THE KURDISH INSURGENCY IN TURKEY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000303280001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 26, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 26, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Cen IntdiI nce Agency
This said, however, Kurdish extremism remains
likely to pose a threat to Turkish and possibly US
interests in Turkey over the next several years.
The threat is most likely to take the form of
terrorist attacks against Turkish politicians,
local government and security officials and
installations, US military and contractor
of southeastern Turkey.
26 August 1985
The Kurdish Insurgency in Turkey
Summary
Kurdish extremists appear to have faltered in
their effort to create a classic rural insurgency
in Turkey's southeastern provinces over the past
year. The Turkish government's military and civil
response to the attempted insurgency appears to be
effective, factionalism has weakened the
insurgents, and crucial sources of foreign
support--especially from Iraqi Kurdish leader
Barzani--have proved fickle. At this stage, the
campaign initiated by the extremists, a group
called the Kurdish Workers Party, appears to have
degenerated into a combination of terrorism,
banditry, and blood-feuding. As such, it does not
pose a threat to the Turkish government's control
This paper was prepared by Western Europe Division, Office of
European Analysis. Questions and comments are welcome and may be addressed to
John McLau
hli
Ch
g
n,
ief, Western Europe Divison,
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personnel, and local Turkish petroleum
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A History of Kurdish Violence
The phenomenon of Kurdish insurgency is not new. In the
1920s and 1930s, the new Turkish Republican Government in Ankara
suppressed four separate Kurdish rebellions with military force,
including the bombing of villages. Kurdish rebelliousness was
fed by the hostility of devout Kurdish tribesmen to the secular
republic and the resentment of traditionally autonomous tribal
leaders of the encroachments of the central government. After a
hiatus of almost four decades, Kurdish violence reemerged as a
serious problem in the 1970s, this time inspired by foreign
models and Marxist doctrines. 25X1
Ankara's Kurdish Solution
Modern Turkish governments have attempted to assimilate the
Kurds by suppressing their cultural identity and theoretically
offering equal opportunity. The teaching of the Kurdish language
and literature is forbidden, and the use of the language in
government offices and courts is prohibited. The very existence
of the Kurds as a separate ethnic group is denied--officially
they are "mountain Turks." On the other hand, there are no
formal barriers to the advancement of assimilated Kurds, and
Turkish officials can cite the examples of individual Kurds who
have been highly successful in business and professional life.
In practice, opportunity and reward have been the province
of select groups. Kurdish elites have been rewarded for their
renunciation of nationalism by assimilation into Turkish
society--often at a high socio-economic level. Local political
power has been portioned out on a tribal basis. The strongest
tribe in a province invariably controls the strongest political
party. Urbanization and modernization have contributed to the
Government's assimilation efforts by breaking down tribal
structures. Many Kurdish youth born of parents who have moved to
the large cities in the west of Turkey never learn to speak
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The rise of militant Kurdish autonomy movements in Iran and
Iraq--particularly the struggle of the conservative Iraqi Kurdish
leader Mullah Mustafa Barzani--aroused widespread sympathy and
support among Turkish Kurds, and contributed to the reappearance
of unrest among them in the 1960s. The violent movements that
surfaced in the 1970s, however, were the creation of leftist
university students and assimilated professionals and owed more
to Marxism than traditional tribal attitudes.
The first separatist groups to appear advocated autonomy
for a Turkish "Kurdistan" in federation with a socialist
or communist Turkish state.
Many other Kurds became directly involved with the
mainstream of Turkish terrorism; they probably did not
comprise a ma'orit in these groups
but they clearly were eavi y
represented in them.
The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980 lent new impetus
to the Kurdish autonomy movement in Turkey. Both combatants
attempted to weaken their enemy by aiding Kurdish dissidents.
Extremist Kurds in Turkey benefitted from the burgeoning arms
flow to Iraqi and Iranian Kurds and from the inability of Iran
and Iraq to police their mountainous borders with Turkey. Iran's
use of Iraqi Kurdish fighters to spearhead a spring 1983
offensive into northern Iraq created something of a safehaven for
Kurdish extremists operating against Turkey and allowed them to
launch an insurgency last fall.
Recent Developments
Over the past year, Kurdish extremists have carried out
series of violent operations in southeastern Turkey
t e violence was part of a plan t
des-i;abllize Turke-yes--predomtwantly-K-urdish-sout-heast.
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The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK)
The PKK is the first significant terrorist group to put
Kurdish independence above the goal of a "classless" society in
Turkey. Before the military takeover of 1980, the PKK was active
in the Kurdish neighborhoods of Ankara and Izmir and in Turkey's
rural and impoverished southeast. The PKK has some support in
the Kurdish migrant community in Europe, especially in West
Germany. Other PKK members were forced into exile elsewhere in
Western Europe and in the Middle East after the 1980 military
takeover. It was widely regarded as the most violent of all
Kurdish separatist groups in Turkey.
The PKK is bitterly opposed to more Marxist Kurdish groups,
such as the Union of the Left, a coalition of Kurdish and leftist
groups reportedly backed by the Turkish Communist Party. PKK
attacks against this and other rival groups increased markedly
after the PKK insurgency effort in Turkey ran into problems last
The PKK appears to have links with the Kurdish tribal power
structure in the east and rival leftists have accused it of being
little more than a hit squad.
The resurgence of the PKK, which had been disrupted by the
military takeover of September 1980, appears to be in large part
the result of support from Iraqi Kurds. Although details are
unclear, the PKK appears to have come to an agreement with Iraqi
Kurdish dissident leader Masoud Barzani in 1983 to use territor
under his control as a base for attacks into Turkey.
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Foreign Support
as operated f territory
controlled by
Barzani, there is no evidence th
rom at hehasrovidd are aunt
of material and weapons assistance. Instead, iteisllikelymthats
Barzani or some of his allies have provided training to PKK
members in return for their occasional assistance as arms
smugglers and guerrillas. A reported link between the PKK and
the Iranian-supported Kurdish Islamic Party (Hizbi-Islami), an
ally of Barzani, may consist of such a training-for-fighters
exchange. The PKK's secularism is not ideologically palatable to
the Khomeini-sponsored Hizbi-Islami however, and their alliance 25X1
will probably not hp vorw I- 14.._,
Although the PKK h
Libya also has sparked Ankara's suspicion by its frequent
pronouncements of solidarity with the "oppressed peoples of
Kurdistan," most recently in mid-April. The Libyans have denied
involvement, but some of the aid they provide Barzani and the
Palestinians probably "trickles down" to Turkish groups. In
addition, Libyan leader Qadhafi strongly supports the Kurdish
Islamic Party, Hizbi Islami with which the PKK reportedly has
cooperated. F_ 7
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Guerrilla Attacks
In
"Hezzen
composed
the summer of 1984 the PKK formed a guerrilla unit called
Rizgariye Kurdistan" (HRK)--Kurdistan Liberation Unit--
of PKK members, members of other Kurdish and leftist
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the goal of the HRK was to 25X1
carry out "armed propaganda" among Turkish Kurds and eventually
undermine Turkish control of the Kurdish areas. 25X1
The HRK began its campaign on 15 August 1984 with
coordinated attacks against "Jandarma"* posts in township centers
in Siirt and Hakkari provinces. Since that time, according to
press reports the insurgents have 25X1
clashed over thirty times with Turkish security forces; the
clashes claimed the lives of 56 Turkish soldiers. About 97 25X1
insurgents have died as a result of these operations --,:: 25X1
The insurgents appear to have
tried to ally with tribes having close family connections with
tribes in Syria and Iraq, so as best to exploit a primitive
logistics net reaching from Turkey to safehavens across the
Tactics have included direct assaults on Jandarma posts,
ambushes of military vehicles, strafing of Jandarma posts to draw
soldiers into ambushes, the murder of suspected informants and
collaborators, attacks on local Kurdish politicians, and at least
one rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) attack against a "loyalist"
village.
*' an arms" are paramilitary units formally subordinate to the Ministry of
Interior, but under Turkish General Staff control during states of emergency or
war, and fiave the role of police in rural Turkey.
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The Stalled Insurgency
As a result of a concerted Turkish Government response,
factionalism within the movement, and an apparent weakening of
the PKK's alliance with Barzani, the insurgency appeared to have
run aground by spring. A large-scale renewal of rebel attacks
the Jandarma had anticipated in late March or April did not
occur. In the past three months, we have had few reports of an
insurgent-initiated attack. Recently there have been reports of
sporadic attacks by insurgents against security forces and groups
of foreigners in the area of Mt. Ararat. No foreigner has been
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killed j +t,
Government Response
By October 1984, the central government had developed a 25X1
concerted strategy of military and civic action to meet the
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04
ieve Turkish forces probably have m
a
a several small-scale
incursions into Iraq in the past year; one clash with insurgents
reportedly occurred on the ragi side of the border near
Sh i rwan .
Reports of a series of firefights in late April and May
suggested that a long-rumored sweep operation, perhaps on a
large-scale, was underway. These operations may have complicated
the insurgents' efforts by interdicting lines of communication
between refuge areas in Iraq and target reas in Turkey.
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argely r a-motivated actions
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reports of the possible
formation of a new light infantry division in t e southeast, but
we do not have information confirming this step.
We believe the amount of Turkish military resources
committed so far to the anti-Kurdish effort is not significant
enough to affect Turkey's ability to fulfill its NATO
responsibilities. Most troops involved probably are Jandarma,
which would only provide indirect support to NATO. It is
probably true, however, that the insurgency effort has drawn down
Turkey's already limited capabilities in certain fields critical
to the counter-insurgency effort but marginal with regard to
Turkey's NATO responsibilities. For example,
reports that as of mid-May, almost all of Turkey s helicopters
had been devoted to counter-insurgency operations in support of a
major "sweep."
Ankara also has undertaken civic action programs in the area
of military operations, including the distribution of weapons to
"loyal" villages.
According to press reports and US
consulate officials in Adana, civilian administrators have
continued to emphasize the socio-economic development programs
for the southeast initiated by Prime Minister Turgut Ozal.
Although the results of such programs will not be seen for a
decade, the government's emphasis on economic development, not
merely security, is probably a welcome change for many locals.
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Finally, the Jandarma--at first ill-trained and poorl
equipped--is now performing better.
indication that the tide is
turning in favor of the Jandarma is that insurgents are
surrendering to security forces conducting sweeps, rather than
fiahtina to the death, as was the case earlier in the campaign
.
Factionalism
Factionalism within the movement has also reatly weakened
the insurgency.
for the indefinite future
Kurdish extremists will be spending more time struggling against
one another than fighting the Turkish Government.
In addition to defections and opposition from leftist
Kurdish groups, the PKK may also be faced with opposition from
conservative Kurds who believe the PKK is still too leftist
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Declining Support
Finally, foreign support--instrumental in the PKK's early
successes--may have weakened.*
Evidence of Soviet aid for Kurdish extremists in Turkey is
sketchy at best. The Soviet connection to Kurdish extremism
seems to exist only at fourth remove--for example, Kurdish
trainees in Palestinian camps under Syrian auspices reportedly
receive training on Soviet weaponry. It is not implausible that
some Turkish Kurds have come into contact with Soviet trainers on
an individual basis. It is extremely doubtful, however, that the
Soviets have aided the PKK as an organization. In fact, we
believe the USSR almost certainly has good reason to steer clear
of armed Kurdish activism:
*The Barzani family has a history of betraying--in some cases, murdering--
erstwhile allies in Turkey when their activities risk bringing down the wrath of
the Turkish Army on Iraqi Kurdistan. Even Masoud Barzani, whose sometime
collaboration with the PKK -departs from his father's restraint, realizes he has a
strong self-interest in preventing the misuse of his territory by Turkish
Kurds.
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-- Such involvement would weaken Iraq, which has benefitted
from substantial Soviet arms aid;
-- Kurdish movements are unpredictable and wildly unorthodox
in ideological views.
Outlook: A Proto-Insurgency Reverts to Terrorism
If, as seems likely, the Turks continue to thwart PKK
efforts to stir up an insurgency in the southeast, we believe
violent Kurdish activism will revert to a pattern of terrorism
and internecine struggle. A more remote but nonetheless real
possibility is that US personnel and facilities will also become
Kurdish targets.
Kurdish groups in Turkey do not have a history of targeting
US personnel and facilities. Their targets have been symbols of
the central government's presence--especially military and police
installations and provincial government buildings. However, PKK
literature asserts that US and NATO facilities are "props" to the
"colonialist" regime in Ankara, suggesting possible ideological
groundwork for attacks against NATO and US targets. The PKK,
moreover, models itself on the PLO and Armenian terrorist groups
and undertakes violence purely for psychological effect. The
murder of US personnel in the area could make the symbolic point
that the "colonialist" regime is not capable of protecting its
collaborators. Iraqi Kurds--whom the PKK emulates--also have a
history of kidnapping and sometimes killing foreigners to put
pressure on the Baghdad government.
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the Turkish Government is concerned at present
that the PKK and other Kurdish organizations will be
strengthened by Syrian and Libyan plans to exploit Kurdish
activism for their own aims. Although Turkish fears of a
large-scale Syrian and Libyan effort to aid Turkish Kurds
are probably unrealistic, at least some of the aid the two
governments provide to Iraqi Kurdish and Palestinian
clients is bound to "trickle down" to small-time groups
such as the PKK. Libya or Syria might eventually turn to
th
e PKK to operate against rival Palestinian, Israeli.
Iraqi, and US targets in Turkey.
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SUBJECT: The Kurdish Insurgency in Turkey
Distribution:
External
Copy 1
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Diana Smith, Dept. of State
Ambassador Robert Oakley, Dept. of State
William Rope, Dept. of State
Robert Dean, Dept. of State
Henry Myers, Dept. of State/INR
Richard Thurman, Dept. of State/INR
Peter Sommer, NSC
Ronald S. Lauder, Dept. of Defense
Internal
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Cys 15-16
Cys 17-20
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EURA/WE/IAB
DDI
ADDI
NIO/WE
NIO/NESA
NIO/W
D/EURA
EURA Production Staff
IMC/CB
C/PES
NESA/PG/I
WE/IAB Production File
C/WE
SOVA/SIG/SF/O
(23 August 1985)
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