THE IRANIAN MISSILE THREAT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000406030001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 27, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 27, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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I I
Central Intelligence Agency
27 March 1985
The Iranian Missile Threat
Summary
Iran claims to have fired seven long-range missiles at
Iraqi cities since 12 March, and high-ranking Iranian
leaders have threatened to launch more rockets in
retaliation for Iraqi attacks on Iranian cities or tankers
carrying Iranian oil. Libya apparently has sent six SCUD
missiles and two launchers to Iran since last November and
later probably sent the personnel to fire the missiles. We
believe that two Iranian 747 transport flights from Tripoli
last week may have carried as many as twenty more missiles
to Iran.
As long as its supplies last, Iran will continue to
fire missiles at Iraqi cities in retaliation for Iraqi
attacks and to try to undermine civilian support for the
regime in Baghdad. Libyan leader Qadhafi probably will
continue to provide operational support for equipment in
Iran but additional assistance is unlikely. Moscow probably
is displeased by Qadahfi's actions and may threaten to stop
deliveries of military equipment or spare parts if he sends
more material to Iran. QadhafI would not want to lose
Soviet military support which he sees as necessary to
counter possible US military threats.
This paper was prepared byl (Persian Gulf Division andl
Arab-Israeli Division, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian
Persian Gulf Division,
Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
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Iraq is not likely to reduce its attacks on Iranian
cities because of the missile attacks and is calling on
Tripoli and Moscow to stop further shipment from Libya to
Iran. Baghdad also may ask the Soviets for more
sophisticated weapons--such as the long-range SS-12
missile--it could use against Iran. Iraq will continue
attacks on Iranian cities, probably will launch air strikes
in an effort to destroy the SCUD launchers, and may try to
shoot down aircraft transporting additional missiles to
Iran.
Iran's new missile capability significantly increases
its ability to threaten oil facilities in the Arab Gulf
states. Although Iran would not have enough missiles to
destroy such facilities, it could use the threat of an
attack to pressure Gulf governments, especially in response
to increasing Iraqi attacks on Gulf shipping. To avoid a
confrontation with the US, Iran would not deliberately
launch missiles against US facilities, although Tehran
probably would launch such attacks in retaliation for US air
or naval attacks on Iran.
Iran claims to have launched its first surface-to-surface missile on Iraq 25X1
on 12 March, hitting the city of Kirkuk. Since then Tehran has launched six 25X1
more missiles that hit Baghdad.
Information from the North American Air Defense Command confirms
suggest that the seven attacks probably have caused around 100 casualties.
thamissiles launched from near the Iranian city of Kermanshah hit Baghdad on
16 and 25 March. Reports from the US Embassy in Baghdad
attack ships in the Persian Gulf, or shoot down civilian aircraft over Iran.
The missile attacks are in retaliation for Iraqi raids on Iranian cities 25X1
and Baghdad's disregard of the UN's call for an end to attacks on civilian 25X1
targets, according to Iranian officials. Tehran has also warned that Iran
will launch more missiles if the Iraqis continue to use chemical weapons,
Iran wants the attacks on cities to 25X1
probably is eager to stop the attacks on its cities to prevent the worsening
of Iranian civilian morale. 25X1
stop so that Iran can concentrate on fighting the ground war. Tehran also
The Libyan Connection
Libya has supplied Iran with the
surface-to-surface missiles used to attack Iraq. We estimate that Tripoli so
far has sent Tehran two mobile SCUD launcher vehicles, associated equipment,
and a small number of missiles. Our estimate of two SCUD launchers in Iran is
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far, however, the Iranians have fired only one missile in each attack. 25X1
based on the size of -'the Libyan military contingent recently sent to Iran.
missiles without significantly reducing Libyan military capabilities.
Libya is capable of providing Tehran with two SCUD launchers, additional
missiles, and the personnel to operate the system. Tripoli has six
operational SCUD brigades deployed in Libya, each equipped with nine
launchers; at least 18 launchers remain in storage. Libya has at least six
missiles allotted for each launcher in operational units, or an estimated
total of over 300 missiles. We estimate that Libya could supply Iran with 30
months of training are required to operate and maintain SCUD equipment.
We believe that Libyan personnel are servicing the missile equipment and
probably fired the missiles from Iran. 18 to 24
estimate, however, that they would not have had time to acquire the ski-TT-to
operate the SCUD system without assistance from the Libyans.
Iraqi Reaction
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Iranian missile attacks so far have not deterred the Iraqis from
continuing air strikes on major Iranian cities or attacking shipping in the
Persian Gulf. On 19 March Baghdad declared an exclusionary zone over Iranian
airspace and warned that civilian aircraft flying over Iran might be shot
down. Iraqi officials also have tried to increase pressure on Iran by warning
the citizens of Ahvaz to leave the city, suggesting that Iraq plans to launch
attacks on the area. Baghdad probably would not agree to end the attacks on
Iranian cities despite the Iranian missile attacks unless such a ceasefire was
linked to an overall settlement of the war.
Future Iranian Attacks
If Iran has received additional missiles from Libya, it probably will use
them to seek revenge and try to deter further Iraqi attacks. Long-range,
surface-to-surface missiles offer Tehran the means to strike the enemy capital
without risking Iran's few remaining operational fighter aircraft. Tehran
also probably hopes that such attacks will help undermine Iraqi morale and
public support for the Saddam Husayn regime. Reports from US diplomats in
Baghdad, however, say that Iraqi morale is high because of the recent victory
over Iran in the marshes northwest of Al Basrah.
We believe the Iranians will use their limited supply of missiles to
attack large area targets such as cities to gain maximum publicity from their
efforts. The SCUD's poor accuracy--around one kilometer at two-thirds of its
maximum range--suggests that Iran probably could not target specific buildings
with reasonable hope of hitting them with a single missile. Although a chance
hit on an Iraqi military base would be costly, Iranian missile attacks do not
threaten to reduce Iraq's overall military superiority over Iran. If Iran
acquired a large number of missiles, however, it might consider launching a
number of rockets at a facility, such as a chemical weapons plant, in hopes
that one missile would find the target.
Tehran is likely to make strong efforts to acquire even more missiles and
launchers, especially from Libya. We expect the Soviets--as they did last
December--to warn Qadhafi about the need to gain Moscow's approval before
transferring military equipment to third countries. Qadhafi is likely to
continue to provide maintenance assistance for the equipment already in
Iranian hands. Libya is less likely to provide more SCUD launchers and
associated equipment. Qadhafi might anticipate that Tehran could use
additional equipment to attack Arab Gulf states and he would not want to be
blamed for disrupting the international oil market--an almost certain
invitation in Qadahfi's mind for US military retaliation against Libya.
Other factors may influence Qadhafi's decision about providing further
missiles beyond those already sent to Iran. Moscow almost certainly is
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displeased by Qadhafi's actions and may threaten to stop deliveries of
military equipment or spare parts to Libya if he sends additional materiel to
Iran. Qadhafi feels vulnerable to US military pressure and sees his close
relations with Moscow as a restraint on Washington's willingness to attack
him. He will not want to do anything that would suggest to the US that there
are strains in the Libyan-Soviet relationship.
Prospects for Iraq
The Iraqis are likely to take strong military measures to prevent Iran
from launching more missiles or to punish Tehran for future attacks.
They
may attempt to shoot down transport aircraft carrying additional missiles,
support equipment, or personnel to Iran. Iraq also probably would increase
its own missile and air strikes against Iranian cities--particularly Tehran--
in retaliation for additional Iranian attacks.
Baghdad will keep pressuring Libya and the Soviet Union to prevent the
transfer of more weapons to Iran. Iraq's ability to influence Libya is
limited, although the Iraqis might threaten to increase support for Libyan
dissidents if Tripoli sent more missiles to Iran. Baghdad is likely to ask
Moscow for further safeguards and assurances that Libya will not be permitted
to transfer weapons to other countries. The Iraqis probably will put
additional pressure on the Soviets for more sophisticated weapons--such as the
SU-24 fighter-bomber or SS-12 missiles with a 925 kilometer range--which Iraq
can use to retaliate against Iran.
Implications for the US
Iran's new surface-to-surface missile capability significantly increases
Tehran's capability to threaten US allies in the Persian Gulf. The SCUD's 300
kilometer range gives it the capability to reach major oil-producing or
exporting facilities along the Gulf in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar,
and Oman. Iranian Revolutionary Guard crews will eventually learn how to
launch the missiles and Tehran might be tempted to attack such targets in
response to increasing Iraqi attacks against Iranian oil export operations.
Although Iran probably would not have a sufficient number of missiles to
destroy or even seriously damage such facilities, Tehran could conduct limited
attacks to pressure the Arab Gulf states to reduce their support for Iraq or
ties to the US.
Tehran wishes to avoid any military confrontation with the US and is
unlikely to strike any US facilities deliberately. Nonetheless, rockets
launched against targets in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait could harm US personnel in
these countries. If the US should launch an air or naval attack on Iran,
Tehran probably would launch surface-to-surface missiles against US facilities
in retaliation. Primary targets would probably include US Embassy compounds
or housing blocks, construction projects, and the headquarters facilities of
the Commander Middle East Force in Manama, Bahrain.
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