MOROCCAN-LIBYAN UNION: STATUS AND PROSPECTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000406300001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 27, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 9, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE Or ItV'TELLIGELVCE
9 May 1985 _
Moroccan-Libyan Union: Status and L'rospects
Summary
Tripoli's support to the Polisario Front.
also sees the union as a useful way to eliminate
Libya and Morocco are moving to implement their
union agreement and to demonstrate that the accord is
providing tangible benefits. Morocco's King Hassan
emphasizes Libyan financial assistance as a means to
ease the country's deteriorating economic and social
conditions that sparked riots in January 1984. Rabat
flights to Latin America.
The union provided Libyan leader Qadhafi with a
diplomatic coup in his effort to enhance his
international standing and to counter US attempts to
isolate Libya. He also will try to use Morocco as a
middleman in obtaining restricted US origin spare
parts for aircraft and as a transit point for Libyan
We believe the union will provide a framework for
further cooperation, especiall in econom'
and olitical relations.
Moroccan exports to Libya tripled last year, equaling
'this memorandum was prepared by the Maghreb 25X1
Branch, Arab-Israeli Division, ciffice of (`fear Eastern and South Asian Analysis.
Requested by the Uffice of the Secretary of Defense, International Security
Affairs. Information as of 9 May 19ts5 was used in preparation of this paper.
CaYUnents and queries are welcome and should be addressed to Chief, Arab-Israeli
Division, 25X1
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the total exports to the United States. Rabat has
brokered relations between Tripoli and several African.
We anticipate that Hassan will resist strongly
any pressure to repudiate the union. Despite the
advantages Hassan believes f9orocco will derive from
the union, he might be led to abrogate it if Qadhafi
does not deliver on his promises -- especially his
large aid commitments. Uver time, shortfalls in
Libyan aid may cause domestic problems for Hassan,
because of his touting the economic benefits of the
4ve believe that Hassan wants to maintain close
relations with the United States, but he is _watching
for signs that Washington is taking punitive action
against him. Hassan's recent postponement of the
joint military and economic talks in Washington was
intended to indicate his displeasure over what he
perceives as a hardnosed attitude toward P9orocco since
the union.
Uf particular concern to Hassan would be a
disproportionate cut in US economic and military
assistance. Such a move almost certainly woula prompt
Hassan to reassess the usefulness of his military
access agreement with Washington.
The union probably presages additional shifts in
Moroccan foreign policy which will not coincide with
US interests, including closer economic ties with
Eastern Europe anti the Soviet Union. The USSR will be
more than willing to warm relations but is not likely
to provide the scale of aid that c^~lorocco needs.
'The rapprochement between Morocco and Libya began in late
June 1983 after King,Hassan bowed to Saudi pressure and ay reed to
see Uadhafi. During the visit, ~adhafi promised to back Morocco
on the western 5anara issue ana to withdraw his support to the
Polisario Front. Hassan agreed in turn not to act against Libyan
Qadhafi and Hassan signed tine union agreement--the Arab-
African Federation treaty--at Uujda, ~~lorocco on 13 August and the
union was popularly approved through referenda held in Morocco
and Libya on 31 August. Hassan publicly stated that he first
considered the idea of a union in mid-July 19134.
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King Hassan and Uadhafi will preside jointly over the
union. Its headquarters--initially in Tripoli--will alternate
between the two capitals, with permanent representatives in
each. Morocco's former Minister of Cooperation Abdelouahed Radi,
a socialist, is Secretary General of the union, and Kamal Hasan
al Maghur, former Libyan Petroleum Minister and President of
OPEC, is the Assistant Secretary General.
Joint political, defense, economic, and education councils
will each have 24 members, ll from each country. 'lhe agreement
calls for coordination of foreign policy, cooperation in economic
development and defense, and the creation of an Executive
Committee, Federal Court, and Federal Parliament. The annual
union budget of $60 million will be provided primarily by Libya,
Why Union?
The Gv"e stern Sahara conflict was a major factor in Hassan's 25X1
decision to form the union.
Hassan probably saw the union as a way to keep
Libya out of the Sahara question and to constrain Algiers'
military options by having a Moroccan ally on Algeria's eastern
border. In addition, Hassan saw the union as a way to reduce
Morocco's isolation in North Africa caused by the Algerian-
Tunisian-Mauritanian friendship treaty signed in 1983.
The timing of Hassan's initiative also suggests that the
Kiny viewed the union as a quick way to relieve growing domestic
pressure over Moroc o' de rior tin' n m' d
conditions.
He was faced with
potentially disruptive parliamentary elections in mid-September,
a shortfall in anticipated aid from western benefactors--
especially the US--and considerable disgruntlement over planned
cuts in education subsidies. In our view, the Kiny bought some
time on the domestic front with promises of adaitional Libyan
economic aid and new jobs.
We believe that Qaclhafi views trio union as an opportunity to
enhance his influence in regional affairs, to strengthen his
international standing, and to counter US attempts to isolate
him. ~adhafi regards cooperation with moderate Arabs as the best
way to limit Libyan isolation in Arab circles while promoting
radical causes and subversion throughout the Middle East. He
almost certainly will be encouraged by the union to pursue more
aggressively his long-standing policy of threatening other Arab
states with subversion unless they unite in a more militant
policy toward Israel. Moreover, Qadhafi has not abandoned his
fervent ideological commitment to Arab unity ana has referred to
the union with Morocco as an example. for other Arab states to
follow.
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Qadhafi probably also hopes for some more immediate and
practical benefits from the union. He likely sees the union as a
way to obtain spare parts for Libya's US manufactured aircraft.
In addition Qadhafi hopes that Morocco will provide Libyan
aircraft transit rights to Latin .America.
Economic Dynamics of the Relationship
The accord followed a ear of rowin economic and
commercial relations.
supplied oil on favorable terms and
provided an
Tripoli also
important market
for Moroccan agricultural exports. 25X1
King Hassan has encouraged the popular belief that under the
union accord Libya will provide
~yBU million to Morocco,
We believe that this figure was 25X1
put forward by I~assan for domestic impact and exaggerates the
level of support Qadhafi is willing to supply. Nevertheless, the
King probably expects Qadhafi to provide substantial assistance,
certainly more than what Rabat has been receiving annually from
The two countries have discussed joint ventures in tourism,,
agriculture, and petroleum development. The US EYnbassy in Rabat
says that a point venture company has been rorrned to further
petroleum exploration in [?Morocco and petroleum supply
arrangements. Morocco also may be considering refining Libyan
oil to help circumvent Tripoli's OPEC production quota.
Libya provides a market for Morocco's agricultural and
manufactured exports. Moroccan exports to Libya totaled X34
million in 1984 about equal to Morocco's exports to the United
States and Rabat hopes to raise the total to ~10U million by
1986. Trade since the accord is up 2U0 percent in value terms
and several Moroccan banks have 25X1
established correspondence agreements with Libyan banks to
facilitate larger anticipated trade volumes. Any increase in
trade will help ,,lorocco's stagnant agricultural exports--2U
percent of export receipts--which are being hurt by quota
restrictions in Europe. 25X1
']'he movement of Moroccan workers to Libya is particularly
important to Rabat because of a severe unemployment problem
3U percent of the urUan labor force and because of the reduced
need for foreign workers in Europe. In addition, worker
remittances are the most important single source of foreign 25X1
exchange--~9UU million in 19t~4. Under the accord, Tripoli plans
to replace other foreign workers with about 81),000 Moroccans. 0
month have gone to Libya
about 1,000 Moroccan workers per 25X1
August--about 10,UOU Moroccans are
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now in Libya. The US Embassy in Tunis reported that Qadhafi
threatened last fall to expel all 70,000 Tunisians working in
Libya by 31 December 19$4 and replace them with Moroccans--a
measure since denied by Qaahafi.
Cooperation on merging the two countries' national airlines
and on shipping also is being considered,
The lJS Embassy in Rabat reported in September that some Moroccan
aircraft technicians already had gone to Libya.
The airline merger, if implemented, would provide
significant advantages to both sides. The Moroccan airline would
gain access to Libya's more abundant financial resources and
extensive traffic rights, while offering Tripoli the stron,y
organizational skills and efficiency of Morocco's airline.
Other Factors of the Union
The US Embassy in Rabat reports that Morocco and Libya have
taken steps toward a more active coordination on regional
issues. Morocco recently renewed ties with Syria at the
ambassadorial level, probably with Libyan assistance. Hassan
undoubtedly used his partnership with Qadhafi to have Tripoli
postpone an Arab-African ministerial conference in March,
blocking Algeria's effort to have the Polisario attend.
Moroccans were quick to point to Libya's agreement with
France on mutual troop withdrawal from Chad last year as evidence
of uadhafi's new moderation. Hassan, however, has remained quiet
on Libya's continuea presence in Chaa ana will do so as long as
Uadhafi backs Morocco's position on G~estern Sahara. Moroccans
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also point to Hassan's success in obtaining the release of four
tsritish workers detained in Tripoli in retaliation for the arrest
of Libyans following the shooting incident at the People's Bureau
In our view, Hassan will cite the absence of Libyan support
to the Polisario Front and the perceived economic benefits of the
Moroccan-Libyan rapprochement as a reason for striking a deal
with Qadhafi. We believe that Hassan's "success" with Qadhafi
may have been a factor iil the recent establishment of relations
between Sudan, Somalia and Libya. In addition, Rabat's brokering
ties between Libya and moderate African states by offering to
represent them in Tripoli may set a precedent that will allow
Libyan inroads in Black Africa. In our view Qadhafi likely will
try to include Libyans on the staffs of Moroccan Embassies in
African capitals where Tripoli has no official presence. 0 25X1
Initially, the union sharpened political differences in
North Africa, dividing the region into, two blocs comprised of
Algeria, Tunisia, and Mauritania on the one hand, and Libya and
Morocco on the other. Recent events, however, ..have softened this
split. Dialogue between Tunis and Rabat has increases after
Algeria blocked Tunisian efforts to.hold a t~iayhreb summit earlier
this year by insisting that the Polisario attend. Furthermore,
the change of regime in Mauritania last December and the shift
away from a strong pro-Polisario position led to reestablishment
of diplomatic ties between Nouakchott and Rabat. 25X1
The union, however, remains particularly irritating to
Algeria. Algiers continues to view the union as a tactical move
by htorocco to block Algerian efforts to promote regional unity
and to end the western Saharan conflict. Algeria hopes that the
personal incompatibilities between Qadhafi and Hassan will break
up the "marriage of convenience." Algiers is likely to move
cautiously to encourage the union's demise and rovide increased
support to Libyan dissidents. 25X1
Prospects for the Union
Hassan will continue with the union as long as Qadhafi
provides economic support, backs Morocco on the Western Sahara,
and does not interfere in Moroccan internal affairs. Qadhafi
will look to Morocco to stop supporting Libyan dissidents, to
serve as a transit point for flights to Latin America, and to
provide parts and maintenance for his US-made aircraft.
The following is a summary, in order of decreasing
livelihood, of areas in which we believe development may help to
sustain and even enhance the Union.
-- Economic, commercial, and labor relations: Many projects
are already underway, such .as joint petroleum and
agriculture development and increased enl~;loyment of
Moroccans in Libya. GVe believe that additional joint
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-- ~;ducational, cultural, and scientific relations: Further
aevelopment is likely in educational and cultural
exchanges and scientific symposia. In our view, Libya is
likely to push to include nuclear energy. Libyan-
Moroccan exchange programs will provide Tripoli with
opportunities to develop agents of influence among
Moroccans.
-- Political, diplomatic, and intelligence relations:
We judge that limited cooperation in these areas will
continue as long as Morocco perceives that the Union is
not damaging its relations with key Arab and western
countries. Morocco is likely to continue sharing data on
Libyan dissidents and coordinating policies on regional
issues.
Military relations:
if Morocco fails to acquire new
ground force materiel from Western sources to replace
aging US- and French-made equipment, we believe that
Hassan would turn to Libya. Moreover, direct hostilities
between Nlgiers and Rabat probably would prompt Hassan to
seek Libyan intervention or at least posturing Libyan
military forces along the Libyan-Algerian border to limit
military actions by Algiers. Hassan would be unlikely to
seek Libyan soldi~:rs to fight along side of Moroccans.
Despite the advantages riassan believes Morocco will derive
from the Union he might be led to abrogate it it Qaahafi goes not
deliver on his past promises--especially his large aid
cornrnitments. The bleak outlook over the next year or so for
Libyan oil sales suggest that Qadhafi may have difficulty in
rnaintaininy assistance on a level satisfactory to Hassan. over
time, this may cause serious domestic proolems for Hassan,
because of his touting the economic benefits of the union.
Hassan's willingness to continue with the union also is
likely to be reduced it, as we expect, Qaahafi at some point
tries to involve Hassan in his radical stand against the United
States and Israel and in Libyan adventurism in the region.
Qadhafi also may be tempted to undertake subversive activities in
P9orocco. The sizable influx of Libyans into Morocco increases
the potential for Qadhafi to make trouble for Hassan if the union
sours.
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Implications for the United States
Hassan almost certainly calculated that a union agreement
would cause some cooling in his relationship with the
United States. We believe, however, that Hassan is sincere in
telling US officials that he wants to maintain close relations
with the United States and that he has no illusions about
transforming ~adhafi's errant behavior. Nevertheless, Hassan
believes that he can control the direction of the union.
At the same time, Hassan will be watching closely for
indications that Washington wants to redefine its relationship
with Morocco. Hassan's wish to :limit the damage to US-Moroccan
relations gives the US some leverage with him on such issues as
technology transfers and intelligence matters. On the other
hand, Hassan's personal prestige is so heavily engaged in the
union that--as he has already amply demonstrated--he will
strongly resist any external pressures to cancel it.
Hassan will consider as a punitive action any decision by
Washington to significantly.reduce or delay ongoing bilateral
programs with Morocco. He has several options in deciding how to
respond:
reduce or stop U5 Naval ship visits and US military
exercises;
refuse to allow US forces to use Moroccan facilities
under the US-Moroccan access and transit agreement;
stop the Voice of 'America operations in P?iorocco;
adopt a more radical stand on Middle East issues;
turn to Libya and the Soviet Union for military
Hassan will continue to use any signs that Libya has turned
over a new leaf--an unlikely occurrence in our view--t o, point out
that dialogue is the only way to tame Qadhafi and that the
United States should join the effort. ~adhafi will draw on the
union to enhance his international stanainy and encourage other
moderate governments to improve relations and to join the
The union with Libya probably presages additional shifts in
Moroccan foreign policy if Rabat does not receive adequate aid
from its traditional supporters. We believe that this will
include closer economic ties with Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union to expand trade and other commercial relations. Hassan
courted the Soviets in the 1960s and knows that aligning his
policies with them will not solve Morocco's lorry term problems,
would aamaye his moderate image, and reduce his flexibility.
Nevertheless, the significant publicity given by Morocco to new
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trade accords signed in September 19t34 and comments by key
f9oroccan officials, for example, underscore a willingness to
consider if not undertake closer ties to the ]31oc.
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Appendix
Key Indicators to Watch For
Scenario A: Morocco and Libya view the union as a useful
means to promote their national interests:
-- Libya provides promised financial assistance, oil, fobs
for Moroccan workers, and funding for joint development
projects.
-- Increased Moroccan exports to Libya.
-- Frequent high level visits between the two countries.
-- Establish joint political, defense, economic and
educational councils, setting forth agenda that will
increase ties.
-- Meetings of the Executive Committee and the Federal
Parliament to discuss substantive issues.
-- Cooperation in international organizations on Middle East
issues.
-- Hassan assists ~adhafi in irnproviny ties with moaerate
Arabs and Western Europe.
-- Increased student exchanges.
-- Military cooperation, to include visits, exchange of
military students, and joint exercises. Libya provides
military materiel to Morocco/or supports Rabat's request
for Soviet arms.
-- Increased cooperation in civil aviation, such as
establishing joint maintenance facilities.
-- Libyan military intervention if Morocco is attacked by
Algeria.
-- Morocco continues to t~rovide information on--or denies
safehaven to--Libyan aissidents.
-- Uther African and AraU countries join the union.
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Scenario B: Morocco and Libya find union does not serve
their interests.
-- Libyans conduct subversive operations in Morocco, to
include funding radical Islamic fundamentalist and other
opposition groups, inciting students to more radical
anti-regime positions, ana spreading Libyan "Green Book"
ideology.
-- Libyan terrorist attacks in MOrOCl:O.
-- Public and private statements by Hassan and other
~~loroccan officials that ~,ibya's inadequate level of
economic assistance is responsible for Rabat's continuing
economic woes.
-- Hassan refuses Qadhafi's demands for a stronger stand by
Morocco against the U5, Israel, and moderate Arab states
even if Qadhafi ties economic aid to a more radical
position.
-- Unfavorable references to Hassan or Morocco in Qadhafi's
speeches or to Qadhafi in Moroccan press.
-- Libya resumes military and diplomatic support to the
Polisario.
-- Morocco recognizes Egypt. 25X1
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13 August 1984:
Late Auyust:
31 August:
1 5eptenrber:
Mid-September:
Mid-September:
l6 September:
l6 September:
2l November:
Late November:
1t ,7anuary 1985:
14-18 January
15 January:
Late January:
10 E'ebruary:
l6 Feburary:
Mid-February:
2 May:
Union Chronology
Arab-African i'ederation signed at Oujda,
Morocco, by Hassan and c~adhafi.
Aviation cooperation agreement.
Referenda in Morocco and Libya approved union.
Moroccan Prime minister visits Tripoli.
Moroccan aviation technicians assigned to
assist Libya airline.
Moroccan Minister of Cooperation named
Secretary General of Union. _
Protection of personnel ay reement signed.
Agreement on Morocco refining Libyan crude
oil.
Transportation and communication ayreement~
signed in Tripoli.
Iron and steel industry cooperation accord.
Union Parliament met in Tripoli.
Twin city programs established between
Kenitra, Morocco, and Zaouia, Libya.
Discussion on joint cooperation in petroleum
industry held in Morocco. Joint corapany for
oil exploration formed.
Agricultural cooperation agreement signed in
Tripoli.
Joint management seminar held in Tangier.
Expanded commercial aviation accord.
Moroccan delegation to Libyan People's
congress.
Hassan offers to represent diplomatically
Senegal and the Gambia in Tripoli.
announced.
Hassan plans visit to Tripoli, date to be
announced.
Scientific and medical cooperation agreement.
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SUBJECT: P9oroccan-Libyan Union: Status and Prospects
i~ESA t9# 1UU94
UISTKIFSUTION:
l;xternal
Uriy - DOD/ISA (Kim Savit)
Internal
DUI (7E44)
c/PE5 (6r2~)
CPAS/If9D/CB ( 7GU 7 )
iVIU/NESA (7E~8).
D/NESA (6V02)
DD/NESA (6GU2)
C/NESA/PPS (6GUZ)
NESA/PPS (6602)
NESA/AI (6GOU)
NESA/IHI/hl ( 6GU U )
DDI/iVESA/AI/P9f
/9 May 85 25X1
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