AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000405810001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 5, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 5, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Top Secret
Intelligence
10 l%%
Afghanistan Situation Report
5 February 1985
79-81, IMC/CB
Top Secret
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AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT
MI-24 USE IN PANJSHER LIMITED
the Soviets have limited their use of MI-24
helicopter guns ips in the Panjsher Valley because of its
vulnerability to guerrilla air defenses
SOVIET COLUMN ATTACKED
The Afghan insurgents inflicted heavy losses on a Soviet
1 25X1
unit in Baghlan Province in early January 25X1
SOVIETS PROTEST CHINA'S AID TO THE RESISTANCE
Moscow's propaganda attacks on Chinese policy are intended
to press Beijin to reduce its support for the Afghan
resistance.
IN BRIEF 2
PERSPECTIVE
THE WAR IN BALKH PROVINCE 1978-19841 4
The position of the Afghan regime in Balkh Province has
improved slightly since 1981, but Kabul still controls much
less territory than it did at the time of the Soviet
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This document is prepared weekly by the Office of Near Eastern and
South Asian Analysis and the Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions
or comments on the issues raised in this publication should be
directed to
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Nok Kundi
Sam and'
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Afghanistan
International boundary
Province boundary
* National capital
O Province capital
Railroad
Road
64 Boundary.Fe~edenietlms
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spring, the Soviets decided ',the MI-24s were too
vulnerable to insurgent antiaircraft weapons' after,
~30 were shot down during the Panjsher campaign. The
Soviets now are relying on fixed-wing aircraft for airstrikes in
the Panjsher Valley and are using helicopters only for t
transport and resupply missions.
gunships to attack targets in the Panjsher Valley since last
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Comment: Helicopters are particularly vulnerable to insurgent
heavy machinegun fire from mountainside positions when the
helicopters operate in narrow valleys--such as the middle and
upper portion of the Panjsher and its many side valleys. The
Soviets are making greater use of SU-17 fighter-bombers and SU-25
attack planes in airstrikes throughout northeastern Afghanistan.
Although the Soviets probably have limited the use of helicopters
in the Panjsher and other valleys,
helicopter gunships continue to provi e'close air support for
ground force operations.
SOVIET COLUMN ATTACKEDI 25X1
linsurgents inflicted heavy losses
in an attack on a Soviet traffic control brigade early last month
in Baghlan Province. The insur.ents set five vehicles on fire
trapping the rest of the column
staging major assaults in the area
Comment: The Soviets have too few helicopters in Afghanistan to
meet unexpected contingencies. Although the Soviet and Afghan
presence in the Panjsher Valley has reduced insurgent attacks
against convoys along the main road between Kabul and the USSR,
the Baghlan attack shows that the guerrillas are still capable of
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the Soviets have not used MI-24 helicopter
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Both Moscow and Kabul have publicized the formal protest that the
Afghan Foreign Ministry made to Beijing on 31 January regarding an
alleged recent increase in Chinese support for the Afghan
resistance. The Kabul regime also publicized the text of a letter
from the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan to the Chinese
Communist Party attacking China on the same grounds.
periodical, Problems of the Far East, published prior to First
Deputy Premier Arkhipov's visit to China, contained a strong
Soviet attack on Chinese support for the resistance, and on 24
January Izvestia rebutted a recent Chinese propaganda attack on
Soviet policy by accusing China of following the American line on
Afghanistan.
Comment: The propaganda suggests Moscow intends to press China on
this issue. Despite the steady growth in Chinese aid to the
Afghan guerrillas over the past five years, Soviet propaganda
attacks on China up to now have not been nearly as frequent as
those leveled against the 'US and Pakistan. Moreover, Soviet
attacks have generally coincided with ups and downs in Sino-Soviet
relations rather than the situation in Afghanistan. For example,
the recent Izvestia article probably was a result of Moscow's
annoyance over Beijing's willingness to resume anti-Soviet
propaganda since first Deputy Premier Arkhipov's trip to Beijing
in December.
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PERSPECTIVE
THE WAR IN BALKH 1978-1984*
NESA
25X1 Military operations in Balkh Province have been concentrated in a
belt approximately 30 kilometers wide that includes Mazar-e
Sharif, the provincial capital, its airfields, an important east-
west highway running through the center of the province and
insurgent bases in the mountains to the south. The position of
the government has improved only slightly since early 1981, and
Kabul still controls much less territory than it did at the time
of the Soviet invasion.
1978-1980--Mainly Peaceful
Neither the Communist coup in 1978 nor the Soviet invasion the
following year sparked strong resistance in Balkh. Mazar-e
Sharif, the country's fourth largest city, did not experience
insurgent activity comparable to other Afghan cities. Mazaris,
'for example, staged only a largely non-violent one-day protest in
February 1980, while Kabulis were engaged in more than a week of
violent demonstrations. For most of 1980, security forces and
insurgents clashed only infrequently in the countryside, and we
know of only two Soviet sweep operations in the province before
December--near Mazar-e Sharif in June and in the southern part of
the province in May. By December, however, incidents in the
countryside were increasing and insurgent pressure on Mazar-e
Sharif became serious enough for the Soviets to stage the first of
several operations designed to drive insurgents from the Marmol
Valley in mountains south of the city.
Early 1981--Insurgent Gains
The resistance made significant gains in early 1981. The Afghan
18th Division, having reinforced units in Faryab Province to deal
with an insurgent threat, had no combat troops to turn back an
insurgent raid on Mazar-e Sharif. By April the insurgents had
reports of incidents in the province acquired from
several provinces. The study is based on approximately 500
*This is the first in a series examining the war in detail in
insurgent s
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of the province.
achieved, with little fighting in Balkh, the elimination of the
government presence in almost all of the mountainous southern half
in January
The only Soviet or government military effort reported in the
southern third of the province between early 1981 and the summer
of 1984 occurred on 1 February 1983 with a raid on a southern base
to rescue Soviet civilians who had been captured in Mazar-e Sharif
district capital west of Mazar in November.
insurgent attacks concentrated on the east-west road, Mazar-e
Sharif, and the airfields. The insurgents temporarily seized a
1981-1983--Ups and Downs for Both Sides
Fighting in northern Balkh during most of the next three years was
characterized by cycles of Soviet and Afghan government sweep
operations that resulted in a marked decline in resistance
activity. With increasing arms holdings and improved
organization, the insurgents became more active in early 1983.
Efforts to improve cooperation were spearheaded by the province's
most influential Jamiat commander, Zabiullah Khan, who was often
able to establish working relations with the moderate-backed
Harakat-i-Inqilab and the Shi'ite Nasr organization.* As usual,
The Balkh River Valley in the mountains southwest of Mazar-e
Sharif has been the only other area with significant military
activity. Despite insurgent gains in the south in the winter and
spring of 1981, the government maintained tenuous control of parts
of the valley. Available reporting suggests that government
forces have tried to do little more than hold their posts--we know
of only three small sweep operations in four years. The
government apparently relies on heavy air attacks to deter the
insurgents.
1984--Slight Soviet Gain
The establishment, in January 1984, of permanent Soviet posts in
the Marmol Valley was presumably responsible for a lower level of
insurgent activity during the remainder of the year. In Mazar-e
Sharif sabotage became, for the first time, more common than
For more information, see the Perspective, "Zabiullah Khan
Profiled." in the 4 December 1984 Afghanistan Situation Report.
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insurgent raids. During the summer, for the first time in nearly
four years, the Soviets staged a few air strikes against insurgent
bases in the southern part of the province.
Lessons
There are some obvious differences in the fighting in Balkh and in
other provinces, especially those along the Pakistani border where
there has been greater military activity. Soviet involvement in
Balkh has been relatively low--most air and ground operations have
involved only Afghan Government forces. The resistance has been
more poorly armed in Balkh than in eastern Afghanistan, primarily
because of Balkh's greater distance from Pakistan and Iran.
Historically, the people of Balkh have not been as rebellious or
warlike as those of most other provinces.
Nevertheless, in our view, some aspects of the war in Balkh apply
to other areas as well:
-- The Soviets.are willing to countenance insurgent control of
remote areas and a low level of insurgent activity. In Balkh
they have made no effort to gain control of the southern part
of the province, and have staged sweep operations only when
the insurgency was active. They usually have not tried to
follow up sweep operations by establishing new posts. Once
the establishment of posts in the Marmol Valley reduced the
insurgency in Mazar-e Sharif to an apparently tolerable level,
they made no effort to block other insurgent infiltration
routes or occupy other base areas.
-- Sweep operations reduce insurgent activity for a few months at
most. At least in Balkh, establishing new posts appears to
have a lasting impact. There was a lasting reduction of
insurgent activity in Mazar-e Sharif only after the Soviets
established posts in the Marmol Valley in January 1984. The
deeper penetration by a larger force in March 1983 brought
only about two months' respite.
-- Terrain is critical in determining insurgent activity.
Insurgents have been able to do little in the flat, open .
northern third of the province; only about 5 percent of the
reported incidents occurred in this area. In central Balkh,-
most
resistance activity on the plains was staged from mountain
bases.
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1981, primarily in reducing the level of insurgency in Mazar-e
Sharif. In our view, however, unless the Soviets are willing to
commit substantially greater resources to the province. they will
The Soviets have improved their position marginally in Balkh since
make little progress in Balkh in coming years.
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