FRANCE-AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000202870001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 28, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 15, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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'Qc- 2,87
15 May 1985
France-Afghanistan
Summary
French support for the resistance grows out of strong anti-
Soviet feelings within President Mitterrand's ruling
Socialist Party, public opposition to Soviet aggression
We believe that French
France has provided humanitarian aidl since 1984
to the Afghan insurgents.
economic ai to the insurgency is likely to
remain modest because of budgetary constraints.
State Dept. review completed
This t
Analysis.
Questions and comments may be addressed to the Chief, Western European
Division, a
EUR M85-10095
Central Intelligence Agency
Wishingon. D.C 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
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Humanitarian Aid
Paris has contributed to several private organizations -- including the
well-known Medecins Sans Frontieres group -- that send European medical and
relief personnel inside Afghanistan to aid insurgents and civilians. These
organizations, run for the most part by French civilians, have sent more than
200 young Europeans, many of whom are French, into Afghanistan. Fifteen
Europeans are currently inside the country,
ese vo un eers
provide the best medical care available to rural Afghans; they often perform
major surgery, establish innoculation programs, treat lesser illnesses, and
train Afgahan paramedics.
Beyond its medical efforts, France has also funded Afghan refugee
programs. Paris has donated about 15,000 tons of wheat and has encouraged the
Common Market to increase its shipments of butter and oil durina 4- e last
several years, according to the US Embassy in Paris
France's Socialist Party has also lent support to efforts to publicize
PS officials are organizing a conference of European Socialist Parties for
late-June, tentatively entitled "The European Left and Afghanistan." This
effort is almost certainly an attempt to compensate for the PS's failure to
persuade the Socialist International to issue a statement in 1984 supporting
the cause of the Afghan insurgents.
the Afghan resistance.
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STAT
Behind the French Support
The government's support for the Afghan resistance stems largely from
President Mitterrand's generally anti-Soviet views and strong opposition
within his Socialist Party to Soviet adventurism. Mitterrand believes the
expansion of Soviet influence is the gravest threat to the development of the
Third World and to international stability,
he views the Soviet occupation of g ants an as a particularly
b utaf manifestation of Soviet expansionism. Mitterrand's own participation
in the French Resistance during World War II, we believe, may also contribute
to a personal affinity with the Afghan cause
Longstanding French scholarly interest in Afghanistan has also spurred
French support for the insurgents, most importantly by arousing opposition to
Soviet actions within influential intellectural circles. A number of well-
known French intellectuals -- especially the anthropologist Oliver Roy -- are
outspoken backers of the resistance and travel frequently to Afghanistan to
report on the state of the insurgency. There are also a large number of
French journals covering Afghanistan -- Les Nouvelles Afghanistan is the most
prominent -- and the insurgency receives an in-depth and almost universally
sympathethic coverage in most major French dailies.
Outlook
Although French diplomatic support for the resistance will remain strong,
Mitterrand is unlikely to increase aid to the Afghans significantly. Domestic
economic constraints have forced sharp reductions
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Most importantly, French aid is constrained by the panuity of
direct French interest in Afghan affairs; lacking commercial or longstanding
cultural ties -- such as exist in Africa, for example -- a more active French
role in support of the Afghans is unlikely. The influence of those who would
support increased aid to the insurgents is, moreover, probably counter-
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balanced by the views of long-time Mitterrand confident end new Foreign
Minister, Roland Dumas. Dumas believes that Afghanistan is not a major
problem for the Soviets and that, in any event, France can do little to help
the resistance succeed against Moscow's superior strength,
Paris also probably assumes the US will play the major role in assistance
programs and can be counted on to take up any slack. French officials decided
recently not to mount a major food aid program in 1985, for example, because
they believe US assistance will meet current needs, according to the US
Embassy.
The French right, which stands a good chance of winning control of the
National Assembly in 1986 and the presidency in 1988, is unlikely to boost
French aid substantially. Although some conservatives would almost certainly
favor a larger role and some, such as Centrist leader Francois Leotard, have
taken a strong personal interest in the insurgency, the right will probably be
restrained by the same fiscal considerations as the Socialists.
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Appendix
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Distribution:
Original
DDI
ADDI
NIO/WE
OD/EURA
EURA Production Staff
IMC/CB
WE /CM
WE Division
Author
EURA/WE/IA 15 May 85
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