AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000405910001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 26, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of TO Secret
Intelligence 5
Afghanistan Situation Report
Top Secret
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26 February 1985
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LACK OF STRONG SUCCESSOR TO ZABIULLAH 1
Khalil Khan, named to succeed recently killed Jamiat leader
Zabiullah Khan, will be challenged by local Jamiat
commanders and rival insurgent groups.
CORRUPTION AMONG SOVIET ADVISERS 2
Extortions from Afghans by Soviet advisers is increasing as
Soviets become more involved in the daily functions of the
Afghan Government.
CONCERN ABOUT AFGHAN REFUGEES IN BALUCHISTAN 2
Pakistani authorities are designating more security forces
to Afghan refugee camps in Baluchistan. 25X1
AFGHAN YOUTHS SENT TO USSR 2
More than 700 Afghan youths left for schooling in the USSR
in late 1984, but many parents are now requesting the return
of their children.
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PERSPECTIVE
MIXED,PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET ELITE UNITS IN AFGHANISTAN
The Soviets are relying on elite units--airborne troops,
special purpose forces (Spetsnaz), and reconnaissance
detachments--for combat operations in Afghanistan. 'Despite
the small increases in the number of elite troops and some
indications of improved unit tactics, the effectiveness of
these forces is limited by poor intelligence, poor security,
the desire to reduce casualties, and too rigid tactics.
This document is prepared weekly by the Office of Near
Eastern and South Asian Analysis and the Office of Soviet
Analysis. Questions or comments on the issues raised in the
publication should be directed to
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LACK OF STRONG SUCCESSOR TO ZABIULLAH
The death of Zabiullah Khan in December 1984 produced a temporary
nnwer vacuum for the ,Jamiat-i-lslami insurgents in Balkh Province-
ea ath -nave been eager to dissociate themselves from Zabiullah's
attackers; others have sought to blame Zabiullah for provoking the
attack by killing potential rival commanders.
Comment: The delay in naming a successor to Zabiullah indicates
Rabbani's lack of confidence that his appointment would be
acceptable to commanders. Similarly, the implication of Harakat
in Zabiullah's death and the reaction of Harakat members to the
reports indicate Harakat leader Nabi's lack of control over his
insurgent bands. Khalil probably will face opposition from local
Jamiat commanders as Zabiullah's successor, and fighting between
Jamiat and Harakat groups in Balkh Province is likely to take
precedence over attacks on the Soviets and Afghan regime this
spring.
Some Harakat-i-Inqilab members--accused of Zabiullah's
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CORRUPTION AMONG SOVIET ADVISERS
Corruption among Soviet civilian advisers is increasing in
Afghanistan Some advisers
reportedly extort valuables from Afghan civilian subordinates by
threatening them with conscription into the Army, interrogation or
firing. Soviet military advisers also order their Afghan
subordinates to collect goods when searching Afghan homes.
Comment: Corruption, endemic among Soviet advisers in
Afghanistan, probably is increasing, in part, because Soviets are
increasingly involved-in the daily functions of the Afghan
Government. Many Afghan officials with knowledge of Western
technology are being dismissed and replaced by Soviets, and there
is a continued outflow of educated civilians from Afghanistan.
Soviet soldiers and officers most often seek cannabis products,
cigarettes, and Western clothing from their Afghan counterparts.
CONCERN ABOUT AFGHAN REFUGEES IN BALUCHISTAN
Pakistani authorities in Baluchistan agreed last November that
five additional paramilitary Frontier Corps battalions (about
3,500 men) would be needed to improve control of Afghan refugees
in the Quetta area The
authorities want additional paramilitary forces because of an
increase in refugee crimes and because 250,000 refugees in urban
areas may be shifted. to refugee camps. The authorities decided,
however, that they can only spare one battalion from the . rest of
Baluchistan and that they may not be able to raise a second
because of lack of funds.
Comment: Until now, the 500,000 refugees in Baluchistan have not
been a major problem for Pakistani authorities. The Pakistanis
appear increasingly worried, however, that the largely Pushtun
refugees will cause difficulties along the border or settle in
urban areas or the. interior of the province and clash with the
indigenous Baluch population.
AFGHAN YOUTHS SENT TO THE USSR
During the last four months of 1984, the Afghan regime sent 743
boys to the USSR for schooling
many are in poor health and that some parents
are seeking their return. Most of the boys are from the Kabul
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area and Paktia and Nangarhar Provinces. Hundreds of others
attend Young Pioneer camps in the USSR
Comment: Afghan parental reluctance--even among party members--to
cooperate in the Soviet and regime education effort has been a
long-standing problem. Moreover, many students return from the
USSR antagonistic toward the Soviet system. Even for those who
are successfully indoctrinated, lack of security outside the Kabul
area may prevent the regime from placing them in appropriate
positions.
-- Red Cross hospital statistics reflect heavy and continuous
fighting this winter near the Pakistani-Afghan border.
Typical winter occupancy rate at the surgical hospital had
been 78 percent, but this year it has been running 102
percent, according to Red Cross officials. The death rate
also has risen dramatically because many patients are more
severely wounded.
-- The Afghan Consul in Bombay may have defected recently,
according to US Embassy reports. The official is
reportedly the brother of Politburo member Nur Ahmad Nur.
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PERSPECTIVE
MIXED PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET ELITE UNITS IN AFGHANISTAN
The Soviets are relying more on a variety of elite units--airborne
troops, special purpose forces (Spetsnaz), and reconnaissance .
detachments--for combat operations in Afghanistan. Compared to
regular units, elite forces are more mobile nd have superior
quality troops and leadership.
Despite recent small increases in the number of elite troops and
some indications of improved unit tactics, however, we believe
these forces are still not being used to best effect. Poor
intelligence, the desire to reduce casualties, poor security, and
rigid tactics have all been obstacles to improved performance.
Major improvements.in effectiveness would probably require changes
in the basic Soviet approach to the war.
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Comparison of Elite Units
There is little to suggest major differences in the types of
operations conducted by airborne, reconnaissance, and Spetsnaz
units. All have participated in heliborne assaults, raids, and
ambushes as well as support for conventional ground-force
operations. Although these units normally have different
missions, it appears that combat experience in Afghanistan has
caused them to arrive at roughly similar approaches to the
counterinsurgency.
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The size of the 11,000 man airborne contingent in Afghanistan
has not changed since 1980. In the spring of 1984 two
battalions of the 104th GAD at Kirovabad were brought
temporarily to Kabul as an operational reserve for the
Panjsher VII offensive, but they were not used in combat and
returned to the USSR in June. In 1983 then First Deputy
Minister of Defense.Sokolov recommended deploying additional
airborne troops, and now that he is Defense Minister there may
be more temporary deployments or permanent stationing of
additional units.
Special Purpose Forces (Spetsnaz): The Soviets have four
Spetsnaz units in Afghanistan that are officially designated
Independent Motorized Rifle Battalions.
These units differ' in, personnel and organization. from typical
Spetsnaz,units associated with Soviet ground-forces in the.:
western USSR and Group of Soviet Forces Germany. The. primary
mission of Spetsnaz appears; to be crisis and wartime...
reconnaissance collection behind NATO lines, carried out by
small teams of 5-15 men. In peacetime typical Spetsnaz are
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subordinate to the GRU; the total peacetime complement is
roughly 10,000 men.
Reconnaissance Units: Each of the three Motorized Rifle
Divisions in Afghanistan has a 370-man reconnaissance
battalion, and most motorized rifle regiments have
reconnaissance companies. In conventional combat
reconnaissance battalions are designed to conduct patrols--out
to roughly 50 km from the front-lines in a NATO war--to
collect information on enemy tactical deployments. They are
equipped for rapid movement and light combat.
In Afghanistan reconnaissance units support convoy security
and sweep operations, as well as conduct independent ambushes
and heliborne assaults.
elements of the reconnaissance
company of the 191st Independent Motorized Rifle Regiment at
Ghazni participated in all convoy and combat operations,
probably as scouts or to secure landing zones. The company
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was also designated. quick-reaction force in the event of an
attack on the regimental compound.
Conclusion
The elite units clearly outperform conventional Soviet troops.
They are better-suited to the mountainous terrain, have more
readily adopted new tactics, and have superior quality troops and
leadership. The effectiveness of Soviet elite forces has been
hampered, however, by a number of factors:
-- Limited Numbers: Elite forces are inherently difficult to
assemble and maintain, and are often resisted by military
organizations that resent their special status or see their
main purpose to be support for conventional combat
operations. The two airborne divisions in Afghanistan
already represent a large fraction of the seven.divisions
available, and the number of Spetsnaz troops is similarly
limited. Further diversion of these resources to
Afghanistan may be viewed as dangerously reducing
capabilities in more important Soviet military regions
opposite NATO and China.
-- Political Constraints: The Soviets, for political reasons,
prefer to operate jointly with Afghan troops who almost
invariably turn in a poor performance. Joint operations
are. also less secure; information is frequently leaked to
the insurgents.
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-- Concern Over Casualties: Soviet commanders have been
instructed to minimize casualties, leading to cautious
tactics and heavy reliance on air and artillery strikes.
Prior air and artillery attacks often alert the insurgents
to impending operations.
-- Rigid Approach to Operations: Soviet forces are designed
primarily to fight a war against NATO, and most troops
going to Afghanistan do not receive training appropriate to
a counterinsurgency war. In conjunction with directives to
reduce casualties, stereotyped and repetitive operations
develop too slowly to engage highly mobile insurgents, and
fail to make effective use of superior Soviet firepower.
Even the more flexible elite units are hampered when forced
to operate jointly with regular troops. In addition Soviet
ground troops, including elite units, are composed of
relatively short-term conscripts so that lessons learned
in country are rapidly lost. Major parts of the airborne
forces, for instance, are rotated twice a year.
While there is room for improvement in particular areas of tactics
and discipline, substantial improvements in elite force
effectiveness would probably require the changes in Soviet
approach to the war, allowing for more aggressive, independent
operations. Even so, elite units alone cannot generally gain
decisive results. Their most effective role is in conjunction
with conventional forces, where their mobility and fighting power
can be decisive in locating and pinning down insurgents long
enough for superior Soviet firepower to be brought to bear.
Success in these operations, however, will require improvements by
regular forces more than by elite troops. While aggressive
patrols and ambushes are useful to disrupt insurgent supply-lines
and bases, and prevent insurgents from massing for attacks on
convoys and cities, the small numbers of elite troops, the
country-wide scope of the war, and the long borders with Pakistan
and Iran limit the overall effectiveness of such operations.
Though the Soviets could increase their elite forces somewhat by
moving in parts of another airborne division, or forming
additional Spetsnaz battalions, large increases are unlikely in
the near future given the scarcity of such troops and the long
periods needed to develop and train them.
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