AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000405920001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 27, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 5, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/18: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000405920001-6 ~--
Afghanistan Situation Report
TOP Secret
NESA M 85-10046CX
SOYA M 85-10045CX
3-marcn IYO.
s?~wEZ Directorate of Fop heeret,~j V- ( -}
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AFGHAN OFFICIAL EXPELLED BY PAKISTAN 2
Islamabad expelled the Afghan Consul General in
Peshawar after linking him with nt terrorist
incidents in Pakistan.
SELLING AFGHAN REFUGEE FAMILIES 3
Sales of Afghan refugee families in Pakistan are
reportedly increasing so that buyers can gain food
rations and support allowances.
IN BRIEF 3
5 March 1985
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TOP SECRET
THE WAR IN KONARHA PROVINCE, 1978-1984 4
Major Soviet offensives in early 1980 wrested
control of the Konar Valley from the insurgents,
but increasing insurgent effectiveness and a
declining Soviet effort have left the Afghan
Government with only a slightly better sitt ion
than at the time of the invasion.
This document is prepared weekly by the Office of
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis and the
Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions or comments
on the issues raised in the publication should be
5 March 1985
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5 March 1985
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AFGHAN OFFICIAL EXPELLED BY PAKISTAN
The Government of Pakistan recently declared the Afghan
Consul General in Peshawar persona non grata, reports
the US Embassy in Islamabad. A Pakistani Ministry of
Foreign Affairs official told US diplomats that
Islamabad had evidence linking the Afghan to a failed
attempt to bomb the Peshawar headquarters of resistance
leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and to several other recent
terrorist incidents. Afghanistan retaliated for the
Consul General's expulsion by ex ellin the Pakistani
third secretary in Kabul.
Comment: Islamabad has long suspected the Afghan-
Consulates in Peshawar and Quetta of aiding KHAD
activities in Baluchistan and the North West Frontier
albeit with little success in disrupting the mujahidin
or fomenting Pakistani resistance-to the Zia.
government. Pakistan continues to tolerate an Afghan
diplomatic presence, however, in order to maintain its
consulates in Afghanistan to monitor Soviet and Afghan
regime activities there. Neither country has
publicized the expulsions, probably because both want
to avoid publicly souring prospects for the next round
of Geneva peace talks set for late April or early
May.
5 March 1985
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TOP SECRET
SELLING AFGHAN REFUGEE FAMILIES
increase in the "sale" of Afghan refugee families
living in camps in Baluchistan. The buyer becomes the
new tribal head of the family that is sold and gains
control of its aid rations and support allowances.
in two recent sales, the going
price for a family was about 1,000 Pakistani rupees--a
little over $60.
Comment: Refugee administrators in Pakistan use Afghan
tribal leaders to help distribute assistance to Afghan
refugees. Although this system follows tribal
traditions, it also provides opportunities for graft
and inequities. If the selling of families becomes
more widespread, refugee and insurgent morale is likely
to decline because buyers tend to show less interest in
the welfare of their charges than did the original
leaders.
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Afghan party
factionalism was responsible for a fight between
a KHAD unit and a provincial police force near
Kabul that, resulted in 28 dead and eight
wounded.
offensives in 1984.
the exodus of civilians caused by Soviet
refitting captured Soviet weapons in the Hazara
tributary of the Panjsher Valley. Masood had
lost a number of technically trained persons in
insurgents have
enough technicians to maintain a repair shop for
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5 March 1985
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TOP SECRET
5 March 1985
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TOP SECREI
PERSPECTIVE
THE WAR IN KONARHA PROVINCE: 1978-1984
Insurgents controlled all but a few isolated posts in
Konarha Province at the time of the Soviet invasion.
Major Soviet operations in the spring of 1980 restored
tenuous government control in the Konar Valley. Since
then, increasing insurgent effectiveness and a
declining Soviet effort have left the government with
only a few more posts than it held at the time of the
invasion.
The Province
Difficult terrain has evidently discouraged Soviet or
government military operations. Only a few narrow
valleys cut through the rugged mountains of Konarha
Province where travel is possible only by animal or on
foot. Almost all military operations have been along
the province's only motorable roads in the valleys of
the Konar River and its two main tributaries the Basgul
(or Landay Sin) and the Pech Dara.
-- The Konar flows through the southern part of the
province roughly paralleling the Afghan-
Pakistani border after entering Afghanistan near
Barikowt. Before the war, about half the
population--predominately Pushtun--lived in the
Konar Valley. Much of Konarha's population has
since fled to.Pakistan. Asadabad, the
provincial capital, and Asmar, the main military
base about 30 kilometers to the north, are
located on the Konar's banks.
The Basgul (or Landay Sin) roughly parallels the
border in the northern part of the province,
joining the Konar near Barikowt. Kamdesh is the
most important town in the valley. About 10
percent of the population--predominately
Nuristanis--lived in this region before the war.
The Pech Dara flows east through southern
Konarha to Asadabad, located about halfway
between Barikowt and the province's southern
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iur Jt(.Kt I
border. The valley contained about a quarter of
the province's population before the war.
Konarha's main importance to the insurgents is probably
symbolic--the resistance began in Konarha and had some
of its greatest victories there early in the war.
Islamic fundamentalist resistance broke out in the Pech
Dara Valley in December 1977,
. After the Communist coup in Kabul the
following April, tribesmen in the Basgul Valley also
rose against the government. By autumn, fighting was
heavy in the Pech Dara, insurgents had seized most of
the Basgul, and some incurnPntc were active in the
Konar Valley.
The arrival of two regiments from Kabul in late 1978 to
support the Afghan regime's mountain brigade
permanently stationed at Asmar enabled the government
to clear the Basgul Valley in January 1979, but an
effort to strengthen control in the Pech Dara Valley
failed the following month. Despite heavy air attacks
that destroyed many villages and'parts of Kamdesh, in
March and April insurgents forced government forces t
withdraw from the Bas ul Valley.
Government forces also retreated from the Pech Dara,
and by April insurgents were besieging posts in the
Konar Valley. Insurgent pressure mounted during the
summer and on 20 August the brigade at Asmar mutinied
except for a few kilometers outside Asadabad and
Barikowt, the insurgents held the entire province.
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Fighting in Kona'rha also strengthens other conclusions
we have:reached from examining the war elsewhere in
Afghanistan:
-- The Afghan Army,is generally unable to hold its
own without Soviet help.
-- Terrain plays a major part in determining areas
of military operations.
-- Soviet and Afghan regime clearing operations
.have little lasting effect.
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