INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SITUATION REPORT #38

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000304090001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 26, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 21, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
International Financial Situation Report #38
21 March 1985
Summary
The sheer enormity of the debt held by the major debtors has focused the majority of the
international financial community's attention on these countries. Nonetheless, the smaller
ral
se
e
we see
problems that could be a sign of insolvent where extraordinary debt relief measures, as in the
would be necessary. ]these countries will experience
nd
l
f P
,
a
o
case o
considerable difficulty in satisfying external financing requirements in 1985 and 1986. Other
developments in recent weeks include:
o On 11 March Mexico's $48 billion debt rescheduling agreement was submitted to the
country's 530 bank creditors for review, with the target date for final approval being 29
March. Mexico and the IMF are close to agreement on the last phase of the three-year
extended fund facility, and a letter of intent is expected to be signed this week.
o Brazil and the IMF are working on a new letter of intent, following last month's
suspension of disbursements. The commercial bank negotiations have been suspended
until a new agreement with the Fund is worked out, which will not occur until mid-May
at the earliest. Paris Club negotiations will begin after an agreement on a Fund
program is reached.
on 4 March and should conclude this week.
o Yugoslavia formally endorsed a draft agreement with the IMF for a 1985-86 standby
arrangement of $300 million, opening the way for completion of rescheduling
negotiations with Western banks and governments.
o The refusal of the National Commercial Bank of Saudi Arabia to participate in the new
money phase for the Philippines continues to delay signing of the financial rescue
package. In addition, the first review of the Philippine IMF standby arrangement began
F_ I
This situation report was prepared by analysts of the Intelligence Directorate. Comments are
welcome and may be addressed to the Situation Report Coordinator,
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Date Event/Country
Camient
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25-26 March Paris Club (Yugoslavia) Scheduled meeting to discuss
rescheduling of Yugoslavia's debt owed
to official bilateral creditors.
25-27 March IDB Annual Meetings (Vienna)
Regularly scheduled annual meetings of
the Inter-American Development Bank. F
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17-19 April IMF/IBRD Meetings (Washington) The Interim and Development Camiittees
problems.
will discuss various economic and
financial topics, including LDC debt
Week of Paris Club (Poland, Ecuador, Tentatively scheduled meetings to
22 April Costa Rica, Mauritania) discuss the rescheduling of these
countries' debt owed to official
bilateral creditors.
2-4 May ADB Annual Meetings (Bangkok) Regularly scheduled annual meetings f
the Asian Development Bank 25X1
4-7 May AFDB Annual Meetings Regularly scheduled annual meetings of
(Brazzaville, Congo) the African Development Bank 25X1
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KEY ISSUE
Problems in Smaller Debtors
The sheer enormity of the debt held by the major debtors - Brazil, Mexico,
Argentina, and Venezuela - has focused the majority of the international financial
community's attention on these countries, Nonetheless, the
smaller debtors' problems are just as severe if not more so. For example, based on
discussions with bankers we see several countries - including Bolivia, Peru, and possibly
Chile - as having problems that could be a sign of insolvency where extraordinary debt
relief, as in the case of Poland, would be necessary. Yet, the "sense of urgency" to assist
financially troubled countries has diminished, and the smaller debtors lack thlitical
and economic strength to draw needed attention. the o these
countries will experience considerable difficulty in satisfying external financing
requirements in 1985 and 1986. The banking community, with less exposure at stake, is
reluctant to lend more money and will be more inclined to write off loans to these
countries.
DEVELOPMENTS IN MAJOR COUNTRIES
Mexico
On 11 March Mexico's $48 billion debt rescheduling agreement was submitted to
the country's 530 bank creditors for review, seven months after the original package was
negotiated. the long delay to difficulties in working out legal
provisions to permit non-US banks to switch up to 25 percent of their total US dollar-
denominated loans to the lending country's currency. The target date for final approval
Mexico and the IMF are close to agreement on the last phase of Mexico's three-
year extended fund facility, and a letter
of intent is expected to be signed this week. The IMF team plans to prepare the final
documentation for presentation to the executive board in mid-May. Negotiations took
more than four months, and Mexican officials bowed to pressure from the Fund after
examining a confidential Mexican assessment that indicated programmed budget and
trade policies would cause the economy to stagnate and keep inflation near 60 percent,
Earlier projections had called for 4.5 percent
economic growth and inflation of 35 percent. As a result of the IMF pressure, the
government introduced new policy changes to cut public spending and reduce the money
supply, which will combat the inflation problem.
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In order to encourage exports and stem capital flight, on 5 March Mexico
increased the daily depreciation of the peso against the US dollar from 17 to 21 centavos,
and last week domestic interest rates were raised. Capital flight, estimated at some $3
billion in 1984, accelerated during the first two months of 1985 to between $500 million
and $1 billion, according to Embassy reporting. The Mexican government also began
exploring ways to encourage exports, Finance officials
recently announced that government financing for exports will increase by about 30
percent. Mexican officials also plan to allow exporters preference in securing foreign
exchange to import needed intermediate and capital goods.
Nonetheless, we believe these measures will be insufficient to substantially
improve economic performance. We judge that additional steps are politically
unacceptable before the local and gubernatorial elections in July.
Brazil
President Tancredo Neves's principal challenge when he assumes office following
his recovery from surgery will be Brazil's unresolved financial negotiations and their
associated political hazards. The IMF suspended disbursements to Brazil last month
because of the government's inability to control inflation. The bank advisory committee,
which had reached tentative agreement on the terms of a multi-year rescheduling
agreement for Brazil, also halted negotiations until a new IMF-supported program is in
place. In addition, the Paris Club will not discuss rescheduling of Brazil's debt owed to
official creditors until a Fund program is in place and Brazil is in full compliance with
the bilateral agreements signed or still to be signed under the 1983 Paris Club
agreement.
a new letter of intent would not be approved by the
IMF until mid-May at the earliest. We believe that agreement on a revised austerity
program will be reached by this summer, although Neves must convince the Fund that he
is serious about controlling inflation. Neves regards as
important the need to continue austerity in order gradually to reduce inflation, which is
running above 200 percent. Finance Minister
Dornelles probably will go before the Brazilian Congress soon to present the
administration's case for strict public-sector austerity.
An accord with the IMF should pave the way for a rescheduling of foreign bank
debt on terms similar to those negotiated by the outgoing government.
some concern that Brasilia will attempt to reopen the
negotiations and seek more favorable terms, which would further delay an agreement.
For example, Neves may insist on some form of protection against a major rise in
interest rates.
any efforts by the IMF to persuade Neves
to adopt austerity measures to bring inflation down dramatically will be rejected. Neves
fears that his acquiescence to perceived excessive retrenchment measures could cause
his coalition in Congress to unravel, making it difficult for the new administration to
obtain sufficient backing for its planned political reforms. We believe a breakdown in
negotiations with the IMF could push Neves to turn away and go without a Fund
program. We believe that Brazil probably could last until the fourth quarter of 1985
without reaching agreements with the Fund and the banks, as a result of its currently
favorable external accounts.
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Argentina
Meanwhile, recent Argentine press reports
indicate that the IMF technical team will return to Buenos Aires on 25 March to review
Argentina's performance under the stabilization program. The local press claims that the
senior Argentine economic officials who were in Washington last week convinced the IMF
to concentrate on adjustments to the 1985 targets and disregard compliance failures in
the last quarter of 1984. 25X1
Last week, however, President Alfonsin told the US
Ambassador that the IMF was taking a tough line on compliance and warned that if this
attitude persisted, it could threaten the critical bank lending package.
the major explosion at the grain port; o a is
Blanca, by threatening to reduce foreign exchange and tax earnings, had added to
Our Embassy believes that the IMF is trying to force Alfonsin to rein in budget
expenditures. Because of the slowing economy, rising unemployment, falling real wages,
and parliamentary elections that are coming in November, however, Alfonsin is under
growing pressure to boost spending. Even with some compliance waivers from the IMF,
Argentina will be very hard pressed to stay within inflation and budget targets.
REGIONAL SITUATIONS
Latin America
The Cartagena Group met last week in Brasilia and issued another communique.
Among other Latin American countries, Venezuela is hopeful of completing its public-
sector rescheduling, Chile reached preliminary agreement with the IMF on
extende " nd facility, and Peru remains at an impasse with its bank creditors.
Cartagena Group Communique
Representatives of the Cartagena Group met on 16 March in Brasilia while
attending the Brazilian presidential inauguration, according to press reporting. In a press
communique, the Cartagena Group voiced their growing concern over persistent adverse
international economic conditions that prolong painful adjustment, accentuate social
conflicts, and frustrate the expectations of the member countries. The participants
called for the Latin American governments to bring about improvement in the
international economy by working through all world forums and holding talks with
industrial governments. The communique concluded with the Cartagena Group agreeing
to continue to coordinate their views for international forums and to keep with the goals
outlined in the meetings held in Cartagena, Mar del Plata, and Santo Domingo.
Venezuela
Caracas anticipates completion this month of the necessary documentation with
bankers to conclude the rescheduling of public-sector debt. According to Embassy
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reporting, however, bankers want to give Caracas time to show greater progress in
registering private sector debt and may delay signing until July. Bankers largely cleared
the way for an agreement by dropping the demand that Venezuela provide specific
assurances of private-sector debt repayment in the rescheduling offer sheet, accepting
instead a separate statement to be issued by the Minister of Finance. The mechanics of
the currency conversion option is one matter that is still unresolved.
Chile
Santiago reached preliminary agreement with the IMF on 15 February for a 3-year
extended fund facility, although the government - faced with extensive earthquake
damage - has already asked for greater program target flexibility. The IMF will provide
$750 million that will be disbursed in 4-5 tranches per year, 2.5X1
Among the performance criteria for 1985 is a public-sector deficit target of 3.5 25X1
percent of GDP, which includes a 0.5 percentage point increase granted after the
earthquake; last year's deficit was 4.6 percent. In a show of good faith, new Finance
Minister Hernan Buchi announced a 10-percent devaluation of the peso on 1 March as the
first of several steps to encourage exports, according to press reports. Additionally,
Santiago advanced a scheduled tariff decrease from June to March. The IMF is expected
to give the program formal approval no later than 17 May. 25X1
The IMF agreement helped clear the way for the start of rescheduling talks with
commercial bank in mid-March, Chile projects 25X1
its commercial bank financing needs for the next three years at $1 billion in 1985, $700
million in 1986, and $200 million in 1987, banks will provide 25X1
only $700-900 million this year. Santiago is seeking increased lending from development
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Chile's recent earthquake has inflicted between $500-800 million in damage.
According to US Embassy reporting, the Inter-American Development Bank already has
agreed to transfer $150 million set for Chilean project loans to immediate earthquake
reconstruction efforts, and the bank plans to investigate the need for additional loans.
The World Bank also is considering transferring some loans, and Chile has asked the IMF
to consider additional help. Although these efforts will help, the amounts will not cover
the full damages. In addition, damage to its ports and road networks will hurt Santiago's
ability to import and export this year. We believe the Chilean economy, rather than
growing the 4 percent in 1985 suggested in its IMF program, actually faces more than a 4
percent drop in GDP.
Negotiations between Peru and its bank advisory committee in mid-February
ended in tacit acknowledgment that, at best, government-bank relations would remain in
a "holding pattern" until the inauguration of a new government in July, 25X1
Most bankers were not fully satisfied with Finance Minister 25X1
Garrido Lecca's package of patchwork measures - gradual increases in gasoline prices,
increased sales taxes and interest rates, and an accelerated rate of devaluation. 25X1
bankers insisted that Lima make further
payments on interest 25X1
arrearages, even if in installments.
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Peruvian officials pledged to try to
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keep arrearages below the 180-day limit. For its part, the bank advisory committee
agreed to recommend that banks maintain trade credit lines at current levels and extend
the rollover of maturities for 60 days.
Relations with bankers nonetheless remain tense. The press reports that Peru paid
$25 million on 22 February as agreed with bankers; this, however, is only half the amount
Lima needs to pay by the end of March to keep its interest arrearages - which amount to
$250 million - within the 180-day limit. Moreover, bankers refuse to discuss debt
refinancing without an IMF agreement in place. Although the first round of presidential
elections is set for next month, a runoff in June probably will be necessary, and the new
president will not be inaugurated until late July. In our judgment, this probably will
delay an IMF agreement until at least the third quarter of this year, causing arrearages
Ecuador
The general manager of the Central Bank stated last week, according to press
reporting, that over 97 percent of Ecuador's creditor banks have accepted the
commercial debt relief package in which Quito will receive $200 million in new money
and have $4.3 billion of debt restructured. With the critical mass of financing from
commercial banks in hand, the IMF Executive Board approved Ecuador's request for a
one-year standby arrangement for about $103 million. Ecuador's previous arrangement
for $157.5 million expired in July 1984. Ecuador's request for a multi-year rescheduling
of official debt is on the Paris Club calendar for the week of 22 April. We believe that
the creditors are sympathetic to some form of extended debt relief, but they will be
unwilling to restructure more than three years of payments.
Bolivia
Creditors and the Siles government implemented policy changes in late February
aimed at breaking the financial impasse, but any progress likely will be short lived.
Representatives of the World Bank, IMF, Inter-American Development Bank, Andean
Development bank, US banks, and the US government formed a coordinating committee
to deal with the Bolivian government on economic matters.
this innovative team approach should ensure that Bolivia works with all agencies instead
of only certain ones. Meanwhile, the US Embassy reports that most bankers are quietly
supportive of Bolivian financial measures taken on 26 February, which included an
increase in minimum interest rates on savings and the end of lending rate ceilings.
Although the bank advisory committee has decided not to bring legal action to declare
the Bolivian government in default, we believe debt rescheduling talks will remain
suspended until La Paz resumes interest payments and implements an IMF-supported
adjustment program. Moreover, we judge that the nationwide strike triggered by recent
austerity measures also will impede any further progress in resolving Bolivia's debt
problems.
Eastern Europe
In Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia reached agreement with the IMF on a new standby
arrangement, Poland's Paris Club negotiations were stalled because of Warsaw's failure
to pay all creditors late interest charges due on the 1981 rescheduling agreement, and
East Germany has obtained several medium-term loans.
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Yugoslavia
On 14 March the Yugoslav Federal Assembly foi finally endorsed a draft agreement
with the IMF for a 1985-86 standby credit of $300 million, opening the way for
completion of rescheduling negotiations with Western banks and governments. According
to Embassy reporting, Yugoslav Federal Secretary for Finance Klemencic characterized
the talks leading up to the agreement as hard and complex but generally consistent with
Yugoslavia's own economic policies. Perhaps in response to criticism that Yugoslavia
yielded to overly austere terms, Klemencic noted that many of the Fund's targets were
less restrictive or less binding than Belgrade's own economic resolutions adopted in late
Under the new agreement, Belgrade is to continue movement toward
establishment of positive real domestic interest rates, devaluation of the dinar to offset
inflation, and tight control over domestic credit and government expenditures, according
to Embassy reporting. The IMF, however, agreed to a new formula for computing the
inflation rate used as the basis for establishing positive real interest rates. As a result,
Belgrade will not have to raise domestic interest rates as much to meet its program
expected to take place in mid-April.
A meeting with the creditor governments is scheduled for 25 March at which time
Belgrade is expected to continue to press for a multi-year rescheduling agreement
(MYRA). Despite Belgrade's efforts, most key Western governments are expected to
remain opposed to any MYRA in 1985. A second round of meetings is scheduled for the
week of 20 May. Rescheduling talks with Yugoslavia's commercial bank -creditors are
Poland
their annual exports to Poland.
Rescheduling negotiations with the Paris Club on 4-5 March came to an impasse
because of the Polish failure to pay all creditors the late interest charges due on the
1981 rescheduling agreement, according to Embassy reporting. The creditors were
particularly surprised over Warsaw's refusal to make these payments to the West
Germans since their bilateral agreement clearly specifies a formula to calculate penalty
interest. Although many delegations were reluctant to break off talks at this stage, the
Paris Club did agree to support West Germany in its attempt to receive full payment and
the broader point that Warsaw must honor explicit terms of contracts. The Polish
negotiators decided to refer the decision on payment of late interest and penalty back to
Warsaw. Discussions with the Poles on rescheduling of 1985 debt did not take place
although general terms were discussed among the creditors. The next Paris Club meeting
is scheduled for the week of 22 April on the condition that the Poles resolve problem
of late interest payments to the satisfaction of the creditors.
Paris Club creditors continued to show no interest in offering the Poles new
credits because they view the country as "manifestly uncreditworthy". Warsaw, however,
has made it clear to creditors that Poland would be unable to meet its commitments
without new credits. According to Polish projections given to the Paris Club, Warsaw is
counting on at least $850 million in new loans from government creditors to meet the
almost $3 billion in debt service due this year. Warsaw recently requested new credit
lines from at least 13 Paris Club members-mostly in the range of 50 to 60 percent of
the West German Ministries of Economics and Finance
The Polish request for new credits has caused substantial disagreement between
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Economic Minister Bangemann hoped to reopen Polish access to Hermes guaranteed
credits for up to 100 million DM during his 21-22 March trip to Warsaw as head of the
West German-Polish Mixed Economic Commission. The Finance Ministry, however,
opposed the move ostensibly on grounds that West Germany is legally restricted by
budgetary law from renewing Polish access to these credits until rescheduling
negotiations are completed. The Finance Ministry was also worried that if Bonn relaxed
its restrictions and granted even a small amount of concessionary credit, the Poles would
apply heavy pressure on the West German government for additional credit. According
to Embassy reportin , the West Germans will not make any credit offer to the Poles at
this week's meeting.
An IMF technical team held talks with Polish officials last month as the first step
in processing Warsaw's application to join the organization, but many Western financial
experts doubt Poland will enter the Fund before yearend. The delegation-the first to
visit Warsaw officially since the United States lifted its sanction against membership-
examined Polish economic data. While finding data on the balance of payments to be
generally in line with IMF practices, the experts recommended changes in some domestic
economic calculations. Another team is scheduled to arrive in Warsaw in mid-April to
examine the current economic situation and plans to have a wide ran a contacts,
including meetings with plant managers and union officials.
East Germany
A surge of medium-term borrowing has bolstered East Germany's financial
strength, giving East German economic managers greater flexibility than they have
enjoyed in years. Since last June, East Berlin has raised about $1.4 billion in seven untied.
credits with tenors of four to seven years on increasingly favorable terms, after several
years of being excluded from the medium-term market. The last two credits - $400
million in December and $500 million this month - were increased from $150 million due
to heavy oversubscription.
We believe East Berlin probably wants most to reduce its vulnerability to any
sharp cutback in bank lending of the sort that nearly forced a liquidity crisis in 1982-83
and necessitated painful domestic adjustment measures. We expect East Germany to
seek additional medium-and long-term credits to reduce its still considerable short-term
debt. At the same time, East Berlin could be taking advantage of its improving
creditworthiness to reduce interest expenses and forge closer links with some Western
banks. Moreover, East Germany also may be positioning itself to boost imports of capital
goods to make up for the decline in investment in recent years.
Philippines
The refusal of the National Commercial Bank of Saudi Arabia (NCB) to participate
in the new money proposal for the Philippines continues to delay signing of the long-
awaited financial rescue package. The Saudis, with $155 million in Philippine exposure
including $78 million in oil credits to the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC), are
Manila's 27th largest commercial bank creditor. According to Embassy reporting, the
Saudis have refused to participate in any rescheduling effort since the first Mexico
exercise in 1982. In most of these cases, the Saudis were a small creditor and other
banks covered their contribution.
time the bank advisory committee
money - an amount too large to b
this
expected the Saudis to contribute 13 million in new
e absorbed by other creditors.
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While the Saudis have expressed their unhappiness on several points, the key to the
controvers a ears to be the bank advisory committee's method of calculating
exposure. the base used for determining a
participant's snare in the new money package includes all loans outstanding, both short-
term and long-term. This is of considerable concern to the Saudis as NCB has engaged in
a number of short-term oil deals with the PNOC.
commitments if the Saudis do not come around.
According to State Department reporting, the Saudis have
indicated that their participation would be forthcoming in an agreement that: required
less new money, established a separate trade facility for NCB, and included a clause that
allowed trade outstandings to be converted to peso equity investments. The bank
advisory committee made a provision to incorporate the third point into the rescheduling
package, but the Saudis held firm on the issue of a separate agreement. The bank
committee is scheduled to meet this week to reassess the situation. According to State
Department reporting, bankers are worried that other creditors may withdraw their
three outstanding issues: the reduction o reserve money, a appreciation of the peso,
and the inclusion of the National Food Authority and Human Settlements Development
Corporation in the list of Philippine government entities to fall under IMF monitoring.
The first review of the Philippine IMF standby arrangement began on 4 March and
should conclude this week. the review will center on
the review will be formally considered by the IMF Executive.
standby loan originally scheduled to be released in early March and late April.
oar in a e pri . the Philippines must pass the
program review to receive a $150 million disbursement of two installments of the
million in loans from the IMF.
Africa/Middle East
In Africa, Nigeria issued a second tranche of promissory notes resulting from last
April's rescheduling agreement with uninsured creditors, and Somalia obtained $53
Bank's expectations and have resulted in lengthy processing delays.
Nigeria
According to Embassy reporting, Nigeria has issued a second tranche of
promissory notes resulting from last April's agreement to reschedule $6-8 billion in
uninsured trade credits. Local bankers told the Embassy in Lagos that approximately $80
million in notes were issued late last week. The first tranche of notes, which was issued
in November 1984, totalled $258 million. According to Embassy reporting, bankers
expect the bulk of the promissory notes - another $2.5 billion - to be issued by mid-
year. Claims under the terms of the April agreement have far exceeded the Central
Head of Civil Service Longe has personally forwarded a draft
memorandum to ead of State Buhari recommending that the government accept the
economic conditions set down by the IMF. Longe and the government economists expect
Buhari to approve their recommendation before mid-April and to forward the
memorandum to the council for ratification. We believe, however, that Longe's
Talks with the IMF remain at a stalemate.
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political power base.
expectations are highly optimistic and that an agreement with the IMF is unlikely to be
reached in the near term. Nonetheless, the government remains concerned that a
decision to approach the IMF will be viewed as buckling under and could undercut its
reforms of the interest rate structure and the domestic banking system.
Somalia
In late February, the IMF approved $53 million in new loans for Somalia.
According to IMF reporting, $22 million will be drawn over the next year as part of a
standby arrangement, and $32 million became available immediately under the
compensatory financing facility. Somalia's 1985 adjustment program involves major
Earlier this month, Somalia met with its Paris Club creditors. According to
Embassy reporting, a $20 million discrepancy in debt estimates and a misunderstanding
on interest payments nearly caused the negotiations to collapse. An agreement,
however, was reached calling for 95 percent of principal, interest, and arrearages to be
rescheduled over a 9-year period including five years of grace. The remaining 5 percent
downpayment will be spread over the grace period. The Paris Club expects negotiations
with bilateral creditors to be concluded by 30 June. In the meantime, the Somalis will
make minimum monthly payments of $200,000 into a special account; the monthly
payments will be recalculated once the terms of the bilateral reschedulings are
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SUBJECT: International Financial Situation Report #38F--]21 March 1985
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Sec. James Baker Treasury
R. G. Darman
Beryl Sprinkel
James W. Conrow
Robert Cornell
Charles Dallara
Charles Schotta
James A. Griffin
Doug Mulholland
Manuel Johnson
David Mulford
Sec. George Shultz State
Kenneth Dam
Morton I. Abramowitz
Michael Armacost
Ralph Lindstrom
W. Allen Wallis
Langhorne MDtley
Richard Burt
Richard McCormack
Chester Crocker
Paul Wolfowitz
Richard Murphy
J.C. Kornblum
Byron Jackson Cunnerce
Lionel Olmer
Roger Robinson
Douglas McMinn
David Wigg
Randall Fort
Leo Cherne
DC;I
ExDir
SA/IDCI
DDI
ADDI
Ch/PES/IDI
NIO Economics
EDO
Ch/DDO/EPOS--
Ch /DDO~
Ch/DDO/AF
Ch/DDO/EA
Ch/DDO/EUR
Ch/DDO/LA
NSA
it
NSC
PFIAB
PFIAB
OSD (ISA)
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64-65
66
Ch/LOO/NE
Ch/DDO/SE
IAD/OCD/PEL
D/ALA
Ch/ALA/SAD/R
D/OEA
D/EURA
Ch/EURA/EE/EW
D/SOYA
D/NFSA
ID/OGI, D/OGI
Ch/OGI/SRD
Ch/OGI/ISID
Ch/OGI/TNAD
Ch/OGI/BCD
Ch/OGI/ECD/FI
67 CPAS/ISS/SA/DA
68 Ch/OGI/Pub
69-76 OGI/Pub
OGI /OD 25X1
1 - Edwin Truman, Federal Reserve Board
1 - Henry Wallich, Federal Reserve Board
1 - David Roberts, Federal Reserve,
New York
1 - Leo Cherne, PFIAB, New York
1 - E. Gerald Corrigan, President,
Federal Reserve Bank, New York
1 - Alan Greenspan,
Townsend, Greenspan and Co.
2 - Doug Mulholland, Treasury 25X1
1 - Richard Combs, State
1 - Lauralee Peters, State
1 - Peter W. Rodman, State
1 - J.D.Bindenagel, State, (for pass to
Ambassador Arthur Burns)
5 - Byron Jackson, Cammerce
1 - Warren E. Farb, Canmerce
1 - DIA
1 -
1 -
eve Farrar,
William Isaac, Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation
1. - IG)
1 - Ch/ECD
1- Ch/E?/FI
1 - Ch/ECD/T
1 - Ch/ECD/DI
1 - Ch/ECD/CM
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/11: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000304090001-0