CHILE'S CARDINAL FRESNO, A POLITICAL PRIMATE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000100570001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 6, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/11: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000100570001-3
P&PD Mr /
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/11: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000100570001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/11: CIA-RDP85T01058R000100570001-3
tj t tftt Ir
Chile's Cardinal Fresno, A Political Primate
Cardinal Juan Francisco Fresno has emerged as a key actor
on the Chilean political scene in the past few months. His
influence has grown to the point that he may well play a vital
role-perhaps second only to that of President Pinochet-in
determining whether the eotmtry achieves an orderly transition
to civilian rule or becomes increasingly polarized over the
next few years.
Fresno's axiden rise to prominence is mainly due to his
success in bringing together a disparate group of political
leaders, persuading them to compromise on widely divergent
positions, and obtaining their endorsement of a set of
proposals for an accelerated transition to democracy-the
National Accord-that was presented to the government in late
August. Pinochet has rejected the accord and, partly as a
result, his popularity is at an alltime low, his political base
is narrowing, and public criticism of his leadership is
mounting. The Cardinal is actively involved in promoting
public support for the accord, especially by trying to ensure
that its signatories remain united and committed to the
document's basically moderate proposals. He appears determined
to continue pressing the regime--if not Pinochet, at least the
This typescript was prepared by , OCR/LE/SAM, and
National Security Council Staff. F~
ALA/SAD/W, in response to a request from Jacqueline Tillman,
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/11: CIA-RDP85T01058R000100570001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/11: CIA-RDP85T01058R000100570001-3
SECRET
armed forces-to accept the accord as the basis for negotiating
a definite timetable for political liberalization and
Pinochet's ultimate departure from the presidency.
Because of his new activism, Fresno is now viewed by
Pinochet and his hardline advisers as a major enemy, and the
regime has launched a campaign to denigrate the national
accord, its signatories, and even the Cardinal. Although the
relationship between Fresno and Pinotet is likely to remain
conflictive for the foreseeable future, several senior
government officials and nuch of the military view the accord
favorably and do not share Pinechet's animosity toward the
The Oammunists and other far leftists-who were excluded
from the accord at Fresno's insistence-fear that the
Cardinal's efforts will succeed, and to prevent this, they may
try to escalate violence. In our view, Pinochet will exploit
any sudden increase in Communist -sponsored violence as
justification for continuing his harsh policies, rallying the
military around him again, and undercutting the accord-and
Fresno.
Fresno's Evolving Role
When Fresno was appointed Archbishop of Santiago and primate of the
Chilean Catholic Church in early 1983, it was generally expected that, as
the leader of the traditionalist wing of the hierarchy, he would assume a
much lower profile than his predecessor, Cardinal Raul Silva Henriquez, a
longtime critic of Pinochet. A widely respected figure within and outside
the church, Fresno had a reputation for prudence and moderation and for
believing that the church should concentrate on its pastoral role; others
in the church, especially Liberation Theology proponents, supported
political activism and outright opposition to the regime.
Fresno's appointment was greeted enthusiastically by government
spokesmen, and, according to the US Embassy, Pinochet was convinced that
future relations with the church no longer would be difficult. The Embassy
reports that Mrs. Pinochet, a staunch Catholic and close adviser to her
husband on political and church matters, commented that Fresno's
appointment was a miracle that would "save" the church. Pinochet attended
Fresno's first mass as head of the church, invited him to lunch, and sent
the Archbishop a Bible for his birthday. For over a year, the two
maintained cordial relations. Until late 1984,
2
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/11: CIA-RDP85T01058R000100570001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/11: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000100570001-3
Publicly, Fresno seemed to move deliberately down a middle path during
the series of monthly antiregime protests that prevailed throughout 1983.
In August of that year, Pinochet listened to the advice he reportedly
received from the military high command to moderate his policies and
appointed an oldline politician, Sergio Jarpa, as Interior Minister to
begin a dialogue with moderate opposition parties over the transition
process. Fresno played a key role in persuading the leaders of the
moderate opposition coalition, Democratic Action, to agree to talks with
Jarpa. Nevertheless, aside from serving as intermediary-he convened the
first talks in his own offices-Fresno was not an active proponent of any
When after a period of months the opposition suspended the talks,
citing lack of movement, and resumed antiregime protests, Fresno continued
to keep a low profile. He moved progressively away from the regime,
however, and after Pinochet reimposed
the state of siege in November 1984, Fresno decided to try to bring the
opposition together in a broad civic front with a view toward pressuring
the government to agree to negotiations on a transition to civilian rule.
The strong attacks by regime spokesmen against the church at that time,
including accusations that leading church figures were cooperating with
Communists in antiregime actions, also contributed to Fresno's decision to
shift course, according to the US Embassy .
Fresno's position was greatly strengthened when he was named in April
1985 as the third Cardinal in Chilean history. His appointment was well
received in most segments of Chilean society and became a source of
national pride. It also underscored, according to the US Embassy, the
support of the Pope for democratization in Chile. The Vatican reportedly
hoped that Fresno's elevation would endow him with greater authority and
freedom to pursue a moderate course in political and church affairs. F
by the time of his elevation
to Cardinal, Fresno had became convinced that Pinochet could not be talked
into leaving office, nor could an early transition be negotiated with him
on a friendly basis. Instead, Fresno had
concluded that it was necessary to mobilize public opinion into a force
sufficiently strong to pressure the President into accepting
negotiations. The new Cardinal, therefore, quietly accelerated his efforts
to bring the opposition together. The US Embassy reports that over a
period of months he held behind-the-scenes meetings with numerous
political, labor, and business leaders to discuss areas of agreement and to
explore prospects for a broad civic front. Moreover, he met several times
with the Interior Minister, the key civilian Cabinet member, to emphasize
that his goal was not to overthrow the government but to reach an
understanding with it, according to the US Embassy.
3
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/11: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000100570001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/11: CIA-RDP85T01058R000100570001-3
5IUH1 T
Early this past summer, Fresno asked three close advisers to draft a
tentative proposal to be reviewed by the leaders of 11 mainstream political
parties. This document was then debated and revised by the political
leaders at the Cardinal's urging, and a c npranise draft was approved and
signed in late August. The parties overcame several major sticking points,
including the key issue of whether to proscribe the Communist Party from
participation in the political process--a question that was left to the
future deliberations of a constitutional tribunal. The US Embassy views
the national accord as a carefully crafted, flexible, moderate, and
basically reasonable document. The accord indirectly recognizes the
validity of the 1980 Constitution, implicitly accepts Pinochet as president
for the remainder of his term, calls for legislation to establish direct
presidential and congressional elections, and insists on immediate
restoration of civil liberties. It also rules out putting military
officers on trial for political crimes, a point the signatories considered
necessary to win armed forces backing for the accord.
Pinochet's Reaction
The US Embassy reports that Fresno's elevation to Cardinal so
displeased Pinochet that the President refused to go to the airport to
greet the church leader upon his return from the Vatican. The President's
attitude became openly hostile as a result of Fresno's role in the national
accord, The US Embassy reports that
Pinochet even told the Papal Nuncio last summer that the church's
cppositionist activities under Fresno had led him to consider changing his
religion.
Pinochet emphatically rebuffed Fresno during a mid-July meeting when
the Cardinal urged the President to agree to a dialogue with the opposition
in order to avoid an escalation of political unrest,
When Fresno relayed a message from the Pope
that he would not visit Chile until the government relaxes its ironclad
control, Pinochet reportedly replied that he would not take orders fran the
Pope and that he had no intention of allowing dialogue or deviating from
the timetable of the 1980 Constitution, which provides for a transition to
begin in 1989. In response, Fresno reportedly warned Pinochet that the
church might join the opposition in protesting against the President's
policies. On several subsequent occasions, according to the US Embassy,
Pinochet has made a point of snubbing the Cardinal in public and permitting
actions by the security forces that were intended as a slap at the
church.
The regime likewise has taken several steps in recent weeks to
denigrate the national accord and to attempt to undermine Fresno's public
stature. According to the US Embassy, senior government officials have
allowed unflattering ccnments about the Cardinal and other bishops to leak
to the press. a government
4
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/11: CIA-RDP85T01058R000100570001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/11: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000100570001-3
SECRET
campaign initiated by Pinochet in late September to discredit the national
accord and its sponsors involves a concerted disinformation effort and
planned activities to provoke discord between the political parties and the
Fresno's Position in the Church
Fresno's actions on behalf of political liberalization since becoming
head of the Catholic Church evidently have dampened the internal unrest the
church has experienced in recent years largely because of divisions between
activist priests and more conservative members of the hierarchy. His
strong record as a defender of human rights and his condemnations of
government repression, coupled with his firm stance against the use of
violence by the opposition, have strengthened his influence within the
church, He has dealt effectively with
activist priests at the lower levels, who previously had accused him of
being a goverment pawn and of ignoring the plight of the poor. He has
publicly attacked those ecclesiastics who have made polemical declarations
on political issues. Furthermore, he suspended a priest who expressed
support for a leftist terrorist group last year.
We believe Fresno's efforts to rein in activist priests stem from his
belief that involvement of clergy in radical political activity will
eventually hurt the church. Fresno attributes such activity to liberation
theology, which he sees as a greater danger to Chile than Cannunism,
The new Cardinal has also been able to count on the support of his
predecessor, Cardinal Silva, who many believed might try to undermine
Fresno's authority within the church because the two have different
philosophies regarding church activism and on how to pressure the
government to speed up the transition process. Recent efforts by top
government officials to drive a wedge between the two have failed.
Continued Turmoil Likely
The moderate opposition and Catholic Church leaders appear to be
convinced that the political tide is running in their favor, and the
moderates are working hard to preserve their still fragile unity. The
accord continues to attract wide public support, as evidenced by the
growing success of a petition-signing campaign in its behalf. The accord's
sponsors maintain publicly that virtually everything in their proposal is
negotiable, but they insist that there must be concrete liberalization
5
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/11: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000100570001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/11: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000100570001-3
SECRET
measures soon, such as enactment of laws permitting political parties to
function freely and an early lifting of restrictions on civil liberties.
I
Cardinal Fresno has told the US Embassy that he will soon begin
pressing the government, and, if necessary, senior military officers, to
accept him as a mediator to arrange talks. Nevertheless, we believe Fresno
faces a difficult task over the next six months or so in keeping the accord
alive, pressing the regime to negotiate, and more generally working to
ensure that the difficult Chilean political climate does not deteriorate
into sharp polarization and escalating violence.
The US Embassy reports that the regime hopes to reach the Chilean
summer vacation period-December-March-without making concessions on the
accord; it appears to believe that Fresno and the accord's other sponsors
eventually will simply give up and that popular interest will dissipate.
There is increasing evidence of disgruntlement within the military over
Pinochet's stance on the national accord and his antagonism toward
Fresno. We believe that he will have serious problems with the armed
forces if he continues to ignore those in the military-and the civilian
bureaucracy-who advocate a more accommodating stance on the national
Fresno the Man
Fresno was ordained as a priest in 1937. He subsequently studied at
the Catholic University of Santiago and earned a degree in canonical law at
the Gregorian Pontifical University in Rane. Prior to becaning Archbishop
of Santiago, he had served for 16 years as bishop of La Serena, a
6
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/11: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000100570001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/11: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000100570001-3
SECRET
provincial mining area 300 miles north of Santiago.
7
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/11: CIA-RDP85TO1058R000100570001-3
 - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/11: CIA-RDP85T01058R000100570001-3
Distribution:
Original - Requestor
1 - Paul Taylor, State Department
1 - Michael S. Durkee tate Department -::7 - Robert S. Gelbard, State Department
1 - DDI
1 - NIO/LA
1 - NIC/AG
1 - PDB Staff
1 - D/ALA
1 - C/PES
1 - DDI/CPAs/ISS
2 - ALA/PS
1 - ALA Research D' rector
4 - CPAS/IMC/CB ,
2 - ALA/SAD
2 - OCR/LE/SAM
2 - ALA/SAD/W
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/11: CIA-RDP85T01058R000100570001-3