TENSIONS ON THE CHINA-VIETNAM BORDER: THE CAMBODIAN FACTOR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000100940001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 13, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 14, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central Intelligence Agency'
Washington DC 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
14 February 1985
Tensions on the China-Vietnam Border: The Cambodian Factor
SUMMARY
The uneven tempo of Chinese along the Vietnamese
border has caused ASEAN--and some Western observers--to question
Beijing's commitment to opposing Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia. The
Thai in particular have complained about what they view as China's tardy
and inadequate responses
Chinese have taken and continue to hold small pieces o
Vietnamese territory.
The problem is, in part, one of perception. The Chinese appear to
have changed their tactics from intermittent, highly publicized assaults to
more sustained, less visible military pressure, while observers are still
looking for the reactive, showy actions of past years. We also believe
Beijing's relations with Moscow and Washington now have a greater
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influence on Chinese action
Cambodia or China's normal
however, believes that its
damaged, we would look for
along the border than Vietnamese operations in
concern about relations with ASEAN. If Beijing,
relations with ASEAN would be seriously
a larger ground assault near Malipo, wider
This memorandum was prepared
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by of East
Asian Analysis. Information available
cis or 14 rebruary 1985 was used in its preparation.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed
to the Chief, Defense Issues
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Branch, China Division, DEA,
EA M 85-10029
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Uopy of 70.
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pressure on the border, or perhaps even limited airstrikes. But Beijing is
unlikely to exercise the costly option of a major "second lesson" unless
Thailand's national security is threatened.
Military Activity Heats Up
In sharp contrast to the 1982-83 Cambodian dry season when Beijing shelled the
Vietnamese border heavily only at the end of major seasonal fighting in Cambodia, China
has applied sustained military pressure against Vietnam throughout the past year.
Although clashes and shelling slowed around the turn of the year and a large
number of troops were temporarily withdrawn to their home garrisons, Chinese combat
engineer regiments continued to improve the roads leading to the occupied hilltops and
an army-level structure was created near Malipo.
There is a possibility, moreover, that
the Chinese have added more troops than we have been able to account for. Chinese
media reports suggest that Beijing has sent troops from seven of its 11 military
regions--more than at any time since the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in 1979--
But Thailand Complains
The absence of a sharp response to Vietnam's largest Cambodian offensive in six
years provoked criticism from Thai officials recently. The Thai believe that they have an
understanding with Beijing that Chinese pressure would be increased along Vietnam's
northern border during periods of Vietnamese attacks against the resistance, as well as an
explicit agreement from Beijing to strike at Vietnam if Vietnamese troops enter Thai
territory in force. Beginning in late December, Thai Foreign Minister Siddhi began to
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voice his unhappiness with China's apparent lack of forcefulness.
Beijing's Past Performance
3.
The Chinese in any event are unlikely to gear their military activity solely to the
situation in Cambodia. Beijing is certainly aware that even if it drastically expands the
fighting, the benefit to the Cambodian resistance and the Thai would be minimal. Since
the beginning of the conflict in 1979, the Chinese have adjusted the level of military
activity in response to a variety of other concerns.
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>r to
ated
visit.
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Beijing's Concerns Today
We believe that broader strategic considerations have similarly played a larger role
than regional factors in Beijing's recent calculations, just as they did last April. In April,
the Chinese wanted to sent a signal to Moscow that they could not be intimidated from
putting military pressure on Vietnam. They also wanted to underscore their strategic
value in the region to the United States.
Having subsequently improved their security relationship with the United States,
we believe the Chinese believed themselves to be in a better position by December to
take a few small steps forward with the USSR, confident that the Soviets would not
misinterpret the gesture as weakness. As a consequence, Beijing did not want an
upsurge in fighting on the border to jeopardize the visit of Soviet First Deputy Premier
Arkhipov a second time. Nor did they want to upset Moscow by launching new attacks
on Vietnam immediately after Arkhipov's departure.
Beijing undoubtedly hoped to use the visit in part to feed Vietnamese suspicions of
Sino-Soviet collusion. By the same token, the Chinese probably wanted to remind
skeptics in Washington that China still maintains some maneuvering room within the
triangle, and that its "independent foreign policy" is not just rhetoric.
The Price Beijing Pays
By adhering to a timetable of its own in applying military pressure to Vietnam,
China has placed some strain on its relations with ASEAN, particularly Thailand. Thai
officials who favor a strong relationship with Beijing ran the risk of political
embarrassment at the tardy Chinese response to this year's Vietnamese campaign against
the non-Communist resistance camps. Those circles in ASEAN that suspect that China
will fight only to protect the Communist Democratic Kampuchea guerrillas have new grist
for their mills the longer China delays what they believe should be stronger military
action.
Although Hanoi is aware of current Chinese military activity along the
border--
-it must also be
pic ing up e grum ing o t e am so. ian resistance leaders who believe China should
be doing more. This could embolden Hanoi in believing it ultimately will divide and wear
down the backers of the resistance coalition.
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If the Chinese fail to make a conspicuous demonstration of force against Vietnam,
observers may suspect that the standdown in criticism of the Soviets at the time of the
Arkhipov visit, plus the moderate tone emanating from Hanoi about the prospects for a
political settlement in Indochina mean the Chinese, Vietnamese, and Soviets are
approaching an understanding. We believe the Chinese would not want such a perception
to go very far for fear of undermining their relationship with the United States and ASEAN
and thus encouraging Vietnam.
What's Next
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Given that tensions along the Vietnamese border affect major facets of Chinese
international relations, the Chinese will weigh these numerous factors before initiating any
major new assaults on the Vietnamese. They may be willing to risk ASEAN ire if they
believe their wider objectives can be served by restraint. Given China's determination25X1
over the long term to wear Vietnam down and to drive a wedge between Hanoi and
Moscow, there is no question that pressure on Vietnam will continue, but its form and
intensity will be Molded by strategic considerations beyond the Cambodian context.
At the least, we expect the Chinese to continue maneuvering ground, naval, and air
forces to keep the Vietnamese off balance, and to keep up the shelling, border incursions,
and seizure of small pieces of Vietnamese territory. If Beijing believes that its relations
with ASEAN would be seriously damaged by the absence of stronger military action in the
face of further Vietnamese pressure on Cambodian resistance bases, we would look for a
larger ground assault, pressure along a wider salient of the border, or perhaps even
limited airstrikes. However, Beijing will weigh all factors before it initiates major action
and China is unlikely to exercise the costly option of a "second lesson" unless Thailand's
national security is threatened.
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SUBJECT: Tensions on the China-Vietnam Border: The Cambodian Factor
Distribution:
National Security Council
1. David Laux, Senior Assistant for China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong,
Room 302 EOB
2. Gaston Sigur, Senior Staff Member, East Asia, NSC. Room 302 EOB
3. Don Gregg, Special Assistant to the Vice-President, White House
Department of State
4. Paul Wolfowitz, Assistant Secretary, East Asian and Pacific Affairs, STATE
5. AMB Morton Abramowitz, Director, INR, STATE
6. Donald Anderson, Director, Office of Chinese Affairs, STATE
7. M. Lyall Breckon, Director for Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea, STATE
8. LT General John Chain, Director, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, STATE
9. Charles Kartman, Bureau of Political Military Affairs, Room 7430
10 Charles Martin, INR/EAP/CH, Room 8840
11.Jack Sontag, INR/EAP/CH
12.AIlen Kitchens, INR/EAP
Department of Defense
13.Richard L. Armitage, Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA, DOD
14.James Kelly, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asia, ISA, DOD
15.Major General William E. Odom, Army Assistant Chief of Staff for
Intelligence, Room 2E466, Pentagon
16.Major General James C. Pfautz, Assistant Airforce Chief of Staff
for Intelligence, Room 4A931, Pentagon
17.Commodore James Cossey, Director of East Asian and Pacific Region,
ISA, DOD
18.Col Robert Young, ISA, DOD, Rm 840
19.Lt.Colonel Larry Mitchel, AF/XOXXP Plans and Operations,
Pentagon
20.Major Chris Johnson, OJCSJ-5, Far East South Asia Division
Pentagon, 2/E/973
21.John J. Sloan, DIO for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, DOD
22.Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary for Defense for International
Security Policy, Room 4E838 Pentagon
23.
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26. Hal Leach, Naval Intelligence Support Center, NISC/00W/P
4301 Suitland Road, Washington, DC 20390
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National Photographic Intrepretation Center
30. Chief, Asian Forces Division, NPIC/IEG/EAFD,
Central Intelligence Agency
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0/DDCI
SA/DCl/DDCI For External Affairs
Chief, Office of Legislative Liaison (HOS REVIEW ONLY)
Director, Intelligence Community Staff
Carl Ford, NIO/EA
Senior Review Panel
National Intelligence Council
Robert Gates, DDI
D/OEA
?EA/CH
OEA/SDS
OEA/NAD
?EA/SEA
0EA/Production Officer
45-47. OEA/CH/DEF
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?EA/CH/FOR
?EA/CH/DOM
OEA/CH/DEV
D/SOVA
SOVA/TWAD/A
D/OGI
D/OIA
/Current Intelligence Group/CPAS
6l-HEf-41tetterrlittflt-eEP+TC-ff /M C /c
G.P.AS-laliZQW-Lr-TAM-MANAGER
OCR/DSD
DO/SPCO
FILE COPY/SOURCED COPY
AUTHORS
C/DO/PPS (RM 3D01)
DDO/EA/
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