ASSAD AND THE TWA HIJACKING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000406520001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 27, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 20, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Washington, D. C.20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
20 June 1985
SYRIA: Assad and the TWA Hijacking
Summary
Syrian President Assad has been in contact with
Amal leader Nabih Barri to urge an end to the TWA
hijacking, but we do not believe Assad is willing to
risk antagonizing Lebanon's Shias, the country's
largest confessional group, by bringing pressure to
bear on behalf of the United States.
Syrian leverage over the Shias is limited in
any case. Barri cooperates with Damascus and
receives Syrian support, but he has maintained his
independence and resisted Syrian efforts to
manipulate Amal. Barri is less dependent on Syria
than other Lebanese factions, particularly for
supplies,, because his forces are an urban street
militia using small arms readily available in
Beirut. Syrian relations with the radical Shia
factions are even more tenuous and increasingly
Assad is a shrewd calculator who almost certainly
has judged that adding to Syria's difficulties in
Lebanon .is not worth the few points he might score
with Washington. He has little propensity to take
dramatic, impulsive steps. His assistance in
releasing Americans in the past have been low-cost
gestures made to advance clear Syrian interests.
State Dept. review completed
NESA M#85-10134 25X1
should be directed to Chief, Arab-Israeli Division
South Asian Anaysis, and the Office of Scientific 25X1
and Weapons Research, Political Psychology Center, at the request
of the Department of State. Information as of 20 June 1985 was
used in its preparation. Questions and comments are welcome and 25X1
Central Intelligence Agency
This memorandum was prepared by the
Levant Branch, Arab-Israeli Division, Office of Near Eastern and
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Hussein/Arafat initiative, Assad must find his plate already full.
Assad's Response to the Hijacking
Assad almost certainly sees the current crisis over the TWA
hijacking as an unwelcome complication of his efforts to achieve
Syrian aims in Lebanon and to move on to other issues. His summit
meeting with President Gemayel two weeks ago set an agenda for
reestablishing security and implementing political reforms.
Me anwh ile , the "war of the camps" in Beirut has br ought to the
fore the Palestinian and inter-Arab dimensions of the problem.
Increasingly frustrated with the seemingly bottomless Lebanese
morass and anxious to devote more attention to Syria's relations
with the superpowers and threats to Syrian interests posed by the
them.
Assad has done what President Reagan asked--urging Amal
leader Nabih Barri to become actively involved in negotiations--
but Damascus remains publicly neutral on the hijacking. The
Syrians press has reported the events without a hint of
denunciation and, indeed, has given prominence to the hijackers'
demands. Our Embassy in Damascus concludes that Assad does not
want to antagonize his difficult allies in Lebanon at least in
part because to do so would cancel the influence he has with
pro-Syrian Amal officials.
Syrian Relations with Nabih Barri and the Shias
In contrast to Syria's control over valid Junblatt's Druze
and several other Lebanese factions, Amal leader Nabih Barri has
remained relatively independent of Damascus. Barri refused to
join the Syrian-sponsored National Salvation Front during the
1983-84 fighting and he has strongly resisted Syrian attempts to
manipulate Amal. Barri has attempted to counter Syrian efforts to
coopt top Amal leaders and to constrain the activities of
Syrian leverage over Barri is reduced by Amal 's lack of
dependence on Damascus for supplies. Amal receives Syrian
support--and most recently cooperated at least tacitly. with the
Syrians in the war over Beirut's Palestinian camps--but the needs
of Barri's forces are limited . Amal fields an urban street
militia that uses small arms, mortars, and rocket-propelled
grenades, which are easily obtainable on the open market or from
Syrian relations with the extremist Shia factions are even
more tenuous. Damascus has tolerated radical Shia activities and
has pr ovided support to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards working
with them to maintain Syria's lucrative ties to Iran, to hasten
total Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon, and to ,serve as a
counter to Barri in an effort to force him to come to terms with
Damascus. Syrian aims in Lebanon are imcompatible with the
radical Shia goal of an Iranian-style fundamentalist regime,
however, and signs of increasing strains in the relationship are
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evident. Syrian troops have clashed with Shia extremists
Bekaa Valley several times since early 1984.
25X1
Political Behavior
Assad probably calculates that a major effort to secure the
.release of the passengers and bring the hijacking incident to a
close is not worth the resources he would have to commit or the
risks he would incur.
certain y as made an initial decision that scoring points
with ~~ashington will not significantly affect US policy in
the region. Acting on behalf of the United States against
Lebanese Shias, on the other hand , would severely
complicate Syrian policy in Lebanon and could prompt
radical Shia attacks against Syria.
He would resist the idea of a strike to 25X6
crush the hijackers and release the passengers because of
the tactical difficulties of operating in Beirut and the
risks of a counterproductive outcome of having hostages
killed or injured in the attempt. 25X1
Assad has provided assistance in releasing Americans when
there has been a compelling Syrian interest to do so and when the
costs of Syrian actions have been minimal. In July 1983, the
Syrians obtained the release from Iranian hands of kidnapped
American University of Beirut President David Dodge almost
certainly to let Tehran know that moving a hostage through
Damascus without Syrian compliance was unacceptable . In January
1984, the Syrians released captured US Navy pilot Lt. Goodman as a
cost-free gesture to hasten American withdrawal from Lebanon.
Recently, on 12 June, Assad made a public appeal to the kidnappers
holding hostages in Lebanon, bluntly stating his commitment to
President Reagan and his opposition to the kidnapping of
diplomats, but he reiterated Syrian support for the extremist
groups involved and gave no hint that S ria was repared to take
action to effect the it release . 25X1
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SECRET
EXTERNAL:
Orig - Mr. Morton Abromowitz, State Dept.
1 - Mr. David Mack, State_Dept.
1 - Mr. Richard W. Murphy, State Dept.
1 - Mr. R. W. DuBose, State
1 - Ambassador Robert B. Oakley, State
1 - Maj. Harry Klein, Pentagon
INTERNAL:
SUBJECT: SYRIA: Assad and the TWA Hijacking
NESA M~85-10134
DISTRIBUTION:
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - Exec. Registry
1 - DDI
1 - C/PES
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - NIO/CT
1 - C/DO/NE
1 - C/DO NE~
7 - PDB Staffers (outside as originals)
1 - PDB Staff
1 - OGI/ITC/TAB
4 - CPAS/IMD/CB
1 - D/NESA
1 - DD/NESA
1 - D/OSWR
1 - C/NESA/PPS
2 - NESA/PPS
1 - NESA/AI
2 - OSWR/STD/PPC
2 - NESA/AI/L
DDI/NESA/AI/L (20Jun85)
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