THE EFFECTS OF AFGHANISTAN ON INDO-PAKISTANI RELATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000406370001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 27, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 17, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
17 May 1985
G3-7
The Effects of Afghanistan on Indo-Pakistani Relations
Summary
since both became independent in 1947.
India and Pakistan both view the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan as a threat to regional security,
although for different reasons. Islamabad worries
about the potential for Soviet and Indian efforts--
separate or joint--to undermine Pakistan's
stability. New Delhi fears that the revival of US-
Pakistani military ties and the expanded US naval
presence in the Indian Ocean will increase superpower
competition in a region where India aspires to
unchallenged dominance. Despite an early effort by
Indira Gandhi to include Pakistan in a regional
response to the invasion, the issue of Afghanistan has
underscored and even widened the differences that have
characterized relations between India and Pakistan
This memorandum was prepared by of the Office of Near
Eastern and South Asian Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be addressed to the Chief, South Asia Division,
NESA, Information as of 15 May 1985 was used in the
preparation of this report.
010
NESA-M-85-
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The Effects of Afghanistan on Indo-Pakistani Relations 25X1
Immediately after the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Indira Gandhi
--who had just returned to power--tried to persuade President Zia's government
to adopt an Indian-sponsored "regional approach" to the Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan.
Indian statements around that time suggest that Indira sought to form a
regional group to exert diplomatic pressure on the Soviets to confine their
activities to Afghanistan. New Delhi probably also believed--as many Indians
still do--that if the Soviets felt secure in Afghanistan, they might be
inclined eventually to withdraw their troops. We do not believe that New
Delhi contemplated publicly opposing the Soviet invasion.
New Delhi probably also hoped a regional approach would head off renewed
Pakistani military involvement with the United States and the potential threat
of a superpower confrontation in South Asia.
senior Indian officials believed the extent o the threat posed to
India and the region by the Soviet invasion would depend on whether Pakistan
became a "buffer state" or whether it became a "confrontation state" by
accepting major military help from outside powers, allowing foreign bases on
its soil, or engaging in "provocative actions" toward the Soviets. In the
Indian view, even with outside help, Pakistan would be incapable of
confronting the Soviet Union militarily--an argument New Delhi continues to
advance in urging Washington to limit arms supplies to Pakistan.
Islamabad's reaction negated Indian President Reddy's plan to announce
the "regional response" proposal in Parliament in January 1980. Pakistani
officials-characterized India's plan to US diplomats as "hegemonistic," and
instead accepted US offers of arms to counter the Soviet threat from
Afghanistan. We do not know precisely how or when Islamabad advised the
Indians of its unwillingness to go along with Indira's suggestion, but New
Delhi's public reaction was strongly negative. In India's view, the arms.
Islamabad has secured from the United States since the invasion make it more
likely that Pakistan's "irrational" leaders will again wage war on India,
despite New Delhi's military advantage.
In response to Indian arguments that Pakistan's acquisitions of US arms
threatened India, Zia in 1981 proposed a nonaggression pact with New Delhi.
We believe the proposal was designed in part to reassure Washington of
Pakistan's goodwill toward India and to improve relations with India as a
lever against the Soviets.
Despite skepticism about Pakistan's motives, Indira Gandhi agreed to
high-level bilateral talks on the nonaggression pact in late 1982. The
meetings eased tensions, but also resulted in a deadlock that has yet to be
resolved. In their counterproposal, the Indians insisted on conditions that
Pakistan saw as impinging on Islamabad's sovereignty; Pakistan would have
foregone the right to take disputes to the United Nations and committed itself
never to allow foreign bases on its territory.
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The two countries agreed to establish working-level joint commissions to
promote normalization of ties, and talks have taken place intermittently
between high-level as well as working level foreign ministry officials. Zia
met with Indira several times, and has already met with Rajiv twice--at the
funerals of Indira and Chernenko. The two foreign secretaries also meet from
time to time at meetings of regional organizations, the Nonaligned Movement,
and the UN. No high-level meetings have been held between military officials,
although the two sides generally abide by an informal agreement to keep each
other informed about military exercises.
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New Delhi continues.to parry Pakistani initiatives on a nonaggression
pact by pushing only for progress on trade and cultural exchanges until
tensions have eased. Many influential Indians believe the 1972 Simla
Agreement--in which Indira Gandhi and then-President Bhutto agreed to settle
their countries' differences through bilateral negotiations, refrain from
hostile propaganda, and avoid meddling in each other's- is affairs--is
the most realistic basis for normalization. 25X1
New Delhi, in our view, wants to maintain at least the appearance of
cooperation on a nonaggression pact. The Indians want to bolster their image
of reasonableness and statesmanship as leaders of the Nonaligned Movement, to
remind Moscow that India is pursuing its own foreign policy line, and to avoid
complicating India's relations with the Gulf Arabs by appearing hostile to a
Muslim state. 25X1
Over the past three years, New Delhi's suspicion of Pakistani involvement
with Sikh extremists in Punjab has emerged as the major impediment to a
breakthrough in bilateral relations. The Indians apparently have surmised--in
our view, correctly--that Zia is even more eager than they to pursue bilateral
normalization, in part because he believes the military balance strongly
favors India. By restarting normalization talks with Islamabad only after Zia
agreed to put on trial two groups of Sikhs who had hijacked Indian airliners
to Pakistan in 1981 and 1984, Rajiv signaled that he probably will continue to
link progress toward normalization with Islamabad's stance on the Sikh
issue. Indira Gandhi last summer broke off talks at least partly to protest
Pakistan's handling of the last Sikh hijacking and its media treatment of
Indian Government actions in Punjab. Rajiv may well do likewise if he decides
Islamabad's actions toward or statements on the Sikhs threaten his domestic
management of the problem. F
For its part, Islamabad still fears that India's desire for regional
preeminence threatens Pakistan's survival. From Pakistan's point of view, the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, coupled with Moscow's close ties with New
Delhi, raises the threat of Indo-Soviet collaboration to weaken Pakistan--a
development we consider unlikely because of divergent Indian and Soviet
equities in South Asia. Some Pakistanis are aware that New Delhi wants
Pakistan to remain intact as a buffer against Soviet-occupied Afghanistan, but
many still worry that Moscow will somehow manipulate India to attack
Pakistan. Pakistanis also are concerned that India might take advantage of
tension along the Pakistani-Afghan border to intimidate Pakistan or that India
might launch a preemptive strike against Pakistan's nuclear facilities. 25X1
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SUBJECT: The Effects of Afghanistan on Indo-Pakistani Relations
Internal Distribution:
1 - DDI
1 - NI0/NESA
1 - NI0/EA
1 - C/PES
1 - D/NESA
1 DD/NESA
1 - D/SOVA
1 - C/SOVA/RIG
1 - C/PPS
1 - D/OGI
1 - C/ISID
1 - C/S0/D/NESA
1 - C/S0/S/NESA
1 - D/OEA
1 - DD0/NEA
1 - DD0/NE
1 - CPAS/ISS
1 - PDB Staff
4 - CPAS/IMD/CB
2 - NESA/PS
2 - NESA/S0/S Branch
DDI/NESA/S0/S (17 May 85)
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SUBJECT: The Effects of Afghanistan on Indo-Pakistani Relations
External Distribution:
Peter Burleigh, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, South Asia Division,
Department of State, Room 4636A, Washington, DC 20520
Major General Kenneth D. Burns, USAF, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Room 4D76.5, Pentagon,
Washington, DC 20301
Captain Edward Louis Christensen, USN, Chief, South Asian Regional Plans
and Policy Branch, Department of Defense, Room 2E973, Pentagon,
Washington, DC 20301 -
Mr. James P. Covey
Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director,
Near East and South Asia Affairs, National Security Council
Room 351, Old Executive Office Building, Washington, DC 20500
Donald Gregg, Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs,
Room 381, Executive Office Building, Washington, DC 20520
Mr. Philip S. Kaplan, Staff Director for Policy Planning Council
Department of State, Room 7316, Washington, DC 20520
Colonel Kenneth E. McKim, Director, Office of the Secretary of Defense,
International Security Affairs, Near East and South Asia Region,
Department of Defense, Room 4D765, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301
Christopher Ross, Director, Regional Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs, Department of State, Room 5254A, Washington, DC 20520
Dr. John D. Stempel, Special Assistant, Near East South Asia,
Department of State, Room 5246A, Washington, DC 20520
Peter Tomsen, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Director, INS,
Department of State, Room 5251, Washington, DC 20520
Darnell Whitt, Intelligence Adviser to the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, Room 4D840, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301
Dr. Dov S. Zakheim
Deputy Assistant Under Secretary of Defense for Policy/Resources
Room 3D777, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301
Mr. Ronald P. Zwart
Special Assistant for South Asia, International Security Affairs,
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of Defense,
Room 4D765, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301.
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