NONALIGNED MEETING IN ANGOLA: PRELUDE TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000305030001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 28, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 27, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
27 August 1985
Nonaligned Meeting in Angola: Prelude to the General Assembly
Summary
The United States will come under sharp criticism at the 2-7
September Nonaligned Movement (NAM) foreign ministers conference
in Luanda, Angola. We ezpect Angola, with the assistance of
Cuba, to ezploit the NAM's established anti-US bias on its core
issues: creation of a Palestinian state, black rule in Namibia
and South Africa, establishment of a New International Economic
Order, and superpower disarmament. The nonaligned countries will
use the conference as a strategy session for the fall UN General
Assembly and prob t the UN the resolutions they
adopt in Luanda.
Diplomatic) (reporting indicate that the
conference atten e~i ry o develop consensus positions and
strategy on several General Assembly issues:
o Soviet Third World clients, led by Cuba, will try to
enlist nonaligned support for condemnation of the US
'This memorandum was prepared b Subversion Analysis Branch,
Office of Global Issues, and Southern Africa Branch, Office of
Africa and Latin American Af airs. as een coordinated with the Offices
of Soviet Analysis, Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, East Asian Analysis
and European Analysis, as well as the Directorate of Operations. Cannents and
queries are welecme,and may be directed to the Chief, Foreign Subversion and
Instability Center,
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Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).
o Cuba and the African countries will try to politicize the
Third World debt issue by advocating a debtors' cartel or
an international debt conference. We expect the major
Latin American debtors to block these proposals, but they
may join a call for negotiations with creditors on
finding alternative methods of debt r,e~avment in order to
send a message to the United States.
o Malaysia will seek conference support for its proposal to
replace the Antarctic treaty, of which South Africa is a
member of, with a UN-controlled regime that would treat
Antarctica as the "common heritage of mankind." The
conference is likely to endorse the Malaysian proposal
because of its desire to establish the common heritage
principle and isolate South Africa, but the proposal
itself is a low priority for most nonaligned countries.
The conference will also try to decide which country should
become chairman of the NAM in 1986. The chairman serves
spokesman and coordinator for the nonaligned in the UN.
The Angolan civil war may overshadow conference business.
Both the Dos Santos government and the Savimbi-led UNITA
insurgents view the meeting as a propaganda opportunity:
Dos Santos hopes that a successful conference will provide badly
needed international prestige while UNITA hopes to disrupt the
conference and demonstrate the government's lack of control. We
believe UNITA will refrain from actions against conference
participants so as not to undercut their expected propaganda
benefits. According to diplomatic reporting, most foreign
observers in Angola--including the Cubans--expect the
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government's precautions will not prevent UNITA from creating one
or more incidents. Should the insurgents be successful, it could
have an impact on the composition of the Angolan leadership as
Dos Santos, searches for sca~eeoats to blame for the breakdown in
security.
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Nonaligned NIeeting in An ola: Prelude to the General Assembly
Introduction
The 101-member Nonaligned Movement (NAM) will hold a foreign
ministers conference on 2-7 September in Luanda, Angola. The
Angolans drafted the conference communique and it is sharply
critical of the United States. Diplomatic reporting indicates
that moderate members, led by Singapore, will press for changes
in it. Nevertheless, we believe that the final communique--due
to a highly organized effort by the Cuban-led radicals--will
reflect Luanda's draft. Cuba used its 1979-1983 chairmanship to
make the NAM a platform for anti-US rhetoric. India, the
chairman since 1983, has worked to temper some nonaligned
condemnations of the United States but the organization retains
The NAM will use the Luanda conference to reaffirm its four
longstanding objectives: creation of a Palestinian state, black
rule in Namibia and South Africa, establishment of a New
International Economic Order, and superpower disarmament. The
conference is certain to criticize US positions on these
issues. Cuba is striving to make support for leftist governments
and movements in Central America and the Caribbean a core
nonaligned issue and is likely to make progress. The ministers
probably will paper over differences on issues which divide
them: we anticipate, for example, that they will neither endorse
nor condemn the Jordanian-PLO peace initiative, leave the
Kampuchean seat in the NAM emUty. and avoid nonaligned membership
Diplomatic (reporting suggest that the
nonaligned countries wi ry o reach consensus positions and
develop strategy on several issues expected to arise at the fall
UN General Assembly: the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI),
Third vVorld debt, and revision of the Antarctic treaty. The
ministers will also try to decide which country will host the
nonaligned summit in 1986 and assume the chairmanship for the
following three years.
Nonaligned Support for Moscow's Anti-SDI Cam aign
e oviets have a good
oppor uni y in uan a o win nonaligned support on SDI through
such Third World clients as Cuba and Angola. Cuba has mastered
the parliamentary manuvering needed to win passage of weakly
supported resolutions. To get an anti-SDI resolution through the
conference, the Cubans and other Soviet clients are likely to use
the proclamation on disarmament issued in January 1985 by the
heads of state of Tanzania, i1~iexico, India, Argentina, Sweden, and
Greece. The proclamation called for the "prohibition of the
development, testinb, production, deployment, and use of all
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space weapons." The Soviet clients may ask Tanzania, India, and
Argentina to help them pass a similiar resolution, perhaps
expanding it to include a ban on SDI research.
An anti-SDI resolution in Luanda could encourage nonaligned
heads of state and foreign ministers to criticize SDI during
their speeches before the General Assembly in late September and
October. Moreover, the above mentioned six heads of state are
considering another summit this October in New York during the
ceremonies commemorating the 40th anniversary of the UN and may,
at the behest of the NAM, emphasize the space militarization
issue. Moscow could thus gain considerable propaganda benefit
shortly before the November US-USSR. Summit meeting.
Politicizing Third World Debt
We believe Cuba and the African countries will take the lead
in trying to politicize the Third World debt issue. Many Third
World debtors are dissatisfied with the current practice of
negotiating individually with their creditors. The July summit
meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) called for a
conference between African debtors and their creditors. Cuba is
advocating a Third World debtors' cartel or cancellation of Third
World debt. The Cartagena group of 11 Latin American debtors has
been trying for the past year to establish a political dialogue
with creditor governments outside the IMF.
In our judgment, the Latin American debtors will prevent the
NAiVI from advocating a debtors' cartel or an international debt
conference. Five Cartagena members do not belong to the NAM and
the other six probably will not feel able to deviate from the
group's opposition to these proposals. We believe the Cartagena
members in attendance are likely to exercise a moderating
influence on the Cubans and the Africans. Nonetheless, we
believe they may agree to a resolution that calls for
negotiations with creditors on finding alternative methods of
debt repayment. We think Cartagena members may want to use the
NAM and the UN to signal the United States and other creditors
that they are impatient with the absence of progress on their
demand for a multilateral .political dialogue on debt.
Malaysia's Effort to Overhaul Antarctic Treaty
Diplomatic reporting indicates that Malaysia--following up
its initiative at the 1983 New Delhi summit--wants the Luanda
conference to further its initiative to replace the Antarctic
treaty with a UN-controlled regime that would treat Antarctica as
the "common heritage of mankind." The current treaty is
administered by the 16 states that conduct significant scientific
research on the continent. Two nonaligned countries, India and
Argentina, belong to the treaty as does South Africa. An
additional 16 countries are associated with the treaty and are
seeking full membership.
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We expect Malaysia to press for a nonaligned resolution
requesting the establishment of a Special Committee in the
General Assembly to review the Antarctic treaty. The Malaysian
proposal received only lukewarm support from the nonaligned in
the UN the past two years and appeared moribund. The July 1985
OAU summit revived it, however, by calling for the common
heritage principle to be applied to Antarctica. Since the OAU
accounts for half of the nonaligned membership, Kuala Lumpur
should be in a strong position. South Africa's participation in
the current treaty will also help Malaysia's cause.
We expect the conference to approve a resolution backing a
UN Special Committee. Argentina and India oppose the idea, but
probably will not voice significant opposition in Luanda. We
expect them to wait until the venue shifts to the General
Assembly where the other treaty members can lead the
opposition. In our judgment, most nonaligned states believe they
have little to gain from an overhaul of the Antarctic treaty and
will support the Malaysian proposal primarily to establish the
common heritage principle and isolate South Africa.
Yugoslavia's Bid for the Chairmanshi
Yugoslavia is the leading candidate to host the next
nonaligned summit, scheduled for September 1986, and assume the
chairmanship for 1986-1989. Belgrade hosted the first nonaligned
chairmanship twice.
e issue is a rea y an em arassmen o e
NAM. The 1983 summit designated Iraq to host the conference but
its war with Iran. another nonaligned member, forced it to
The nonaligned chairman serves as a spokesman and
coordinator for the developing countries in the United Nations
and, if aggressive, can steer the developing countries toward a
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singled out the United States for criticism.
Yugoslavia voted for all 19 "name-calling" resolutions that
more moderate or radical UN agenda. While we think Yugoslavia
would use its chairmanship to push more moderate views, Belgrade
probably would acquiesce to strong criticism of the United States
on the NAM's core issues. Diplomatic reporting indicates that
Yugoslavia feels its nonaligned credentials are vulnerable
because it is one of only three European members in the NAM.
Moreover, in the past Belgrade often has been unwilling to
distance itself from the anti-US positions of nonaligned
radicals. For example, during the 1984 UN General Assembly,
The Angolan Government and UNITA: The Pro aganda War
We believe the Angolan civil war may overshadow any business
conducted at the conference. Both the Dos Santos government and
the UNITA insurgents view the meeting as a propaganda
opportunity. The Angolan government is attempting to ensure the
meeting takes place without incident. Western diplomats in
Luanda estimate the Angolan government is spending from $30 to
$50 million on the conference. Security is being tightened in a
30 kilometer radius from the capital and at strategic points such
as the airport, power lines, major highways, and the port. The
government is also attemptin to im rove Luanda's a earance and
infrastructure. hotels and 25X1
numerous office buildings are being renovated, 25 kilometers of
streets improved and upgraded, and a $5 million contract was
awarded to a Brazilian company to install a telephone net for the
meeting.
itself and one against a provincial target--to embarrass
Most foreign observers in Angola--including the Cubans,
according to a Western diplomat--expect the government's
preparations will not prevent UNITA from creating one or more
incidents. UNITA, according to the diplomat, may have been
responsible for setting fire to the governments main warehouse in
mid-July, destroying some $3 million worth of consumer goods
imported especially for the conference. The diplomat reported
speculation among the foreign community in Luanda that UNITA will
make two major strikes during the conference--one in Luanda
undercut its expected propaganda gains.
rom ac ions agains conference participants so as not to
The success or failure of the Luanda conference is likely to 25X1
have significant political ramifications. Disruption of the
meeting would not only embarrass the Soviet-backed regime, but
would also have an impact on the composition of the Angolan
leadership as Dos Santos looks for scapegoats to blame for the
e e ieve, owever, t a wi re rain
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breakdown in security. Conversely, should the meeting take place
without incident its success would provide a much needed morale
boost for the government, increase the party's international
prestige, and undercut UNITA's claims about its military
prowess.
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SUBJECT: Nonaligned Foreign Ministers Conference
(GI M 85- 10228C)
OGI/FSIC/SA/~ (28 August 85)
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Distribution:
Copy 1 Mr. Philip Ringdahl, Director of African Affairs, NSC
2 Mr. Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
African Affairs, Dept. of State
3 Mr. Donald Gregg, Asst. to the Vice President for
National Security Affairs
4 Mr. Frank jVisner, Deputy Asst Secretary for African
Affairs, State Department
5 Mr. Frank Cabelly, Special Asst to the Asst Secretary
for African Affairs, State Department
6 Mr..Anthony Dalsimer, Director, Office of Analysis for
Africa Bureau of Intelligence and Research, State Dept.
7 Defense Intelligence Officer for 25X1
rica,
8 Mr. Jeffrey Davidow, Director, Office of Southern
African Affairs, State Department
9 Ambassador Herbert Okun, Deputy Perm Rep to the UN
10 Ambassador Joseph Reed, US Rep to the UN Economic &
Social Council
11 Ambassador Hugh Montgomery, Alternate Rep to the UN for
Special Political Affairs
12 Mr. Larry Silverman, INR/AA, State Dept.
13 YIr. John Donovan, INR/LAR, State Dept.
14 Mr. Jerr Gallucci, AF/S, State Dept.
15 DIA, JSI 5B, Pentagon 25X1
16
17 DDCI
18 SA/DDCI
19 ExDir
20 NIO/AF
21 NIO/Economics
22 SRP/ODCI
23 DDI/PES
24 DDI
25 ADDI
26 DDI Registry
27 CPAS/ISS
28 D/OGI, DD/OGI
29-33 CPAS/CB (7G07)
34 OGI/PG/Ch
35-37 OGI/EXS/PG
38 AF 25X1
39 AF
40 Ch/FSIC
41-44 FSIC/SA
45 Mr. Gregory J. Newell, Asst. Secretary for
International Org. Affairs, State Dept.
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