CHILE: SCENARIOS OF DRAMATIC POLITICAL CHANGE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000405370001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 25, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: MEMO

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SUBJECT: Chile: Scenarios of Dramatic Political
Change 25X1
1. This memorandum presents a number of possible scenarios
that could follow the death of President Pinochet or end ulti-
mately in his ouster. It thus complements Intelligence Community
assessments and estimates that focus on probable further develop-
ments in Chile. The analysis, purposely provocative, aims to
make explicit and bring to the forefront of our thinking the
diversity of challenges that could threaten the Pinochet regime
in the years to come. Because the analysis out of context is
susceptible to misunderstanding, external distribution has been
severely restricted. Please limit circulation in your office and
do not reproduce the document. Your thoughts on the analysis and
suggested indicators are welcome.
2. We will send you similar papers on other countries as
they are completed.
"Chile: Scenarios of Dramatic
Political Change"
GI M 85-10277L, 17 October 1985,
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SUBJECT: Chile: Scenarios of Dramatic Political Change
(GI M 85-10277L)
Distribution List
External/non-NFIB:
Copy 1 The Honorable Raymond F. Burghardt
Special Assistant to the President and Senior
Director for Latin American Affairs, National
Security Council
2 The Honorable Elliott Abrams, Assistant Secretary,
Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
3 The Honorable Harry Barnes, US Ambassador, Santiago,
Chile
4 The Honorable Peter W. Rodman, Director, Policy
Planning Staff, National Security Council
5 The Honorable Fred C. Ikle, Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy, Dept of Defense
6-9 DI Rep/OLL
10-12 Extra Copies (OGI/FSIC/PI Room 2G24 Hqs.)
External NFIB:
13 The Honorable Morton I. Abramowitz, Director, Bureau
of Intelligence and Research, Dept of State
14 Mr. Douglas P. Mulholland, Special Assistant to the
Secretary for National Security, Dept of Treasury
15 VADM E. A. Burkhalter, Jr., USN, Director,
Intelligence Community Staff
Internal:
16 DCI
17 DDCI
18 Executive Director
19 NIO/LA
20 SRP/ODCI
21 C/PES
22 DDI
23 D/OGI
24-26 OGI/EXS/PG
27 OGI/FSIC
28-29 OGI/FSIC/PI
30 D/CPAS
31 SA/DA/CPAS
32-35 C/IMC/CPAS 33 434OCR i35 P4-pD 32-
37 OCR/DSD/DB
38 D/ALA
39 C/ALA/SAD
40 C/ALA/SAD/South America West Branch 25X1
41 C/DO/LA
42 C/DO/LAI
OGI/FSIC/PII I (17 October 85)
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CHILE: SCENARIOS OF DRAMATIC POLITICAL CHANGE*
developments.
This memorandum explores alternative scenarios that could
lead to the ouster of President Pinochet or other dramatic change
in Chile. Specifically, it seeks to clarify the individuals and
groups that might attempt to seize power, circumstances that
could impel or impede takeover attempts, and indicators that
would suggest specific scenarios are unfolding. The analysis,
purposely provocative, does not attempt to predict the likelihood
of specific outcomes other than in the broadest sense. Rather, it
provides a structured way of thinking about possible leadership
change in Chile on the basis of observable events and thus a
greater ability to recognize the potential implications of key
President Pinochet is in control, but the political turmoil
of the last two years has undercut his position. Political
parties have become more active and unified, his civilian
political base has narrowed, and leftist terrorism is growing.
Pinochet has retained the loyalty of the military, but serious
disagreements within the junta and squabbling among the security
services suggest that military support may no longer be automatic
A senior officers' coup is the most likely scenario of
dramatic political change, in our view. If the recently formed
broad opposition front remains cohesive, anti-regime protests
and unqualified.
This memorandum was prepared by
Foreign Subversion
and Instability Center, Office of Global Issues. Information available as
of 20 September was used in this report. Comments and queries are welcane and
may be addressed to Chief/Political Instability Branch, OGI on
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intensify, and radical violence accelerates, we believe
Pinochet's fellow officers would press him to moderate his
policies and consider an accelerated transition to civilian
rule. If he resisted, they probably would try to remove him from
off ice.
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We believe the chances that Pinochet would bow to the
demands of the moderate opposition and agree to an accelerated
transition are modest but growing. The opposition would have to
further expand its popular base, develop a stronger infrastruc-
ture, and gain greater military support before Pinochet would
question his ability to remain in power. It is less likely, in
our view, that Pinochet would choose instead to crack down
violently against the moderate opposition. This almost certainly
would require a purge of several senior military officers who
support the moderate opposition and oppose increased repression.
In our view, there is only an outside chance that Pinochet
would retire voluntarily. If he did, Pinochet probably would
choose a conservative Army officer to serve as a caretaker until
the presidential plebiscite in 1989. Prospects for a radical
left government coming to power also are remote. Radical leftist.
groups are actively laying the groundwork for a future insur-
gency, but we believe it will take them several years to develop
the necessary military infrastructure to seriously challenge the
L Cg11[Ie .
Pinochet's departure would carry with it both opportunities
and risks for the United States. In our view, US interests would
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benefit if the transition to civilian rule--now slated to begin
in 1989--were advanced, especially if power were turned over to
political moderates and a representative democratic system were
established. However, Chile's moderate politicians appear less
willing than Pinochet to adhere to the terms for repaying the $20
billion foreign debt. They would be more likely to endorse the
proposal of Peruvian. President Alan Garcia and limit payments to
a fixed percentage of export earnings.
Pinochet's replacement by another military strongman who
continued the repressive policies that have prevailed for the
past 12 years would risk further polarization and provide greater
opportunities for the radical left to promote the armed
struggle. A radical left government almost certainly would
establish ties with the Soviet Union, Cuba, and other radical
states and facilitate efforts by these countries to meddle in the
affairs of Chile's neighbors. 25X1
If Pinochet prolonged his stay, the impact on US interests
would be mixed. Pinochet has been a staunch opponent of
Communism, but he also has resisted any significant move toward
political liberalization in Chile at a time when the trend toward
democratization is so evident elsewhere in Latin America.
Moreover, we believe his continuation in power would accelerate
polarization and increase the likelihood of serious violence
breaking out upon his departure from office. 25X1
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THE PRESENT SCENE
Chilean politics has been dominated by President Augusto
Pinochet Ugarte since the military overthrew Salvador Allende in
1973. To consolidate his position, Pinochet from the outset
repressed all opposition and tried to eliminate the radical
left. Pinochet also manipulated the military to ensure their
continued loyalty and, over the past few years, has played on
middle-class fears of renewed political violence to undercut
support for the opposition. 25X1
The Constitution that was promulgated in 1981--and which the
opposition maintains is illegitimate--granted Pinochet an eight-
year term through 1989, when the transition to a democratic
system is scheduled to begin. At that time, a plebiscite will be
held to ratify a single candidate chosen by the regime. We
believe that Pinochet intends to be that candidate--if necessary,
by resigning from the military and seeking election as a civilian
to serve another eight year term. 25X1
Pinochet's strength appears to have seesawed since 1983,
when a severe economic recession helped stimulate mass protests.
Labor unions and resurgent political parties staged monthly
nationwide days of protest, calling for Pinochet's immediate
resignation and a quick transition to civilian rule. In response
to pressure from senior military officers to moderate his poli-
cies, Pinochet appointed an old-line politician, Sergio Jarpa, as
Interior Minister and authorized him to begin a dialogue with
moderate opposition leaders in what came to be called "the
political opening". According to Embassy sources, this gesture
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undercut middle-class support for the opposition, but radical
leftist groups escalated their terrorist campaign.
Pinochet responded to renewed efforts by the opposition to
stage protests and a series of terrorist attacks on the security
forces by imposing a state of siege in November 1984. The
government regained the momentum, and in June 1985, the state of
siege was replaced by an ostensibly less severe state of
emergency. Early this year, Pinochet purged Jarpa and another
moderate minister from his cabinet. In so doing, he:
o Eliminated potential sources of dissent within the
regime.
o Signaled that he would no longer permit a dialogue with
the opposition on accelerating the transition.
o Indicated that he planned to pursue a hard line with the
moderates as well as the terrorists. 25X1
Popular support for the Pinochet regime continued to
deteriorate in the aftermath of the state of siege--an opinion
poll taken last June showed that a majority supports transition
to democratic rule before 1987. Recent confirmation that the
security forces had killed three Communists in March--despite
official denials at the time--has further damaged the regime's
credibility and aggravated long-standing rivalries and institu-
tional infighting between the security services. According to
the US Embassy, Pinochet has tried to distance himself from the
developing scandal by shaking up the top leadership of the
Carabineros (National Guard), cashiering its Commander, and
dissolving its intelligence arm.
A watershed in Chilean politics may have occurred in late
August, when the moderate opposition signed an unprecedented
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joint agreement that renewed the call for an early return to
civilian rule. The ability of the moderates to unite around a
responsible, orderly proposal has put Pinochet further on the
defensive. He has rejected the proposal and declared he will
adhere to the timetable stated in the Constitution, but we
believe he realizes that his backing within the government and
the military now is less certain. 25X1
The regime also is vulnerable, in our view, to increased
terrorist and economic pressures. Terrorism has been
comparatively low in the past, but recent events--such as the
attempted rocket attack on the presidential palace in June--
indicate that the terrorists are using more sophisticated
equipment and aredetermined to attack senior officials and
military targets. Opposition groups, both radical and moderate,
also appear to be in a better position to attract new supporters
who would be alienated from the regime by another economic
decline. However, we believe a dramatic downturn similar to that
in 1982--when growth fell to minus 14 percent and unemployment
reached 24 percent--is unlikely unless international financial
support is withdrawn.
GROUPS CAPABLE OF SEIZING POWER AND OTHER MAJOR ACTORS
The military is the only group capable of seizing power from
Pinochet during the next three to five years. The intentions of
its leaders during this timeframe will play a critical role in
determining whether Chile moves toward a civilian government and
at what pace. So far, the professional and disciplined military
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has been basically steadfast in its loyalty to the President. To
ensure its support, Pinochet has manipulated the military through
promotions, pay, and loyalty bonuses while restricting political
activity. According to the US Embassy, many officers believe
they have a "sacred commitment" to reform the country and to
ensure that the Communists are excluded from the political
process before returning power to the civilians. Moreover, most
are firmly committed to the Constitution, in part because it
grants them immunity from prosecution for their conduct under
'')r_V-I
several occasions since 1982.
The junta--the Commanders of the Navy, Air Force, and
Carabineros, and the second highest Army leader after Pinochet--
remains loyal to the President, but tensions have resurfaced on 25X1
We believe senior military officers also have been
worried over the debilitating effects of the death-squad scandal,
the shake-up of the Carabineros high command, and evidence of
heightened rivalry and squabbling among the security services.
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We believe the reimposition of a state of siege or any
further hardening of Pinochet's policies towards the moderate
opposition would cause serious strains within the senior officer
corps. In our view, military dissatisfaction might even approach
regime-threatening proportions if:
o Pinochet persists in manipulating the political process
to remain in power indefinitely.
o The President refuses to relax political restrictions
despite growing polarization within the society.
o Leftist terrorism escalates.
o Chile plunges into a severe economic recession.
The moderate opposition has become significantly more
unified in recent months and now is pressing hard for an
accelerated transjtion to democracy. Eleven parties--from the
democratic left through the moderate right--signed a "National
Accord" in August calling for an end to all of the regime's
political restrictions, direct presidential and congressional
elections, and negotiations between the regime and the opposition
to set the transition process in motion. The Accord implicitly
accepts the validity of the Constitution and deals with the
contentious issue of banning the radical left by proposing that
it be resolved by a constitutional tribunal. Although Pinochet
rejected the Accord, it has continued to gain new adherents from
trade unions, non-political associations, and respected public
figures. If the moderate opposition can remain united and vocal,
we believe the military could become sufficiently concerned to
press Pinochet to reconsider. 25X1
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Chief among the moderate opposition groups is the Christian
Democratic Party--Chile's largest. It enjoys strong middle-class
support, has been trying to organize in slum areas, and tradi-
tionally has had ties to the Catholic Church. The party also
spearheads the Democratic Alliance coalition formed in 1983--
whose members signed the National Accord--and,
rebuild influence with organized labor and professional
organizations. 25X1
The right is trying to overcome years of organizational
decline, personal rivalries, and the stigma of having been
closely tied to the regime. Pro-government parties are on the
decline, and mostof them favor civilian rule, have been
distancing themselves from the government, and have been collab-
orating increasingly with the Democratic Alliance. The National
Party, traditionally the largest on the right, and the National
Union--which carries weight among influential conservative
sectors--are not members of the Alliance but did sign the
National Accord. 25X1
is hoping to broaden its base and 25X1
The radical left, including the well-organized and
disciplined Communist Party, has been working actively to lay the
groundwork for an insurgency. The far left historically has
commanded significant popular support--upwards of 15 percent of
the popular vote in pre-1973 elections for the Communist Party
alone
Radical leftist groups also have cooperated in an overt campaign
to try to mobilize political support.
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The Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front, an affiliate of the
Communist Party, is primarily responsible for the terrorist
campaign of the last two years. Since 1984, the radical left has
tried increasingly to provoke harsh government responses in order
to polarize the population. The Communists and the Front have
engaged in joint operations with the other leading terrorist
group, the Movement of the Revolutionary Left. So far, the
Communists have resisted the Movement's overtures to create a so-
called popular army, chiefly because they do not want to share
control with any other group.
Labor unions have a history of intense politicization and
militancy but have been weakened since 1973 by repression and
token concessions. Now they are basically subservient to the
regime. Nonetheless, critical sectors such as transportation and
utilities remain over 80 percent unionized, and a general strike
would paralyze the country. To date, the opposition has failed
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to mount a general strike that labor unions and workers would
endorse, but we believe workers might support a prolonged strike
or join in opposition protests if economic conditions
deteriorated as sharply as they did in 1982.
Student politics has revived over the last year, as has
student support for leftist groups, including the Communist Party
and the Movement of the Revolutionary,Left. Since October 1984,
center-left coalitions have unseated regime-imposed organizations
in student elections on Chile's two major campuses, and numerous
sit-ins and demonstrations have been staged. According to the US
Embassy, the regime's response so far has been uneven, but the
replacement of the Education Minister with a hardliner in July
indicates that Pinochet is determined to eliminate the unrest.
Students probably will continue to play an important role in
future opposition efforts by using radical left youth groups to
organize protests in slum areas and to challenge the security
forces in downtown areas.
The Catholic 'Church played a key role in getting the
moderate opposition to formulate the National Accord. Its
relationship with the regime has deteriorated steadily during the
past year,
Church leader Cardinal
Fresno has grown impatient with the regime's intransigence.
Pinochet recently rebuffed his personal appeal for moderation.
Nonetheless, we believe Fresno still hopes that the Church can
serve as mediator between the moderate opposition and the regime
to ensure that negotiations on a transition process are held.
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Five scenarios are presented below. The first outlines two
paths a succession crisis could follow. The others examine
possible mechanisms for Pinochet's ouster or other dramatic
political change in Chile. It is possible that two or more
scenarios could take place sequentially. Following each scenario
is a list of indicators--a series of observable events--which
signal milestones in the scenario's progression. Like a major
road from which a number of forks can be taken, several scenarios
share some of the same signposts. Each scenario though is likely
to manifest these common indicators in different combinations
along with other indicators that are unique. Hence, the obser-
vation of some indicators may merely suggest a general direction
while others may represent major turning points.
Pinochet Dies or Is Incapacitated
If Pinochet were to die or become incapacitated, the
Constitution states that the junta is to choose his successor by
unanimous vote within 48 hours.* We expect that the Army
hierarchy--the real power in the military--actually would make
the choice, although junta members would be able to voice their
preferences. We lack detailed information about the political
views of the Army high command, but we believe they would choose
a successor from within their ranks.
If no negotiations on the National Accord had been held by
the time of Pinochet's death, opposition leaders would move
quickly to establish contacts with key Army officers and lobby
for the selection of a moderate successor. Cardinal Fresno would
supplement their efforts and offer to serve as mediator between
*
The formal succession arrangements would change once a functioning
Congress is created in 1990, but only if Pinochet is not reelected. I 25X1
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the two sides. Opposition leaders probably would suspend any
protest activity to convince the military of their moderation and
persuade the new president to reopen political negotiations.
Only if a hardliner were selected and refused to negotiate on the
basis of the National Accord would the moderate opposition resume
protests. meanwhile, the radical left might step up its
terrorism campaign to capitalize on the uncertainty and force the
selection of a hardliner in the hope of accelerating polariza-
We believe the Army would select a moderate if the opposi-
tion remained cohesive or if negotiations already were underway
at the time of Pinochet's death. In our view, the new leader
would have a mand4,te to resume the dialogue with moderate leaders
but would move quickly against the radical left to restore law
and order. As long as he did not extend the harsh measures to
the population at large, he probably would retain the confidence
of his military backers and maintain a favorable climate for
We envision a different scenario, however, if Pinochet were
assassinated. The assassination would bring a swift and massive
response from the government against terrorists and, perhaps, all
opposition groups if the regime perceived them as equally respon-
sible. We believe the junta would close ranks and delay naming a
permanent successor until any serious threat to law and order had
subsided. The new president doubtless would refuse to negotiate
any changes in the transition timetable. If Pinochet were
assassinated in 1989, the regime might agree to proceed with the
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transition but might rig the plebiscite to ensure its choice is
ratified. 25X1
Indicators of the Developing Scenario
o Pinochet dies or is incapacitated.
o Senior Army officers engage in continuous discussions;
junta members are included but are not key actors.
o Moderate opposition leaders, businessmen, and Cardinal
Fresno lobby senior Army officers as the succession
scenario unfolds.
o The new president includes politicians from the moderate
right in his cabinet and maintains contact with
opposition leaders.
o The radical left steps up terrorist activity to encourage
the selection of.a hardliner and further polarize
society.
o The successor orders a crackdown on the radical left and
maintains..political restrictions.
The Military High Command Ousts Pinochet
We believe senior military officers would increasingly
question Pinochet's leadership if the President's policies
appeared ineffective or counterproductive in addressing a
deteriorating political and economic situation. According to the
US Embassy, military loyalty to Pinochet, though strong, is
tempered by a greater loyalty to the services and a commitment to
Internal security could degenerate severely if the radical
left stepped up its terrorist campaign and an economic crisis--
marked by a surge in unemployment and a sharp decline in living
standards--occurred simultaneously. Spontaneous social unrest of
significant proportions would break out and contribute to the
turmoil generated by the terrorists. The political parties,
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labor unions, and the radical left would seek to turn the unrest
into a massive, prolonged anti-regime protest. The parties would
stage rallies and demonstrations and urge the unions to mount a
general strike to paralyze the country. Meanwhile, the far left
would fan any spontaneous violence in the urban slums, and its
extremist rhetoric might win it new supporters among the
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Military officers would support a harsh response by Pinochet
to counter the terrorism but would disapprove if a hard line,
such as a reimposition of the state of siege, were applied to the
moderate opposition as well. Senior officers would be concerned
if blanket repression generated more polarization, the Army
became increasing,,Iy bogged down with internal security responsi-
bilities, the military suffered high casualties from terrorist
attacks, or troop morale and efficiency fell. Senior officers
would approach Pinochet and urge him to be more flexible with the
moderate opposition--and perhaps agree not to seek a second term
--in order to defuse the unrest and reduce the pressure on the
security services.
If Pinochet remained intransigent despite repeated appeals
and if growing polarization spawned mounting political violence,
we believe the high command would start plotting to remove him
from office. Senior officers probably would act only with near
unanimity. Army officers in command of key combat forces would
have to support any move by the junta in order to convince
Pinochet that he had no choice but to step down. A senior Army
officer willing to pursue a more flexible course most likely
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would be named to succeed Pinochet. The successor then would
initiate discussions with the moderates--and perhaps agree to an
accelerated transition timetable--while continuing to repress the
radical left. 25X1
Indicators of the Developing Scenario
o The radical left steps up its terrorism campaign.
o A major economic recession spurs unemployment, business
failures, and spontaneous demonstrations and. violence.
o Moderate opposition rallies attract significant segments
of the middle class, and moderate leaders demand an early
return to civilian rule.
o Pinochet orders a crackdown on all opposition, reimposes
the state of siege, and orders the Army to assist the
Carabineros in restoring order.
o The security forces suffer high casualties, morale falls,
and terrorism continues unchecked.
o Senior military officers urge Pinochet to lift the state
of siege, allow negotiations with the moderates, and
agree not to run for reelection.
o Pinochet remains intransigent, and senior officers ask
key Army commanders to support his removal.
o The high command confronts Pinochet, informs him that he
no longer has military support, and asks him to step down
The Moderate Opposition Forces an Accelerated Transition
The moderate opposition already has strengthened its
position considerably and could do so further if the disparate
parties can coordinate their activities and continue to attract
support from significant portions of the population. A political
crisis, such as a broadening of the Carabineros scandal that
directly implicated Pinochet, could give a major boost to the
opposition movement. It probably would lower Pinochet's
political standing further, alienating many of his middle class
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supporters and discrediting his claim to be the guardian of
political order. Moderate opposition leaders would try to
capitalize on the crisis to attract middleclass support and to
fashion a common rallying point for their activities. They also
would contact senior military officers, probably using the
Church's good offices, to urge renewed negotiations with the
regime. If Pinochet remained adamantly opposed to a dialogue,
the political parties would organize joint demonstrations but
would eschew cooperation with the radical left to avoid appearing
extreme and alarming the military.
A unified, vocal opposition capable of staging massive
demonstrations with middleclass support would be a major
political force tl.at the regime could not easily repress or
ignore. Although Pinochet's first inclination would be to crack
down, he might waver if he believed such action would be politi-
cally counterproductive or make him vulnerable to a coup. If
Pinochet believed he could not trust the military to reach an
acceptable accomodation--perhaps because senior officers publicly
declared their support for negotiations or were already meeting
with opposition leaders--Pinochet might decide to negotiate with
the moderates himself. Once Pinochet realized that the strength
of the opposition made his continuation in power questionable, he
either would agree to an accelerated transition or would name a
caretaker successor until the plebiscite in 1989. Any agreement
that Pinochet accepted, however, would have to ensure.his 25X1
personal safety upon departing office.
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Indicators of the Developing Scenario
o A political crisis narrows the regime's civilian base and
alienates large segments of the middle class.
o The moderate opposition immediately jumps on the issue,
castigating the regime and organizing joint protests that
attract middleclass and Church support.
o Protests sponsored by the radical left are not endorsed
by moderate leaders and attract little popular support.
o Air Force Commander Matthei, who already has said
publicly that he welcomes the National Accord, develops
stronger ties to moderate opposition leaders.
o Senior Army officers indicate that they endorse the
Accord and support Matthei's initiatives.
o Pinochet authorizes his cabinet to negotiate with the
moderate opposition, bypassing the military high
Radical Left Activity Leads to Prolonged Political Violence
Major changes in Chilean politics would have to occur before
the radical left would be strong enough to challenge the regime.
Large segments of the population would have to become alienated
from the government. If significant portions of the middle class
and the Catholic hierarchy began to support the left--clandes-
tinely or openly--the regime's ability to forestall a "Nicaraguan
solution" for Chile would become progressively weaker.
The radical left would continue to build its ranks by:
o Capitalizing on an unpopular issue, such as a broadening
of the Carabineros scandal or a deteriorating economy.
o Asserting that Pinochet has no intention of ever leaving
office.
o Arguing that the moderate opposition was incapable of
effecting change.
The radical left would gain the support of the poorer urban
neighborhoods as its supporters there clashed with the security
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forces. Bombings would be more frequent, more lethal, and
directed against economic targets as well as military and
government installations. The security forces and government
officials also would be targeted for assassination.
As the radicals developed a military infrastructure capable
of sustaining an insurgency--which we believe would take several
years--they would establish logistics bases of support in rural
areas and sanctuaries along the borders of neighboring states.
Radical left leaders in exile would be infiltrated back into
Chile, while Cuba, the Soviet Union, and other allies would step
up the flow of arms and other-assistance. The radical left also
would try to exploit any evidence of government corruption to
bring internation&l condemnation on the regime. As their
capabilities and membership grew, the radical left would try to
extend the violence to all major cities and directly engage the
security forces in combat.
Pinochet would respond firmly to the escalating violence,
but his insistence on harsh repression and his determination to
perpetuate himself in power probably would lead to further polar-
ization. Moreover, the ability of the security forces could be
hampered by falling morale if the terrorists continued to target
their forces, or if their families and friends no longer chose to
side with the government. If security continued to degenerate
and senior military officers were seriously troubled by declining
morale in their ranks, they would urge Pinochet to be more
flexible and to announce his intention to step down in 1989. If
Pinochet refused, the military hierarchy probably would begin
planning to remove him from office.
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An accelerated transition would be out of the question as
long as the radical left remained unchecked. Although the
security forces almost certainly would retain control, the regime
would be confronted with the prospect of a prolonged period of
turmoil verging on civil war that would leave the country deeply
divided. If Pinochet or a successor installed by the military
decided to cut his losses and arrest the growing polarization of
society, a compromise might be reached to hold the plebiscite--or
elections--on schedule in 1989 and allow moderate politicians to
run. Once a new civilian leader was installed, the radical left
then would work to have sympathizers named to influential posts,
thereby giving them political entree that they later could
Indicators of the Developing Scenario
o The regime's middle class supporters and the Catholic
Church are alienated by a major economic relapse or
government scandal.
o The moderate opposition remains divided over tactics,
cannot mount a coordinated response to the government,
and fails to attract the middle class.
o The radical left steps up terrorism, organizes the urban
slums, and establishes rural bases and sanctuaries.
o Cuba and the Soviet Union provide training and send large
amounts of arms, money, and materiel to the insurgents.
o The regime institutes harsh repressive measures against
all sectors of the population, and the Carabineros and
Army are hamstrung by poor morale.
o The junta asks Pinochet to moderate his policies or step
down.
o Pinochet or his successor turns over power to a civilian
in 1989, and the radical left gradually insinuates itself
into power.
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Pinochet's Intentions Change
Stepped-Up-Repression
Pinochet has threatened the opposition--both moderate and
radical--with harsher measures if unrest continues, and it is
possible he would launch a massive campaign to eliminate his
opponents. Before he could order a crackdown on civilians,
however, Pinochet first would have to catch senior officers off
guard and purge those he believed might attempt a coup. He then
would reimpose the state of siege and censorship, round up moder-
ate opposition leaders, and authorize a total crackdown on the
radical left. A situation similar to the mid-1970s would pre-
vail, with disappearances, torture, and executions increasingly
common. Ultimately, Pinochet might cancel the 1989 plebiscite
and announce his intention to remain in power indefinitely.
Indicators of the Developing Scenario
o Pinochet purges senior officers who advocate more
flexible policies.
o A state of siege is reimposed and moderate leaders are
arrested or exiled.
o The security forces launch a "dirty war" against radical
We expect Pinochet to hold onto his office as long as he
can, but he has taken unexpected actions in the past. Pinochet
might decide to step down voluntarily because of family or health
reasons, a sense that he had fulfilled his mandate to reform
left members and sympathizers.
o Pinochet cancels the 1989 plebiscite.
Pinochet Voluntarily Retires
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If Pinochet retires before 1989, he probably would attempt
to install a conservative Army officer as interim president until
the plebiscite. The moderate opposition most likely would lobby
the military to hold elections instead of a plebiscite or, at
least, to select a civilian candidate. The closer to 1989 that
Pinochet retires, the less opportunity the new regime would have
to consolidate its position and the greater the chances that the
moderate opposition could prevail.
Indicators of the Developing Scenario
o Pinochet announces that he will retire and names a
conservative Army officer as interim president.
o Moderate opposition leaders step up pressure on the
military to agree to electoral reforms or the selection
of a civilian candidate for 1989.
o Moderate 1ilitary officers persuade the new president to
agree to some of the opposition's demands.
IMPLICATIONS FOR US INTERESTS
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Although Chile is important to the United States as a
political ally, it also is an authoritarian state and an
important Third World debtor. Politically, Chile remains one of
the few countries in Latin America which has resisted the trend
toward democratization and which continues to systematically
restrict human rights. Although Pinochet remains a staunch
opponent of Communism, his refusal to move toward liberalization
increases the likelihood of political polarization and fuels the
possibility of a radical left takeover. The longer he stays in
power, the more likely it is that the level of instability will
grow and that serious violence could break out upon his departure
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Economically, Chile is the fifth largest Latin American
debtor and owes-US banks a third of its $20 billion debt.
Foreign investment is crucial for domestic production in Chile,
and the regime so far has avoided declaring support for a debt
moratorium to avoid antagonizing its creditors. A moratorium is
not completely unthinkable, however. Considerable pressure from
creditors--such as a threat to suspend additional aid unless the
human rights situation improves--could prompt either Pinochet or
a successor to threaten a moratorium to improve its bargaining
position. Declaration of a moratorium or support for a debtors
cartel, moreover, could encourage other debtors such as Argentina
to follow in Chile's path. 25X1
We believe an accelerated transition to civilian rule would
be the most beneficial to US interests. A representative
democracy in which the center and democratic left would have a
greater stake in the system would undermine the appeal of the
radical left. A moderate civilian government also would be the
most likely to respect human rights, and the greater stability
would provide a favorable climate for foreign investors. It is
less clear, however, that a moderate civilian regime would honor
the current terms for repaying Chile's debt. The leader of the
Christian Democrats already has said the conditions require
unacceptable social and economic hardships and has praised the
position of Brazil's President Sarney and Peru's President Alan
Garcia. 25X1
The advent of a moderate military successor following
Pinochet's death, early retirement, or a coup also would benefit
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US interests, in our view. While a moderate military leader
probably would continue to repress radical terrorism, he most
likely would be responsive to opposition requests to reopen
negotiations, possibly including an accelerated transition. Such
a successor most likely would assure the United States and other
foreign creditors that his government would honor Chile's debts
and maintain a favorable investment climate by eliminating human
rights abuses. A successor who came to power in the wake of
Pinochet's assassination, however, would have less flexibility.
His first priority would be to maintain law and order, and he
probably would be much less willing to consider accelerating the
transition. 25X1
A radical left takeover would be the worst possible scenario
for US interests. We believe the authoritarian regime that would
follow would be even less inclined than the present government to
return the country to democratic rule, and human rights abuses
would be flagrant and sweeping. Close ties would be established
with Cuba, the Soviet Union, Nicaragua, and possibly Libya, and
the presence of the new regime might facilitate efforts by these
countries to meddle in the affairs of Chile's neighbors. A
radical government also would be more inclined to support Cuba in
urging a debtors cartel and might consider repudiating Chile's
foreign debt.
Stepped-up repression by Pinochet could prove almost as bad
for US interests as a radical takeover. Although an ultra-
conservative regime would try to keep radical leftist activity in
check, another prolonged period of repression risks further
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polarization and greater instability over the long term.
Meanwhile, prospects for a transition to civilian rule would be
set back substantially, and human rights abuses would increase.
Although the regime most likely would adhere to its loan commit-
ments, foreign creditors, alarmed at the renewed unrest, might
refuse to extend new loans or provide other concessions. The
regime then might take the dramatic step of suspending payments
on its existing loans and channeling all its resources to
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domestic needs instead.
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