AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000405700001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 27, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 8, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Top Secret
Intelligence
51 0
Afghanistan Situation Report
Top Secret
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anuary 1985
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the number
150,000.
IN BRIEF
PERSPECTIVE
we estimate
full and part-time insurgents at
The Soviets and Afghans launched a large operation
to relieve insurgent pressure in Paktia Province and
stem infiltration from Pakistan, and the insurgents
maintained a high level of activity in Ghazni,
Qandahar, and Herat Provinces.
THE SOKOLOV PROMOTION 8
The promotion of Marshal Sokolov to Defense Minister
will lead to some shifting of responsibilities
within the Soviet military for the war in
Afghanistan. There are a number of senior Soviet
officers who could succeed him as chief architect of
the war.
8 January 1985
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This document is prepared weekly by the Office of Near
Eastern and South Asian Analysis and the Office of Soviet
Analysis. Questions or cnents on the issues raised in the
publication should be directed to
8 January 1985
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8 January 1985
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ESTIMATE CE INSURGENT STRENGTH
we estimate the number of
full and part-time insurgents at 150, 000. Several thousand more-such
as those in the Hazarehjat--are armed but fight the Soviets and regime
only rarely, expending most of their energies in internecine
conflicts. We further estimate that no more than five to 10 percent of
the insurgents are under the operational control of any Peshawar-based
group, though nearly all are affiliated with a Peshawar organization in
at least sane loose fashion for the purpose of obtaining support.
-- Resolutions passed by the Islamic Conference foreign ministers
meeting in December criticized the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, but
the highly publicized final communique omitted reference to the Soviets
in Afghanistan. Muslim diplanats said sane Arab states were reluctant
to fault the Soviets on non-Middle Eastern issues.
- Diplanatic sources in Kabul report the Afghan regime is planning the
20th anniversary celebration of the Peoples Democratic Party of
Afghanistan on 10 January. Politburo
member Ponomarev and delegations from sane 30 countries will come to
Kabul. Few high-ranking officials are likely to attend because of poor
security conditions and low esteem for Afghan leadership.
- On 5 January the Afghan Politburo announced that volunteers for
military service would be required to serve a minimum of two rather than
three years. This inducement is the latest in a continuing effort to
gain recruits for the dwindling Afghan Army.
8 January 1985
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Signs of the Afghan insurgency's vitality five years after the Soviet
invasion were abundant in December. For the third time in 1984, a large-scale
Soviet and Afghan multibattalion operation was attempting to relieve insurgent
pressure in Paktia Province and stem infiltration from Pakistan; the
resistance maintained a high level of activity in Ghazni, Qandahar, and Herat
Provinces; and harassment of the Soviet and Afghan forces in the Panjsher
Valley increased. Meanwhile, the sacking of Defense Minister Qader testified
to the Soviets' dissatisfaction with the incompetence and infighting in the
Afghan military.
As on the fourth anniversary of the invasion, the Soviets and the Kabul
regime illustrated their ability to curtail guerrilla activity in the capital
by means of extraordinary security measures. Moreover, the continuing
availability of consumer goods and fuel in Kabul indicated that successive
Soviet and Afghan assaults on the Panjsher Valley in 1984 have held down
insurgent attacks on convoys on the vital highway from Termez to Kabul.
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Paktia Province
One of the largest Soviet and Afghan multibattalion operations of the war
in the border area began in mid December in Paktia Province, but--like
previous large-scale operations in Paktia in February and August-it will
probably yield only temporary results and prove costly.
about two Soviet regiments and a large Afghan contingent are __p__yea in _ _,
Ali Khel area near the Pakistan border, and the area has been heavily
bombed.
Soviet and Afghan-forces are meeting fierce resistance when they try to leave
their encampments.
The operation-like the earlier ones-probably is designed to
re ieve insurgent pressure on Ali Khel garrison and to close some of the
insurgents' resupply routes. The insurgents are well armed and close to their
support bases in Pakistan, however, and numerous passes allow them to transit
the border area almost at will.
Ghazni, Qandahar, and Herat
While winter weather may have contributed to limiting. combat activity in
much of Afghanistan, the insurgents maintained a high level of activity in
Ghazni, Qandahar, and Herat Provinces. According to US Embassy sources,
insurgents and Soviet forces clashed frequently in the city of Ghazni in
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December, and security on the main highway through the province
deteriorated. The sources claim that in one attack on a convoy, the
insurgents damaged sane 70 vehicles. Qandahar, often subjected to Soviet
sweeps, remains insecure from the regime's point of view; US Embassy sources
report that skirmishes with the resistance and bombing of the surrounding
villages remain mmmr,n
Ct C DUVIUL
and Afghan operation w un erway in Herat during December, and US Embassy
sources said that the insurgents destroyed several armored vehicles in a
Soviet
convoy near the provincial capital.
Kabul Area
As in 1983, tight security prevented the insurgents fran carrying out
significant action in Kabul to mark the 27 December anniversary of the Soviet
invasion. The US Embassy reports that increased security measures included
thorough searches of vehicles, night use of spotter planes and flares, and
shelling of suspected insurgent concentrations. On several nights,
nevertheless, guerrillas managed to harass Soviet positions and attack the
Defense Ministry with rockets and heavy machineguns, according to US Embassy
sources. Soviet pilots, the US Embassy reported, continued to exhibit concern
over insurgent possession of heat-seeking missiles; the pilots fired flares
and u
d ti
h
se
g
t spiral flight patterns on takeoffs and landings.
Panjsher Valley
Insurgent pressure, harsh weather, and other problems hampered Soviet and
Afghan military operations in the Panjsher Valley area.
Embassy sources report that the insurgents have almost uncontested control of
the upper valley and the side valleys, and continue to strike at.convoys on
the highway between Termez_and Kabul, though not to the extent they did a ear
ago.
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Defense Minister's Dismissal
n+-1Ji+U1 LCLCI15e Lvu.nisLer
QadeL was removed tor his lack of effectiveness, lack of ideological
commitment, and inability to overcome problems of factionalism in the military
ranks. Qader was replaced by Nazar Muhammad, a member of the Khalqi faction,
which dominates the military. The move may boost morale among sane party
members in the military, but the Afghan forces', ineffectiveness--rooted in
disloyalty, poor training, and manpower shortages--will be difficult to
over c n
e
8 January 1985
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Outlook
Increasingly harsh weather probably will keep combat actions at a low
level. Besides providing security on the highway between Termez and Kabul,
the Soviets' and Afghans' most difficult task will be to maintain their
Panjsher garrisons in the face of insurgent harassment.
8 January 1985
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The promotion of First Deputy Defense Minister Marshal Sokolov to Defense
Minister will lead to sane shifting of responsibilities within the Soviet
military for the war in Afghanistan. Over the past five years, Sokolov has
acted as the Defense Ministry's chief overseer of the war and probably has
done more than any other individual to shape the current Soviet military
approach to the war. Whoever assumes these responsibilities--Canmander in
Chief of the Soviet Ground Forces Petrov is a top candidate-will operate
under Sokolov's continuing influence and the same constraints that have
dominated for the past five years.
The political leadership of the Soviet Union makes all the policy
decisions on the war, including the key questions of manpower and material
commitments. But the political leadership gives the Soviet military more
leeway than mili ar professionals generally receive in the West when it comes
A Favorable Report Card?
Sokolov's promotion, together with the elevation of Marshal Akhraneyev to
the position of Chief of the General Staff last September, suggests that the
Soviet leadership is not deeply concerned with the conduct of the war to
date. Akhraneyev also has long been associated with the Afghan war,
n
accompanyi
g Sokolov on most of his visits to Afghanistan.
Nonetheless, Sokolov and Akhrcmeyev have been subject to criticism for
the USSR's lack of progress in the war and have had to endure internal debate
over how to bring the war to a successful conclusion,
there has been
a continuing debate over the relative merits of multibattalion search and
destroy operations (advocated by Sokolov) versus smaller unit ambush and
raiding tactics (favored especially by Army General Mayorov, the senior Soviet
commander in Afghanistan in 1980-81). An effective balance between these two
approaches remains a problem for the Soviets to the present day; the larger
operations tend to dominate, but not to the exclusion of small unit actions.
Changes in Command
There are a number of senior officers who could succeed Sokolov as chief
architect of the war. One of the leading contenders probably is Marshal
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Petrov, currently Commander in Chief of the Soviet Ground Forces, and also a
candidate to replace Sokolov- as a First Deputy Minister of Defense. Petrov
has considerable experience in counterinsurgency, having directed Cuban
operations in both Angola and Ethiopia.
Army General Varennikov, currently First Deputy Chief of the General
Staff and head of its Main Operations Directorate, might be tapped to replace
Akhraneyev. In this position he too has been closely associated with
operations in Afghanistan and has made a number of inspection trips there, the
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