(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000406150001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 27, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 19, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central Intelligence Agency
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19 April 1985
INDIA'S POSITION ON AFGHANISTAN: PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE
Summary
The Indian Government opposes the Soviet
occupation of Afghanistan, but its private efforts to
influence Moscow's decisions have been unsuccessful
and have irritated Moscow. Given this experience, the
regional repercussions of the Soviet invasion, and
India's continuing reliance on Soviet arms supplies,
Rajiv Gandhi probably will continue to avoid public
confrontation with. Moscow on Afghanistan in the near
term. In two or three years, strengthened ties with
the West, a strong political position at home, or
signs that Moscow has ambitions beyond Afghanistan
could encourage Rajiv to review his public statements
and India's vote in the UN on Af ghanistan.
This memorandum was prepared by
of the Office of Near 25X1
Eastern and South Asian Analysis. n ormation as of 15 April
1985 was used in its preparation. Comments and queries are
welcome and ma be addressed to the Chief, South Asia Division,
NESA, on
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NESA-M-85-10075
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INDIA'S POSITION ON AFGHANISTAN: PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE I I 25X1
The Indian Perception
New Delhi believes the regional repercussions of the Soviet invasion pose
a more direct threat to India than the invasion itself. In the Indian view,
the invasion has:
-- Introduced increased superpower competition to a region where New
Delhi aspires to unchallenged military and political dominance.
-- Sparked the renewal and growth of US-Pakistani military ties that are
not only strengthening Pakistani military capabilities but also, in
the Indian view, seem likely to provide the US with basing rights in
Pakistan.
-- Allowed the security relationship between Washington and Islamabad to
acquire a dynamic of its own apart from the common cause in
Afghanistan, with the United States willing to tolerate Pakistani
progress toward a nuclear wea ons capability in return for a foothold
in Southwest Asia.
India's ambiguous public position on Afghanistan also reflects an effort
to bolster its nonaligned credentials by steering a course between Moscow and
its opponents. The Indians view their abstention on the annual United Nations
resolution on the occupation of Afghanistan as a neutral. act. Rajiv Gandhi in
public has echoed his mother's wish for an end to both the Soviet military
presence in Afghanistan and US aid to the Afghan resistance.
The Indians argue that their recognition of the Babrak Karmal regime in
Afghanistan does not confer legitimacy on Babrak's Soviet backers and will
ensure the country's independence and nonalignment if Soviet troops pull
out. They believe a prolonged occupation will "Sovietize" Afghanistan and dim
prospects for its eventual return to independence. Foreign aid for Afghan
insurgents, in New Delhi's view, makes a Soviet troop withdrawal less
likely.
Some Indian officials privately acknowledge embarrassment over New
Delhi's policy on Afghanistan. US diplomats in New Delhi reported that the
abashed official who was charged with explaining his government's vote in the
UN to block a human rights investigation backed by the United States admitted
that Soviet pressure has played apart in India's stance for the past two
years. When pressed as to why India sided with Libya, Syria, and Mozambique,
he noted that from time to time US positions on human rights have reflected
conflicting political interests.
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Dealing With Moscow
New Delhi's ambiguous public stance on Afghanistan conceals considerable
frustration over the Soviet intervention. The Indians resented Moscow's
failure in 1979 to advise them of the impending invasion. Beginning in 1981,
Indira Gandhi expressed her unhappiness over the Soviet occupation with
increasing openness. She even voiced some of her concerns publicly while in
Moscow in 1982, to the consternation of her hosts.
India's public position also masks its rivate efforts to persuade Moscow
to withdraw its troops. Moscow has ignored 25X1
New Delhi's diplomatic appea s or a nego is a se ement and Soviet troop
withdrawal.
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ecause ew e i as ecome convince tat t e Soviets will not leave except 25X1
on their own terms, the Indians avoid direct confrontation with Moscow that
might threaten their vital arms relationship. 25X1
Indian Foreign Secretary Bhandari's recent comments to Undersecretary of
State Schneider in New Delhi reiterated the basic Indian view. Bhandari said:
-- The Soviet military presence in Afghanistan is likely to become
permanent unless a diplomatic solution is found soon.
-- India, however, would not get into "the game of mediation". New Delhi
has indicated on other recent occasions that it might be willing to
play a "a more active role" if the Soviets did not object.
Outlook in the Near Term
Rajiv's more evenhanded approach to the superpowers and his Western-
sounding emphasis on economic liberalization indicate his desire to widen
India's options and to underline its independent foreign policy. Even so, we
believe Rajiv's statement to Parliament last week that he will maintain the
timetested foreign policy he inherited suggests he will continue to avoid
positions likely to antagonize Moscow seriously. His adherence to the status
uc~o could reflect a desire to focus his current efforts on setting his
domestic house in order, or it could imply that he has not yet formulated his
In our view, New Delhi probably believes that a changed Indian stance on
Afghanistan would yield no more tangible concessions from Washington on US
regional policy than it would from Moscow. The Indians certainly doubt that
the US intends to modify its security relationship with Pakistan, which New
Delhi believes implicitly challenges India's regional hegemony. Earlier this
month, Rajiv publicly cited the flow of US weapons to Islamabad--and to the
Afghan insurgents--as an obstacle to closer Indo-US ties, and Indian planners
calculate that increased US aid to the insurgents will result in a deeper US
commitment to Pakistan's defense. Some Indians also believe that Washington
disregards the danger that an unconditional Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan
could open the way for a fundamentalist Islamic regime.
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Rajiv in our view would resent any US attempt to alter India's foreign
policy as the price for movement on technology transfer or concessional aid.
New Delhi is proud of what it sees as its independent and pragmatic pursuit of
its national interests and, overall, sees its carefully calibrated policy on
Afghanistan as serving these interests. Any appearance of caving in response
to US pressures would damage Rajiv's credibility at home and probably in the
Nonaligned Movement.
The Longer Term Outlook
Several developments in our view could prompt a reevaluation of New
Delhi's policy on Afghanistan two or three years hence. Growing prosperity at
home and a waning of Sikh troublemaking would allow Rajiv to focus on foreign
policy issues and consider major policy shifts.
A slowdown in Pakistan's military acquisitions, warmer ties with the
West--including increasing flow of high technology from the United States and
Europe--and progress toward arms diversification also would allow, even
encourage, New Delhi to reappraise the costs and benefits of its reliance on
Moscow. New Delhi, for example, might publicly condemn the Soviet invasion
without simultaneously criticizing foreign aid to the insurgents. This would
comprise a significant shift away from its current stance. The Indians also
could shift their vote in the United Nations--a clear signal that New Delhi
The Indians would still have to weigh the potential price of changing
their policy on Afghanistan--disruption of Soviet arms supplies that they
consider essential to counter Pakistan's military might. New Delhi knows that
for the rest of the decade, its reliance on Moscow for spare parts--and for
sophisticated arms offered on uniquely concessional terms--could enable the
Soviets to raise the cost of diverging from their preferences on a range of
has reordered its foreign policy priorities.
issues.
Despite these concerns, we believe that New Delhi's assessment of the
threat posed by Afghanistan to Indian interests--and its stand on the issue--
would change rapidly if the Soviets:
-- Appeared ready to expand their presence beyond Afghanistan into
Pakistan, reducing its viability as a buffer between India and Soviet-
occupied Afghanistan.
-- Stepped up pressure on India to grant military facilities or other
concessions that would compromise India's independence.
-- Acquired such facilities in a neighboring country.
-- Markedly improved relations with China, reducing--in India's estimate
.India's commitment to nonalignment, its sensitivity about being perceived
as a tacit Soviet al1_y, and its reservations about longterm Soviet intentions
--the value Moscow places on New Delhi's friendship.
Could India Move Closer To Moscow?
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in the region all will continue to make New Delhi reluctant to consider closer
regional cooperation with Moscow. Still, the Indian Government probably would
consider closer cooperation with the Soviets if it:
-- Believed that Pakistan developed a nuclear weapon with the tacit
consent of Washington.
-- Had firm evidence that the United States acquired the use of military
facilities in Pakistan or another neighboring state.
-- Saw major transfers of advanced US arms to China. 25X1
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SUBJECT: India's Position on Afghanistan: Prospects for Change
Internal Distribution:
1 - DDI
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - NIO/EA
1 - C/PES
1 - D/NESA
1 DD/NESA
1 - D/BONA
1 --C/BONA/RIG
1 - C/PPS
1 - D/OGI
1 - C/ISID
1 - C/SO/D/NESA
1 - C/SO/S/NESA
1 - D/OEA
1-
1-
1 - CPAS/IBS
1 - PDB Staff
4 - CPAS/IMD/CB
2 - NESA/PS
2 - NESA/SO/S Branch
DDI/NESA/SO/S
19 Apr 85)
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SUBJECT: India's Position on Afghanistan: Prospects for Change
Peter Burleigh, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, South Asia Division,
Department of State, Room 4636A, Washington, D.C. 20520
Major General Kenneth D. Burns, USAF, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Room 4D765, Pentagon, Washington,
D.C. 20301
Captain Edward Louis Christensen, USN, Chief, South Asian Regional Plans and
Policy Branch, Department of Def ense, Room 2E973, Pentagon, l~ashington, D.C.
20301
Donald Gregg, Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs,
Room 381, Executive Office Building, Washington, D.C. 20520
Byron Jackson, Office of Intelligence Liaison, Department of Commerce, Room
6854, Washington, D.C. 20520
Elie Krakowski, Department of Defense, OASD/ISP, Room 1C475, Pentagon,
Washington, D.C. 20301
Colonel Kenneth E. McKim, Director, Office of the Secretary of Defense,
International Security Affairs, Near East and South Asia Region, Department of
Defense, Room 4D 765, Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301
Christopher Ross, Director, Regional Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs, Department of State, Room 5254A, Washington, D.C. 20520
Dr. John D. Stempel, Director, Near East and South Asia Region, International
Security ,off airs, Department of Defense, Room 4D765, Pentagon, Washington,
D. C. 20301
Peter Tomsen, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Director, INS,
Department of State, Room 5251, Washington, D. C. 20520
Darnell Whitt, Intelligence Adviser to the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, Room 4D840, Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301
Commander Ron Zwart, Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, International
Security Affairs, Department of Defense, Room 4D765, Pentagon, Washington,
D.C. 20301
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