LATE STAGE INDICATORS OF INSURGENT SUCCESS: A SALVADORAN UPDATE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000303920001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 26, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 8, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Centra Intelligence y
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
8 February 1985
Late Stage Indicators of Insurgent Success:
A Salvadoran Update
Summary
Based on a reapplication of the late stage indicators to the
Salvadoran insurgency, we believe the government's situation has
generally improved since we first applied the indicators in March
1983. The progress of the Magana and Duarte administrations has
been slow but steady in three of the four major categories used
to measure insurgent success. Evidence of improved government
performance has resulted in increased confidence In government
capabilities with respect to 9 of the 14 indicators we
examined. Two indicators--lack of sufficient government troops
for counterinsurgency and the recent coup plotting by some
military elements--give the extreme left some opportunities';
nevertheless, this is down from four indicators in 1983.
To be sure, the guerrillas remain a formidable enemy.
Despite continuing ideological disagreements, personalistic
differences among their leaders and frequent lapses in tactical
coordination, the five armed guerrilla factions are still able to
mount fairly large military operations and continue to dictate
the terms of most insurgent-government military confrontations.
Furthermore, guerrilla leaders have to be encouraged by Duarte's
recent collisions with the armed forces and the Constituent
Assembly which underscore the fragility of his whole
administration. On balance however, the positive changes over
nearly two years lend credence to the view tha_ttime is
increasingly on the side of the government.
This memorandum was prepared byl J Insurgency
Branch, Office of Global Issues. Support was provided by the
Office of African and Latin American Analysis and the Directorate
of Operations. Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Instability and Insurgency Center, on
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Application of Indicators to the Insurgency,
I. Progressive withdrawal of domestic support for the government
Withdrawal of support by specific, critical segments of population
Growing popular perception of regime illegitimacy
Popular perception of insurgents as leading nationalists
Insurgent co-optation, incorporation, or elimination of other major opposition groups
to the government
II. Progressive withdrawal of international support for the government
Withdrawal of foreign support by specific, critical allies
Increasing international support for the insurgents
III. Progressive loss of government control over population and territory
Significant expansion of territory under insurgent control
Escalation of guerrilla/terrorist violence
Increasing inability of government to protect supporters/officials from attacks
IV. Progressive loss of government coercive power
Military plots or coups against the government
Armed guerrilla forces multiplying in size
Lack of sufficient government troops for counterinsurgency
Government seriously negotiates sharing of power with rebels
Confidence level of judgements:
High-strong or abundant evidence; data overwhelmingly supports
judgement.
=Medium-adequate evidence; contrasting information or conflicting
trends may exist, but bulk of data supports judgement.
Low-weak or insufficient evidence; although data supports
judgements, there is significant conflicting information or evidence
opposing trends.
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
E
No
Yesn
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
b The involvement of key military officers in the reported coup plotting of
December 1984-January 1985 remains enigmatic and may have been
intended primarily to signal Duarte of the institution's desire to preserve its
prerogatives. In this light, the plotting may have been no more serious than
efforts made in the 1982-83 time frame.
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Late Stage Indicators of Insurgent Success
An analysis of historical cases indicates that a common
pattern of behavior and events characterizes the defeat of a
government battling an insurgency. This pattern comprises four
categories of developments:
o Progressive withdrawal of domestic support for the
government.
o Progressive withdrawal of international support for the
government.
o , Progcessive loss of government control over population
and territory.
o Progressive loss of government coercive power.
These categories include a total of 14 interrelated and mutually
reinforcing indicators of prospective insurgent victory (see
chart). Historically, the indicators have not appeared in any
single order. Moreover, while no single indicator can be
considered conclusive evidence of insurgent victory, all
indicators need not be present for a government defeat to be in
progress. While the indicators are designed to identify a
progression of events typical of the final stages of a successful
insurgency, this progression is not inevitable. Effective
government countermeasures can block the evolution of an
insurgency and shift its momentum. This, combined with some
important insurgent failures, is precisely what we believe has
happened in El Salvador since we last applied these Late Stage
Domestic Support for the Government
the
Salvadoran government gained in popular support under both Magana
and Duarte while support for the guerrillas may now be at an all-
time low. Evidence for this judgment has been considerable
during the past year and emerges from every strata of Salvadoran
society. On the basis of this reporting, we concur with US
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election would probably only garner 5 to 10 percent of the
Embassy estimates of last summer indicating that a political 25X1
party representing the FMLN or acting as its front in a national
We believe the increase in domestic support for the
government has in part been the result of several government
efforts.
o The government, along with the military, has worked hard
to build upon the socio-economic reforms of 1980 and
continues to demonstrate its genuine commitment to the
democratic process. The 1982 electoral repudiation of
the insurgents was repeated again this past spring as
more than 80% of El Salvador's electorate risked
guerrilla harassment and sabotoge to cast ballots. On
the other hand, overt political support for the
guerrillas has almost disappeared because of several
factors, including guerrilla tactical reversals and the
improved human rights situation.
o The Duarte regime has demonstrated its willingness to
take risks and instigate bold initiatives to increase
its popular appeal. The recent olive branch offered the
guerrillas by opening a dialogue is but one example.
o Although the payoff has been gradual, nearly 600,000
camoesinos have now benefitted from agrarian reform.
Moreover, programs like the National Campaign Plan--
although only a partial success--and the new Civilian
tin
Self-defense Corps h e beo, ":~ stimulate local
community spirit.
We also believe the government has, in the past year,
benefitted significantly from the insurgents' increasing reliance
on intimidation and economic targetting. Large numbers of rural
poor continue to be the daily victims of roving bands of
guerrillas. "War taxes" are collected at gunpoint along the
major highways, while numerous small towns and farms have been
attacked or overrun with foodstuffs and other basic necessities
expropriated. Popular discontent with the FMLN may have reached
its height last year when, according to US Embassy and Salvadoran
officials, guerrillas forcibly recruited nearly 3.000 people,
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International Support for the Government
The government's standin in the nity has
also improved. last
spring's succes u presidential election coupled with President
Duarte's solid diplomatic performance during his travels to
Europe, the United States, and South America have resulted in a
significant dropoff in levels of political and financial aid to
the insurgency from several international donors, r)artiniilArl 'n
Western Europe,
We believe a heightened
guerrilla propaganda campaign for much of 1984--designed to
undermine the international support for the government--
accomplished little, while a more mobile and more aggressive
Salvadoran military was able to blunt or turn back a number of
large and intermediate-sized insurgent attacks.
Cuba and Nicaragua remain the principal supporters ano
conduits of resupply to the five armed truerrilla ctions.
there are
periodic lapses in the Havana-Managua pipeline--arms, ammunition,
r
i
i
f
p
ov
s
ons,
unds, etc.--which, in addition to more aggressive
government operations, help explain the relatively limited FMLN
operations of the past year.
Government Control Over Population and Territory
The government's position has improved the most during the
past year with respect to its political-military control over the
population and territory. In part, we believe this improvement
has been a result of the insurgents' inability to provide
security for the population in-areas they occupy and their
failure to offer viable alternatives to the government's economic
we estimate that roughly three-quarters of all
guerrilla ammunition needs and substantial amounts of basic
necessities are funneled through the Havana-Managua pipeline.
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and social programs. However, the government has become
increasingly active and is responsible for many of its own gains.
0 Increasingly aggressive military tactics no longer
concede any base areas to the guerrillas. For example,
the traditional insurgent stronghold north of the Torola
river was attacked and occupied by government troops on
several occasions during 1984 and early 1985.
o President Duarte has placed considerable emphasis on
human rights. Strict new bombing guidelines for the
Salvadoran Air Force and a major restructuring of the
Public Security force have, in the words of one of the
country's leading intellectuals, "markedly decreased the
climate of repression."
o Peace has also returned to the country's universities,
formerly the center of leftist organizing. The
country's largest--the University of El Salvador--
reopened in September after a four-year closure.
o The government has worked hard to ease the burden of
some 500,000 people internally displaced by the war.
About 75 percent of all displaced persons nationwide
receive at least some good clothing and medical
assistance from a national government commission, while
the remainder receive comparable benefits from private
voluntary organizations like the Catholic Church and the
International Red Cross.
o The government has tried its hand--with limited success-
-at rebuilding in several war torn areas. In San
Vicente and Usulutan where the National Campaign is
underway, several towns have been rebuilt, numerous
roads have been resurfaced and a large number of schools
and medi
l f
i
ca
ac
lities have been reopened.
During this year's election, insurgent forces were able to
prevent voting in 53 towns--approximately 20 percent of the
national municipalities. However, in 10 of the 53 towns people
were able to take advantage of alternate voting facilities in
neighboring villages while most of the other towns--traditional
"backwaters" virtually devoid of the country's major cash crops
or other strategic resources--have largely been abandoned. In
Chalatenan
o
d
g
an
northern Morazan, where about three-fifths of
the nonvoting towns are located, aerial photography confirms a
landsca
e of d
t
p
es
royed and vacant villages.
The guerrillas' ability to attack the country's economic
infrastructure remains a potent weapon. Only heavy infusions of
US aid have kept the economy from deteriorating further. From
the government's perspective, however, there may be some hope.
Following a 25 percent decline in GDP in the first three years of
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the insurgency, real economic!' growth has remained flat for the
past two years.
Government Coercive Power
Our estimates of total guerrilla force strength have
remained in the 9,000 to 11,000 range for several years. The
FMLN attempted to bolster its ranks throw h forced rpo itment
during this past summer hilt
a comparable numb r
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LJ/~ I
including numerous experienced combat veter
-_d
s
l
ans
e
erted
duri
n
the same time. A little over a year ago we did revise our g 25X1
estimate of well-armed, well-trained, combat experienced 25X1
uerri 1 la
-- f
/ nnn w .. ... _
g
s
rom
strategy designed to integrate insurgent militiaaintoecombatrll>a
units. We have seen no evidence, however, which would lead us to
similarily revise our estimate of overall guerrilla force
stren
th
g
Concurrently, the Salvadoran military and security forces
have grown dramatically, from approximately 32,000 in mid-1983 to
about 45,000 today. Moreover, increasingly aggressive tactics by
the Salvadoran army, including psychological operations and
closer coordination between air and ground units, have kept the
e ieve the transition of the
Salvadoran military into an effective counterinsurgency force
is
still underway and remains dependent on continued improvement in
leadership capabilities and obtaini force levels needed to
saturate the countryside.
The Salvadoran military appears to have grown accustomed if
not comfortable with its new relationship to civilian
authority. We base this judgement on the general pattern of
behavior within the Defense estahl;ch silt over several ears
series of
uncharacteristic tactical errors by President Duarte at the close
of 1984, however, has deeply strained the president's relations
with the military. Duarte inadvertently reinforced fears among
the top brass that h
ill
e w
usurp instittil
uona prerogatives,
es~eeial ly by inter.......
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Duarte's current position with civilian authorities is no
less stressful. Angered legislators have fiercely challenged
Duarte's efforts to exercise a partial veto of the electoral law
and appear to be supported by the majority of the cabinet
Despite the challenges to Duarte's authority during the past
month, we believe there is little immediate threat of a coup.
Nevertheless, extreme and moderate forces on the right, both
civilian and military, have found some important issues to rally
around. Duarte can sur i e this crisis but he will have to move
cautiously.
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SUBJECT: Late Stage Indicators of Insurgent Success:
A Salvadoran Update
OGI/IIC/I
Distribution:
1 - The Honorable Thomas
El Salvador
1 - SA/DDCI
1 - Executive Director
1 - DDI
1 - DDI/PES
1 - NIO/LA
1 - CPAS/ISS
1 - D/OGI, DD/OGI
1 - OGI/PG/Ch
8 - OGI/EXS/PG
1 - C/OGI/IIC
1 - C/OGI/IIC I
1 - OGI/IIC/I
1 - Chrono
(8 February 1985)
R. Pickering, Ambassador to
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