JAPAN: POLICY TOWARD NICARAGUA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000101430001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 26, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 16, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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16 May 1985
Japan: Policy Toward Nicaragua
Summary
Nicaragua, like other nations in Central America,
is a low priority in Japan's foreign policy. The
Japanese have only a small economic interest in
Nicaragua and want to stay clear of regional disputes
surrounding the Sandinista regime. When Tokyo has
acted on Nicaraguan issues, it has generally been in
response to US pressure and only reluctantly. We see
little likelihood that Japan will abandon its policy
of trying to maintain balanced relations in the
region. We believe Tokyo will avoid taking
steps--such as providing aid to Managua--that would
directly counter US policy, but at the same time will
resist moves--such as joining in a trade embargo--that
could damage its relations with other Latin American
countries.
This memorandum was prepared byl (Office of East
Asian Analysis. Information available as of 16 May 1985 was
used in its preparation. Comments and queries are welcome and
may be directed to the Chief, Japan Branch, Northeast Asia
Division, OEA,
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Although the Japanese are one of Nicaragua's major
buyers--accounting for nearly 20 percent of Managua's total
exports in 1984--the economic stake in Nicaragua for Japan is
insignificant. Purchases in 1984 (mainly cotton) amounted to
only 0.07 percent of Japan's total imports, and sales to
Nicaragua (mostly spare vehicle parts) made up less than 0.01
percent of total exports. Japanese businessmen continue to
discuss barter deals with Managua, but we see little chance of a
significant increase in bilateral trade.
Japan's Trade with Nicaragua
(Millions US$)
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984*
Total Exports 130,435
151,500
138,443
146,982
170,136
Exports to Nicaragua 29
28
19
19
20
Total Imports 139,892
140,830
130,319
125,017
136,451
Imports from Nicaragua 13
57
45
66
90
*estimated figures
The Japanese have long acknowledged that Nicaragua and
other Latin American countries are in the US sphere of
influence. Japan's own policy toward the region has been to
maintain good relations with all countries and to stay out of
the area's domestic affairs. For the most part, Tokyo's
alliance with Washington has not led the Japanese to modify this
approach. In general, the Japanese public, press, and foreign
policy bureaucrats do not see a major stake for Japan in the
current Central American dispute. Ruling party politicians have
told US officials that most Japanese do not believe the
situation in Central America poses a Communist threat to the
United States and that they distinguish Nicaragua from Cuba on
the basis of its private economy. The Japanese press, moreover,
has usually portrayed Nicaragua as the underdog.
Tokyo supports the Contadora process--although Foreign
Ministry officials privately admit they do not see much hope for
a settlement soon--and has emphasized the Contadora call for
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withdrawal of foreign military advisers and a halt to
militarization of the region. According to the US Embassy,
Japanese officials are skeptical about US policy intentions
toward Nicaragua and during US-Japan consultations on Central
America in late 1984 said they feared the development of a
Vietnam-like situation in Nicaragua. The officials claimed
Tokyo was worried that if such a scenario developed, defense
expenditures might be drawn to such a conflict at the expense of
other areas where the United States has a military presence,
particularly Japan.
Case Study: The Aid Issue
Although Japanese officials question US policy toward
Nicaragua, a close look at Japanese diplomacy suggests many of
their decisions concerning Managua and its neighbors are
primarily reactions to moves by Washington. For example, in
response to pressure from the United States, Tokyo last year
began to consider increased aid to El Salvador--which amounted
to $1.2 million in 1983--and the reopening of its embassy in San
Salvador. Foreign Ministry officials argued, however, that it
would also be necessary to provide some form of assistance to
Nicaragua. In 1980 Tokyo had extended $1.3 million in food aid
to Managua and in 1982 had provided humanitarian assistance to
flood victims, but had offered no aid since. We believe several
factors accounted for the Foreign Ministry's position:
o The Ministry was under pressure from the Diet to
demonstrate that Tokyo's economic aid policy was not simply
a response to Washington's requests, but was based on
humanitarian need and Japan's own interest in maintaining
balanced relations in the area.
o The Nicaraguan ambassador to Japan had lobbied strongly
against opening an embassy in El Salvador, and Japanese
officials hoped promises of aid would quiet Managua, and in
the process, lessen the leftist guerrilla threat to a
reestablished embassy in San Salvador.
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o Tokyo saw aid as a way to win Nicaragua's support for the
Japanese candidate in elections for the International Court
of Justice (ICJ) in late 1984.
Tokyo dropped the Nicaragua aid plan just before the
Reagan-Nakasone summit in January.
The Overall Record
Despite Tokyo's responsiveness in this instance, Japanese
officials are showing some signs of restiveness over US pressure
on Nicaraguan issues:
o Tokyo has complained privately that the US objection to
humanitarian aid to Nicaragua is unjustified. The Japanese
believe that if the pressure they faced on this issue is a
result of close consultations with Washington, they would
be better off simply giving aid without advance notice.
o Japanese officials also argue that Tokyo should receive
more credit than it has for past support of US policies in
Central America, especially compared with the European
Community and Canada.
Japan's past "support" has in fact been marked more by
nonparticipation in anti-US activities than by active
cooperation:
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o The Japanese treated the mining of the Nicaraguan harbors
in a low-key manner despite Diet pressure to make a formal
demarche to Washington on the issue.
o Japanese officials have pointed to their decision to
abstain from voting on a Nicaraguan draft resolution on
Central America in the UN General Assembly, even though it
was never put to vote.
o Tokyo did not send observers to the Nicaraguan elections in
late 1984 but also stayed away from the elections in El
Salvador in March 1985.
According to our Embassy in Tokyo, a growing number of
Foreign Ministry officials favor following the perceived US lead
in support of democratic movements in the region, but the
Japanese in fact have stalled when support interferes with their
traditional neutral position. Tokyo has not provided aid to
Nicaragua, but neither has it significantly increased aid to El
Salvador or reopened its embassy there.
Prospects
In our view, Japan's approach to the US-Nicaragua dispute
will probably continue to be a balancing act--Tokyo will not
take steps that blatantly undercut US policy but will resist
supporting moves that would jeopardize its neutralist position.
Because the foundation of Tokyo's foreign policy is the US-Japan
relationship, the Japanese will probably not accede to
Nicaraguan requests for humanitarian aid. Moreover, they may
hope to appease Washington by participating more actively in
low-cost pro rams such as the Caribbean Basin Initiative.
Tokyo is unlikely, however, to offer active support for US
initiatives on Nicaragua. We do not believe, for example, that
Japan would join in an embargo of Nicaragua--except perhaps in
the unlikely event the West Europeans decided to participate.
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With no large stake in Central America at this time, the
Japanese do not have an incentive to risk damaging relations
with other Latin American countries by siding with Washington.
Furthermore, Tokyo is beginning to move toward expanding its
role in international affairs and is becoming increasingly
involved in areas traditionally of little interest. This new
trend is marked in Latin America by gradual efforts to
strengthen diplomatic ties and increase aid to countries outside
areas of conflict. Tokyo probably believes it cannot afford to
appear too closely tied to Washington if it hopes to build its
influence in the region.
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Distribution
Subject: Japan: Policy Toward Nicaragua
Original - OEA/NAD/Japan
1 - OEA/NAD/Korea
1 - C/OEA/NAD
1 - C/OEA/China
1 - C/OEA/Southeast Asia
1 - OEA Production Office
1 - D/OEA
1 - DDI
1 - Executive Director
1 - PDB Staff
1 - C/PES
1 - C/DO/PPS
1 - C/EA/0
1 - OCR/ISG
1 - NIC Analytic Group
1 - NIO/EA
1 - Legislative Liaison
1 - CPAS/ILS
5 - CPAS/IMC/CB
1 - ALA/MCD
1 -
1 - Donald Gregg, Office of the Vice President
1 - Desaix Anderson, Department of State
1 - William Brooks, Department of State
1 - Linda Hockstein, Department of State
1 - LTC. Jerry Williams, Department of Defense
1 - Byron Jackson, Department of Commerce
/OEA/NAD/Japan/JG:mem/
(16 Ma
y 1985)
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