THE DOUBLE NINE COUP: WHAT NEXT FOR THAILAND?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000202080001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 26, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 6, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/17: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000202080001-4
CIO
,C,O
10
'CIO
0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/17: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000202080001-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/17: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000202080001-4
Central Intelligence Agency
Nhshington. D. C.20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
/Pt
6 November 1985
The Double Nine Coup: What Next for Thailand?
Summary
Prime Minister Prem's political position has
been shaken by September's coup attempt, but we
think he can succeed in putting the revolt behind
him. Prem will be helped by his political rivals'
lack of standing and his demonstrated ability to
overcome political setbacks. In addition, Prem's
military backers, Army Chief of Staff Chavalit and
the senior officers from Class Five, are in an even
stronger position. since the annual military
promotions took effect last month.
If Thailand's economic difficulties intensify
over the next several months, however, Prem runs the
risk of losing his military supporters--particularly
if public disorder results from increased
unemployment.
Picking up the Pieces
Since mid-September, Prem has moved quickly to repair
Thailand's international image. Over the opposi-tion of some of
his advisers--who believed the- domestic situation was still
unsettled--the Prime Minister went ahead with his trip to the
United States and Western Europe to demonstrate his confidence in
This memorandum was prepared byl (Office of East 25X1
Asian Analysis. Information available. as of 30 October 1985 was
used in its preparation. Comments and queries are welcome and
may be directed to Chief, Southeast Asia Division, OEA, on 25X1
25X1
85-10199 25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/17: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000202080001-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/17: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000202080001-4
the stability of his government. Bangkok has also tried to ease
embarrassment about the death of two Western newsmen during the
coup by claiming that the shooting was accidental.
Prem has moved cautiously, however, to counteract the
domestic effects of the coup attempt. US diplomats report that
the Defense Ministry has begun to transfer junior and midlevel
military officers out of units that participated in the coup,
under cover of the annual promotion cycle in October. Prem has
also quietly abolished the post of deputy supreme commander--a
do-nothing office for senior representatives from each service--
because the three incumbents have all been implicated to varying
degrees in last month's revolt. In the Cabinet, Prem has done
the minimum to demonstrate that he is in control--replacing only
three Cabinet ministers from former Prime Minister Kriangsak's
Meanwhile, Prem has been carrying through on his promise,
made after the coup collapsed, of a complete investigation. By
the end of October, about 40 people--including Kriangsak, and a
deputy supreme commander--had been officially indicted on charges
of sedition. But the alleged mastermind
behind the coup, former Colonel Manun, remains at large through
official connivance--after an Air Force plane took him to
Singapore, he flew on to West Germany.
2.5X1
25X1
Winners and Losers
In reviewing the incident, government and senior military
spokesmen have been repeatedly emphasizing that the Constitution,
not a coup, offered the best means of solving national
problems. The US Embassy suggests that such statements may boost
the prestige of the parliamentary system. Some media
commentaries have also argued that the length of- time since the
fast successful coup--which took place eight years ago--means
that the parliamentary system is beginning to put down roots. 25X1
We view the coup attempt in a far more ambiguous light.
Parliament and civilian politicians were completely left out of
the struggle between the two military groups. On the other hand,
the revolt and its aftermath underscored the fragmentation within
the officer corps that has hampered recent political activism by
the military. Although the constitutional regime won this
battle, we think that the form of the political system and the
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/17: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000202080001-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/17: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000202080001-4
division of responsibility among the military and civilians will
continue to be contested.* 25X1
In our judgment, certain individuals emerged from the revolt
with their positions substantially strengthened. Our list of big
winners includes:
Army Chief of Staff Chavalit--the mastermind behind the
revolt's failure. Although he has avoided drawing public
attention to his role during the coup attempt, we suspect
Chavalit will privately use the additional political
capital he has acquired to further his military and
political aspirations. Chavalit may hope that his role in
suppressing the revolt will earn King Bhumipol's favor
Officers from Class Five of the military academy, who
helped Chavalit monitor the plotters and who contributed
their backing to loyalist forces. These officers--who
graduated in 1958--are the most powerful Army faction
today, according to US diplomats. As a reward for their
previous support of the Prime Minister in 1981, when they
were instrumental in crushing the previous coup attempt,
Class Five graduates have gained command of 11 (out of 13)
Army combat divisions within the past two years.
Retiring Deputy Army Commander Thianchai, who received
public credit for putting down the coup. Thianchai is
reportedly considering a political career, and his fame
may stand him in good stead.
The first losers, in broad terms, are Bangkok's
international image and the reputation of the Thai military. The
negative attention focused on the revolt and the killing of the
Western journalists undermines, at least for the time being,
government efforts to portray Thailand as a maturing Third World
nation. In addition, the coup exposed the opportunism of,a
nwiber of.curre5t asid, former military officers.' More important,
in our view, there are disturbing implications for the military
in the fissure between senior officers, who generally opposed the
coup, and junior officers, some of whom apparently agreed to
support Manun. The past two coup. attempts suggest a breakdown of
traditional patron-client relationships that have restricted
junior and midlevel officers to a subordinate role in both coups
and politics. In the most extreme case, the crumbling of these
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/17: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000202080001-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/17: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000202080001-4 25X1
ties between senior and junior officers could lead to more
violent power struggles within the officer corps.
A number of other individuals have cause to rue their
behavior as well:
-- First Army Commander Pichtr. It is widely believed in
official and military circles that Pichtr was a
coconspirator who backed out at the last minute.*
Whatever the extent of his involvement, Pichtr's standing
has already suffered, and a whispering campaign against
him--run possibly by. his enemies from Class Five--is in
full force in Bangkok.
(press reports
indicate that Army Commander-in-Chief Arthit has taken
command of tanks formerly under Pichtr's control.
According to the US defense attache's office, lingering
suspicions about Pichtr may prejudice his chances of
becoming Army commander in chief in the future.
Commander-in-Chief Arthit. He has emerged as one of the
biggest losers from this affair. The coup attempt
reinforces the impression that Arthit is unaware of what
is going on inside the Army and that he is unable to
control his officers.** Moreover, a recent Army
publication attempting to highlight Arthit's role in
putting down the coup is not likely to improve his image,
according to US diplomats. Despite his public relations
**One rumor currently circulating in Bangkok is that Arthit
planned the coup to replace Prem as prime minister. There is no
evidence to support this.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/17: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000202080001-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/17: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000202080001-4
campaign, Arthit has twice been junketing abroad when he
should have been minding military matters at home--last
spring, when heavy fighting occurred along the Thai-
Cambodian border,
-- The royal family. Since the coup, damaging gossip
concerning political involvements of the royal family has
intensified, according to US diplomats .
What Now for Prem?
Prem has shown a capacity to recover from political
setbacks, and we think he will probably do so again. On the one
hand, Prem has safely come through two revolts aimed at ousting
him--a record for Thai prime ministers--and has developed a
reputation as a political survivor. In addition, US diplomats
believe that key political actors still view Prem as the most
acceptable leader available. Despite frustration with Prem's
faults, his rivals in the parties and the military lack his
stature, and in our judgment have yet to establish the political
base necessary to supplant him.
Prem himself appears to be guardedly optimistic about his
chances, and may even be considering a third term as prime
minister after 1987,
Moreover, the US Embassy reports that the annual military
promotions list, which took effect at the beginning of October,
enhanced the power of the military coalition that blocked the
coup attempt. Chavalit's promotion to Army Chief of Staff makes
him the second most powerful officer in the Army, and Class Five
officers retained command of most of the Army combat divisions.
In our opinion, these developments will tend to intimidate
opponents of the Prime Minister.
Despite these positive factors, the coup attempt landed the
Prime Minister in an vulnerable position, and we believe the next
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/17: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000202080001-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/17: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000202080001-4
several months will be the most difficult Prem has faced since
the April Fools' rebellion in 1981:
-- Prosecution of some of the conspirators could force Prem
to make tough decisions about how to handle allegations
against senior officers.
-- Prem's ruling coalition--which, has lasted for a record two
years--is looking a bit shaky following the coup,
according to the Embassy. The largest party in the
coalition, the Social Action Party (SAP), is attempting to
shift blame for economic difficulties to Finance Minister
Sommai--an apolitical technocrat--to shield SAP
politicians who hold the agriculture and commerce
portfolios.
The government is also under fire to protect Thai
exporters against possible US import restrictions,
including the Jenkins textile bill.*
military and political backers. 25X1
within the next several weeks to
Prem's well-established political style is generally to stay
aloof from controversy, but we think that he must take some steps
Prem considers the economic situation-- 25X1
particularly overproduction and low international prices for
Thailand's agricultural exports--his most pressing problem- and
his economic policies. There is a slight chance that Prem will
promote Finance Minister Sommai to deputy prime minister to make
him less visible~an& shield*,him from criticism. Prem's support
for Sommai over the past year has been so marked, however, that
we believe Sommai would remain the chief economic policy maker in
any case.
25X1
rem w i l l not realign his ruling coalition or drastically alter
*Thailand's textile and clothing industry, a major export
earner, is heavily dependent on the US market, and Bangkok is
trying to win an exclusion from the bill or increase the proposed
quotas.
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/17: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000202080001-4
 -- Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/17: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000202080001-4
Prem will, however, try to give the economic team a new
look. We believe he may drop several ministers whose poor
performance has been the subject of public cnmment fnr many
Prime Minister is also likely, in our opinion, to replace the SAP
Minister of Agriculture to divert attention from problems in the
agricultural sector.
Prem's public statements since early September also suggest
that-he and his advisers will try to make his economic policy
more palatable by mounting a public relations campaign and by
taking some very limited measures to bolster the economy. For
example, Prem's speeches indicate that he will reduce spending on
major industrial developments that depend on imports from abroad
in order to shift funds to projects that stimulate the rural
economy. The government may also reduce interest rates, a step
that it has been urging on private banks for several months. We
believe, however, that the government will continue to give
priority to dealing with Thailand's mounting foreign debt service
ratio--which is expected to reach a record 27 percent this year,
according to US diplomats. Concerns about paying off previous
borrowing and limiting new borrowing thus will severely limit
Prem's ability to earmark additional funds for economic
Dealing With the Plotters
Despite his promises, Prem probably realizes that it would
be dangerous to take strong measures against the conspirators.
We believe legal action against senior active-duty officers would
be highly embarrassing to the Army, because it would draw public
attention to divisions within the officer corps and because more
accusations against senior officers might surface. It might also
provoke a sympathetic backlash from officers who believed that
Prem was unfairly making an example of those who were unlucky
enough to be caught after Manun was allowed to escape. Police
officials are alrea&y nervous abou=t getting involved ?'n quarrels
within the Army, and a senior police official told US diplomats
that the investigators feel caught between one military group
that wants the plotters tried and punished and another aroup that
As a result, the government will be extremely selective in
choosing which active-duty officers to punish. We strongly
doubt, for example, that Prem will take legal action against
Pichtr or Air Force Commander Praphan,.who claims he was kidnaped
by the coup plotters. Midlevel officers suspected of involvement
are unlikely to face disci linar action beyond transfers to less
favorable posts.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/17: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000202080001-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/17: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000202080001-4
The fate of the former senior officers, such as Kriangsak,
and those officers caught in flagrante during the revolt is
another story. We believe the government will probably use these
officers as scapegoats, and thus portray the whole affair as a
half-baked plot by former officers. Although Manun is almost
certain to escape prosecutionr
25X1
25X1
We believe, 25X1
however, that eventual punishment, men , if it occurs, will probably be
light. According to the US Embassy, the government could stretch
out the legal process until public and international interest
fades, and then arrange for light sentences. A slightly
different option would be to exile the conspirators or to seek a
royal pardon for the plotters at some stage of the judicial
process, 25X1
25X1
Lower-level military
personnel such as those who fire on the two newsmen. are most
likely to be singled out for actual punishment.
Risks Abound
US diplomats report concern in official circles that unknown
backers of the coup attempt will strike again within the next
several months to try to overthrow Prem. The rumors appear based
on the assumption that damning evidence against Pichtr will
surface, prompting him to try to oust the government rather than
face disciplinary action.
NevertheTess,'Prem's dependence on Chavalit, Class Five
senior officers, and the King means that a shift of their support
would finish him politically. Although the behavior of Chavalit
and Class Five during and after the coup indicates that they
oppose any move to oust Prem right now, Prem knows that his
predecessor Kriangsak was forced to resign when key military
commanders in the capital would no longer back him. He thus will
consult with these groups to win their.aDDrova any action he
might take against the conspirators.
Our analysis of Prem's chances would be much more
pessimistic if:
-- The Prime Minister took no action to deal with the
economy, the plotters, and his sagging public image.
25X1
25X1
L Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/17: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000202080001-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/17: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000202080001-4
-- Economic performance deteriorated sharply over the next
several months, possibly because of the enactment of US
import restrictions on Thai goods. If increased
unemployment prompted widespread demonstrations against
the government or public disorder, we believe prospects
for military intervention would be strong.
-- Prem attempted to tighten his control over the Army as a
result of the revolt or if he tried to punish powerful
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/17: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000202080001-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/17: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000202080001-4
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/17: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000202080001-4
 _. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/17: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000202080001-4
SUBJECT: The Double-Nine Coup: What Next for Thailand?
Distribution:
Original - OEA/SEA/ITM
1 - Richard Childress, NSC
1 - Charles Salmon, State
1 - Nicholas Mauger, State/Thailand Desk
1 - Alan Kitchens, State/INR/EAP/SA
1 - Alice Straub, State/INR/EAP/SA
1 - Cora Foley. State
Lt. Col. William Wise, Pentagon
Dave Hatcher, Pentagon
Lt. Col. Richard Rice, Pentagon
Como. James Cossey, Pentagon
DC/OEA/SEAD
OEA/SEA/IB
C/OEA/NEA
C/OEA/CH
D/OEA
OEA/Research Director
PDB Staff
C/N IC
NIO/EA
DDO/EA
DDI
CPAS/ILS
CPAS/IMC/CB
OCR/EA/A
C/PES/DDI
OCR/ISG
C/EAP
NIC/Analytical Group
C/D
BIS
, OCR/EA
VA/TWAD
A/NIO Econ
/PPS
/Analytical 'Group
1 - DDI Rep, CINCPAC
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/17: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000202080001-4