NIGER: CHALLENGES FACING KOUNTCHE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000100370001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 25, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central Intelligence Agency
if
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
25 JULY 1985
NIGER: Challenges Facing Kountche
Summary
Moderate President Senyi Kountche is confronted with an
array of problems that threaten to undermine his 11-year-old
military regime, a development that we believe would favor
Libyan efforts to gain influence over yet another southern
neighbor. In our view, deteriorating economic conditions and
mismanagement of drought relief have drawn public attention to
Kountche's political weaknesses and fostered ethnic tensions
and rivalries in the military. A takeover attempt in 1983 by
one of Kountche's closest advisers highlighted the
vulnerability of his one-man rule, the absence of a designated
successor, and the regime's dependence on the 3,700-min
military, which put down the coup. Although Kountche has taken
some halting steps toward developing political institutions--
with the aim of eventually returning the former French colony
to civilian rule--he has yet to find a workable power-sharing
formula between dee l sus icious military and civilian
leaders.
This memorandum was prepared for Helen Soos, Deputy Director, African
Affairs, National Security Council. It was written by West
Branch, Africa Division, Office of African and Latin American Analysis,
frica Branch, Office of Central Reference. It has been
coor mated with the Directorate of Operations. Questions and comments
are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Africa Division, ALA, on
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Kountche, however, is a proven political survivor and we
judge that in the near term he probably will weather the
pressures on his government. Over the longer term, however, we
believe that the increasingly difficult task of balancing the
need for political and economic reform with the competing
demands of his supporters may compel Kountche to resort to more
repressive measures, which would only serve to discredit his
regime and fuel greater opposition.
Declining Economic Conditions
Despite Kountche's commitment to economic modernization since he came
to power in 1974, Niger remains heavily dependent on uranium mining, which
is suffering from a prolonged slump. Industry sources estimate Niger's
uranium reserves at 80,000 tons, the largest in sub-Saharan Africa.
Prosperity appeared within reach in the late 1970s, when world energy
prices boomed and Niger's uranium exports--some 75 percent of foreign
exchange receipts--peaked at about $460 million in 1980. This newfound
revenue spurred a short-lived burst of economic growth--real GDP increased
8 percent annually from 1978 to 1980--and prompted the government to begin
ambitious development projects. Despite the sharp downturn in the world
uranium market after 1980, which reduced exports by about 50 percent,
Niamey failed to curb expenditures and instead borrowed heavily abroad,
saddling the country with almost $700 million in public debts by the end
of 1983, according to the US Embassy. While export earnings lagged, costs
of imports, particularly petroleum products and food, have soared. The
deteriorating terms of trade have contributed to what the IMF estimates
has been a 20-percent decline in real GDP over the past three years.
Kountche has attempted to slow the downward economic slide by
implementing an austerity program and improving government efficiency,
according to the US Embassy. Niamey turned to the IMF in 1984 for an $18
million one-year standby agreement and secured another $16 million one-
year arrangement for 1985. The government abandoned or cut back on many
development projects, reduced student scholarships, froze government
salaries and hiring, and is working with the World Bank to reform some 54
state enterprises. Niamey has met, and in some instances, exceeded
targets recommended by the IMF, reducing the budget deficit percentage
from 7.3 percent of GDP in 1983 to 5.0 percent in 1984, and halving the
1984 current account deficit to 3.4 percent of GDP. Niger's IMF agreement
opened the door for debt rescheduling, which reduced the public debt
service ratio from 20 percent in 1983 to 16 percent in 1984.
Nevertheless, long-term economic recovery depends heavily on more thorough
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of which we believe are unlikely in the near term.
reform of state enterprises and the revival of world uranium demand--both
Troubles with Drought
Kountche's efforts to foster economic recovery were dealt a serious
blow, however, by the worsening drought over the last two years. The UN
Food and Agricultural Organization estimates that the drought-afflicted
harvest in 1984 yielded less than half of 1983 production, resulting in a
food deficit of some 375,000 tons. Starvation and disease have ravaged
livestock, and the FAO calculates it will take up to four years to
reconstitute the herds. The IMF estimates that export earnings from
livestock, the country's major export after uranium, dropped 30 percent in
1984 and are expected to fall at an accelerated rate as long as the
drought continues. The IMF estimates that as a result of decreased
exports and the need for food imports, the balance of payments deficit
will grow from 1.5 percent of GDP in 1984?-to almost 9 percent this year.
Drought is not the only constraint on food supplies. Nigeria's
closure of its border with Niger in 1983--to combat black marketeering and
gain control over its own deteriorating economy--compounded Niamey's food
supply problems, according to Embassy reporting. Closing the border has
curbed the traditional black market trade in foodstuffs from Nigeria to
Niger, and caused shortages and a sharp price increase. Although the
Nigerian government opened its borders to permit US emergency food to
reach Niger, administrative bungling and security checks have delayed
shipments, as happened with relief supplies bound for Chad via Nigeria.
Despite the relief effort, serious food shortages are occurring in
several northern prefectures, according to the Embassy, and we believe
that the public perception that1Countche's southern-based regime has
mismanaged relief again raises the'specter of political upheaval.
Widespread starvation and a pattern of discrimination in food deliveries
led Kountche himself to overthrow former President Diori's civilian
government in a military coup in 1974. The US Embassy reports, for
example, that informed Nigeriens blame the Army Chief of Staff, a
southerner from Kountche's Djerma tribe who oversees relief, for
neglecting the northern prefectures of Tahoua and Agadez in the food
distribution system.
Deteriorating Government Effectiveness
Niger's inability to deal with its food crisis highlights, we
believe, a ge n&al deterioration in the government's cohesion,
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effectiveness, and goals. A senior government official told US Embassy
officers last month that Kountche has surrounded himself with corrupt
advisers who do not share his goal of developing the country. According
to the official, one such influential adviser is Idrissa Hassane, a member
of Mrs. Kountche's extended family and manager of the president's personal
finances, who also is one of several merchants who control smuggling
operations throughout the country. US Embassy officials believe that
Kountche probably has given tacit approval to H ' activities.
Moreover corruption in
Niger is the worst he has seen in Africa. We believe that if Kountche's
recently announced campaign against corruption touches his closest
advisers, one of them may launch a coup similar to the attempt tried.by a
close friend and counselor of the president in 1983.
The US Embassy also reports that the increasingly isolated Kountche
receives poor counsel from his advisers, which impairs his
decisionmaking. Lines of communication within the government apparently
are breaking down as even the Foreign Min+ster is sometimes a of
presidential decisions. the 17-
man Supreme Military Council no longer functions as a consultative body
The US Embassy reports that the timetable for an eventual return to
civilian rule was pushed back indefinitely last month and a draft
constitution which was to be ratified in a national referendum in January
1986 has been delayed. The Embassy also indicates that although a
civilian National Assembly will eventually be formed, the government does
not envision a role for political parties under civilian rule. Moreover,
informed Nigeriens have expressgd skepticism that military influence will
be effectively limited or that Kountche intends to follow through on the
transition to civilian government, according to the US Embassy.
Potential Strains in the Military
Against this backdrop of persistent economic problems and
deteriorating government effectiveness, Kountche's greatest concern in
maintaining the loyalty of the 3,700-man military, the force most capable
of removing him. The military has required careful handling from Kountche
to balance the sometimes competing demands of the senior officers and
junior officers and enlisted men. We believe the small senior officer
corps--slightly over 100 men--could use Kountche as a scapegoat to deflect
public criticism from the military government if Kountche fails to control
public dissatisfaction with the economic decline. We judge that if the
president pushes a return to civilian rule too quickly or austerity
threatens senior officers' benefits, they could move to replace him with a
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fellow officer who would preserve the status quo.* Moreover, defense
attache reporting indicates that senior officers resent capable and
aggressive junior officers who they fear may threaten the system in which
While we have no evidence of organized coup plotting among the Army's
lower ranks, we believe that austerity-mandated reductions in salaries or
benefits and cutbacks in equipment could trigger a coup attempt. In our
view, junior officers and the enlisted men--who have fewer opportunities
for corruption-to supplement their income--could become convinced that a
radical redistribution of political and economic power is necessary. The
US Embassy reports that junior officers are unhappy-with what they view as
slow promotions while civilians surrounding the president "line their
pockets". According to US Defense Attache reporting, the better-educated
junior officers also are frustrated with senior officers, who rely heavily
on French advisers to do their work and are perceived as lazy and
Aggravated Ethnic Tensions
Kountche also is contending with traditional ethnic tensions among
Niger's tribes. Since independence, northern nomadic tribes--less than 10
percent of. the population--have resisted attempts by successive southern-
dominated governments to control them. The inability of the small
military to police large portions of the northern territories opens these
areas to potential subversion. Although unconfirmed reporting indicates
that some Tuareg tribesmen accept small arms and funds from Libyan leader
Qadhafi, we believe that these fiercely independent peoples probably are
doing so to maintain their nomadic independence rather than out of
political sympathy for Qadhafi or Libyan policies. Nevertheless,
tribal discontent over the north's meager share of power, as well as the
government's inadequate distribution of food, could serve Libyan interests
by providing a rallying point for opposition to Kountche's southern-based
regime. We'believe tensions have i'ncreased following the government's
expulsion earlier this month of over 400 Tuaregs who officials claim were
from Mali and Mauritania and posed a security threat to the regime,
according to Embassy reports.
Kountche's government also could face eventual challenges from
Hausa-Fulani tribesmen in the south who make up about 50 percent of the
population. According to US Embassy reporting, the Hausa-Fulani have long
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dominated Niger's commercial trade, while Kountche's fellow Djermas
monopolize the military and civil service. We believe this traditional
balance could be upset--a Libyan-backed Hausa coup attempt took place in
1975--if the Hausa-Fulani feel that they are bearing a disproportionate
share of economic hardships.
Libyan Meddling, Iranian Presence
Libya appears to be capitalizing on Niger's vulnerabilities by
renewing subversive activities in the predominantly Muslim country.
Nigerien officials blame a Libyan-backed opposition group--People's
Liberation Front of Niger (FPLN)--for an attack on a remote government
outpost in Tchin-Tabaraden last May. The group is rumored to be based in
Libya and headed by the son of former President Diori and Kountche's
former special security adviser who engineered the 1983 coup attempt,
according to US Embassy reporting.
that a Libyan official met last Apri wit members in Benin to
arrange for their travel to Libya for military training. Moreover,
Kountche has privately expressed his fear to US officials that the
thousands of Nigerien workers who cross into Libya each year in search of
seasonal employment are an especially inviting target for Libyan
subversion. In recent years, Qadhafi also has sought to encourage unrest
by broadcasting propaganda urging Nigeriens to rise up against the
government, bribing government officials, and encouraging them to defect
to Tripoli. Niger alleged that Libya was behind a plot by northern
Tuaregs in April 1982 to blow up the major uranium processing plant at
Arlit, 1200 kilometers northeast of the capital.
Libya also has become more active along the Libya-Niger border.
at Toummo along Niger's northern border, an area claimed by Tripoli.
Libyan construction workers also have periodically occupied a well and
small dirt airstrip at Bir al War, six kilometers inside Niger. We
believe that the Toummo airfield will allow Libya greater access to
Niger's northern border area and strengthen its territorial claims against
Niamey. However, the slow pace of construction suggests that the Libyans
have no immediate plans to use the airfield, whose location also is
consistent with Tripoli's previous practice of building airfields near its
border with Tunisia, Algeria, and Chad. When completed, the Toummo
airfield will be capable of accommodating any aircraft in the Libyan
Although Kountche deeply mistrists Libyan intentions, according to
the US Embassy, he still believes that he must placate Qadhafi, as
indicated by his favorable response to Tripoli's proposal earlier this
year that the two countries expand relations. Both the Libyan and
Nigerien embassies currently are sparsely staffed, with two Nigerien
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perhaps less stispicious of Qadhafi s motives and in need of economic
assistance, would be more susceptible to Tripoli's frequent offers of
f .1
diplomats resident in Tripoli and one Libyan administrative officer in
Niamey. Nevertheless, US Defense Attache reporting indicates that
additional construction has begun on the Libyan Embas y, which will be the
largest in Niamey when completed.
In our view, Kountche--or any other Nigerien leader--will continue to
avoid publicly taking anti-Libyan positions. Kountche has repeatedly and
publicly indicated that he believes his weak nation must continue to deal
with its stronger neighbor. Should Kountche be displaced, new leaders,
Sunni Muslim population, according to the Embassy.
established an embassy in Niamey last March consisting of six diplomats
and a charge. In our view, the new Iranian presence probably is linked to
Tehran's efforts to upgrade relations with Islamic countries-in Africa and
to Niamey's attempt to sell uranium. Unconfirmed reporting indicates that
Iran sought to purchase a small amount of Niger's uranium last year under
a barter agreement for Iranian petroleum products. The deal apparently
fell through, however, because Niger already purchases ample fuel supplies
at relatively low prices from Nigeria. Niamey has kept Iranian diplomats
under close surveillance because of suspicions arising from Iranian
efforts to foment religious fundamentalism among the country's moderate
"Q11%olal id in exchange for another Libyan toehold in the region.
Libya is not the only potential troublemaker for Nicer. Iran
Relations with France
Although France traditionally has been Niger's most reliable and
largest source of technical, budgetary, and security assistance, French
acquiescence to Libya's occupation of northern Chad has shaken Ni erien
confidence in Paris as a military all
Substantially deteriorated relations with France would be a severe
blow to Niger. France provided about 25 percent of Niger's total foreign
aid in 1983 as.well as development loans on concessionary terms to finance
Agadez to help protect against possible Libyan encroachment.
Niamey and Paris do not
e ense agreement. US Embassy reporting also: indicates that
France plans to reduce military aid--which totals about $2'to 3 million
annually--and the number of French advisers in Niger as part of an Africa-
wide cutback stemming from French budgetary constraints. Nevertheless,
some 175 French advisers are involved in every aspect of the country's
security. For example, the US Embassy reports that France has helped to
equip a Nigerien armored squadron to be stationed in the northern town of
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I I
of supply.
long-term government projects, according to US Embassy reports. France
also is Niger's largest trading partner--buying 82 percent of Niamey's
exports in 1981, the last year for which reliable data are available.
France purchases the majority of the country's uranium production and has
provided price subsidies in order to maintain a reliable, long-term source
US Relations
Niger's relations with the United States are excellent. In fiscal
year 1984, US security assistance reached about $10.3 million and
development aid totaled some $19.6 million. Washington had budgeted about
$19 million in development aid, $5 million in economic support funds, a $5
million military assistance program, and $175,000 for military training
and education for fiscal year 1985. Niamey purchased several US C-130
transport aircraft and receives spare parts and associated pilot and
maintenance training under the small military aid program. Washington
also provided assistance to the Nigerien Army to equip and train a new
parachute unit located at Maradi in central Niger for the first time in
1983, and a small Defense Attache Office is scheduled to open early next
year. Emergency food aid from the United States is likely to total around
$50 million by the end of 1985 in repsonse to Niger's serious food
finance coal and electricity producing projects.
While US-Nigerien aid relations are strengthening, commercial ties
are limited by Niger's lackluster economic prospects. US investment in
Niger has dwindled in the last several years, in large part because the
drop in uranium prices forced US mining companies to divest their
holdings. The only US company remaining in Niger is Citibank, which
finances short-term loans and guarantees letters of credit. Other US
banks with outstanding loans to the government include the American
Express International Banking Corporation, with a $7.5 million loan to
Outlook
Barring an unlikely upturn in the world uranium market or a quick end
to the drought, Niger's economy almost certainly will continue to weaken
and render the country increasingly dependent on Western donors for
economic and emergency food assistance. In our view, Kountche probably
will find it difficult to distribute shrinking resources among his
competing supporters, particularly in the military on whom he depends for
his own security. Moreover, his reliance on corrupt advisers and the poor
handling of drought relief is likely to inspire ethnic tensions and
diminished public confidence in his leadership. Additional belt-
tightening measures almost certainly would risk triggering serious unrest
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among the financially hard-pressed Nigeriens, particularly in urban
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of desperation, Kountche may make risky foreign policy moves in hopes of
promoting uranium sales or gaining additional economic aid, primarily from
Libya and Iran. Tripoli or Teheran could use such an opening to stir
increased opposition to Kountche by focusing local attention on his
government's inability to deal with Niger's dismal economic prospects. We
do not believe'-despite Niamey's hopes--however, that the Libyans or
Iranians are willing or capable of bailing out Niger i r
providing substantial long-term economic assistance.
In our view, Kountche's mounting problems now make trim more
vulnerable to a coup than any other time during his 11 year rule. Any
successor regime, in our judgment, probably would prove less stable and
more vulnerable to foreign meddling than Kountche's. Although a new
government headed by senior Army officers-probably would retain a moderate
and pro-Western orientation, we believe that the less-experienced leaders
would be prone to the same problems that would have brought Kountche's
downfall. Moreover, the possible emergence of a radical regime dominated
by junior Arad officers could afford Libya the opportunity to gain enough
influence to use the country as a base for subversion against an even more
desirable regional target--northern Nigeria which argest
concentration of Muslims in black Africa.
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Niger and Its Neighbors
North
Atlantic
Ocean
Weste-n
Sahara
Spain -t Boundary representation is
-rte, not necessarily authoritative.
~1 fl<
o o -
Mediterranean Sea
TUn'S'
RIPOLI
Ugba
Bin Nafi
Ghadamis
Morocco
Libya
Mauritania
Ivory
Coast
Lgeria
Ghat
Toummo
(under construction)
Aozou. Ma'tan
as Sarra
Mali`
e Arlit
Niger
Agadez e
* NIAM
e Maradi
Chad
Turkey
Lebano19
. Egypt
Red`
Sea
Sudan
Nigeria
Equatorial
Guinea
Central African
Republic
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SUBJECT: NIGER: Challenges Facing Kountche
Distribution:
Original -- Helen Soos, Deputy Director, African Affairs, National
Security Council
1 -- Phillip Ringdahl, Director, African Affairs, NSC
1 -- Ambassador James K. Bishop, Africa Bureau, Department of State
1 -- Robert Cabelly, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary
of State, Department of State
1 -- Princeton Lyman, Africa Bureau, Department of State
1 -- Frank G. Wisner, Africa Bureau, Department of State
4 -- Anthony Dalsimer, Director, Office of Analysis for Africa, INR,
Department of State
1 -- J. Maurice Ealum, Director, Office of Iranian Affairs,
Department of State
1 -- Harlan Robinson, Office of Analysis for Africa, INR
4 -- Howard K. Walker, Director, West African Affairs, Department of
State
1 -- Steven Brundage, Niger Desk Officer, Department of State
1 -- Steven Singer, Deputy Coordinator of Food for Peace, Agency
for International Development, Department of State
1 -- Ronald H. Hinckley, Director, Special Studies Crisis
Management Center, NSC
1 -- Gary Moser, Budget Examiner, Office of Management and Budget
1 -- Lt. General John T. Chain, Jr., Director, Bureau of Political
Military Affairs, Department of State
1 -- Noel C. Koch, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense,
1 --'Karen Puschel, INR/SEE, Department of State
1 -- Stephen Grummon, INR/NESA/Iran, Department of State
1 -- Steven Sestanovich, National Security Council
1 -- Vincent Cannastraro, National Security Council
1 -- DD I
1 -- ADDI
1 -- DDO/Africa
1 -- NIO for Africa
1 -- NIC Action Group
1 -- PDB Staff
1 -- ILS
1 -- C/DDI/PES
4 -- OCR/AFLAWE/AF
1 -- D/ALA
2 -- ALA/PS
1 -- ALA Research Director
4 -- CPAS/IMD/CB
4 -- ALA/AF
4 -- ALA/AF/W
2 -- ALA/Af/W 25X1
ALA/AF/W
(25 JULY 1985)
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