ARGENTINA: ELECTION PREVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000100500001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 22, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 9, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

-ANNIL STAT
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State Dept. review _
completed
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i 25X1
Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
ARGENTINA: ELECTION PREVIEW
Summary
The November congressional election in Argentina will have considerable impact on
the nation's political and economic stability. We expect President Alfonsin's Radical Party
to retain its majority in the lower house of congress and improve its position in the
senate. The Radicals' high standing in the polls stems, in our view, largely from the
public's confidence in the bold economic austerity package that Alfonsin introduced last
June. It also reflects the dynamism and cohesion of the ruling party--especially in
contrast to the infighting and disarray prevalent in the opposition Peronist movement.
As Peronism loses its vitality the leftist Intransigent Party is gaining importance.
A Radical victory, in our view, would enhance Alfonsin's overall political standing and
probably spur the President to persist with his economic reforms, at least in the short
run. We are virtually certain, however, that a setback at the polls would boost the
influence of Presidential advisers who want to sacrifice austerity for job creation and
pursue radical approaches to the repayment of the foreign debt. A landslide Radical
triumph that crushed Peronism would pose different problems. The Intransigent Party
might then become the main opposition to Alfonsin, giving leftist forces substantial
influence should the government incur serious political.or economic difficulties. F___~25X1
This memorandum was prepared by I (South America Division, Office of
African and Latin American Analysis, and was coordinated with the Directorate of Operations.
Information as of 7 October 1985 was used in the preparation of this paper. Questions and
comments may be directed to the Chief, South America Division, ALA, on
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Introduction
On 3 November Argentina will hold its first elections since President Alfonsin took office
in 1983. Half of the seats in the lower house of the national congress and many in the
provincial legislatures--which choose the national senators--will be contested. The vote, in
our view, will largely be a referendum on President Alfonsin's popularity and on the economic
austerity program he implemented in June. The ruling Radical party hopes to retain its
absolute majority in the lower house of congress and do well enough on the provincial level
to eventually acquire working control of the senate. Most importantly, the elections will help
determine whether Alfonsin feels he has the political strength to press ahead with his bold
economic reform package or begins to heed interest group pressure to dilute the program.
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Alfonsin's Radicals: Flying High
During the first half of this year most knowledgeable observers were predicting an
electoral drubbing for Alfonsin's centrist Radical Civic Union (UCR) in November. The
President appeared to have no plan to battle an inflation rate of over 1000 percent, the
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military was openly grumbling over the trials of top Generals for human rights abuses, and
political pressure from the opposition Peronist labor movement mounted daily. Polls showed
that Argentines intended to cast protest votes for small parties of the right and the left and
that the Radicals would be lucky to conserve the support of two-thirds of the 52 percent of
This picture changed dramatically in June, when Alfonsin turned to "shock
treatment"--including wage and price controls, efforts to cut the budget deficit and restrict
monetary expansion, and a new currency--to cure inflation. Notwithstanding its recessive
impact, the adjustment program was highly popular with the public, which, according to the
U.S. Embassy, felt that the President's firm leadership had saved Argentina from economic
chaos. Nearly four fifths of the populace supported the moasures when they were announced
and relative price stability--inflation for September was only 2 percent--has kept approval
ratings in the 60 percent range since. This positive attitude toward the government and
Alfonsin has directly benefited the UCR. The President has campaigned extensively for Radical
candidates and, in our view, has successfully linked his personal popularity to his party's
electoral fortunes. The latest polls show the Radicals with a two to one lead over their
Several other government initiatives have bolstered the political standing of both
Alfonsin and the UCR.
-- The Beagle Channel treaty with Chile, which was overwhelmingly approved by a
referendum last year, gave the regime a clear-cut foreign policy success that at least
partially offset the lack of progress in resolving the Falklands dispute with Great
Britain.
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-- The trials of the former junta members, after some initial military protests, have
proceeded smoothly. The prosecutions have underscored Alfonsin's determination to
consolidate democracy in Argentina, a goal, according to polling data, that is widely
shared by the general public.
-- The government's simultaneous trials of leftist terrorists have enhanced its reputation
for evenhandedness and made clear that the military trials are not just a vendetta
The UCR, however, has not entirely rested on Alfonsin's laurels. The party itself has
numerous positive qualities--especially when compared to the chaotic infighting that plagues
Peronism. Radicalism, in our view, is the best organized and most dynamic political force in
Argentina. It has an infrastructure in every province and an energetic youth sector that has
been effectively mobilized during the campaign. While Alfonsin's leadership of the UCR is
virtually unquestioned, the party has not stifled internal dissent. A relatively wide range of
opinion, from the center-right to the moderate left, now finds a home within Radicalism,
thereby helping the party expand beyond its traditional middle-class constituency. Polls show
that today about 20 percent of Radical voters are blue-collar workers, a slightly higher
proportion are upper-middle class, and that UCR support is divided almost equally among
individuals with
i
pr
mary, secondary and college educations.
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Peronism in Eclipse
Peronism has been adrift since the death of its founder, General Juan Peron, in 1974. No
charismatic leader has emerged capable of directing the disparate populist/nationalist
movement, and the resulting leadership vacuum, in our view, has allowed a coterie of
discredited political and labor bosses to seize control of the party. At a "unity" congress in
July, two of the most controversial figures in Peronism--Vicente Saadi, a leftist with widely
reported links to Montonero terrorists and the ultra-rightwing Herminio Iglesias--temporarily
defeated moderate leaders seeking to reform and democratize the party. Saadi and Iglesias,
along with trade union leader Saul Ubaldini, have launcheel-a vituperative campaign against
the government's "pitiless" austerity program and the "usury" of the IMF and the international
banks. The electorate, however, appears unconvinced that the Peronists possess a viable
alt
i
'
ernat
ve to Alfonsin
s austerity package. Polls show that only about one fifth of
voters--down from 40 percent in 1983--intend to cast a Peronist ballot in November.
Part of this poor showing stems, in our view, from the intense infighting that continues
to afflict the party and demolish the fragile unity achieved at the July congress. In August,
Peronist moderates ousted party First Vice President Saadi from his post as leader of the
Peronist bloc in the senate, and in the Federal District of Buenos Aires a young reformist
leader bested the official Peronist slate in internal party elections. The most potentially
divisive conflict has occurred in populous Buenos Aires Province, a Peronist bastion long
dominated by party Secretary General Iglesias. Reformist party members in the province have
s
urned I
lesia
d
"
p
g
s an
are running an
independent" Peronist ticket in the elections.
We believe that a more fundamental cause of Peronist decline is the party's decaying
demographic base. Once a broad-based movement whose working class core was
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any such reconstruction will, in our view, be a long, arduous, and uncertain process.
complemented by significant support from the middle-class and the intelligentsia, Peronism
has become, a party of the "old, the uneducated, and the
poor." Polls show that Peronism is backed almost exclusively by urban industrial workers and
peasants from the underdeveloped interior provinces--dwindling segments of the electorate.
And in a country with perhaps the highest literacy and education rates in Latin America, one
study reveals that only 2 percent of university educated voters identify with Peronism. The
US Embassy reports that Peronist reformers are aware of these problems and expect that
defeat in November will finally discredit the party's old guard. Although these moderates
believe they will then be able to take over the movement and rebuild it on firmer foundations,
studies, precluded the emergence of a strong socialist or Marxist current in Argentine politics.
The movement's disarray in recent years, however, has given new impetus to the Argentine
left, which hopes to lure disgruntled Peronists into its ranks. Although polls show that leftists
are beginning to make such gains, they must overcome several obstacles before becoming a
major political force.
Ferment on the Left
Peronism's monopoly of working-class support has, according to several academic
The workers' enduring allegiance to the Peronist labor movement remains an
effective barrier to leftist influence. The trade unions, unlike the party, are well
organized and fairly effective. Until leftists achieve prominence within organized
labor, Peronist unions will, in our view, continue to deliver a large part of the worker
vote to the Peronist party.
-- The left is plagued by factionalism, byzantine ideological disputes, and personal
quarrels. A welter of social democratic, socialist, communist, nationalist-leftist, and
Trotskyite parties are competing against one another in the run up to the November
elections, thus splintering the already small leftist vote.
infiltrated the PI recently and now hold top posts within the party.
Despite these difficulties, one leftist group--the Intransigent Party (PI)--has made
impressive progress during the past two years. The PI has traditionally espoused an
ill-defined mix of nationalism and populism. Originally an off-shoot of the UCR, many
members--including, in our view, party founder Oscar Alende--are middle-class socialists
only dimly aware of the radical implications of their rhetoric. The US Embassy and the press
report, however, that since 1983 the PI has attracted numerous hard-core Marxists who have
helped party radicals defeat moderates in recent internal elections. The PI has moved so far
left that, according to one press report, a delegation of Spanish Communists visited Argentina
last year to study it as an example of "Euro-Communism." Moreover, there is considerable 25X1
evidence that members of the Marxist, terrorist, Revolutionary People's Army (ERP) have
claims that Alende visited Havana in July and received 25X1
$
the 300,000 from Castro, who was reportedly pleased with the radicals' growing stature within 25X1
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Polls give the PI from 10 to 15 percent of the vote in greater Buenos Aires--which
comprises over a third of the nation's electorate--but only minimal support in the interior
provinces. We expect that its nationwide total will far exceed the 2.4 percent polled by Alende
in the 1983 Presidential race. The PI is aided by an active, youthful membership, and its
aggressive campaign to repudiate the foreign debt and reactivate the economy is being
well-received by left-leaning working and middle-class voters alienated by Peronist infighting.
Although the PI will probably control no more than 20 seats in the next legislature, this
presence will enhance the party's legitimacy and give it a platform from which to propagate
The Right in Disarray
Prior to mid-June of this year, the right expected to make significant gains in the
November elections. The chief conservative party, Alvaro Alsogaray's Union of the
Democratic Center (UCD), was attracting a middle-class following by prescribing free-market
economics and rigorous austerity to combat runaway inflation. Alsogaray's apparent
willingness to take drastic economic measures helped compensate for his party's scant
support outside greater Buenos Aires and his own association with numerous military
governments since 1955. The prospect of a strong showing also instilled a spirit of
cooperation among the traditionally fractious right, which saw the contest as a chance to
recover from its 1983 debacle, when conservative parties polled under 5 percent of the vote.
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Alfonsin's economic adjustment program, in our view, effectively dashed these hopes. By
seizing the banner of responsible economic management from the right, the President
deprived the UCD and other conservative parties of their main electoral appeal. Although
Alsogaray and other conservatives have quibbled with many aspects of the program, they
have not offered a substantially different alternative. The UCD's standing in the polls has
dropped in recent months and Argentina's conservatives have reverted to their customary
disunity. Although the right will probably improve on its 1983 tally, we doubt that it will
emerge as a major civilian political force over the next year.
Outlook for Economic and Political Stability.
We expect the UCR to preserve its majority in the lower house of congress and make
substantial gains in the provincial legislatures. This would assure Radical control of the lower
house through 1987 and allow the UCR to eventually improve its position in the senate.
Alfonsin would almost certainly interpret such a result as a vote of confidence for his
economic policies. The President would then be more likely to tackle some of the vexing
economic problems--the large budget deficit, inefficient public-sector companies, an
antiquated industrial plant--that must be resolved if his program is to succeed in the long
run. Although a Radical victory in November would by no means guarantee a vigorous
assault on Argentina's economic ills, a severe electoral setback for the UCR would almost
certainly jeopardize the progress made so far. Such a surprise defeat would boost the
influence on Alfonsin of advisers who want to sacrifice austerity for job creation and pursue
radical approaches to the repayment of Argentina's foreign debt. If implemented, these
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policies would probably reignite inflation, spur foreign creditors to withdraw new loans, and
The impact of the November elections on Argentina's political evolution will be more
complex. We do not believe, for example, that a landslide UCR victory that leaves Peronism in
shambles and converts the PI into the government's chief opposition would enhance overall
political stability. This scenario would strengthen Alfonsin in the short term while precluding
the emergence of a revitalized Peronist party as a moderate democratic alternative to the
UCR. The PI and the increasingly militant labor movement would then probably become
rallying points for opposition to the government, giving ultra-leftist forces considerable
influence should Alfonsin incur serious political or economic difficulties.
A less crushing Peronist defeat would, in our view, be more conducive to long-range
political stability. This would be particularly true if Argentine voters castigate the party's
discredited official candidates and reward the various "reformist" or "independent" Peronist
slates. The moderate and democratic forces within Peronism might then be able to pick up
the pieces of the shattered party, do a thorough housecleaning, and transform it into a
working and middle-class oriented social democratic movement. Such a development would
probably take years and would not immediately threaten the UCR's and Alfonsin's dominance
of Argentine politics. But it could lay the foundation for an alternation of power between two
democratic parties and minimize the influence of three of Argentina's traditional sources of
political instability--the radical left, organized labor, and the military.
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1 - DDI
1 - Executive Director
1 - NIO/LA
1 - NIC/AG
1 - PDB Staff
1 - C/DDI/PES
1 - DDI/CPAS/ISS
1 - D/ALA
2 - ALA/PS
1 - ALA Research Director
4 - CPAS/IMC/CB
1 - Raymond Burghardt, NSC
1 - Jackie Tillman, NSC
1 - Nestor Sanchez, DoD
1 - Robert S. Gelbard, State
1 - Paul Taylor, State
1 - Don Harrington, State
1 - Mike Durkee, State
(9 October 1985)
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