KUWAITI AIRLINES HIJACKING: A RETROSPECTIVE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000304670001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 11, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 9, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence ency
Washington, D. C. 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
9 AUG 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: (see attached distribution)
SUBJECT: Kuwaiti Airlines Hijacking: A Retrospective
1. The attached memorandum assesses the evidence concerning
responsibility for the planning, execution, and subsequent management of the
December 1984 hijacking of the Kuwaiti Airlines flight to Tehran. It is our
judgement that while Iran was not involved in planning the actual hijacking,
Iranian authorities sought to exploit the incident
2. This memorandum was prepared by
Analysis Divison, Office of Global issue
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Terrorism/Narcotics 25X1
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3. Your comments and suggestions on this memorandum are welcome and may
be addressed to the Chief, Terrorism Analysis Branch, OGI,
Attachment:
Kuwaiti Airlines Hijacking: A Retrospective
GIM 85-10176, 7 Aug 85
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SUBJECT: Kuwaiti Airlines Hijacking: A Retrospective
DDI/OGI/TNAD/TAB (7 August 1985)
Distribution:
1 - Ambassador Robert Oakley, State
1 - Richard Murphy, State
1" - Gordon S. Brown, State
1 - James M Ealum, State
1 - Morton I. Abramowitz, State
1 - Ch/INR/GIS, State
1 - Stefanie Stauffer, State
1 - I I DIA
1 -
1 -
1 - NSA
1 -
1 -
1 - Admiral John M. Poindexter, White House
1 - Donald Gregg, White House
1 - Wayne Gilbert, FBI
1 - Noel Koch, DOD
1 - Virgil Krohn, FAA
1
1 - SA/DDCI
1 - Executive Director
1 - DDI
1 - DDI/PES
1 - Charles Allen, NIO
1 - CPAS/ISS
1 - D/OGI
1 - OGI/PG/CH
8 - OGI/EXS/PG
1 - OMS/POD
1 - DC/NIC
1 - D/NESA
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - C/NESA/PG
1 - C/NESA/AI
1 - C/NESA/P
1 - C/NESA/PG/I-I
1 - C/NESA/AI/L
1 - DC/CPN
1 - C/DDO/CTG
1 - C/DDO/NE
1 - C/DDO/NE
1 - DO/NE
1 - C/TNAD
1 - C/TNAD/TAB
1 - TNAD Chrono
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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
7 August 1985
Kuwaiti Airlines Hijacking: A Retrospective
Summary
The available evidence indicates Iran was not involved in
planning the 4-9 December 1984 Kuwaiti airliner hijacking and did
not provide material support to the hijackers while the plane was
on the ground in Tehran. Nevertheless, Iran's ambivalent'
handling of the incident on the ground indicated its sympathy for 25X1
the hijackers and their goals. Iran pressed Kuwait to accede to
the terrorists' demands and interfered with Kuwaiti neaotiati
Finally, among Iran's conditions for the return of the
aircraft is its demand that Kuwait fulfill the hijackers'
principal demand--that is, the release from prison of the
Iranian-backed terrorists responsible for the December 1983
bombings of US, French, and Kuwaiti installations in Kuwait.
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and asylum to the hijackers in Iran. 25X1
TPT t c i was prepared by Office of Global Issues,
Terrorism/Narcotics Analysis Division, Terrorism Analysis Branch. Information as
and should be directed to Chief, Terrorism/Narcotics Analysis Division
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a little-known Iranian law may uarant amnesty
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The Terrorists and Their Weapons
The hijackers were four Arabic-speakinn their early
twenties.l the
hijackers boarded the aircraft in Dubai after traveling from
Beirut, Lebanon. Available evidence suggests-the four were
radical Lebanese Shias inspired by Iran's Islamic fundamentalism.
-- One of the terrorists said that members of his family
had been killed in the Sabra-Shatila massacre in
September 1982. Nearly half of the refugees living in
those camps were Shias.
Native Arabic-speakers among the crew and passengers
aboard the aircraft identified the terrorists' accents
as Lebanese.
The hijackers' principal demand was that Kuwait release
the prisoners convicted for the December 1983 bombings
of the US and French embassies. The prisoners are
members of the Iranian-backed Dawa Party, and three of
them are from Lebanon.
The debriefed hostages said the terrorists had as many as
four handguns and one or two fragmentation-type grenades. Two of
the handguns were small caliber (.22 or .25) automatic pistols,
one was a .38 caliber revolver taken from the aircraft security
guard, and the fourth may have been a .45 caliber handgun.
Although the terrorists threatened to blow up the aircraft, there
is no evidence that they had any explosives other than the
grenades. Most of the hostages, including the flight crew,
believe that the devices the terrorists claimed were explosives
ware not
ne
1The passengers said the hijackers identified themselves only as Abu Hassan
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Whether or not the hijackers were assisted by outside
accomplices remains unclear. The hostages said the hijackers did
not receive additional weapons or other equipment while the plane
was on the ground in Tehran. If true, the hijackers' weapons and
equipment were either brought on board by them or by accomplices
before reaching Tehran or else were acquired from passengers.
Most of the debriefed passengers said security at Dubai and
Kuwait airports was lax, making it easy for determined terrorists
to bring weapons onto the aircraft. The security guard on board
the aircraft searched the passengers only cursorily before they
boarded the aircraft in Dubai. The handcuffs used on one
American hostage were taken from the aircraft guard and the rope
used to bind the hostages reportedly.came from the baggage of a
Pakistani passenger. The pilot said the hand-held radio used by
the hijackers was forcibly taken from an Iranian official while
he was delivering food to the aircraft.
In contrast, a Pakistani passenger claimed that a black
briefcase placed next to her seat by a uniformed ground attendant
in Dubai was retrieved by one of the hijackers before departure,
but this report has not been confirmed. In addition, the Kuwaiti
security guard on board said that as the plane began taxiing in
Dubai, one of the terrorists insisted on using one particular
restroom, suggesting that the weapons may have been hidden
The Case against Iranian Involvement
o is been surprised by the incident:
Iran appears
According to the released passengers, the terrorists do
not appear to have received any weapons or other
equipment after the plane landed in Tehran.
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The hostages say there was no indication of a close
rapport between the terrorists and Iranian personnel in
contact with them. They did not see any messages being
Tehran also apparently followed some standard counter-
terrorist procedures in handling the crisis.
Iranian officials negotiated deliberately, insisting on 25X1
the spelling of words and frequent repetition to make
certain of their meaning. .
The Iranians also apparently were skillful in
distracting the terrorists, engaging in protacted
negotiations over the use of the ground power unit, even
though the aircraft's own power unit provided most of
the power needed.
terrorists.
these ruses may have
distract the
The Possibility of Iranian Complicity
We cannot rule out the possibility that elements of the
Iranian Government knew about the hijacking beforehand or were
involved with the hijackers during the ordeal. Representatives
of several ministries, particularly the Iranian Revolutionary
Guard Corps and the Foreign Ministry, support various terrorist
groups and sometimes plan terrorist operations, often without the
knowlgdge of other elements of the Iranian Government.
Iranian officials, particulaly those in Lebanon, could have
e os ages acknowledge they could not observe all of
the hijackers' activities. The hijackers may have received
support or encouragement from the radical Iranian officials
initially in charge at the airport which the hostages were unable
to detect. ~
Tehran's inconsistent handling of the hijacking may also
have been, in part, the result of disagreements among elements or
officials within the Iranian Government. Hardliners--
particularly from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, and possibly
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from the Foreign Ministry and Interior Ministry as well--probably
supported the hijackers' objectives and argued that Tehran should
cooperate with them as much as feasible. As it became apparent
that Kuwait would not comply with the hijackers' demands, the
more pragmatic elements evidently prevailed, probably because of
international pressure.
Iran's Sympathies
Whether or not Tehran actively assisted the hijackers, Iran
clearly was sympathetic to them and their goals. This sympathy
produced Iranian behavior that complicated a prompt resolution of
the incident:
The circumstances surrounding the rescue operation on 9
December, however, are very suspicious, and we do not believe the
rescue operation was a genuine assault. We suspect, instead,
that Iranian officials made a prior arrangement with the
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hijackers to stage the assault.
Iranian security forces reportedly were firing their
weapons as they stormed the aircraft, but no hostages or
hijackers were killed or wounded. The principal
objective of counterterrorist forces conducting such
operations is to disable the terrorists.
The hostages say the hijackers' conduct and attitude on
t"he last day suggested that they knew some sort of
conclusion to the incident was at hand.
Evidence available shortly after the hijacking suggested
that Tehran might try to mitigate the adverse effects the
incident had on its image by appearing to deal harshly with
hijackers:
Tehran claimed it will try the hijackers for murder--a
crime punishable by death in Iran.
Tehran moderated its conditions for extraditing the
hijackers. Initially, Iran said it would extradite the
four terrorists only in exchange for Iranian opposition
leader Rajavi, resident in France. Iran's chief justice
later said Tehran is interested in reciprocal
extradition agreements and would consider extraditing
the four terrorists if other countries extradited the
hijackers of Iranian aircraft.
Nevertheless, since December, Iran has obstructed Kuwaiti
efforts to retrieve the hijacked aircraft and it appears that
Tehran has no intention of releasing the aircraft to Kuwait. For
several weeks, Iran would not allow a team of Kuwaiti technicians
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Despite Iran's public statements that it will eventually try
the terrorists,
The hijackers almost certainly will not be incarcerated in a
criminal prison, nor are they likely to be tried for the murder
of the two American diplomats.
there is an obscure Iranian law t at automatically provides
amnesty and asylum in Iran for any Muslim who kills a non-
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APPENDIX:
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS DURING KUWAITI AIRCRAFT HIJACKING
(Note: All times are approximate Tehran local times)
0235 Kuwaiti Airlines flight 221 from Dubai to Karachi
hijacked and forced to fly to Mehrabad Airport,
Tehran. Total of approximately 166 people
aboard: 151 passengers (including three USAID
employees and a US businessman), 11 crew, and four
hijackers.
Soon after the plane landed, USAID employee Charles
Hegna was shot and killed. Hijackers demanded that
the plane be refueled and food be brought on board.
Hijackers announced to tower that their "first and
last demand" is for the release of the Dawa-
prisoners in Kuwait.
5 December
Hijackers released 19 passengers after aircraft is
refueled.
0630 Injured aircraft guard released.
morning Two Kuwaiti passengers broadcast appeals over
radio; lead hijacker cut one with axe from
aircraft. Terrorists then pretended to kill two
Kuwaitis.
2030 Doctor allowed on board aircraft to treat Kuwaiti
passenger suffering from heart problem. Two other
passengers also reportedly suffering heart
ailments, and hijackers offered to exchange them
for Kuwaiti Charge in Tehran.
Kuwaiti negotiating team, headed by Minister of
State for Foreign Affairs, arrived in Tehran. 25X1
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Before 0740 Mr. William Stanford, USAID, killed on the platform
of the aircraft after broadcasting appeal on radio
and told to give a countdown to his execution. The
hijacker calling himself Abu Hassan was invovled in
Stanford's killing.
0740 Hijackers claim to have killed two passengers--
Stanford and a Kuwaiti. Pakistani passenger
escapes from the aircraft.
0740 Hijackers first contacted Kuwaiti negotiating
team. Discussions lasted only 10 minutes.
Hijackers threatened to kill the remaining US
citizens if the Kuwaiti prisoners are not released.
0915 Photographer allowed to approach door of aircraft
and take pictures of bodies of Kuwaiti passengers
allegedly killed earlier in the day.
Before 1045 Hijackers demanded a new crew be supplied for the
aircraft.
Before 1444 Kuwaiti flight engineer suffering from heart
ailment released by hijackers.
First beatings of the two remaining American
hostages by the hijacker calling himself Khalid.
Four more passengers released from aircraft.
Twenty more passengers, all Pakistanis, released.
0000 Time set by hijackers for Kuwait to meet demands or
plane would be blown up. First actual deadline set
by hijackers. Allowed to pass.
0700 Revised deadline, but this one passed unmarked too.
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1407
1730
2030 , i
Morning
Hijackers' first statement broadcast on Iran
radio. Statement condemned Kuwait, justified
killing of Hegna and Stanford as CIA agents.
Claimed killing of two other unspecified persons;
said next to be killed would be presumably USAID
employee Kapar (although name and title garbled)
and three named Kuwaiti diplomats.
Eight more passengers released (6 Pakistanis and 2
Iranians described as students.) Released
passengers said only two Americans had been killed.
Sixteen more persons released (nationalities not
specified).
Second beatings of the American hostages by Khalid
and Abu Hassan.
Hijackers told tower that the "trial" of the
Americans "will now begin."
Hijackers told tower they would release all those
"not connected with this matter."
Hijackers' second statement carried by Tehran
media. Repeated above release offer and reasserted
terrorists' intent toward remaining captives.
23 hostages--all Pakistanis--released.
Deadline set by "Islamic Jihad" in earlier
anonymous call to Agence France Press in Beirut.
Caller said killing of Kuwaiti diplomats would
begin if demand not met; reiterated position that
hijackers were not members of "Islamic Jihad" but
enjoyed "group's" full support.
Kuwaiti negotiating team left Tehran; said
negotiations will be handled by diplomatic
personnel on scene.
Hijackers declared they wanted to leave Tehran;
demanded new aircraft.
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1349 AFP reported two unscheduled Syrian airliners
landed in Tehran. No word on who was aboard.
1520 Hijackers broadcast "last will and testament" to
control tower, rejected food, and broke
communications.
1619 Ambassadors from Saudi Arabia, Syria, Pakistan,
Algeria, and Bangladesh summoned to Mehrabad
airport, presumably to witness Iranian rescue
operation.
1635 Hijackers renewed communications with tower. Final
prayers reported, explosives said to be planted.
Renewed threat to blow up plane and demand another
aircraft.
1710 Food delivered to aircraft.
2037 Hijackers said they would "release the innocent and
kill the criminals."
2002 Mehrabad tower informed the hijackers that a "bus"
had arrived and was under the aircraft. Hijackers
repeated threat to blow up plane with American and
Kuwaiti hostages. Tower pleaded with hijackers to
wait until their previously set 2400 deadline.
2145 Seven more hostages released: six crew members and
a "flight engineer."
2345 IRNA reported that Iranian security forces
"stormed" the plane. Hijackers came out with their
hands up, and remaining hostages walked out.
According to the IRNA report, the troops had hidden
close to the plane and entered when the hijackers
requested a clean-up crew. Gunfire reported, but
no casualties announced. The two Kuwaitis the
hijackers claimed to have killed were among the
nine hostages "rescued," confirming that Hegna and
Stanford were the only passengers killed.
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