AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000405720001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 27, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 15, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
79-81 INC/CB
61V
Afghanistan Situation Report
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15 January 1985
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FACTIONAL INSECURITIES AMONG REGIME LEADERS
Factionalism remains a significant problem in the
government, and President Babrak recently warned
Afghan Army officials, the Interior Ministry, and
KHAD against criticism of his regime.
MOSCOW GIVES CORRECT TREATMENT TO 20TH PDPA ANNIVERSARY
Moscow sent a lower level delegation to the Kabul
celebrations marking the 20th anniversary of the
People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan.
President Zia is unlikely to change his position on
his Afghanistan policy, but cynicism in Pakistan is
widespread and few people believe the Soviets can
be dislodged.
INDEX TO PERSPECTIVE ARTICLES IN 1984
This document is prepared weekly by the office of Near Eastern
and South Asian Analysis and the Office of Soviet Analysis.
Questions or comments on the issues raised in the publication
should be directed to
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Unless major developments warrant otherwise, we will not publish
the AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT next week. The next report will
appear on 29 January 1985.
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15 January 1985
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FACTIONAL INSECURITIES At'4ONG REGIME LEADERS
the Babrak
regime has begun a program to discredit the Khalqi faction of the ruling
party. The program allegedly will permit public criticism of Khalqis
and involve prosecution of Khalqis for crimes committed during Taraki's
rule. in separate speeches to Afghan Army
officials, the Interior Ministry, and KHAD, Babrak warned against
criticism of his regime. He complained that senior Afghan officials
frequently discuss with their Soviet advisers the prospects for a change
in the Afghan leadership.
The appointment of a Khalqi to replace Defense Minister Qader
probably produced a flood of r unors throughout Kabul officialdom that
(Prosecutions and open criticism
of Khalqis remain unlikely because of that faction's strength in the
Army and the Interior Ministry.
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11.
MOSCOW GIVES CORRECT TREATMENT TO 20TH PDPA ANNIVERSARY 25X1
Moscow's delegation to the Kabul celebrations marking the 20th
anniversary of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan was headed
by Uzbek First Secretary and Central Committee member Inamdzhon
Usmankhodzayev and included party leaders from the Soviet Central Asian
Republics. Usmankhodzayev's meeting with Afghan President Babrak Karmal
was described by Soviet media as taking place in a "warm comradely
atmosphere," with Karmal expressing "profound gratitude" for the Soviet
Union's "great assistance". PRAVDA published the full text of Karmal's
speech on the occasion.
The composition of the delegation, the level of Soviet media
attention, and Soviet characterizations of the atmosphere are consistent
with current Soviet practice for decennial party celebrations in
Cazmnunist-oriented Third World countries. Moscow typically sends lower
level delegations to party anniversaries than to observances of
revolutions and national days. Moscow paid greater media attention and
sent a higher level delegation to the April 1983 commemoration of the
fifth anniversary of the Afghan revolution. The Soviet delegation on
that occasion was headed by candidate Politburo member Sharif Rashidov,
who was then first secretary of the Uzbek party. Moscow is not known to
have sent any party delegation for the last major PDPA anniversary in
January 1980, which occurred just after the Soviet invasion.
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insurgent a tacks on a ue pipeline in northwestern
Afghanistan. Sabotage of the pipeline resulted in a large loss
of fuel early this month. The guerrillas also attacked a fuel
pipeline in Baghlan Province, causing several fires.
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Afghan army officers have instructed vi agers purciase an
transport flour from Pakistan to Khost because it is cheaper and
safer to transport than flour from Kabul.
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This article is extracted from a report prepared by the US
On the fifth anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, most
Pakistanis view the Soviet presence as a fact of life. But Pakistanis hold a
variety of attitudes about the domestic and international consequences of
hosting over two million refugees. They have accused the refugees of:
-- crowding Pakistanis out of economic opportunities, particularly in
transportation and construction;
-- increasing smuggling and arms/heroin trade;
- overtaxing limited in-patient and elective medical services;
-- degrading the environment by destroying pasture land, forests, and
water supplies;
increasing crowding and disease in Peshawar, Quetta, and, to a lesser
degree, Karachi; and
raising crime rates.
These allegations are a mixture of fact and myth. The Afghans have begun
to play a visible role in the country's transportation sector, but without the
assistance of the Afghan transporters, indigenous transporters could not have
met the needs of the refugees. The allegation that the refugees dominate
construction trades because they receive free basic food and shelter and can
thus underbid Pakistan's laborers is overstated; no Afghan receives food or
shelter once he leaves the refugee camps. Afghans have placed a tremendous
burden on the medical facilities in some areas of Pakistan; however, economic
assistance from abroad is carrying a large share of the refugees' medical
burden. The charges of degrading the environment and causing overcrowding are
indisputable, at least within those areas where the refugees are
concentrated. Afghans are certainly involved in the smuggling of drugs and
arms and other goods, but statistics do not support the hypothesis that the
presence of the Afghans has led to an increase in the crime rate.
The Pakistani public is sharply divided as to whether the refugees would
return to Afghanistan if circumstances permitted. The refrain that the
refugees never had it better and will stay to take advantage of the greater
economic opportunities available in Pakistan is often heard. Others,
primarily in government, believe that the refugees will return if a settlement
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is reached in the not too distant future. However, even President Zia this
fall conceded that, at some future date, Pakistan must be prepared to absorb
the refugees-to leave them festering in the camps indefinitely will
eventually constitute a security risk for Pakistan.
The Dangers of Conflict
some Pakistanis also see the Afghan refugees as an international
liability heightening the risk of war for Pakistan with Afghanistan and the
Soviet Union. This view is frequently expressed by opposition politicians and
intellectuals. They are convinced that the refugees constitute a target for
Afghan/Soviet forces seeking to eliminate insurgent supply lines and
intimidate Pakistani policymakers. They also see the refugees as a source of
cover for foreign agents (especially KHAD) seeking to undermine Pakistan?s
internal security.
Zia?s critics urge a more conciliatory GOP approach to the Afghan
Government and Soviet Union, but public sentiment in favor of direct
negotiations with the Afghan Government is spotty, and evidence of any broad
opposition is inconclusive. Several "national" and regional parties are
outspoken in criticizing the government and, interestingly, the government
allows the media to report their comments in detail. Their leaders castigate
the government's policy as neither war nor peace, and an invitation to more
refugees and saboteurs. They accuse the GOP of unwillingness to undertake
direct negotiations because it is beholden to the US.
However, Afghanistan is an issue on which Zia's domestic political
opponents are divided. Even outspoken critics of the government's Afghan
policy concede that the Soviets are an undesirable neighbor posing grave
threats to Pakistan. They counter, however, that a martial law regime can ill
afford to antagonize its Saudi and American paymasters and thus cannot work in
good faith towards a negotiated settlement of the conflict. A popularly
elected government, they argue, would have the strength of character to ignore
pressure from the Saudis and Americans and to negotiate with the Afghan regime
an honorable settlement which would lead to the return of the refugees and the
withdrawal of the Soviets. They argue that once Pakistan entered into direct
negotiations with the Karmal regime, a settlement would not be far behind.
There is no sign President Zia or any other top GOP leaders (civilian or
military) are ready to change Pakistan's position. There is considerable
skepticism in the military, as elsewhere, that the US can be counted on when
the chips are down. The military, however, is even more doubtful about the
consequences of doing business with the Soviets and their puppets in the
Afghan regime, and some almost certainly believe Pakistan should take stronger
military action against Afghan/Soviet border violations. We see little
likelihood Afghanistan will be an issue in the upcoming national legislative
elections. Opposition to the Pakistani Government's Afghanistan policy,
however, could become more focused and widespread if there is a further
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significant escalation of Afghan/Soviet pressure on Pakistan beyond border
areas now under attack and/or if a newly elected legislature becomes a forum
allowing public criticism of Pakistani policy.
Baluchistan
We estimate there are around 300,000 Afghan refugees in Baluchistan; the
official Pakistani tally after re-enumeration is 507,000. The refugees are an
important economic force in Quetta and in the small towns near the Afghan
border, and their presence and the international attention they attract has
provided a considerable economic boost to the province. The Baluch worry,
however, that a majority of the refugees will not return hare, regardless of
the war's outcome. They are concerned that the large numbers of refugees will
tilt the ethnic balance in the province toward the Pathans, who will end up in
control. However, there appears to be little tension between Afghan refugees
and local residents, perhaps because the refugee population is concentrated in
those areas which are predominately Pathan. Baluch leaders have been taken
aback by the brutal Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, but they still like to
allude to the prospect of cooperation with the Soviets as a means of obtaining
The Soviet presence in Afghanistan appears to have dampened Baluch
yearning for independence. Active Soviet interference in provincial politics
has seemingly not yet materialized. Prior to 1979 many Baluch considered
Soviet support a viable option in a future confrontation with Pakistan. While
this sentiment has not disappeared, any illusion that the Soviets would
provide backing to tribal chieftains without trying to impose their own
controls has run up against the reality of Soviet actions in Afghanistan.
Outside Influence
Pakistani perceptions of what the United States and other nations say
about Pakistan's Afghanistan policy, and even more importantly how other
nations are seen to support Pakistan's objectives, weigh heavily on Pakistan's
perception of its own interests and policy toward Afghanistan. Pakistanis
joke, but many believe, that the United States will support Afghanistan until
the last drop of Pakistani and Afghan blood is shed.
The readiness of 119 states to vote at the UN in favor of objectives in
Afghanistan corresponding to those of Pakistan is not matched by their
individual deeds to support those objectives. Consequently, the Pakistani
government, its domestic critics, and general Pakistani public opinion have a
nagging sense of lonely isolation in standing up to real and increased
Afghan/Soviet pressure on the Afghan-Pakistani border. Over time, this is
likely to affect Pakistan's willingness/ability to stick with its current
policies.
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Outlook
Cynicism is widespread in Pakistan and few Pakistanis believe the Soviets
can be dislodged from Afghanistan. At the same time, few are ready to accept
the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. President Zia, in interpreting the
recent referendum results as a mandate for him to remain in office another
five years, is unlikely to show any slackening of his commitment to hold
firmly to his Afghanistan policy. Nevertheless, Pakistan's polices
international norms of behavior.
Islamabad is especially sensitive to US statements and actions. If the
US and its allies focus on East-West arms talks and Afghanistan is relegated
to the back burners, popular fears in Pakistan and pressure on Zia to
compromise would grow. In short, the Pakistanis want Afghanistan to be seen
by the world co munity as a test of Soviet willingness to play by accepted
Afghanistan remains sensitive to domestic and international attitudes.
maintained, and probably deepened and made more effective.
Pakistan is carrying far more than its fair share of the burden of
confronting the Soviets and supporting close to three million refugees. We
expect this to continue at least as long as Zia is in control. But if
Pakistan is not to falter over time, free world support must be at least
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